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Abstract 
Decentralization has been considered a panacea for good governance worldwide and pursued with 
great fervour by international organizations and national government alike. Though experiences 
worldwide reveal that it is not a panacea that it is envisaged to be. Given this dichotomy, this work 
systematically explores the puzzle why decentralization is being projected as a panacea for irrigation 
management by the Indian state and/or international institutions alike, when it has failed to deliver 
envisaged outcome. In this context, greater need to understand the inter-linkages between 
decentralization and participation has been noted in the literature. In contrast to the argument that 
greater participation is good for decentralization of water resource management, this dissertation 
examines the relationship\linkages between participation, decentralization and politics through the 
lens of actors’ ‘ideational realm’ which I argue in light of structural and cultural ideational variables 
influences outcome of decentralization processes. This dissertation posits actors’ ideational realm as 
a compelling parameter to understand processes that influence decentralization of water resources 
or in other words processes that elucidate how institutional change happens. Specifically, focus is on 
role of actors (NGOs, bureaucrats, farmers and farmer organizations) in influencing (or obstructing) 
decentralization of water resource governance structure at the intermediate level in Madhya 
Pradesh, India.  
Ideational realm in this research building on Campbell (2004), Berman (2013), and other scholars, viz. 
Mielke, Schetter and Wilde (2011) is conceptualized as actor’s interpretation of situation, and not the 
situation itself, that determines a way forward for an actor. Actor’s choices are narrowed down when 
they take a certain subjective or objective standpoint for interpreting things. Ideational realms are 
formed by ideas that actors’ subscribe to, and which define their ideational role. Ideational variables 
like norms, beliefs, and values are employed in this research to elucidate how actors’ ideational 
realms are shaped by their motivations as well contexts. Furthermore, ideational approach is useful 
in elaborating how ideas about farmer participation in irrigation management have institutionalized. 
This research demonstrates how the existing idea on irrigation management is deliberatively formed 
as consequence of particular kind of ideational belief(s) that state, and state actors have 
countenanced. This dissertation examines the historical processes that have facilitated adoption and 
consolidation of certain idea of irrigation management in India. This work examines the historical 
choice and the ideological practices of actors that established and reinforced particular definition of 
participation in irrigation management during the colonial period, in the post-colonial developmental 
state, and the liberalized Indian state. This dissertation posits that relationship of actors (bureaucracy 
and political office bearers) with the larger institutional ideological context within which they 
operate is critical to bear in mind to understand institutional changes, as actors embody particular 
  
 
vi 
identities/subjectivities - for instance, engineers as harbingers of growth and progress. Furthermore, 
this dissertation concurs with other policy translation literature that argue that the global turn to 
participatory approaches by international organizations has equally fuelled and supported 
perpetuation of participatory management polices at the national and state level in India. 
Specifically, as a case study this work studies processes that led to introduction of participatory 
irrigation management in Madhya Pradesh in 1999 and argues that decision to form farmer 
organizations was not an outcome of deliberative discussion process. Rather thrust on farmers from 
the top. This work also discusses how top-down regulation can initiate processes for a certain 
institutional change, but with little problem resolution on the ground through the empirical findings 
of two case study farmer organizations. Based on empirical findings this research posits that actors’ 
ideational realm is a compelling parameter to understand and (mould) institutional change i.e. 
intermediate level decentralization. As implementation of decentralization initiatives in Madhya 
Pradesh has reinforced rather than reduce hierarchal boundaries thereby creating a contentious 
arena for policy implementation. 
 
Keywords: Decentralization, Participatory Irrigation Management, Farmer Organizations, Ideational 
Realm, Participation, Corruption, India 
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1 Introduction and Research Design 
“Decentralization is a word that has been used by different people to mean a good 
many different things. But what do we see in practice? Experiments with local 
government that end in chaos and bankruptcy; ‘decentralized’ structures of 
administration that only act as a more effective tool for centralizing power; regional 
and district committees in which government officials make decisions while the local 
representatives sit silent; village councils where local people participate but have no 
resources to allocate” (Mawhood 1983 cited in Agrawal & Ribot, 1999, p. 473). 
“Governments often perform acts of decentralization as theatre pieces to impress or 
appease international donors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or domestic 
constituencies” (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999, p. 474). 
“Decentralization of the planning and decision-making process for water resources 
management, together with enhancement of public participation is essential for 
introducing sustainable solutions” (UNESCO, 2012, p. 684). 
Efficacy of decentralization has been contested (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Mawhood, 1983), though it 
is still propagated by international organizations and implemented by national governments 
(UNESCO, 2012). The above three citations -from three different decades- echo this paradox of 
decentralization as a contested approach for resource management. Following this debate, this 
research undertakes a systematic enquiry into the puzzle that has intrigued water researchers, 
professionals/practitioners, and researchers who keenly study decentralization in India and 
worldwide. That is why decentralization is being projected as a panacea for irrigation management 
by the Indian state and/or international institutions alike, when it has failed to deliver envisaged 
outcome? To understand this paradox the focus of this dissertation is on understanding role of actors 
in obstructing or influencing implementation of decentralization initiatives.  
Given, decentralization is widely researched subject in the Indian context varied aspects of it have 
been studied by scholars (See Harriss, 2010; Johnson, 2001; G. Kumar, 2006; Mahor & Singh, 2012; 
PRIA, 2009; Rao, 1989; inter alia). However, emphasis on intermediate level decentralization has 
been lacking (Mollinga, 2010). To fill this research lacuna I explore why despite numerous attempts 
made by the Indian state and international organizations to decentralize intermediate level of 
irrigation management - the results have been far from satisfactory. I focus on the role of actors’ -
bureaucrats, farmer/farmer organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) - in 
influencing (or obstructing) decentralization of irrigation management at the intermediate level in 
Samrat Ashok Sagar (hereafter SAS) Project in Madhya Pradesh, India. This is in contrast to the work 
done till now, which has largely focussed on institutional roadblocks to decentralization at the micro 
level and don’t take into account diverging rationalities. Building on the existing scholarship on 
decentralization, in this dissertation I elaborate failure of decentralizing the intermediate level i.e. 
Introduction and Research Design 
 
 
 
 
2 
devolving the 3Fs (funds, functions and functionaries) as the cause for decentralization not being 
considered panacea. 
This work studied in-depth the SAS Project which was commissioned by the state government in 
1980s. Since its inception, the project has witnessed several attempts to decentralize irrigation 
management through instituting farmer participation by constituting different types of farmer 
organizations, primarily under the aegis of the state government with occasional facilitation/financial 
support from international organizations like the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), World Bank and the India Canada Environment Facility (ICEF) over a period of 
time. The large temporal dimension (1980s, 1990s and 2000) over which farmer organizations have 
been constituted and variety of levels (intermediate and micro/local) of decentralization in SAS 
Project makes it an ideal case study to examine the impediments to intermediate level 
decentralization. Rather than working with the assumption that greater (farmer) participation is good 
for decentralization of irrigation management, this research examines the relationship and\or 
linkages between decentralization policies and participation in context of local politics through the 
lens of actors’ ‘ideational realm’ following work of Campbell (2004) and Berman (2013).  
Decentralization has followed a top-down process model, which has been critiqued by scholars who 
advocate for greater participation at local level. Section 1.1 reviews decentralization literature and 
illuminates that structural and cultural factors dominate decentralization experience worldwide. This 
review also underpins salience of actor’s role -in light of structural and cultural limitations- as an 
essential element for any framework that aims to understand roadblocks to implementation of 
decentralization. Based on this review in section 1.2, I elaborate the research problematic - lack of 
decentralization at the intermediate level, followed by elaborating the conceptual framework of 
ideational realm that underpins this research. Section 1.3 discusses the research design and Section 
1.4 concludes with structure of this dissertation.  
1.1 Problem: decentralization considered a panacea for poor governance  
The UN World Water Development Report 2006 argues that there is an impending water crisis, but it 
is a crisis of management (UNESCO-WWAP, 2006). Worldwide, the water resource sector is inflicted 
with bad institutions, bad governance, bad incentives, and bad allocation of resources (Mollinga, 
2008, p. 6). Given the problems in allocation and management of resources, in recent years 
tremendous efforts have been made towards developing methods, approaches and thinking to 
improve water resource governance worldwide. Decentralization is one approach, which has been 
pursued with great fervour to improve governance after the failure of state engineered projects (c.f. 
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J. Scott, 1998).i Taking cognisance of the criticism of large scale engineered projects, and 
simultaneous growth of literature propagating ability of people to manage their resources better for 
instance the literature on community based natural resource management (See A. Agarwal & Narain, 
1997a; Bromley & Cernea, 1989; Gadgil & Guha, 1995; Ostrom, 1990; 1992; inter alia) resulted in 
greater impetus for decentralization in the 1980s. Arguably, decentralization if implemented in 
essence has the virtue to deepen democracy, as it not only provides a platform for equitable 
governance but also for greater political participation, and it increases efficiency and equity for 
sustainable management of any resource (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Bardhan, 2002; Bergh, 2004; G. 
Kumar, 2006; UNESCO, 2012).  
Given such strong emphasis on decentralization, it is not surprising that in the global (and Indian) 
water policy narrative, approaches like Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) have been 
debated widely considering they speak about the question of institutional and organizational change 
needed to improve implementation of decentralized resource management. For instance, the notion 
of PIM is based on the ‘ideology of democratization, decentralization and de-bureaucratization’ and 
last but not least, the empowerment of water users and cost recovery (Swain & Das, 2008, p. 29). 
This research focuses on PIM as an exemplar of decentralization in India, as it is a dynamic case to 
evaluate decentralization of irrigation management wherein I demonstrate mere provision of 
irrigation service is not sufficient to evince decentralization. Rather real devolution of power over 
productive resources is required. Decentralization is an important subject for research not only in 
context of irrigation management, but also to understand larger issues of equitable resource 
distribution that pose a grave challenge to all nations. Moreover, an in depth study on current 
decentralization practices merits research, as despite some of the known problems -discussed briefly 
in the following section- decentralization policies have been pursued as a panacea for good 
governance worldwide. 
Foremost, for definitional clarity, the process of decentralization involves both deconcentration i.e. 
local bodies are handed over roles and responsibilities, which are traditionally undertaken by line 
departments, and devolution i.e. local authorities are granted political and financial authority to fulfil 
their responsibilities (Johnson, 2001, p. 522).ii In fact, decentralization can be of varied types, viz. 
fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization and political or democratic decentralization 
(A. Shah & Thompson, 2004).iii The focus of this research is on democratic or political decentralization 
which is defined ‘as meaningful authority devolved to local units of governance that are accessible 
and accountable to the local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty’ (Blair (2000) cited in 
Johnson, 2001, p. 523). By emphasizing ‘meaningful authority’ Johnson (2001) brings attention to the 
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democratic aspect of decentralization which is more than just having democratic institutions i.e. 
elected bodies. Rather focus ought to be on institutions that promote democratic politics i.e. greater 
contestation and deliberation that lead to ‘deepening of democracy’. 
Democratic decentralization can be in any sector, for instance, health, education or natural 
resources. However, focus of this work is on processes that hinder and/or facilitate decentralized 
management of natural resources, specifically, irrigation management at the intermediate level.iv Till 
now mostly decentralization at the micro level has been the focus of scholars (Baumann & 
Farrington, 2003; G. Kumar, 2006; inter alia); although, it is critical to focus on intermediate level as 
well, as decentralization entails devolving powers from top to the bottom. In this context, Falleti 
(2005), Sharma (2005) and Surie (2010) among others emphasize focusing attention on sequential 
theory of decentralization which necessitates devolving the 3Fs i.e. funds, functions and 
functionaries at all levels,v as decentralization in essence entails clear articulation of duties and 
responsibilities (funds), sufficient resources (funds) and staff (functionaries). The 3Fs are crucial for 
any institutional design and must be sequenced to ensure its success (Surie, 2010), as otherwise the 
envisaged outcomes are hard to achieve.vi  
Prior to delving into the necessity of studying PIM at the intermediate level, a brief overview of issues 
that are salient for the analytical framework of ideational realm from experiences worldwide of 
decentralizing the micro level is discussed briefly. As I postulate that actor’s ideational realm -
collectively the realm includes, actor’s worldview moulded over time and guided/informed by their 
structural and cultural reality, knowledge and ideas- determines the success of any decentralization 
project. Furthermore, the socio-cultural, economic and state structures (due to legislations/rulings) 
and development cooperation that has structural elements as well by design are critical 
determinants of actor’s ideational realm. The frame of ideational realm is appropriate for study as it 
has been argued that research must delve beyond stated objectives of a policy to elucidate what the 
constituents are doing through and inside the institution created by any policy (Chhatre, 2008). It is 
not argued here that ideational dimensions are solely responsible for establishing causality. Rather 
conceptual frame of ideational realm facilitates in elucidating how ideas and interests interact.  
In developing countries, decentralization reforms were initiated in the mid-1980s after promising 
evidence from the micro level on success of people’s ability to manage resources themselves by 
crafting rules for management (Ostrom, 1992). Subsequently, this idea was taken up by international 
organizations for project implementation.vii By the late 1980s, almost all countries -developing as 
well as transitional countries- embarked on transfer of political power to local units of government 
(Crook & Manor, 1998, p. 1; Crook & Sverrisson, 2001, p. 1), although for different reasons. The 
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western world decentralized in order to have an alternative for provisioning public services in a more 
cost-effective way (Work, 2002, p. 5). Whilst reasons for decentralization in developing countries are 
numerous, and vary from political pressure to democratize in the Latin American context, in order to 
prevent return to autocracy; as a step towards political and economic transformation in post 
communist countries; to counter economic inefficiencies, macroeconomic instability in countries like 
Russia, Indonesia, Pakistan or to simply enhance participation, for instance in India (A. Shah & 
Thompson, 2004, p. 3; Work, 2002). It is noteworthy that pursuance of decentralization as an 
approach for good governance was due to perpetuation of neoliberal discourse through thin 
multilateralism by handful of powerful liberal states. The neoliberal approach affected sub national 
planning by including decentralization as a measure of governance (Mohan, 2010; Mohan & Stokke, 
2000; Schuurman, 1997). The neoliberal approach treats decentralization and the local as a 
functional, economic space with policies designed to increase the efficiency of service delivery. 
Emphasis on decentralization has also come from communitarians who posit salience of local 
knowledge and participatory development. The communitarians share a common belief to rely less 
on outside agents (state or western development agencies) and more on self/community for 
changing situation for instance (Mohan & Stokke, 2000, pp. 251-252). Overall, the above instances 
illuminate different motivations i.e. political or economic which have stirred the interest of 
policymakers to decentralize and not merely attaining the objective of having the right balance of 
power among different levels –local/intermediate/central of the government (A. Shah & Thompson, 
2004). Moreover, not only are different motivations crucial in decentralization policies, but also the 
role of actors is equally salient to understand the reasons for pursuance of decentralization. As 
indicated earlier, the political pressure to decentralize came from the international organizations, as 
well as from civil society and national governments. For instance, pursuance of economic 
decentralization is more often hand-held by international institutions like the World Bank (Litvack, 
Ahmad, & Bird, 1998). Similarly, the Indian state after pursuing the economic reforms in the early 
1990s, initiated various constitutional reforms and the 73rd and 74th Amendment to the constitution, 
and formally recognized the third tier of government at the sub national level (Behar & Kumar, 
2002).  
Furthermore, several structural and cultural limitations to implement natural resource 
decentralization have been identified by scholars (Crook & Manor, 1998; Ribot, 2004; I. Roy, 2008). 
First, limited devolution of power is a structural constraint that has hindered decentralization at the 
micro level, and without discretionary powers, local government has most often become merely an 
administrative extension of the central/state government (Ribot, 2004, p. 21). Second, entrenched 
patronage patterns from top to the bottom have resulted in weak political will to decentralize 
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despite pressure from the international organizations (Crook & Manor, 1998). These patterns are 
signifier of social structures that curtail decentralization. In this context, to create greater 
accountability and transparency, greater role of civil society organizations like NGOs has been 
advocated by international organizations to check the inherent rent seeking practices of the state 
functionaries as well as the entrenched patronage pattern. However, little attention is paid to the 
type of organization, their motivations and strategies they employ to broker greater accountability 
and transparency. That is to say the apolitical donor-driven governance and role of civil society 
organizations like NGOs in the context ought to be examined (I. Roy, 2008).  
Third, international donors have addressed/ promoted certain policy problems, for instance, 
deferred maintenance with respect to irrigation development in developing countries as a solution to 
decentralized management without taking cognizance of farmer and irrigation agency staff 
perceptions (Suhardiman & Mollinga, 2012). Additionally, experiences of irrigation management 
through the case of Philippines and Mexico (discussed in chapter two in this dissertation) highlights 
role of international donors and state bureaucracy in perpetuating a certain idea of decentralized 
participatory irrigation management with great fervour to better manage irrigation systems.  
Fourth, recognizing the need to build capacities of local communities to take over decentralized 
management of resources, ‘coparticipation system’ has been tried in several countries under the 
ambit of World Bank funding. For instance, using the Columbianviii case, it has been argued that 
coparticipation system – wherein local communities provide labour, material, etc. in a project- 
fosters community involvement in execution, operation and maintenance of project work (Litvack et 
al., 1998, p. 28). The practice of participation that donor agencies and international organizations 
have promoted undermines the political process inherent to democratic decentralization. To wit, 
participatory approach has been pursued technically without engaging with the issue of power and 
politics (Bergh, 2004; Hickey & Mohan, 2004). However, despite criticism of this approach, the 
mechanism of coparticipation or beneficiary contribution has been almost universally adopted by all 
development-funding agencies for natural resource management, for instance, to manage irrigation 
systems, without considering the interest and aspiration of the local communities/beneficiaries. I 
demonstrate the same through empirical findings in this dissertation.  
Problems with pursuance of participatory approach are widely recognized, however, an elaborate 
discussion on how, why, and what mechanisms drive the idea (and understanding) of participation in 
an actor’s worldview is lacking in the context, though actors drive the decentralization process. 
Moreover, scholars of decentralization argue for greater theorizing of intervening variables between 
decentralization and outcomes. Ribot (2004, p. 24) argues that there are gamut of factors (like how 
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devolved powers are used, how decision making is undertaken, who are the influential actors for 
decision making, who participates and who is left out) that mould outcomes and need to be 
understood. Paying attention to these, and other structural constraints have been considered crucial 
to understand lack of decentralization at the micro level (c.f. Banerjee, 2013). Similar observation for 
paying attention to existing cultural, political and institutional arrangements within any country given 
the complexity of decentralization and multiple stakeholders (central and local governments, 
citizens, NGOs and community-based organizations and the private sector) that are involved in the 
process is echoed by Work (2002, p. 15). Without keen attention to these structural and/or cultural 
factors, and motivations of actors (international organizations, national or state governments, local 
communities, NGOs), decentralization cannot be a panacea for good governance. Additionally, 
greater attention to the process of decentralization have been echoed by Shah and Thompson (2004, 
p. 19). Overall, from this brief review, role of actors, different realms that have propagated 
decentralization and salience of processes become salient to understand decentralization and needs 
to be further researched in-depth given that decentralization is still being pursued despite some of 
issues discussed above.  
Main concern of this research: decentralizing the intermediate level  
There are several micro level studies that assess the process of implementation and impact of 
decentralization reforms at the local level (Baviskar, 2004; Manor, 2003; Mehta, 2005).ix Similarly, 
there are several macro level studies that undertake comparative analysis to assess the above-
mentioned problems in the process of decentralization (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Blair, 2000; Byrne & 
Schnyder, 2005; Crook & Sverrisson, 2001; Ribot, 2004; Work, 2002). However, it is only recently that 
researchers of decentralization have turned their focus to sub national actors and their interests 
while analyzing decentralization (Dickovick, 2007; Falleti, 2005; Raghunandan, 2010; Surie, 2010). 
There is now a greater focus on vertical relations between levels of government that elucidate levels 
of decentralization at different points in time, and also effects of earlier reform on later ones (Falleti, 
2005). The focus on vertical relations and sub national actors and their interest for/against reform 
process necessitates delving into: how does actors’ worldview develop as they are built over time 
and are reflective of social cultural reality as well structural factors that influence implementation of 
decentralization.  
Additionally, while researching decentralization preferences of actors for type of decentralization 
and level of decentralization i.e. intermediate versus local level also needs to be borne in mind 
(Falleti, 2005, p. 344).x This research contributes to this scholarship and focuses on intermediate level 
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issues, which is also broadly identified as district/regional/provincial level, as not much attention 
have been given to this level as illustrated further through the following discussion.  
In context of decentralization of natural resource management, PIM has been heralded as a 
stupendous effort to decentralize irrigation management services across the world by international 
institutions and organizations like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), USAID, and Ford 
Foundation. However, another narrative that has gained salience in context of participatory irrigation 
management is that PIM is not working. This creates a puzzle, if PIM is not working why international 
organizations/institutions and different state governments still considering this particular idea for 
improving irrigation management practices?  
Critiques have suggested the need for change in the system of management being pursued: a need 
to try new/alternative models of irrigation management, for instance, Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) models for reducing the bleeding within water agencies/institutions, or the need for further 
experiments to find solutions for the maladies that inflect the irrigation sector worldwide (c.f. 
Mukherji et al., 2009). These discussions suggest a deductive (top-down) approach to pursue any 
problem for which solutions are sought without dwelling enough into the raison d’être for PIM not 
working.  
Moreover, there is prolific literature on problems with implementing reforms in large scale canal 
projects or in other words with PIM. This work does not intend to re-emphasize these findings. 
Although it is noteworthy that most of the literature available is partly propounded by proponents of 
reforms with a sizeable section lacking any rigour (Mollinga, 2003, p. 5; Vermillion, 1997). Although 
few scholars have critically questioned the reform process, for instance, Reddy & Reddy (2005) have 
discussed lack of strong institutional structures post implementation of PIM in Andhra Pradesh as a 
reason for tardy reforms. While the edited volume by Bruns & Meinzen-Dick (2000) emphasize 
delving into the question of water rights to understand the reform process. The edited volume 
elucidates local community’s water rights to multiple uses and also elucidates the plurality of the 
legal systems under which rights are negotiated and resolved. Furthermore, scholars have succinctly 
established that equitable and inclusive allocation of water hinges on explicit rights of the 
marginalized to water. Gendered aspects of water rights have been discussed by Zwarteveen (1997) 
and van Koopen (2000) among others. 
Chhotray (2004) through her work on watershed development has examined the instrumental nature 
with which participation has been practiced by actors and elucidates shortcoming of the 
instrumental approach. Similarly, Blair (2000) has delved into the role of international organizations 
Introduction and Research Design 
 
 
 
 
9 
like USAID in promoting decentralized local governance which in his paper he articulates as 
democratic local governance. Dubash (2002) through his work on groundwater management has 
emphasised paying attention to larger political, economic and physical exogenous shocks that are 
inherently constituted in spatially and historically embedded social relations. He argues that this has 
implications for effective groundwater market reforms. While Saravanan (2010) through the case of 
PIM in the Himalayas has emphasized the need to research how structural, cultural, and rational 
constraints restrict reform process. Building on work of these scholars this dissertation delves into 
understanding of bottlenecks -i.e. structural and/or cultural constraints- that restricts reform 
process, which not many studies elucidate.  
Furthermore, experience on participatory irrigation management, till now, elucidates reluctance of 
irrigation bureaucracy to share responsibilities. Mollinga’s (2003) work on large-scale irrigation 
management projects elucidates that irrigation departments processes have been disconnected from 
interest of other actors. The current narrative on policy making in India indicates its highly 
prescriptive nature, with a tendency to elaborate on how farmer participation is solicited. In this 
context, Mollinga (2010) makes a case for deeper analysis of actual dynamics of the policy processes, 
given the polarization on the issue: i) what ought to be the process for water resource policy 
development; and ii) process of interaction between civil society and the state (Ballabh, 2008, p. 14). 
Similarly, scholars have posited that farmers are not inclined to take over the new responsibility that 
has been envisioned and entrusted to them i.e. operation and maintenance of canals (Parthasarathy, 
2008, p. 124). However, adequate explanation of why farmers behave in a certain way is not given. 
For instance, Parthasarathy argues in context of hike in water price that if farmers perceive 
alternative to surface water is cheaper, then they resent price hike of canal water and are not 
interested in operation and maintenance activity (ibid.). However, contrary to this, empirical 
evidence from this work suggests that farmers are willing to pay higher water rate if the service is 
reliable.xi This work emphasises that, it is the political office bearers and bureaucracy in case of 
Madhya Pradesh who have changed narrative on collection of irrigation fee. Given this finding, it is 
evident that it’s not only actor’s rational interest which explicates poor implementation of 
decentralization. This work looks at interaction between material and non-material interest in actor’s 
ideational realm, and thus overcomes the limitations of work which only posit rationalization of 
actors as a raison d’être to explicate poor decentralization in the irrigation sector (See Pandey, 2006; 
Parthasarathy, 2008; Raju & Gulati, 2008; Wade, 1982 inter alia). This scholarship omits paying 
attention to non-economic structures, particularly at political and cultural level that also populate 
actors ideational realm and is thus important variables to explicate poor implementation of 
decentralization.  
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Furthermore, in the Indian context, the idea of handing over maintenance of irrigation systems to 
farmers also brings forth another predominant (though subtle) idea that government is no longer 
responsible for taking care of farmers and irrigation structures (Naik and Karlo, 1998 cited in Nikku, 
2006, p. 24). The ‘usual attitude of technocrats is to smell antagonism in people. PIM programs have 
been directed against this attitude and have, indeed, been somewhat successful in clearing the 
atmosphere of suspicion on both sides’ (Sengupta, 2006, p. 122). Sengupta also argues that if farmers 
are involved in planning stage then the reluctance to change -an institutional problem- that mars the 
Indian bureaucracy will be resolved. Sengupta’s focus here is on institutions and does not pay 
attention to actor’s realm or worldview.  
Similar point is made by Narain who posits that no serious attempt has been made to involve users 
(i.e. farmers) while discussing and designing the policy process or in advocacy (Narain, 2009, p. 126). 
Narain comes to this conclusion by arguing that technical choices and interface with local 
government structures are determinant of the effectiveness of PIM (Narain, 2003). However, it is not 
only farmers who have not been involved in this discussion process, but also junior (irrigation) 
bureaucracy and functionaries of the irrigation department who implement policy on ground and are 
the recipients of new policy idea. This work, illustrates how actors (for instance junior bureaucracy) 
works at interface of various ideational realms and this is a crucial aspect to understand irrigation 
policy - an aspect that has not been emphasised thus far.   
From this brief discussion of some of the prominent work on PIM in India, it becomes evident that 
the focus of most of the work has been on micro level issues. Additionally, all the above studies point 
towards how institutional and political economy aspects affect policy-making and political outcomes. 
Many a times poor outcomes are appropriated to unintended consequences of institution building by 
focusing on ambiguity in environmental conditions only at the outset (Parsons, 2007, p. 98). Long 
(1992), however, notes that policymaking is not a linear process that influences practices. Rather 
greater attention to context and actors in which new policy ideas are implemented is necessary i.e. 
actor’s ideational realm or mansikta (as the farmers/bureaucracy in the region connoted it), which I 
postulate is a signifier of success of a decentralization project.xii Additionally, literature on policy 
processes and politics of policy also discusses strategic action of actors in influencing practices (See 
Mollinga, 2007; Mollinga et al., 2010).  
Given the salience of above literature it is imperative to focus on ‘how’ one understands strategic 
practices of actors in irrigation. This requires paying greater attention to interests (material as well as 
non-material) of the actor and/or organizations advocating an idea, keenness of actors who need to 
implement the idea or perception of actors who ought to imbibe the idea are some key variables to 
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be pondered over as this impacts how policy ideas are implemented. However, it is evident from the 
literature review that ideational aspects have been neglected till now while discussing the irrigation 
reforms process and emphasis is mostly on the rationalization of material interests, and institutional 
and political economy undercurrents as a reason for lack of decentralization. The salience of this line 
of enquiry is noteworthy; however it is not only material structures which guide actor’s worldview. 
Rather as discussed earlier political and social structures also need to be taken into account.  
In this research, I conceptualize decentralization as process driven, i.e. as a discursive political 
processxiii that gains shapes due to efforts of different actors and their motivations, interests, ideas 
and power dynamics that are at play. This is contrary to previous studies that have viewed 
decentralization solely as technical endeavour. Furthermore, from the review it is evident that 
decentralization till now has been pursued by the states without paying adequate attention to actors 
-local communities/constituents, state/provincial/junior bureaucracy, NGOs or private organizations- 
who are the carriers, implementers or recipients of the idea of decentralization and hold the onus to 
decentralize. Addressing and analysing this constraint is also a focus of this work.  
Specifically, this dissertation discusses the role of actors in influencing (or obstructing) 
decentralization of water resource management at the intermediate level through the case of PIM in 
Madhya Pradesh, India. I use the lens of ideational realm which is conceptualized as actors’ 
interpretation of situation based on their material/structural/cultural bearing, and not the situation 
itself, that determines a way forward for an actor and undergirds how decentralization unfolds at the 
intermediate level.xiv  
Objectives of this research  
The primary research question that I examine is the role of actors’ (farmers, farmer organizations’, 
NGO, and senior and junior bureaucracy) in influencing (or obstructing) decentralization at the 
intermediate level in SAS Project in Madhya Pradesh, India. Given that SAS is a major irrigation 
project spanning across two district boundaries of Vidisha and Raisen, the intermediate level in this 
research refers to distributory committees and project committee that were formed under the SAS 
Project post 2000 -after enactment of the PIM Act in 1999 in Madhya Pradesh, to hand over 
operation and management of irrigation network to farmer organizations. Three forms of farmer 
organizations were formed in the SAS Project post 2000, viz. distributory committees and project 
committee at the intermediate level, and Water User Associations (WUAs) at the micro level. 
Three-fold research objectives to address the research question are: 
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 To identify the role of actors viz. bureaucracy, international organizations, NGOs and experts, in 
instituting a certain idea for decentralizing irrigation management in the national and state policy 
narrative, and the diffusion of this idea in the SAS Project area. 
 To examine the understanding of participation among select actors, viz. farmers, farmer 
organizations’, senior and junior bureaucracy on participatory irrigation management at the state 
level and in two select WUAs –Betwa and Saraswati- in SAS Project, to elucidate roadblocks to 
intermediate level decentralization.  
 To assess structural (political and socio-cultural structures) factors that shape ideational realm of 
actors, and thereby influence implementation of intermediate level decentralization (for 
irrigation management).  
1.2 Relevance of conceptual frame of ideational realm that undergirds this 
research 
The research objectives, discussed in the previous section, not only clarify the focus of this research 
but also shed light on the conceptual frame of ideational realm that is used to analyze the research 
problematic. Drawing from Campbell (2004), Berman (2013) and others (Mielke et al., 2011) 
ideational realm in this research is conceptualized as actor’s interpretation of a situation -which 
could be influenced by beliefs, norms, culture, ideology, structure (political, economic or cultural)-, 
which determines/influences actor’s choices/decisions. Furthermore, this realm is not only 
influenced by ideational variables like beliefs, norms, culture and ideology but is also influenced by 
ideational roles of actors which is circumscribed (to an extent) by actors affiliations and statutory 
rules that guide functioning of an organization. To elaborate, context structure actor’s perception. 
Context here could be institutional context, belongingness for instance to an organization, 
community, ideology or financial and market incentives that influence people’s ideas and identities. 
Furthermore, it is premised that actors perceive and reflect on their context strategically, and this 
shapes their actions. Campbell (2004) argues that, loosely, there are four different types of ideas that 
actors can function under viz. programs, frames, paradigms and public sentiments, and these ideas 
have cognitive or normative outcomes which can influence/constrain actors’ functioning. However, 
based on empirical research, this works posits that it is not organizational affiliations alone that 
determine an actor’s ideational realm. Rather focus ought to be on ideational variables that populate 
and guide an actor’s ideational realm.xv As structural and cultural ideation factors are at play when 
actors and institutions interact, and are determinant of how, when and why actors act in a certain 
manner. For instance, farmers perceive their position: in WUA, on the canal, in the villages, as a 
reflection of their embeddedness in socio-cultural reality. Similarly, bureaucracy also perceives their 
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position based on state’s structural mandate, and rulings, and existing institutional hierarchy.xvi 
Detailed elaboration of the conceptual framework is done in chapter three. 
Ideational literature also facilitates in elucidating causal relationship between ideational elements 
and action. Berman (2013) in her recent work has argued that ideational scholarship ought to pay 
attention to structural forces as well as case specific factors and agency to elucidate change. Building 
on this proposition, this research demonstrates that in order to understand decentralization, one 
need to delve into the processes and mechanisms that facilitate formulation and further 
reproduction of a certain ideational realm of actors. Additionally, ideational realm as a conceptual 
framework facilitates in examining whether the policy choices made in reference to irrigation 
management may even be constituted as decentralization.  
A comprehensive literature review reveals that several frameworks have been developed to 
study\explore\assess decentralization process. For instance, Leach (2004) has developed a 
framework to assess devolution in terms of inclusiveness, representativeness, procedural fairness, 
lawfulness, deliberativeness, and empowerment, to study democratic merit of devolved policy 
making processes. Similarly, Manor (1999) argues, that to study decentralization of any resource 
focus ought to be on political, fiscal and administrative decentralization. Leach and Manor, however, 
follow an instrumental approach, which does not pay attention to underlying processes. Crook and 
Sverrisson (2001), on the other hand, undertake a comparative analysis of cases across Asia, Africa 
and Latin America to evaluate the performance of decentralization interventions vis-à-vis poverty 
reduction. They posit salience of regime type, political parties and commitment of state to prevent 
the capture of power by the elite at the local level. They, however, fail to pay attention to role of 
bureaucracy and its’ constituents in decentralization. Their work is more in line with decentralization 
as statecraft. In another attempt, Agrawal and Ribot (1999) have developed an accountability 
framework, informed by actors’ relations with accountability and power, to study decentralization of 
forest resources. Their work is interesting and focuses on institutional underpinnings of 
decentralization and how accountability is instituted. The above authors delve into the issue of 
power, and actors’ role in instituting decentralization from an institutional perspective. They argue 
that only division of power, constituting rule making and enforcement, can lead to effective 
decentralization. However, their formulation does not take into account actor’s worldview, which 
results in actors taking strategic action and is a determinant of whether rules, if at all, will be 
enforced by an actor. This particular facet is demonstrated through this work.  
In summary, all these frameworks and/or approach to assess decentralization differ in their 
outcomes due to the disciplinary background of the scholar(s), and case site being studied. 
Moreover, although all these frameworks pay attention to institutional change (decentralization), 
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however, they do not to pay adequate attention to role of actors, who are essential to implement 
change as carriers/receivers/implementers of an idea. This research tries to plug this gap by 
focussing on this critical and often neglected aspect.  
1.3 Research design  
The state of Madhya Pradeshxvii in central India was chosen to conduct an in depth case study.  
Madhya Pradesh is an ideal site since contestations over water resources have long marred its 
history. In fact, contestation over a series of dams on the river Narmada and its tributaries are well 
known. Further, efforts towards decentralized governance have long been a focus in the state. 
Madhya Pradesh was one of the first few states in India to enact legislations and introduce PIM 
(Swain & Das, 2008, p. 33); thus making it a critical case to study on PIM as an exemplar of 
decentralization.  
Case study is an ‘intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of 
(similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon—e.g., a nation-state, revolution, 
political party, election, or person—observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period 
of time’ (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). Characteristics that are attributed to good case study selection are 
plentitude, boundedness, comparability, independence, representativeness, variation, analytic 
utility, replicability, mechanism and causal comparison (Gerring, 2001b, p. 163). However, it is not 
possible for one research design to incorporate all these factors; there is always a trade off, which is 
contingent on what criterion a researcher decides to give salience to in order to achieve the best 
possible fit, in light of the research question being answered. For instance, most likely case study 
type evinces comparability and representativeness based on the findings from a particular case. As 
the name itself suggests, most likely cases are instances of the most prevalent and typical events for 
understanding a phenomenon (Gerring, 2001a, pp. 218-219).  
The case study selected for this research is a major irrigation project -SAS Project- which spreads 
across two districts of Madhya Pradesh viz. Vidisha and Raisen and lies in the Chambal Betwa river 
basin. The location of the case study site in Madhya Pradesh is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1. 1: Location of case study site 
 
Source: adapted from www.mapsofindia.com accessed September 13, 2013 
This project was selected as a case study site as senior bureaucracy from Water Resources 
Department (WRD) and experts in Bhopal perceive it as successful and typical major irrigation 
project. This project has also received considerable funding to institute participation of farmers for 
irrigation management. Given, that the research problematic is to understand the success of 
decentralization at the intermediate level, I considered it appropriate to select a case that is 
considered successful and typical by the bureaucracy. Moreover, SAS is the only major irrigation 
project in the state where NGOs were involved as part of the India Canada Environment facility 
(ICEF), and hence is a critical case to study decentralization at the intermediate level as well, as this 
research evinces the role of different actors in the implementation of participatory irrigation 
management. The SAS Project provides a wide and dynamic field for analysis, as there are plentitude 
of actors (senior and junior bureaucracy, farmers, farmer organizations, NGO/consultancy and 
political office bearers) who have been involved in this project for instituting decentralization. 
Furthermore, SAS Project can be categorized as most likely or typical case -to use Gerring’s (2001a, 
2004) typology- to study (effective) decentralization. Since the project was perceived and categorized 
by the bureaucracy as a successful project, to elaborate, a senior official from WRD, Bhopal posited 
SAS Project as a very active project where there is good coordination between WUA and engineers of 
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the department (Interview, June 7, 2011). Given, an important criterion to bear in mind for case 
selection is the degree of representativeness and variation it provides (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 
296). SAS Project was found apt in this regard, as it is representative of large-scale irrigation projects 
in Madhya Pradesh and also provides variation in analysis as is the only major irrigation project, 
which received funding under ICEF, and had a plenitude of actors involved to facilitate 
decentralization. Thus, the selection of the case study state and site is purposive in this research. 
Furthermore, to elucidate variation within case study, two farmer organizations, one upstream 
(Saraswati) and the other downstream (Betwa) on the same canal was selected for data collection 
and analysis. It is noteworthy that for ethical reasons, the names of all individuals, farmer 
organizations, villages, NGO mentioned in the primary research data have been changed in 
agreement with the researched community.  
A general feature of case study analysis is to rely on within case variation to parse larger causal 
interpretations (Gerring, 2001b, p. 215). Bearing this aspect in mind, and to evince causality a non-
experimental cross sectional research designxviii is set up for this dissertation, wherein observations 
and variations from single case study are used to understand effectiveness of decentralization. 
However, given the weakness of single case analysis in proving causality and validity, this research 
overcomes this weakness by undertaking an analysis of political process of policy making with 
respect to decentralization at the national and state level, to establish causality beyond a single case 
study. This also facilitates in attributing wider applicability of findings of this research. To 
substantiate, this research analyzes aspects of decentralization not only hierarchically (national, 
state, and project/WUA level), but also diachronically. To elaborate, historical analysis from pre-
colonial era to present time is undertaken in chapter four to elucidate origin of ideational realm in 
irrigation management. This discussion illuminates how the idea of participation, role of engineers, 
and viewpoint on farmers has been institutionalized or changed in state ideology. Furthermore, 
historical analysis is also significant to understand ideational realm and process of irrigation 
management that was institutionalized in SAS Project after project commissioning in 1978. Historical 
analysis is particularly significant for the research design of this dissertation, as findings are grounded 
in interpreting processes, mechanisms and discursive realities that build over time. Thus, I argue that 
history matters to understand roadblocks to decentralization. Furthermore, historical analysis also 
demonstrates that ideational realms are not ahistorical. Table 1.1xix outlines the research design of 
this dissertation further.  
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Table 1. 1: Research design 
Factors 
Case study (two 
farmer organizations 
in SAS Project) 
State level analysis* National level analysis
#
 
Evidence Within case variation 
An analysis of the political 
process of policy making and 
how this influenced actors’ 
perception and ideational 
realm on policy making 
An analysis of the politics of 
policy making and institutional 
boundaries that influenced actors 
perceptions and ideational realm 
Unit of analysis 
Intermediate level 
farmer organization 
Debate to institute farmer 
participation and constitute 
farmer organizations 
Debate to constitute farmer 
organizations 
Temporal scope 
Synchronic and 
Diachronic 
Synchronic & Diachronic Synchronic & Diachronic 
Population Farmer organizations - - 
Sample Two - - 
Case 
Decentralization in 
SAS Project 
Efforts made to decentralize 
in Madhya Pradesh and 
salience of actors in instituting 
the same 
Ideas to initiate decentralization  
Observation 
Perception of actors 
that elucidate 
(in)effective 
decentralization 
Perception of actors that 
elucidate constitution of 
policy on farmer participation 
in irrigation management 
Discussion on how the idea of 
farmer participation in irrigation 
management gained salience at 
the national level 
* State level analysis is undertaken using review and key informant interviews  
#
 National level analysis is undertaken using secondary data sources. 
 
Table 1.1 illustrates that in this dissertation two types of evidence are analyzed. First, the findings of 
the case study site illustrate within case variation. Second, the state and national level findings 
collected through primary and secondary data substantiate the case study findings and provide 
evidence that facilitates greater representativeness of case study findings. Furthermore, as has 
already been discussed, the unit of analysis for this research is the intermediate level farmer 
organizations (distributory and project committee) and this research undertakes synchronic and 
diachronic analysis to study decentralization in irrigation management. To elaborate, the status, 
functioning and discussion of farmer organizations for the SAS Project is done for specific time 
periods (pre PIM phase i.e. between 1978 and 1999 and post PIM phase i.e. from 2000- March 2012), 
as well as over a period of time. Similar historical analysis is undertaken at the state and national 
level to elucidate the trajectory of instituting participation of farmers in irrigation management in the 
policy narrative.  
Given the research design, an ethnographic qualitative methodological approach is used for this 
research. This research critically examines actors’ ideational perspective to elucidate their role in 
influencing or obstructing irrigation reform process, i.e. implementation of participatory irrigation 
management in two select WUAs in SAS Project, Madhya Pradesh, India. Further, this research 
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conceives of actors as ‘social actors’ and not as some disembodied social categories based on class or 
caste for instance, or passive recipients of intervention but rather active participants who process 
information and strategize their dealings (Long, 1992, p. 21). Thus, actors in this research are 
strategic, who perceive their standing for instance within the caste and class categorization or within 
organizational hierarchy and thus exercise their agency i.e. perceive their power/capabilities to 
exercise and/or influence outcomes.  
Methods employed for data collection include key informant interviews, focus group discussions, 
observations and secondary sources. Key informant interviews were conducted with subject experts, 
senior bureaucrats and/or engineers, junior bureaucrats/engineers, lower functionaries of the WRD, 
representatives of Non-Government Organizations, WUA members, former Member of Legislative 
Assembly, faculty of Water and Land Management Institute, Bhopal, Indian Institute of Forest 
Management, Bhopal, Academy of Administration, Bhopal and International Water Management 
Institute, Anand. In addition, semi-structured interviews with farmers and self-help group members 
present in the two select WUAs was undertaken. In total, 117 interviews were conducted between 
May 2011 and April 2012. Interviewees of this research are from diverse backgrounds and provide 
eclectic information, which is essential to understanding diverse ideational realms/mansikta of 
actors.  
Data collected through above-mentioned methods facilitated in understanding how actors’ everyday 
decisions are influenced by the wider structure and cultural context. Additionally, observations 
facilitated in understanding the nature of relationship between different actors i.e. how actors’ 
(farmers and WUA members) interact (and/or negotiate) with bureaucracy in WUA meetings. 
Furthermore, interviews and observations also facilitated in understanding not only the relationship 
between different actors’ but also power relations that determine these relationships, as actors are 
positioned at different levels of authority, and have different interests and incentives for performing 
an action. The data collected through the above-mentioned methods also facilitates in understanding 
what factors influence decision-making - caste, party politics, interest group politics and how actors’ 
strategize to work between different nodes of power relations. In addition, key informant interviews 
(with experts) provided critical sources of information about the political processes. To avoid 
disrupting the flow of discussion, elaboration on method of data collection and analysis is provided in 
Appendix I.  
In this dissertation, I have approached date collection and interpretation objectively. To elaborate, 
while undertaking data analysis, several categorical inequalities based on class, caste, gender 
hierarchies became evident. Respondents identified binaries to elucidate categorical inequalities for 
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instance, big or small farmer; bade sahab (senior bureaucracy) or choote sahab (junior bureaucracy) 
and I have thus interpreted data along these categorizations. However, even in these categorizations, 
I have engaged with data relationally, for instance, within the landownership pattern (which is a 
structural pattern contingent on class) of big or small farmers, the caste issue (cultural structure) 
came up. Hence, taking cognizance of this I have analysed data from the standpoint of - as explained 
and perceived by respondents, however, in order to ensure scientific scrutiny I have also critically 
reflected how these worldview and imagery were constructed and that is when the interdependence 
of various structures -material, political and cultural- become salient for my conceptual framework 
i.e. ‘how and why, me and my respondents understand an aspect in a certain way’. Moreover, these 
categorizations also facilitated in discerning inherent contradictions that emerged while interpreting 
data, for instance, overlapping of ideational realms between different categorizations.  
Additionally, process tracing is used to elucidate causal processes and complex decision-making 
(Tansey, 2007). Near-synonyms of process tracing are process analysis, discerning, pattern-matching, 
micro foundations, causal narrative, intermediate processes, etc. Methodological concerns of all 
these different methods in the research design is to elucidate transparency and causal pathways 
(Gerring, 2005, p. 189). Process tracing in this research has been used to demonstrate how and when 
which ideas (of actors) affect outcomes (decentralization) in chapter four and five. For this archival 
and bibliographical material has been relied upon to determine causality between actors’ (ideational) 
realms and policy decisions taken to implement decentralization. In chapter five, these findings are 
also substantiated with interviews undertaken with bureaucracy and experts in the state capital 
Bhopal. 
1.4 Structure of this dissertation 
Findings of this research are relevant not only to understand why irrigation reform process is not 
working in the case study site but can be extended out to understand decentralization processes in 
general. This is a critical subject to research, as worldwide so much impetus and resources are 
focused on getting the process right to improve governance and sustainable management of 
resources. This dissertation elucidates the salience of broader socio-political relations, which 
determine and define actors’ ideational realm and thus contends that ideational realm is a crucial 
variable to understand decentralization processes. Chapter two sets stage for the following eight 
chapters of this dissertation. Chapter two argues that discussion on evolution of irrigation 
management in the late 1980s and 1990s in India is incomplete, if done in isolation, and without 
taking into cognizance the events and role of actors at the international level.  
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Chapter three outlines and clarifies key terms and the analytical framework employed to understand 
roadblock to decentralizing irrigation management. Ideational literature does not have enough cases 
that elucidate processes through which ideas become institutionalized and affect political outcomes 
over time. More so, empirical cases that carefully investigate ways in which ideas shape or form both 
actors’ motivations and contexts (Berman, 2013, p. 217), and that is where this research contributes 
conceptually to the discussion by illustrating a case where ideas that gained salience earlier in time 
have slowed down the learning process for new idea (of participatory management) to stick through 
as the earlier idea of irrigation management has institutionalized actors motivations and contexts in a 
certain way. Additionally, given the criticism of ideational research that ‘motivations and causality 
continue to be somewhat unclear and confused’ (ibid); through the case of participatory irrigation 
management in this dissertation motivations and causality is clarified using the conceptual frame of 
ideational realm.  
Chapter four drawing on chapter two and three elucidates the salience of history, structure, 
organization and people for understanding decentralization in irrigation management at the national 
level. This chapter argues that the trajectory of irrigation reforms in India with respect to imbibing 
the idea of greater role of farmers in participation and management of irrigation point towards the 
need to inquire some key aspects viz. understanding origins of idea of participation in irrigation 
management in India in the policy narrative, identifying the proponents and carrier of this idea, and 
exploring conditions that led to acceptance of this idea during a particular period in policy paradigm.  
Chapter five elucidates how ideational paradigm for decentralization or in other words participation 
of farmers in irrigation management was shaped in Madhya Pradesh through the conception of first-
generation (late 1980s to 1999) and second-generation (2000 onwards) farmer organizations. This 
chapter also elaborates the role of various actors that have influenced the ideational paradigm 
and/or held power within their domain to restrict/facilitate decentralization.  
Chapter six introduces the case study site and elaborates the socio-cultural and political context of 
the SAS Project in which local actors i.e. farmers, farmer organization and junior bureaucracy are 
embedded in and which shapes their ideational landscape or mind-set (mansikta). Chapter seven 
unpacks the worldview of actors that are shaped to an extent by their ideational role i.e. farmers, 
farmer organizations, and bureaucracy) in SAS Project from 1978-2000 when first-generation farmer 
organizations were constituted in the state. The chapter demonstrates how the network of irrigation 
system that was set up by the state in 1970s changed the agricultural and social landscape of the SAS 
Project area by 1990s. Chapter seven also discusses the process of constitution of first-generation 
farmer organizations (Sinchai Panchayats and Krishak Samiti) in the villages and salience of ideational 
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variables to understand functioning of first-generation farmer organizations. The chapter provides 
evidence that these first-generation farmer organizations were unsuccessful as: limited role and 
functions were provided to them legislatively; there was little or no effort made by the irrigation 
bureaucracy to create awareness about these farmer organizations within the community; the 
leaders of these farmer organizations did not share information and/or knowledge about functioning 
of farmer organization with local community or other members of the committee; the attitude and 
perception of bureaucracy was a roadblock for having a good working relationship and/or sharing of 
information between irrigation bureaucracy and first generational farmer organization leaders. 
Furthermore, chapter seven elucidates perceptions of farmers with respect to norms for availing 
irrigation water, and their perception about bureaucracy and functioning of farmer organizations. 
The chapter also discusses how these norms and beliefs were influenced by the socio-cultural 
context, and until end of 1990s, all efforts to decentralize irrigation management were targeted at 
the micro level. There was no effort made to decentralize the intermediate level of irrigation 
management in the state.  
Chapter eight elaborates on the ideational realm/worldview of actors’ post 2000 in the project area 
when second-generation farmer organizations (WUAs) were constituted in Madhya Pradesh and in 
the project area at the micro and intermediate level. The focus is on explicating reasons that the 
state government has used for not decentralizing the intermediate level i.e. poor functioning of 
micro level farmer organizations -WUAs- have been used as a signifier to not decentralize the 
intermediate level. Although, field findings elucidate that the reality is not that simple. This chapter 
demonstrates that some of the responsibilities that were devolved to WUAs were gradually 
withdrawn through strategic practices of junior bureaucracy at project level, for instance, cases of 
maintaining paperwork, or releasing the salaries of watchmen and timekeeper. In the two case study 
WUAs’ junior bureaucracy have on one hand maintained the sanctity of basic structural mandate; on 
the other hand they have exercised their agency for their self-interest to ensure their access to 
commission, that they enjoyed prior to constitution of WUAs are not curtailed. The chapter also 
identifies structural and cultural ideational factors that are salient to understand poor functioning of 
micro level farmer organizations i.e. WUA.  
As a continuation of discussion in chapter eight, chapter nine elucidates how diverse worldview of 
actors have resulted in poor functioning of micro level farmer organization at the micro level. This 
chapter also illustrates that farmers are not a homogenous entity although the paradigmatic and 
programmatic ideation realm i.e. of decision makers or theorists failed to acknowledge this aspect 
while propagating the idea of decentralizing irrigation management. Furthermore, this chapter 
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illustrates that mansikta of farmers and bureaucracy has been a roadblock for decentralizing the 
intermediate level. This dissertation concludes (chapter ten) with discussion on how the concept of 
ideational realm (as demonstrated through this research) is useful to understand roadblocks to 
intermediate level decentralization and indicates future areas that merit research. The focus is also 
on discussing the relevance of conceptual frame of ideational realm for theory and as a method of 
enquiry.  
Overall, this dissertation underscores strategic practices of actors that exemplify the complex 
relationship that exist between bureaucracy and farmer/farmer organization with respect to 
decentralization of irrigation management in Madhya Pradesh. This dissertation elucidates how 
formal political structures of decentralization and participation have influenced/ and is influenced by 
cultural structures and practices of irrigation management in a dynamic social political setting of SAS 
Project. 
 
                                                          
i
 Scott argues that a combination of four elements: i) administrative ordering of nature and society, ii) high 
modernist ideology, iii) authoritarian state, and iv) a prostrate civil society have resulted in ‘most tragic 
episodes of state initiated social engineering projects’ (J. Scott, 1998, pp. 4-5). 
ii
 Decentralization process could be top-down and can be undertaken as part of governments mandate to 
downsize the central government, improve service delivery, etc. Although it may not necessarily provide the 
local community/authority right to decision making (Johnson, 2001, p. 523). 
iii
 Fiscal decentralization refers to devolution of fiscal powers from national to sub national or local level. Whilst 
deconcentration or administrative decentralization refers to giving the local officials powers to recruit or 
dismiss local staff and thereby making local officials accountable to elected officials (Davoodi & Zou, 1998; A. 
Shah & Thompson, 2004). 
iv
 Hereafter in the text, I use decentralization and democratic decentralization interchangeably.  
v
 An alternative argument is proposed by Dickovick (2007) who posits that central government at times take 
tactical decision to strengthen one type of sub national government i.e. local governments in order to weaken 
intermediate level governments. 
vi
 Chapter seven, eight and nine of this dissertation demonstrate that sequential theory to decentralize the 
intermediate level can only work if there is willingness of actors to take forward the reform process. 
vii
 For detailed explanation see chapter two. 
viii
 Chapter two further elucidates the Columbian case with respect to decentralizing irrigation management. 
ix
 Critiques of natural resources decentralization reforms argue that it may not be the panacea for natural 
resource management (or any public good) that it is envisaged to be, as if profitable the collective decision 
makers are likely to exploit natural resources rather than conserve (Ribot, 2004, pp. 14, 23). 
x
 Falleti (2005) in her well-known article propagates sequential theory of decentralization which has three key 
characteristics, viz. looking at decentralization as a process, second, taking into consideration territorial 
consideration of actors and third, incorporating policy feedback effects. 
xi
 At present Madhya Pradesh has one of the highest water rates for irrigation in the country (see chapter five). 
xii
 Other scholars that have worked with actor’s/agents perspective are Mollinga, Bhat & Saravanan (2010), 
Laube (2007), inter alia. 
xiii
 Adapted from Work (2002) and Agrawal & Ribot (1999). 
xiv
 For details see chapter three. 
xv
 It is acknowledged that the conceptual frame of ideational realm is similar to the work scholars have 
undertaken under institutional analysis. How this work departs from this literature is discussed in chapter three 
and ten. 
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xvi
 Discussed in detail in chapters five to nine. 
xvii
 Madhya Pradesh was bifurcated in November 2000 to create the new state of Chhattisgarh. [Note: Archival 
data on irrigation potential is available for undivided MP. Although the two case sites discussed in this 
dissertation are in the present day Madhya Pradesh.  
xviii
 Adapted from Gerring (2001b). 
xix
 Adapted from Gerring (2001b, p. 161). 
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2 Dominant Global Narratives on Water Management - PIM  
This chapter elaborates key issues that are pertinent to understand the trajectory of initiating 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) worldwide. The chapter also reviews celebrated PIM 
cases globally and outlines salience of history, structure, organizations, and people i.e. local context 
in order to undertake research on PIM. To recall, chapter one had emphasized focusing on actors 
that played a key role in shaping the discourse on PIM as a panacea for irrigation management. 
Consequently, in this chapter focus is on identifying these actors and elucidating how structural or 
cultural factors played a role in constraining and/or facilitating the idea of irrigation management 
worldwide through discussion of select cases. This chapter also discusses salience of policy 
translation literature to explicate how ideas travel and gain prominence in policy realm, which is 
contingent on local context. 
2.1 Definitional clarity – PIM/IMT  
PIM is not a new concept. Rather is follow up approach of what is widely known as Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT) or irrigation management turnover in many parts of the world. IMT 
refers to complete replacement of the role of government. Whilst PIM aims to strengthen the 
relationship between the role of government and water users (Vermillion, 1997). The concept of IMT 
gained ground in various parts of the world since 1960s after the irrigation bureaucracies world over 
decided to reduce their financial burden, improve productivity, and stabilize deteriorating irrigation 
systems (ibid.).  PIM/IMT has been defined in several ways:  
“PIM refers to the level, mode, and intensity of user group participation that would 
increase farmer responsibility in the management process. (…) IMT is a more specialized 
term that refers to the process of shifting basic irrigation management functions from a 
public agency or state government to a local or private sector entity” (Groenfeldt and 
Svendsen 2000, cited in Barker & Molle, 2006, p. 66). 
Thus, it becomes evident that PIM/IMT can be of different types varying from: ‘i) transfer of assets 
and management to farmers; ii) transfer of management but not assets to farmers; iii) strengthening 
farmer management capacity without management transfer’ (Groenfeldt, 2003). 
The notion of PIM gained salience in the 1990s with change in focus and thereby consideration of 
‘farmer participation’ as an institutional approach. Rather than an organizational approach 
(Suhardiman & Mollinga, 2012). Thus, the difference between PIM and IMT is in terms of degree of 
farmer participation that is envisaged for management of irrigation system. Furthermore, the 
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institutional approach envisaged change in role of irrigation agency as technical agents of 
development to partners of farmer (Vermillion & Sagardoy, 1999). Additionally, a key distinction 
between the two is that in IMT the focus is on transferring management responsibilities at the 
use/micro level. However structural changes are not made to ensure greater farmer involvement at 
different levels i.e. macro or intermediate level in IMT. While the idea behind PIM is process driven 
and envisages change from macro to micro level and envisages devolving responsibilities and thus 
requires structural change in terms of legislations/rulings and thus necessitates institutional 
overhaul.xx  
Having made a distinction between PIM and IMT, the next section discusses key proponents of this 
approach. It is noteworthy that PIM/IMT is used interchangeably (in this chapter) while discussing 
international policy context, as scholars in their writing make reference to both interchangeably. 
More so, because international institutions like the World Bank made IMT as a cornerstone of its 
reform model for water management policy which later evolved as PIM (Mukherji et al., 2009; 
Suhardiman & Mollinga, 2012). Although, the focus of this work is on PIM and the structural change 
that it envisages by instituting farmer participation at all level. 
2.2 Proponents of farmer participation in irrigation management 
Proponents of PIM/IMT at the international level have come from different segments, one of them 
are organizations like World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and 
Ford Foundation and second, the academic community. Within academia, two schools of thought 
have been instrumental in advocating for constitution of farmer organizations. First, the 
development sociology group at Cornell University -spearheaded by Norman Uphoff- has advocated 
participation of farmers in poor functioning irrigation systems as a possible solution; which basically 
advocated for top-down designing of institutions. Uphoff propounded the idea of farmer 
participation through a working paper which was an outcome of a study commissioned by USAID (c.f. 
Uphoff, 1986a, p. v). Second school of thought emphasizes attention to ‘crafting institutions’ and 
comprises theorists like Ostrom (1990, 1992) and Tang (1991, 1992) who through workshops in 
political theory and policy analysis at the Indiana University in the United States propounded the idea 
of bottom-up crafting rules by local community and thereby institutions for resource management. 
The idea of crafting institutions is based on promising evidence from small-scale community based 
natural resource management wherein local groups have made rules for resource appropriation and 
successfully demonstrated potential of crafting institutions. Scholars argue that this can be scaled up 
in the context of irrigation management as well. To substantiate, Community Based Natural Resource 
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Management (CBNRM) literature on water management has advocated for shift from state led 
development to more communitarian and civil society driven development. In this context, critical 
approaches that emphasise greater community participation for self-governance and autonomy have 
been developed as NGO approaches for agricultural water resources management with significant 
international financial assistance (Mollinga, 2010, p. 421). Overall, the narrative on irrigation 
management at the international level has been influenced by these two academic propositions, 
which has been taken forward by transnational policy entrepreneurs, to use Rap’s (2006) 
terminology.  
Moreover, researchers of international organizations (like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB)) and research institutes/ think tanks have been strongly inclined towards research on issues of 
farmer participation in irrigation management viz. International Irrigation Management Institute 
(IIMI), which was later renamed as International Water Management Institute (IWMI), International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the World Bank Institute, Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), USAID, Ford Foundation. A lot that been written by the researchers of these institutions has 
not only provided a good overview and analysis of this issue but has also influenced the trajectory of 
the reform process (c.f. Giordano, Samad, & Namara, 2007; Mollinga & Bolding, 2004b; Rap, 2006). 
Thus, these transnational researchers acting as ‘ideational brokers’ developed new paradigm that 
promoted success of PIM/IMT at the global level and transmitted this ‘programmatic idea’ of 
irrigation management to national decision makers (c.f Campbell, 2004). These ideational brokers 
have used workshops, seminars, and similar forums to take forward this idea. For instance, FAO and 
International Network on Participatory Irrigation Management organized an email conference on 
IMT in 2001 (FAO, 2001). A discourse emphasising PIM/IMT was perpetuated through these 
conferences by these researchers where its merits and demerits, potential, and experiences from 
cases worldwide were discussed. For instance, the Mexican success story of IMT and functioning of 
WUA was told, retold and thereby legitimated and defined by these ideational brokers acted as 
transnational policy experts in international policy meetings (Rap, 2006). These ambitious policy 
makers have used the performatory success as an influential tool in international policy making. The 
worldview of these ideational brokers is guided by belief of demonstrating success and dissociating 
themselves from failure (Rap, 2006, p. 1301; emphasis added). To elaborate: 
“Policy discourse usually presents the ‘success’ of a policy as a self-evident empirical fact, 
which basically explains its own diffusion. In conversation with a World Bank official 
during an IMT promotion event, I asked why he considered the Mexican case to be a 
success. He pondered and answered: ‘because nobody denies that it is a success’” (Rap, 
2006, p. 1302). 
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From the above citation, salience of ideational broker’s worldview and their beliefs in promotion, 
adoption, and perpetuation of an idea (good or bad) becomes salient. Thus, ideational brokers used 
their belief to take forward the neoliberal and neo-institutionally informed global water discourse to 
national arenas (Bolding 2005 cited in Rap, 2006). Salience of ideational brokers -organizations and 
experts- in shaping the neoliberal discourse on environment/water at the international level is 
known (Heynen, McCarthy, Prudham, & Robbins, 2007; Moore, 1989; Swyngedouw, 2007). However, 
policy transfer and translation from international to national and sub national arena requires paying 
attention to the context and actors that reconfigure the idea and processes of governance 
(Mukhtarov, 2009; Mukhtarov & Gerlak, 2013), as it is not only foreign funding and ideational 
brokers which influences the reform process. Rather this process is contingent on advocates of 
reform process within the state, for instance, the bureaucracy. If they react adversely to the reform 
process -as it is reflection of feedback based on performance- then reforms would be hard to initiate. 
Thus, enabling conditions and context is important, and reform advocates (bureaucracy) need to be 
prepared to capitalize on opportunities that come their way for desired policy change (Mollinga & 
Bolding, 2004a, p. xiii). This preparation is reflective not only in terms of having adequate resources 
for mobilizing change, but also requires partnership between strategic interest groups, and a will to 
change. Thus, there is a need to understand ‘ideational factors’ that determine how reform process 
shapes up, i.e. funding for advocating a certain idea, interest of the actor/organization advocating an 
idea, keenness of actors who need to implement the idea, etc. Some of the scholars who have 
studied irrigation management widely and enthusiastically and have been frequently cited and aimed 
to influence policiesxxi on IMT/PIM have belonged to the World Bank (Svendsen and Groenfeldt), IIMI 
(like Vermilion, Brewer), Meinzen-Dick (from IFPRI). However, since then IIMI has widened its 
research focus from irrigation management to water resources management after changing its name 
to IWMI and in recent times has questioned the validity of PIM (c.f. Mukherji et al., 2009; T. Shah, 
2011). Furthermore, researchers from Wageningen University, in the Netherlands have also actively 
tried to engage irrigation agencies in debate with civil society (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004a). 
Moreover, structural characteristics of donor cooperation are known wherein international 
organizations have promoted international policy trends/ideas, which have been adopted by 
recipient developing country governments (Suhardiman & Mollinga, 2012; emphasis added). The 
structural characteristic of donor cooperation is also elucidated by Crewe and Harrison (1998) and 
Mosse et al (1998), Mukhtarov (2012), among others who posit development assistance is provided 
without taking into account the local context. For instance, the hegemonic policy narrative on 
Integrated Water Resource Management has been produced and promoted by representative of 
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international organizations (Mukhtarov, 2009) who have acted as ideational brokers without paying 
attention to local context. Thus, policy narratives can reproduce elements of structure.  
Having discussed the salience of ideational brokers in general in influencing the policy paradigm at 
the international level, the next section focuses on how the hegemonic idea of farmer participation 
gets transformed differently based on national context through select cases. To recall, from 
discussion in chapter one, the focus of this work is on understanding the hegemonic promotion of 
the idea of farmer participation in irrigation management in India. Therefore, prior to discussing the 
national context in chapter four, the next section further elaborates how the dominant narrative on 
farmer participation in irrigation management was created at the international level.  
2.3 Select international cases – creation of dominant narrative on farmer 
participation in irrigation management  
In the 1950s and 1960s governments and international organizations made significant investments in 
the irrigation sector, unfortunately, the results were disappointing. As a consequence of which a 
discussion on sub sector irrigation reforms gained prominence in the late 1960s, and by 1970s IMT 
emerged as an alternative in the international arena for reforming irrigation sector (Garces-Restrepo, 
Vermillion, & Muñoz, 2007, p. 3). To substantiate, irrigation bureaucracies during this period were 
exploring ways through which they could reduce the cost of operation and maintenance of irrigation 
systems, increase user participation, and attain higher cost recovery for better system performance 
and productivity (Nikku, 2006, pp. 19-20). A FAO and IWMI study reports that the biggest motivation 
for adopting IMT in various parts of the world had been shortage of funds for operation and 
maintenance in irrigation systems (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007, p. 12). During this period, it was also 
perceived that problems that plague the irrigation sector are primarily due to lack of participation of 
farmers, as the technical aspects of irrigations systems were well defined.  
“Engineering is not the fundamental problem underlying irrigation development in the 
less developed countries. Engineering principles are known and can be adapted, but the 
major problem, however, is to discover ways to utilize farmers more effectively in 
operations and maintenance and development programmes which will create rural 
transformation. Rural transformation essentially requires changes in farmer’s behaviour, 
motivations, and expectations, which is hardly possible until institutions exist to provide 
them with improved production possibilities and incentives” (Wiener 1976, cited in 
Narain, 2008, p. 160).  
The above citation evinces the emphasis during that period was tilting towards user participation, 
thus, the idea of top-down ‘designing institutions’ for collective action in irrigation management 
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gained salience in the 1970s primarily to avert financial problems that irrigation bureaucracies were 
plagued with. A general consensus during this period was that designing institutions can be an 
alternative to nationalization and privatization of natural resources, and to avert financial problems 
that irrigation bureaucracies were plagued with (Narain, 2009, p. 125). Interestingly, however, the 
onus of the problem was chiefly put on behaviour, motivation and expectations of farmers. Thus, 
many countries moved towards handing over operation and management or complete transfer of 
irrigation management and assets to farmer organizations (Nikku, 2006, p. 24).  
International organizations like the World Bank, which currently proclaims itself as a knowledge bank 
played a key role as carrier of this new idea of participation of farmers in irrigation management.xxii 
To delve a bit into the history of World Bank to underscore its salience as an ideational broker is 
paramount here. World Bank was created as part of the overall Bretton Woods system, which 
emerged from the capitalist crisis, global war and reconstruction of the 1930s and 1940s. Bank’s 
lineages to tenets of cold war inspired liberalism (liberal developmentalism and classical 
modernization theory) in its early period that led to structural adjustment loans to recipient 
governments are known. In the late 1970s, in the changing international context the World Bank 
adopted the tenets of neo-liberal order which reflected the interests of its major sponsors (M. T. 
Berger & Beeson, 1998). World Bank’s rationalization of neoliberal policies was partly grounded in 
the social and economic problems of the 1970s and by 1980s they emerged as agenda setters in 
international development debate. The Bank used its intellectual influence as an ideational brokers, 
which was reinforced by the economic leverage it had with governments around the world looking 
for investment, loans and foreign aid (M. T. Berger & Beeson, 1998) to propagate its policies. 
Interestingly, IMT/PIM has been the cornerstone of World Bank policy and similar international 
ideational brokers. Organizations like ADB and the World Bank have made their loan conditional –a 
structural feature of donor cooperation- on particular reform packages that have steered towards 
reducing the role of the state and pushing for a greater role of private sector in management of 
resources. Thus, the idea of farmer participation in management was implemented by these 
organizations through loans they disbursed, by making farmer participation a conditionality as a 
solution to financial crisis that irrigation bureaucracies were facing (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004b, p. 
314). There are several in-depth studies on farmer participation in irrigation management from the 
Philippines, Mexico, Turkey, and Colombia. Here, the focus is on parsing the salience of key processes 
like donor funding as a structural feature and role of ideational brokers in bringing forth irrigation 
reforms in these countries, as it provides guideposts to understand the irrigation reform trajectory in 
India in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  
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Any discussion on farmer participation in irrigation management cannot begin without mentioning 
the case of the Philippines, as it is the first country where major efforts to introduce farmer 
participation were made in the late 1970s. The case of IMT in the Philippines is considered an 
instance of gradual learning process approach (Groenfeldt, 1996, p. 2; Raby, 2000, p. 113). 
Participatory approach to irrigation management in the Philippines can be traced back to 1976 when 
the local community owned the communal irrigation systems. When/after turnover (IMT) policies 
were introduced in the Philippines local development officers were engaged to work as catalysts and 
build capacities of farmers, as the local community already had ownership rights over the 
infrastructure and were entailed to undertake operation and maintenance work (Nikku, 2006, p. 23). 
Actors that played an important role in shaping the irrigation reforms in the Philippines were the 
National Irrigation Administration (NIA), politicians and funding agencies. President Marcos 
demonstrated political will towards the reform process, and charter of NIA was amended to make it 
a financially autonomous body that was expected to keep its own account. This financial pressure to 
reduce cost, ultimately pushed the NIA to hand over the management function of irrigation system 
to users (Groenfeldt, 1996). This reform process was initiated at the behest of Ford Foundation, 
USAID and the World Bank with the aim to completely transfer responsibility management, 
maintenance, and fee collection of tertiary canals to user groups (Barker & Molle, 2006, p. 67; 
Panella, 2006, pp. 96-97). Amongst all the lenders, the Bank has had the biggest influence on the 
irrigation policy in the Philippines, as it has given substantial loans (though the frequency of loans has 
been lesser). The focus of the Bank loans has been on incorporating institutional components over 
and above the component on infrastructure development. Further, the World Bank had not 
hesitated to get involved in the internal policy dialogue and thereby was able to influence the 
irrigation reform process (Panella, 2006, p. 103). The Bank’s support for communal irrigation system 
and thereby communal irrigation committees resulted in institutionalization of acceptance of 
participatory practices in irrigation management in NIA and worldwide (Panella, 2006, p. 111; 
emphasis added); and the Bank used it as a successful model to be replicated elsewhere. The Bank’s 
approval to participatory approach in communal irrigation systems also paved way for adding 
additional credibility to other organizations like ADB who then pursued participatory approach in 
irrigation loans thereafter (ibid.). The focus of discussion here has been on the role of international 
organizations in influencing the reform process, however, it is not claimed that they were the sole 
dominant actor due to which the reform happened. Rather, it is acknowledged that it was the 
interaction amongst different actors, and timing of events that shaped the irrigation policy of the 
Philippines, for instance, political will shown by the then president Marcos, and the bureaucrats in 
NIA.xxiii  
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The case of Mexico is similar, to Philippines, as the role of international organizations was salient 
there as well. Mexican irrigation reform process was a top-down process and call for reforms came 
from international organizations after the economic crisis of 1986. During this period poor irrigation 
performance in the irrigation districts that were publicly managed was a dominant narrative. The 
Mexican government bureaucracy lacked incentives and responsiveness to optimize irrigation 
management performance (Rap, 2006, p. 1304). Consequently, National Water Commission (CNA) 
was constituted in 1989 with a mandate that encompassed all aspects of hydrology and policy 
making with respect to water resources. Through Article 50 of the National Water Law concessions 
were granted to WUA for use, exploitation of water for agricultural purposes and these WUAs had 
the right of administration and management of irrigation systems (Palacios V., 2000, pp. 5-6, 9). The 
Mexican reform process, though top-down process, had considerable interaction between some key 
policy actors at the top viz. senior hydrocratsxxiv, the Mexican President, and the World Bank officials 
which resulted in the reforms shaping in a certain way (Rap et al., 2004, p. 57). Furthermore, the 
emergence of IMT policy in Mexico cannot be explained only by the economic crisis. Rather one 
needs to broaden the analysis and infuse it with historical, political and bureaucratic processes, to 
understand what factors lead up to and sustains reform. The authors do this analysis in case of 
Mexico and argue that that though IMT was imposed on the hydraulic bureaucracy by the World 
Bank and the Mexican president, ‘the reform package did not entail a complete devolution or 
reduction of bureaucratic powers, but that it served to reorder bureaucratic control over essential 
domains and resources’ (Rap et al., 2004, p. 86). The Mexican case emphasizes the importance of 
history, structure, and institutions for understanding any reform process.  
Other well-known and celebrated instances of farmer participation in irrigation management are the 
Turkish and the Colombian cases that point towards different motivations and actors that lead to 
transfer of management of irrigation systems. Turkey has had a legal framework that facilitates 
transfer of management responsibility of public irrigation schemes to locals since 1954. The 
Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) is the main executive agency of the government to plan, 
execute and operate matters related to water resources in the country. The budgetary crisis in 
Turkey provided the impetus for state agencies to transfer management responsibility to local 
organizations. The Bank played a critical role in this reform by pressurizing for improved cost 
recovery that provided an added impetus for change. Subsequently, when moment for change 
arrived, Turkey built on an existing legislation for transfer of management, rather than introducing a 
new one. The World Bank also funded tours of DSI functionaries to Mexico and elsewhere, to 
facilitate envisioning of change for the functionaries after transferring management to locally 
controlled organizations (Svendsen & Nott, 2000, p. 27; Svendsen, Trava, & Johnson III, 2000). The 
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Turkish case is an instance of a hybrid approach to IMT wherein policy has evolved over time and 
involved consensus building and tending to organizational issues over time, while, the Colombian 
case is an instance of bottom up call for transfer of management of irrigation systems. The first call 
for transfer of irrigation management system in Colombia came from local group of farmers in Tolima 
valley way back in early 1970s; and the first two schemes were transferred in 1970s. It is only in 1993 
that new law was enacted that recognized the legal status of water user associations and elaborated 
on their roles and responsibilities as well as the support and obligations that National Irrigation 
Agency (INAT) was to provide (Quintero-Pinto, 2000, p. 89). The ownership rights of system in all the 
cases (Philippines, Mexico, Turkey, Colombia) stayed with the government (Svendsen et al., 2000, p. 
141).  
From this brief discussion of four cases of IMT, some points that gain prominence are that reasons 
for initiating farmer participation in irrigation management are diverse. Foremost amongst it was the 
interest of governments to reduce cost given the financial crisis, and increase productivity in 
management of resources. Role of international organizations as carrier of new ideas for water 
management and pressurizing pursuance of the idea of farmer participation through loan 
conditionality was critical for adoption of new policies at the international level. At the national level 
there were political gains that domestic actors could achieve by shift in irrigation policy given the 
financial crisis. Furthermore, the case studies make evident that there are various structural, 
historical, and institutional factors that resulted in adoption of the idea of irrigation transfer 
differently. In some case, like the Philippines, it was the loan conditionality that led to adoption of 
the idea, though there was semblance of participatory management historically in the region with 
communal irrigation system in place. In Mexico, though this process is generally classified as big 
bang, there were other domestic actors like the social hydrocrats that had an important role to play 
as well. Overall, there was major thrust for pushing the policy model of PIM/IMT and the type of 
policy that resulted depended on interactions between key actors: international organizations staff, 
political office bearers, experts, and the bureaucrats/hydrocrats.  
2.4 Summing up 
This chapter provides an overview of issues and salience of international organizations globally in 
promoting farmer participation in irrigation management through select cases. The discussion in this 
chapter posits that to understand policymaking and/or the reform process, it is critical to pay 
attention to history, structure, organizations, people and their local context.  
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In case of PIM there have been two approaches that have been widely publicized, i.e. of crafting or 
designing institutions worldwide. The cases discussed in this chapter make evident that apart from 
the Columbian case (which to an extent could be connoted as a case of institutional crafting), for rest 
of the cases the impetus for reform was top-down and are instances of designed institutions wherein 
focus was to reduce financial burden of irrigation bureaucracies. Furthermore, from the brief review 
it is evident that appropriate conditions for reforms are critical for the reform process to stick. 
Additionally, this chapter discusses the salience of global narrative, which has advocated farmer 
participation in irrigation management as the most appropriate approach for decentralizing irrigation 
management.  
This review was also useful to bring forth common issues that gain salience in any discussion that is 
held with respect to national level PIM/IMT in countries where this approach for irrigation reforms 
has been initiated. Given, so much impetus on farmer participation in irrigation management, the 
rest of this dissertation elucidates through the Indian case, why approaches like PIM are not going to 
work unless attention is paid to ideational factors that elucidate lucidly the roadblocks to reform 
process. Having discussed some key issues viz. salience of history, structure, organization and people 
that are critical to understand the reform process, the next chapter building on these identified 
elements provides a theoretical and analytical framework to understand irrigation reforms using the 
lens of ideational realm. 
 
                                                          
xx
 The notion of participation in irrigation management is explained by two interrelated concepts of 
‘participation with patronage’ and ‘empowerment with accountability’ by Vermillion (2006, p. 410). The former 
concept essentially deals with the notion of participation as tokenism, as it refers to the old irrigation 
development paradigm where superficial participation of farmers in government programmes was envisaged. 
Whilst explanations of participation with patronage, emphasize dominate role of government bureaucracies, 
which aim to control the development processes and rent seeking practices. Under the former explication, the 
state is dependent on donor funds and there is perpetuation of farmer dependency on state. The latter 
concept (of empowerment with accountability) is more holistic and relates to political and legal empowerment 
of Water User Association (WUA), and accountability between users. This notion of empowerment with 
accountability aims to check the rent seeking practices at work; thereby creating greater accountability and 
transparency (Vermillion, 2006, p. 411).   
xxi
 For instance, by influencing state’s to have greater selectivity in signing loans. 
xxii
 The shift of Bank’s policies now though is changing from its portrayal as a knowledge bank to that as a 
‘solutions bank’ (World Bank, 2012). 
xxiii
 For details see Panella (2006) and Raby (2000). 
xxiv
 Rap, Wester, & Pérez-Prado (2004) refer to engineers working in water bureaucracies as hydrocrats. 
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3 Theoretical and Analytical Framework: Ideas, Actors and 
Ideational Realms  
The idea of irrigation has not only transformed agricultural practices worldwide but has also 
transformed relationships within farming community and their interaction with state and its 
representatives. The notion of irrigation has brought with it different ideas, ideology, beliefs and 
norms on how irrigation ought to be administered/practiced/managed depending on state or 
societal perspective. Furthermore, given that water management is critical for food security as 
mostly food grains are cropped in irrigated areas, management of irrigation systems has been a focal 
point of discussion for policymakers, and farming communities alike. Consequently, there have been 
diverse policy ideas on how irrigation systems ought to be managed. In contemporary history, there 
has been greater impetus on the idea of farmer ‘participation’ in management of irrigation systems 
in the state narrative as a signifier of decentralizing irrigation management. As indicated in previous 
two chapters, farmer participation as an essentiality for decentralizing irrigation management has 
been emphasized by the Indian state and international organizations alike. This chapter elaborates 
on the theoretical and conceptual framework applied to examine the dynamics of decentralizing 
irrigation management at the intermediate level in Madhya Pradesh, India. The focus is on ideational 
realm of actors’ -i.e. farmers/farmer organization, NGO and bureaucracy- as roadblock for reform 
process i.e. emphasis is given to context, narratives and strategic practices that actors’ employ to 
establish and legitimize a given practice of irrigation management.  
Given several efforts have been directed to explore the right idea to formulate the right policy 
model. The case of participatory irrigation management discussed in this dissertation is posited as an 
instance that furthers understanding of factors behind policy making on one hand. On the other 
hand, policy-making is not finished after its political design is accomplished. Rather policies are 
subject to a continuing process of production and promotion aiming to mobilize and maintain 
political consent among the epistemic communityxxv to which they are directed and which they shape 
(Haas 1992 cited in Rap, 2006, p. 1303; see also Saravanan, 2010).  
Foremost, in section 3.1, I review relevant literature on role of ideas and actors in policymaking and 
policy analysis (briefly) to inform relevance of this literature for this work. Thereafter, in Section 3.2, 
relationship between ideas, institutions actors and change is elaborated with a focus on clarifying the 
conceptual guideposts of this research. Following Berman (2013), this section clarifies the ideational 
variables employed in this research. In Section 3.3, I discuss work of Campbell (2004) and others for 
understanding salience of type of ideas in influencing ideational role and realm of actors. This 
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discussion is undertaken in reference to the discussion in previous two chapters. In section 3.4 based 
on the theoretical underpinnings discussed thus far, I elaborate on the analytical framework used for 
analyzing ideational realm on irrigation management in this work. Section 3.5 briefly summarizes the 
arguments of this chapter.  
3.1 Role of ideas and actors in formulating policies  
The role of actors in promoting a certain idea for policymaking have intrigued scholars lately, and in 
this context the relationship between ideas and policymaking has been identified as crucial. For 
instance, the seminal article by Peter Hall (1993), ‘policy paradigms, social learning and the state’, 
emphasizes the need to look at various ways in which state and society can be linked in order to 
better understand what social learning implies and entails, and thus emphasizes the need to pay 
greater attention to role of ideas in policy-making.  
“The manner in which ideas condition policymaking and how they change, are organized 
around the concept of ‘policy paradigms’. Policy paradigms can be seen as one feature of 
the overall terms of political discourse. They suggest that the policymaking process can 
be structured by a particular set of ideas, just as it can be structured by a set of 
institutions” (Peter A. Hall, 1993, p. 292).  
Furthermore, Hall emphasizes the role of ideas in political life by arguing that state actors’ 
interpretation of past and present events as well as their power to selectively screen information can 
exert crucial impact over political outcomes (Berman, 2013, p. 220). Similarly, constructivists have 
argued that ideas can mediate and magnify material ideation, or in other words power of ideas can 
shape perceptions and identities and foster a certain interpretation of situation. However, in this 
analysis actor’s agency is not taken into account and Bell (2012, p. 662) argues for paying greater 
attention to how ideas constitute relationships of power. Specifically, how actors develop and use 
ideas is crucial to understand. For instance, varied ideas of ‘participation’ are used in policy arena. 
The idea of participation is an instance of how a policy can be negotiated by state and societal actors 
at different levels i.e. during its design and implementation. To elaborate, historically, the idea of 
participation is not considered apolitical. Rather, its origins lie in radical politics and ideologically 
charged political movements that worked for greater democratization of development activities 
(Chhotray, 2004, p. 327). The current mode of participatory development approaches, however, has 
been criticized for not engaging (enough) with issues of power and politics. Rather in the current 
narrative of policy making, participation has been advanced as a technical approach to development 
by NGOs, international organizations and state actors alike (Chhotray, 2004, p. 327; Hickey & Mohan, 
2004, p. 4). However, this technical conceptualization misses to observe the need to draw a link 
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between participation and popular agency as a political practice, in order to rethink the concept of 
participation with respect to the notion of space, political capabilities and citizenship (Hickey & 
Mohan, 2004, p. 4).xxvi  
From this brief discussion salience of ideas in policymaking is evident. Additionally, through the 
instance of participation it is evident that actors can evoke a certain meaning attached to an idea and 
make it a predominant narrative compared to other. Thus, to undertake ideational research, salience 
of actors and their repertories that influence or obstruct policy (or its implementation) is critical to 
understand. Policy analysis with an ideational perspective is a two-step process: 
“During the first stage, existing ideas are questioned and tarnished, opening up political 
space new ideas can fill. In this phase, in other words, a demand for new ideas is created 
by the perceived failures or inadequacies of the reigning one(s). Once a political space 
has begun to open and a demand for new ideas begins to appear, the second stage of 
the process begins. During this stage, a variety of new ideas may arise as political actors 
champion alternatives to the ideas being questioned and perhaps abandoned. It is during 
this phase, in other words, that a supply of new ideas begins to appear and vie with each 
other for dominance” (Hall 1989 and Trachtenberg 1983, cited in Berman, 2013, p. 227). 
Moreover, salience of structural elements is evident in ideational research. For instance, state 
structures can forge social alliances among institutions and thereby shape social and political 
development. Skocpol and Weir (1985, p. 109) through the American, Swedish and the British cases 
provide comparative historical evidence to argue that variation in national responses to depression 
account for different social policy outcomes in the 1930s. They demonstrate that structural features 
of state and pre-existing legacies of public policy are imperative for understanding the variation in 
interstate response to depression, as that in turn influenced the political orientation and capacities 
of different actors, determined what changes would be acceptable, specifically, what intellectual 
innovations would be successful (Skocpol & Weir, 1985, pp. 109, 136). Thus, salience of studying 
elements of structure as an idea for understanding policy is noteworthy. Moreover, through the 
three cases Skocpol and Weir demonstrate how policy relevant ideas emerge and become influential 
by developing a ‘complex model of causal interrelationships’ which illustrates that actors consciously 
build and/or react against past governmental efforts to come up with same or similar policy 
problems (ibid., p. 119).  
Similarly, Blyth (2002) argues that role of (economic) ideas need to be taken seriously and 
sequentially. In ‘Great Transformations’ he demonstrates primacy of ideas or ideational research to 
understand institutional change and critiques rational choice institutionalism and historic 
institutionalist explanations as incomplete formulations. Researchers need to perceive how 
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institutional orders are formed or broken: as a sequential phenomenon of uncertainty reduction, 
mobilization, contestation and institutional replacement. This approach provides a better 
understanding of how double movements work in practice (ibid, p. 45). Blyth focuses primarily on the 
double movement surrounding role of economic ideas and the business in institutionalizing 
embedded liberalism in the United States (Blyth, 2002, pp. 5-6, 81) to demonstrate causality. As a 
major challenge of the ideational literature has been demonstrating causality:  
“(…) all ideational claims require two arguments. First, they must show the proximate 
causal role of preexisting ideational elements. This involves a demonstration that the 
ideational elements do not just reduce to other immediate conditions, but focuses on 
conditions just prior to the action in question. The second step is to show more deeply 
that these ideational elements reflect their own distinct dynamic, establishing their 
autonomy vis-à-vis longer-term or overarching objective conditions. In other words, an 
ideational claim must document its particularistic foundations, showing how much ideas 
or norms have autonomy from other causes” (Parsons, 2007, p. 109, emphasis added). 
Furthermore, causality is demonstrated in Hall’s (1993) analysis in reference to the change in British 
economic policy by identifying first, second and third order change and by arguing that though the 
basic policy goals remained unchanged, the policy instruments underwent a change to achieve the 
policy goals. In the British case study, the policy goals were achieved not only by past policy 
precedence but also by societal conflicts and debates. Hall demonstrates causality by demonstrating 
a different learning curve for actors in the first, second and third order, where different causal 
mechanisms and processes are elucidated (Berman, 2013, p. 220). Thus, for ensuring causality, it is 
pertinent that there is clarity on ideational claims from the very outset. In her most recent article 
Berman (2013) has also emphasized on definitional clarity and need to identify ideational variables 
up front to undertake ideational research and to evince causality.  
Overall, since ‘policy paradigms, social learning and the state’ several scholars have used ideational 
variables to explain policy-making and institutional change. Scholars like Béland (2009) in this context 
have used ideational variables to flush out motivation and causality in their analysis to respond to 
the criticism of ideational literature that ideational argument is not an explanation. Additionally, 
scholars -Béland & Cox (2010), Berman (1998), McNamara (1998)- have distanced themselves from 
material ideation and have argued that ideas rather than interests (though this is debatable) 
determine actor’s goals, preferences and political behaviour (cited in Berman, 2013, p. 222). There 
are not enough empirical cases in Political Science that demonstrate how ideational variables play an 
important role in understanding how ideas become institutionalized and how ideas shape both 
actor’s motivation and contexts (Berman, 2013, p. 233) when policies are implemented.  
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Moreover, most of the ideational literature till now has unilaterally focused on how ideas influence 
policies, however, scholars fail to pay attention to relationship between these policy models and 
practices, events that the policy is expected to generate/legitimize. Policy making generally follows a 
linear or instrumental approach has distinct phases, viz. problem identification, policy formulation, 
implementation and impact evaluation (Mosse, 2004) and how everyday practices are influenced by 
cultural norms and structural elements is overlooked. Generally, once decision to implement a 
certain policy is taken then efforts/ discussions are directed towards how to implement these policy 
models in practice (Rap, 2006, p. 1303). For instance, there is prolific literature in context of 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) in India that favours this instrumental approach and has 
been propagated by international organizations like the World Bank. However, this instrumental 
approach of policy formulation, focuses more on successes of a policy and thus it is not surprising 
that policy actors in public forums evade responses or acknowledge problems with certain policy, for 
instance, the irrigation management transfer policy in Mexico discussed in chapter two (Rap, 2006, p. 
1302). What has been not been emphasized enough, however, is structural and cultural aspects that 
facilitate in understanding the context in which policy formulation and subsequent reproduction that 
happens. For instance, Rap (2006), Suhardiman and Mollinga (2012) have emphasized structural 
elements of donor cooperation that illuminate promotion and propagation of policy of integrated 
water resource management by international organizations. To elaborate, sector wide approach to 
water resource management and tied funding have been used as policy instruments by donor 
organizations which led to pursuance of neoliberal and neo-institutional informed global discourse 
on water (Bolding 2005 cited in Rap, 2006). Similarly, salience of cultural aspects and social structure 
and ideology to understand how communities manage water resources has been emphasized by 
scholars (Boelens, Getches, & Gil, 2010b; Mosse, 1999). Thus, recognizing the salience of political and 
cultural structures this research analyzes policy trajectory with respect to irrigation management in 
India to elaborate how ideational variables -norms, beliefs, values, culture, and ideology- can 
influence both the policy implementation and outcome and thus result in tardy reform process. 
However, prior to delving into this aspect, it is imperative to get some definitional clarity on some 
key terms that are used in this research, viz. structure, culture, ideology - in context of the notion of 
ideational realm. 
Any analysis of ideas affecting policy making cannot be done in isolation and without taking into 
account structural -material, legislative, rules, regulations- aspects that determine the arena in which 
a policy is implemented and thus are a signifier of institutional change. Structure facilitates in 
understanding distribution of power between different institutions, agencies and society through 
studying the interaction between actors and institutions over a period of time.xxvii Furthermore, 
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: Ideas, Actors and Ideational Realms 
 
 
 
 
39 
institutions and institutional change has always intrigued scholars. This work using ideational 
approach process-traces the way actor position one another through the use of a widely employed 
discourse/narrative on irrigation management. I employ this approach as it is suitable to trace not 
only dominance of ideas in the national or state narrative but also gives salience to how ideas are 
legitimized by actors in the case study.  
Furthermore, new policies are made with an objective to change existing institutional arrangement, 
for instance, as was discussed in chapter two, existing irrigation management practices were not 
considered beneficial for irrigation bureaucracies and thus new institutional arrangements, or 
institutional change i.e. farmers involvement in irrigation management through constitution of 
farmer organization has been envisaged. Given that the research focus is to understand institutional 
change, the next section further clarifies the relationship between ideational processes, ideational 
variables and institutional change by taking cognizance of key ideational variables.  
3.2 Salience of ideational processes and variables to understand 
institutional change  
Scholars like Bourdieu (1977), Denzau & North (1994), Mielke et al. (2011) and Campbell (2004, p. 33) 
posit salience of ideational processes by elucidating the notion of habitus, mental models, mind-set, 
and ideational realm to explicate circumstances/context in which actors perceive their interests and 
environment in order to mobilize for institutional/policy change.  
Ideational perspectives are considered noteworthy to understand institutional change that could be 
evolutionary or revolutionary. The degree to which change is evolutionary or revolutionary depends 
on how many ‘dimensions’ of an institution change over a given period of time, wherein, 
‘institutional bricolage’ alters dimensions of an institution and makes the change evolutionary or 
revolutionary (Campbell, 2004, pp. 32-33). The notion of bricolage facilitates in paying attention to 
processes that facilitate actors to recombine existing institutional elements at their disposal; second, 
understand the paradox of institutions which enable as well as constrain actors; third, explicate 
processes involving recombination of institutional traits (ibid., pp. 71-73). Building on bricolage, the 
notion of ideational realm is evoked by Campbell to elaborate the context in which actors function 
and their role in influencing institutional change. There are four different types of ideas that actors 
can function under viz. programs, frames, paradigms and public sentiments, and these ideas have 
cognitive or normative outcomes which influences and/or constrains actors’ functioning (ibid.), and 
thus are used to explicate change.  
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The notion of ideational realm propounded by Campbell goes beyond the previous understanding of 
rational choice theorists where actor’s actions are only determined by their material interest and\or 
motivations and not by ideas and this is explicated as the main criterion that drives policymaking and 
its subsequent reproduction. Campbell’s conceptualization is useful to understand actor’s ideational 
realm as he critiques rational choice theorist for not giving attention to role of ideas in their analysis 
though they clearly establish importance of actors and their agency in their analysis (2004, p. 101). 
Whilst historical institutionalisms (Abdelal, Blyth, & Parsons, 2010; Béland & Cox, 2010; Peter A. Hall 
& Taylor, 1996; March & Olsen, 2004) demonstrate through their work the importance of institutions 
as actors’ motivations and actions about future course of action are contingent on institutions, and 
so is the response of other actors’ to their actions. Institutions provide actors with cognitive 
templates for actions that shapes actors identities and preferences (Berman, 2013, p. 221). On the 
other hand are the organizational institutionalists like Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) who pay 
attention to the role of ideas (by having for granted worldviews) in their analysis but fail to give 
enough attention to role of actors and their agency (ibid.). Overall, there has been progression from 
rational choice and historic institutionalism to ideational scholarship to explicate institutional change 
and policy making as historical institutionalism did not provide a ‘sophisticated understanding of how 
institutions affect behaviour’ (ibid., p. 222).  
Additionally, the old literature on ideas posited the old idealist notion that ideas rather than interest 
matter, however, rather than starting from that standpoint, which leads one to dwell on idealist 
versus materialist explanation of policy making. The arguments in this dissertation follow the 
approach of Campbell (2002a) and Hall (1993) who look at how ideas and interests interact with each 
other (Campbell, 2002b, p. 33). There has been some headway with this approach, with research on 
how identities influences how actors define their interests, for instance, the case of labour unions 
explained by Locke and Thelen (1995). Research on transnational advocacy networks by Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) has also provided insights into how interest based rational actor models can be 
combined with an idea based social constructivist model to explain how new policy programmes are 
propagated (Campbell, 2002b, p. 33), case in point being the transnational network on environment 
advocacy networks and the HIV AIDS network. Till now, so much has been said in this section about 
ideas, clarity on ideational variables is paramount, as many a time scholars have been criticized for 
not clarifying what they mean by certain terms. Some of the most common evoked ideational 
variables -relevant for this research- that defines actor’s ideational role and realm are norms, beliefs, 
culture, ideology and structure.  
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Beliefs according to Oxford English dictionary is defined as an ‘acceptance that something exists or is 
true, especially one without proof or something one accepts as true or real; a firmly held opinion’. 
Thus, it is the basic viewpoint of actors that is limited in scope and could be bounded by certain area 
of politics. Beliefs can be individual or held collectively; can last for years or change with the wind 
(Berman, 2013, pp. 223-224). Thus, it can be argued that beliefs are not durable entities rather quite 
facile, compared to other ideational variables like norm and culture.  
Norms compared to beliefs are more circumscribed, as they can be associated with a specific group 
of actors. Moreover, a group may share more than just norm -a strongly held belief about a defined 
policy area or type of behavior. A norm can be defined as a ‘collectively held belief that governs 
thought and behavior in some specified and circumscribed area of political life’ (Berman, 2013, p. 
224). Norms can be identified as ideational elements that explain social action of actors. Moreover, 
norms are dynamic and inter-subjective constructs rather than static structures (Schmidt, 2008). 
Comparable to norms are values attached to political action.  
Values legitimate policies and programmes by referring to its appropriateness and thus values and 
political culture help in adoption of transnational policy ideas (Schmidt, 2008). For instance, caste has 
been a salient element of politics in India, which has been adopted by the Indian state since its birth 
as a method and value of democratic politics as its meaning as a social institution is founded in the 
values of Hinduism (c.f. Rudolph & Rudolph, 1960). Values are affective views of an actor who is 
somewhat conscious of his/her belief or norms, which leads to his/her emotional preferences in light 
of conceivable alternatives. Thus, actors consciously prefers his/her practices or beliefs, having 
‘internalized’ a commitment to them, and would tend to defend them against alternatives (Parsons, 
2007, pp. 121-122). This constant belief in values leads to its institutionalization through 
routinization of actions (Mielke et al., 2011).  
Culture has been defined in various ways. According to Geertz (1973), it is a way of life of people 
(including their technology and material artifacts). Whilst Keesing (1974) defines culture as publicly 
available symbolic forms through which people experience and express meaning (Swidler, 1986, p. 
273). Culture often is ascriptive in nature and individuals do not (generally) join or switch cultures. 
Rather they belong to them. For instance, in the Indian context, caste is an ascriptive cultural notion. 
Culture provides a repertoire or tool kit of habits, skills and styles, from which people construct 
strategies of action, thus influence of culture is not because of the value that it provides. Rather 
because of the shaping of these repertoires (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). Similarly, DiMaggio (1997, p. 265) 
citing Swidler (1986) and Bourdieu (1990) posits ‘culture as complex rule like structures that 
comprises resources that can be put to strategic use’ which is in contrast to another popular view of 
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culture as beliefs, intention and collective life. Whilst Ideology differs from culture as ideological 
groups are not defined by their ascriptive characteristics. Ideology creates its own community of 
individuals with a belief and commitment to ideology itself (Berman, 2013, p. 225). For instance, 
state ideology to pursue large-scale irrigation projects.  
Structural claims explain what people do as a function of their position vis-à-vis exogenously given 
‘material’ structures like geography, distribution of wealth, or distribution of physical power 
(Parsons, 2007, p. 12). Thus, material identities are also structurally constituted and need to be taken 
into account. To give an instance, gift-giving (economic) norm in society, for instance the practice of 
dowry is an instance of structural and cultural ideation. Structural elements of state 
ruling/legislations emerge when they interact with society. For instance, chapter two had discussed 
structural elements in development cooperation (case of PIM). Similarly, government rulings also 
have structural elements. Another related concept that needs clarification is Class that by traditional 
Marxist theorists is viewed as salience of economic structures for understanding state society 
relations and points towards the direction of economic determinism. However, Marxist theory also 
recognizes the salience of political in the context of revolutionary action as it subjugates and holds 
down subaltern groups. Taking that perspective, economic structures can also be ‘viewed as a set of 
constraints on political initiatives which limit political acts- in the sense of ruling out some options, 
constraining others, and imparting a direction to political choices consistent with the interests of 
basic social groups’ (Kaviraj, 2010, p. 8). In the Indian context, while discussing class, Kaviraj 
emphasises the need to look at coalitional relation of classes which he posits can be contained in 
three distinct social groups, viz. the bourgeoisie, the landed elites and the bureaucratic managerial 
elite (Kaviraj, 2010, pp. 107-109). The salience of bringing in bureaucratic elite as a category of 
coalition class is crucial as Kaviraj argues that ‘traditional Marxists accounts of the ruling coalition 
saw the bureaucratic elite as being too straightforwardly subordinate to the power of the 
bourgeoisie, and saw what was basically a coalitional and bargaining relation as a purely instrumental 
one’ (Kaviraj, 2010, p. 108, emphasis in orginal). 
Having clarified salience of ideational processes and ideational variables for institutional change the 
next section elaborates how different types of ideas define actor’s ideational role and therefore is 
signifier of actor’s ideational realm and their actions thereof. 
3.3 Type of ideas and their salience in shaping ideational realm of actors  
Ideational realms are formed by ideas that actors’ subscribe to and which define their ideational role. 
Ideas here are worldview, norms, identities, values, intellectual paradigms, culture and other beliefs. 
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Actors and their ideational realms is a good lens to analyze institutional change as it overcomes 
limitations of the rational choice and historic institutionalism (Campbell, 2004, p. 90). There are 
varieties of ideational explanation, which use different methods and have different levels of analysis, 
but all arguments in ideational research concern with following the basic causal logic that is the 
relationship between ideational elements and action.xxviii Table 3.1, elaborates Campbell’s typology of 
ideas. 
Table 3. 1: Types of ideas and their effects on policy-making 
 
Concepts and theories in the 
foreground of the debate 
Underlying assumptions in the 
background of the debate 
 Programs Paradigms 
Cognitive (outcome oriented) 
Ideas as elite prescriptions that 
enable politicians, corporate 
leaders, and other decision makers 
to chart a clear and specific course 
of action 
Ideas as elite assumptions that 
constrain the cognitive range of 
useful programs available to 
politicians, corporate leaders and 
other decision makers 
 Frames Public Sentiments 
Normative (Non-outcome 
oriented) 
Ideas as symbols and concepts that 
enable decision makers to 
legitimize programs to their 
constituents 
Ideas as public assumptions that 
constrain the normative range of 
legitimate programs available to 
decision makers 
Source: Campbell (2004, p. 94) 
Table 3.1 illustrates four types of ideas that actors can function under viz. programs, paradigms, 
frames and public sentiments. Ideas can be normative or cognitive and these ideas can 
influence/constrain functioning of actors. In Table 3.1, paradigms illustrate elite assumption that can 
constrain decisions of decision makers like politicians, bureaucrats. For instance, as discussed in 
chapter two the idea of crafting or designing institutions through farmer participation for better 
irrigation management was a paradigmatic idea introduced by scholars like Uphoff (1986a) and 
Ostrom (1992) and propounded later by international organizations. Chapter two had also illustrated 
that this paradigmatic idea of participatory irrigation management has been adopted differently by 
politicians, bureaucrats in Mexico, Turkey, Philippines and Colombia based on their understanding of 
the local conditions, history and institutions. Thus, paradigmatic idea can lead to different 
institutional change in different conditions. Additionally, chapter two demonstrated how once the 
idea of farmer participation in irrigation management was adopted by the national governments as a 
programmatic idea, it was legitimized to its constituents using different repertoires i.e. actors used 
public sentiments to favour their viewpoint on PIM. What becomes evident from the discussion until 
now is that different types of ideas have different effect on policy making. Additionally, the above-
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mentioned typology of ideas demands a certain ideational role from actors in a particular category, 
which determines actor’s ideational realm to an extent.  
Campbell (2004) argues that ideational realm necessitates theorizing the role of actors’ vis-à-vis any 
account of institutional change as it is contended that ideas do not emerge spontaneously or become 
influential without actors. Institutional frameworks are guided by ideas that populate it and this 
guides (or constrains) actors and their ideational realms. Institutional change is tardy when ideas are 
not transferred from one actor’s ideational realm to other, to wit, actors’ don’t fulfil their ideational 
role. Rather they get constrained by it. This leads to ambiguity or incoherence in representation of 
ideas and making policy decisions. This in turn reflects actor’s preferred interpretations thereby 
opening space for politics (Béland & Cox, 2010). Additionally, there is slippage in ideational realm. It 
is not air tight, actors (at times) operate at interface of different ideational realms (Campbell, 2004, 
p. 107). So, there may be unconscious ideas at work in people’s mind, which may define/guide their 
ideational role but actors are not conscious of it. It is noteworthy that the concept of ideational 
realm used in this dissertation is similar to Bourdieu’s (1977, p. 72) concept of habitus, which is 
defined as a ‘system of durable transposable dispositions’. Through the concept of habitus, Bourdieu 
links the external conditions and internal motivations of actors i.e. actors’ cognitive mind-sets and 
behaviour/agency. Bourdieu argues that it is the context that determines how actors position (or 
continue positioning themselves). Thus, it is the context that an actor is in which constrains and/or 
enables possibilities of other actors. For this research, context has been understood and elaborated 
using the typology of Campbell (2004). Bourdieu’s expositions are useful to conceptualize and 
describe cognitive dimensions of ideational realm.  
To further elaborate, according to Bourdieu, an individual’s behaviour and daily interactions are 
guided by their habitus in two ways: as ‘structuring structure’ and as ‘structured structure’. The 
former stresses the creative capacity and provides guiding principles for concrete action as modus 
operandi while the latter subsumes an individual’s history and experiences as the modus operatum 
(Mielke et al., 2011, p. 11). It is possible to trace ‘structured structure’ empirically through practices 
and actor’s worldviews. Whilst, ‘structuring structure’ can be elaborated by elucidating underlying 
aspects of detectable structures, i.e. what generates regular practical actions and patterns of 
perception, evaluation and thinking in general (ibid. ). Bourdieu argues that culture, social 
institutions, habits and routines shape people’s practices and their viewpoint of the world, notions of 
proper behaviour and peoples actions are framed by their past experiences, individual capacities and 
current social positions. And based on these experiences individuals develop a sense of orientation 
that guides their actions (Cleaver, 2012, p. 38). For Bourdieu, ‘the freedom to innovate is strongly 
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‘conditioned’ by social structure and ‘conditional’ on relations with others’ (ibid., p. 39). However 
state structures like rulings, legislations or donor cooperation also have structural elements that 
cannot be overlooked.  
Actors use the given social reality -an ideational artefact premised on perceptions and agreements of 
relevant actors- for instance the norm of irrigation management to suit their purpose. Actors thus 
use ideas and mental constructs of varied kind to interpret a situation individually and collectively in 
order to mirror their interests or preferences (Bell, 2012, p. 666). Campbell’s conceptualization is 
useful in this context as ideas and mind-set of actors are shaped by the context that is the ideational 
role which I posit is determined by the changing structural and cultural context, as is demonstrated 
through this work. Drawing on the typology of ideas discussed earlier, Figure 3.1 illustrates a 
typology of actors and their ideational realms.  
Figure 3. 1: Actors and their ideational realms 
 
Source: Adapted from Campbell (2004, p. 101) 
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of key actors that embrace, fabricate, manipulate and carry a certain 
idea within a given institutional setting of being, for instance, a bureaucrat or a politician (Campbell, 
2004). On this formulation of Campbell I have added political and cultural structures as ideational 
elements -as explained above- to emphasize that it’s not only institutional settings that determine 
ideational realms.  In Figure 3.1, decision makers are politicians, bureaucrats, etc. who follow elite 
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paradigmatic assumptions propounded by theorist like academics and intellectuals who propounded 
the idea of crafting or designing institutions for irrigation management. Thus, worldview of actors is 
populated by different ideas and ideologies. Constituents are actors like political elites, voters, 
general public, farmers, etc. who through their way of functioning and normative assumptions can 
constrain/influence the outcome of any programmatic idea. Brokers are actors who facilitated 
interaction between all the other actors. To recall, from chapter two, international organizations like 
World Bank, USAID were actors who brokered the paradigm of participatory irrigation management 
at the global level. In the above figure, it is conceptualized that actors function under cognitive or 
normative realm and are thus influenced by ideational variables (beliefs, norms, culture, structure), 
which in this research is connoted as structural and cultural ideation. Overall, I find it useful to 
articulate my research under the above discussed categorizations of Campbell, however, the 
categorization of framers (spin-doctors, campaign managers, etc.) was not found relevant for this 
research and is thus not discussed in empirical chapters.  
It is premised that these categorizations -programs, paradigms, public sentiments, brokers- facilitate 
in defining and distinguishing positions and hierarchy. Moreover, these categorizations also facilitate 
in discerning inherent contradictions that emerged while interpreting data, for instance, overlapping 
of ideational realms between different categorizations (see chapter six to nine) which are contingent 
on which aspect of structural or cultural ideational actors rationalize in their ideational realm. 
Consistence of structural and cultural ideation indicated above is further clarified in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3. 2: Consistence of structural and cultural ideation  
 
Source: Adapted from Campbell (2004, p. 101) 
Additionally, this research recognizes the need to have a fine balance, and pays attention to actors’ 
material (for instance large or small holding farmer) as well as non-material (junior or senior 
bureaucrat) identity. Although, it is contended that some of the material identities (for instance, big 
or small farmer) are also structurally constructed and thus need to be viewed as a structural 
constraint. This is noteworthy as recent criticism of ideational scholarship stems from ideational 
scholars having given preference to actors’ non-material identities or in other words ideational 
structures -for instance, as socialists, conservatives, religious fundamentalists- with the claim that 
these identities trump over actors economic identities- for instance, as workers, capitalists, export-
oriented business owner, small farmer (Berman, 2013, pp. 231-232).xxix However, as indicated earlier 
in this chapter, this work does not intend to make the same folly and hence the focus is on 
interaction between the material and non-material structures and how that shapes the ideational 
realm of actors.  
Culture is a guide for social action and can have significant impact on actors’ ideational realm. 
Background influence of culture on social policy has been explained in varied ways, for instance by 
Hall (1993) as policy paradigms and Kane (1991) as cultural structures. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) 
argue that culture not only shapes human action by structuring understanding of an individual and 
their world but also changes as meanings become contested and re-configured within new symbolic 
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relationships and social practices (as cited in Padamsee, 2009, p. 416). Moreover, power is deep 
seated in any study of cultural aspects to elaborate, ‘everything in social and cultural life is 
fundamentally to do with power (…) it is integral to culture. All signifying practices -that is, all 
practices that have meanings- involve relations of power’ (Jordan & Weedon, 1995, p. 11, emphasis 
in original). Whose voices are heard, what aspects of history are remembered, what are hidden, what 
is perpetuated through norms all have implications for what kind of actions are perpetuated by 
actors. All these repertoires speak to the question how certain practices are upheld or resources 
managed and thus respond to the question - who has power in a given social setting to legitimate 
actions and is also a signifier of the underlying politics for resource management. Here, power is 
understood as a relational force, which facilitates in understanding how rules and practices create 
divergent meaning for how actors ought to act on one hand; and also is structured and generated by 
these processes (Mielke et al., 2011). Foucault argues that power should not be studied from the site 
of domination i.e. intentions of, for instance, state actors who set out rules and regulations, rather 
from the standpoint where it is exercised over individuals and legitimated, as power circulates 
through networks rather than being applied at particular focal points (Foucault 1979: 92-102; 
2003:27-34 cited in Jessop, 2006, p. 5). This is in contrast to the Weberian notion of power wherein 
the emphasis is on explicating authority system through concepts of domination and ideal types. 
Weber posits ‘power as a probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis in which probability rests’ (Weber, 
1978, p. 53). In this work, however, Foucault’s conceptualization of power is found more compelling 
as it brings out the relationality of actors as a historical construct linked through complex web of 
relations (McKee, 2009). Building on this conceptualization in this work, I demonstrate how 
worldview of farmers in Samrat Ashok Sagar (SAS) project area are historically constructed and 
intersubjective which has led to multiple (rationalities) site of governing in the project area wherein 
each actor exercises his/her power. To cite an instance, Gill (1995, pp. 411-412) has developed a 
framework of power and posits ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ as perpetuation  of concrete form of 
structural and disciplinary power. Here, neoliberalism as an idea is bureaucratized and 
institutionalized with varying degrees and intensity across public and private spheres wherein 
discipline embodies both transnational and local dimensions of power. This conceptualization of 
power does not concede to state as sole monolithic centre of power. Rather it is posited that there 
are multiple sites from power can be exercised for instance, by international institutions or NGOs 
(Hart, 2004, p. 92). Moreover, the above conceptualization facilitates in going beyond the traditional 
understanding of hierarchical state control, towards a more enabling state that is promoting 
involvement of private and local community (McKee, 2009). Power here is situated in network of 
human interactions and actors worldview changes when any practice (for instance downstream 
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farmers drawing water fist) is regarded legitimate by attaching normative values to it and this results 
in institutionalization of the practice. It is noteworthy that discussion on legitimacy have had varied 
focus, viz. Habermas’s (1975) conceptualization of formally structured social forms like the state or 
societal authority systems of Weber (1968), or Powell and Dimaggio’s focus on (1991) organizations 
(J. Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek, & Norman, 1998, p. 380). The concept of legitimacy is fundamental for 
understanding social process as it mediates relationship between power and authority and thus 
affects establishment, persistence and change of organizational forms (J. Berger et al., 1998, p. 379). 
As, legitimacy provides institutions validity and thus, is crucial internal mechanism of control in actors 
worldview (Mielke et al., 2011, p. 15). For instance, in case of participation in irrigation management, 
how the idea is legitimized and gains salience is critical to understand. Figure 3.3 illustrates the 
relationship between participation, legitimacy and power. 
Figure 3. 3: Relationship between participation, legitimacy and power  
 
Figure 3.3 illustrates that perpetuation of certain idea of participation for agricultural water resource 
management in the policy realm has led to discursive construction of norms, beliefs and values for 
irrigation management practice. Taking an ideational approach here, facilitate in understanding not 
only how reform process shape but also shed light on how idea of farmer participation is legitimized 
by actors, in different contexts, an aspect that is overlooked while designing institutions.  
As discussed earlier, ideational variables that define actor’s ideational role and realm are norms, 
beliefs, and values. These variables are also identified as institutional variables. Both the perspectives 
-ideational and institutional- give salience to the idea that meanings are causes; however, the 
difference between the two is ontological. As by taking ideational approach different aspects of 
causality are discerned, i.e. ideational explanation facilitates in discerning how actors understand 
causality of norms/beliefs/values. Thus, the distinction between the two is in terms of explicating 
•Perpetuation of 
certain idea of 
participation for 
irrigation management 
and policy realm 
Participation 
•Discursive 
construction of 
norms, values, beliefs 
for irrigation 
management practice 
and authority  
Legitimacy  
•Framing decentralized 
irrigation 
management as an 
idea that will resolve 
maladies  -financial 
crisis- of irrigation 
bureaucracies  
Power 
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‘how’ causality works. One aspect gives greater salience to totality of institutional structures while 
the other to actor’s ideational realm which is guided by not only economic structures but also 
political and cultural structures.   
Bearing in mind the above discussion, the concept of ideational realm in this study is posited as 
actors’ interpretation of situation, and not the situation itself, that determines a way forward for an 
actor. Actors’ choices are narrowed down when they take a certain subjective or objective 
standpoint for interpreting things. Thus, ideational elements facilitate in providing an interpretative 
dynamics, which makes it distinct from mere structural or cultural explanations rather one needs to 
view it as interdependence of structural and cultural ideation.  
3.4 Operationalizing ideational realm in context of irrigation management  
The previous section elucidates conceptualization of ideational realm for this research and also 
clarifies the ideational variables that are salient to understand actor’s ideational realm. This section 
elaborates how ideational realm has been operationalized for this research. From the above sections 
it is evident that rationality of actor’s (i.e. why they take certain decisions) cannot be explained only 
through structural or cultural ideation. Rather one needs to take into account interdependence of 
structural and cultural ideation. The analytical framework to study ideational realm of actors’ is 
elaborated in Table 3.2.  
Table 3. 2: Analytical framework to study ideational realm  
Formation of 
ideational realm: 
ideational variables 
Signifier of ideational realm Understanding ideational realm 
Norms, beliefs, 
culture, ideology, 
structure 
Cognitive or normative frame 
Programs, frames, public sentiments, and 
brokers 
Idea of participation 
& politics 
Actors* perception and their 
capabilities over time (based 
on the ideational frame that 
they follow) vis-à-vis the 
world around them result in 
creation of dominant mind-
set/worldview/mansikta 
 Salience and perpetuation of certain idea of 
participation in irrigation management in 
policy realm 
 Discursive construction of irrigation 
management practices 
 Framing decentralized irrigation 
management as an idea that will resolve the 
maladies of bleeding irrigation bureaucracies 
and benefit farmers  
 Discursive construction of (irrigation) 
decision making authority – differences 
between mandated and actual practice of 
irrigation management  
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: Ideas, Actors and Ideational Realms 
 
 
 
 
51 
Formation of 
ideational realm: 
ideational variables 
Signifier of ideational realm Understanding ideational realm 
Participation and politics are structured by certain settings of institutions i.e. configurations which are 
established due to prevalent structural and cultural dimensions 
* For this research, relevant actors are farmers, farmer organizations, junior and senior bureaucracy, Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO). 
 
In context of irrigation management -which is the subject of this research- to understand how 
irrigation management practices are structured by ideational realm it is critical to understand who 
has the authority or decision making power, how policy decisions for irrigation management are 
made. Table 3.2 provides an analytical framework to do the same based on the theoretical 
underpinnings discussed in previous sections. To elaborate, it is premised that to understand 
ideational realm focus ought to be on ideational frame that actors follow as it influences ideational 
role and realm of actors’. Actor’s studied in this work are farmers/farmer organization, (junior and 
senior) bureaucracy, experts, and NGO who work at interface of ideational realm based on their 
cognitive or normative frame as structural and cultural dimensions mould ideational frames, and are 
crucial analytically to understand institutional change building on the discussion in previous section 
(c.f. Campbell, 2004). Additionally, in the above table, following Berman (2013) ideational variables 
that are identified to be crucial to study are norms, beliefs, culture, ideology and structure which 
determine what meaning of participation for instance is propounded by an actor.  
Typology of ideas viz. programmes, frames, paradigms and public sentiments are critical for 
operationalizing ideational realm as elaborated in Table 3.2. To elaborate, First, it is premised that 
salience and perpetuation of certain idea of participation in irrigation management in policy realm is 
due to elite prescriptions as propounded by international organizations and experts, which has led 
to, for instance, top-down designing of institutions (creating farmer organizations) for irrigation 
management. Additionally, programmatic ideas were propounded by designing representative 
institutions by mandating inclusion of women and/or marginalized sections (discussed in empirical 
chapters five, seven, and eight). Secondly, it is premised that to understand ideational realm focus 
ought to be on discursive construction of irrigation management practices. To wit, perpetuation of 
certain assumptions about management of irrigation systems to legitimize programs available to 
decision makers/ senior bureaucracy on one hand and on the other hand a contra discursive practice 
formulated by junior bureaucracy by propagating a strategic and normative imagery of irrigation 
practice. Third, to understand ideational realm, framing of idea is critical. For instance, framing of 
decentralized irrigation management as an idea that will resolve the maladies of bleeding irrigation 
bureaucracies and benefit farmers discussed in subsequent chapters. Additionally, framing of ideas is 
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also critical to understand how actors strategically construct realms about who has the decision-
making power.  
Overall in Table 3.2, the ideational realm is conceptualized as an understanding of how actors’ 
(farmers, farmer organizations, bureaucracy, NGO) perceive themselves and their capabilities over 
time vis-à-vis the world around them i.e. their worldview/mind-set/mansikta. The notion of 
ideational realm of actors facilitates in understanding institutional change, in this case 
decentralization i.e. devolution of governance structure for irrigation management at the 
intermediate level. It is premised that institutional change or any reform process is contingent on 
actors’ agency i.e. willingness and capability to exercise influence, as this determines which ideas, 
practices, knowledge, information gets diffused or reinforced in a certain setting. Thus, ideational 
realm of actors is a useful analytical tool to understand and elucidate how certain ideas gain salience 
in policy making, how certain irrigation practices (like salience of undertaking warabandi (fixed time 
and date for water supply) in large scale projects) and decision making authority is reinforced and 
perpetuated over time despite known lacunae. To wit, rules, norms and meaning arise through 
interactions and they are preserved and modified through human behaviour (W. R. Scott, 2008). 
Furthermore, understanding position of actor’s in context of irrigation management is a complicated 
exercise and needs to go beyond the predominant viewpoint of actors’, for instance, farmers are 
profit maximizers or that irrigation officials are rent maximizers (Mollinga, 2003, p. 27). As mentioned 
in the earlier paragraph, key actors’ whose perceptions on irrigation management are studied in this 
research are farmers, farmer organizations, NGOs, and bureaucracy.  
In literature there are different conceptualizations of NGOs: not for profit organization, independent 
organization, third front, voluntary organization, separate from market and state, separate from 
politics, and the difference between the three generation of NGOs (Fisher, 1997, pp. 446-448; Petras, 
1997). Thus, it needs to be clarified that NGOsxxx for this research are envisaged as significant actors -
and fall under the typology of brokers (in reference to Figure 3.1) - for deepening democracy by 
facilitating decentralization. As key development agents, NGOs have also become key partners of 
both governments and donor agencies in implementing development programmes. However, in their 
role as political entrepreneurs (to use Chhotray’s terminology), NGOs are not devoid of politics and 
use various repertoires to make headway with the state functionaries (political office bearers, 
bureaucrats and other officials) to elicit greater participation and accountability (ibid.). Similarly, 
international organizations are also conceptualized as brokers in this work, who have propounded 
the idea of farmer participation in irrigation management drawing on ideology of neoliberalism and 
communitarianism.  
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Given, there are diverse facets to the idea of participation in irrigation management literature and 
this affects how this idea is implemented in context of irrigation management. It is imperative thus to 
elaborate on various meaning of participation that are there which affects practices of irrigation 
management, and the same is discussed briefly in this section. The typology of participation (Table 
3.3) developed by Agarwal (2001) in context of inclusion of women in community based forest 
management is worth mention in context of this work to evaluate how participatory approaches are 
implemented.  
Table 3. 3: Typology of participation 
Form/level of participation Characteristic features 
Nominal participation  Membership in the group 
Passive participation 
Being informed of decisions ex post facto; or 
attending meetings and listening in on decision-
making without speaking up 
Consultative participation 
Being asked an opinion in specific matters without 
guarantee of influencing decisions 
Activity-specific participation 
Being asked to (or volunteering to) undertake 
specific tasks 
Active participation  
Expressing opinions, whether or not solicited, or 
taking initiatives of other sorts 
Interactive (empowering) participation Having voice and influence in the group’s decision 
Source: Agarwal (2001, p. 1624) 
Table 3.3 illustrates that normative and/or cognitive aspects influence participation of individuals in 
meetings. Normative aspects here include social norms that define gender segregation of public 
space or gendered division of labour, or gendered behavioural patterns restrict participation. 
Similarly, cognitive aspects include social perceptions for instance, incorrect perceptions regarding 
women’s ability impinges men’s reluctance to include women in activities, or the social perception 
that farmers don’t know the science of irrigation management; other elements that restrict 
participation are household endowment and attributes, men’s entrenched claim and control over 
community structures (B. Agarwal, 2001). Nominal participation is of least influence in this typology, 
as it just ensures membership and thus envisages commanding-managing people’s participation 
through quorums for instance. Whilst interacting (empowering) participation envisages regulating 
social processes and is more substantial in nature. Based on the above discussion, for the purpose of 
this research participation is conceptualized as not apolitical. Moreover, is assumed that 
participation as a practice influences the workings of power in the decentralization process and 
fosters inclusion/exclusion in spaces in which participation occurs (adapted from Bebbington, 2004, 
p. 281). The notion of participation conceptualized for this research emphasizes more inclusive 
participation that acknowledges the agency of citizens as ‘makers and shapers’ rather than users and 
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choosers of interventions (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000 cited in Gaventa, 2004, p. 29). According to the 
typology of participation advanced by Agarwal (2001), the meaning of participation used implied in 
this research would fall in the last category of interacting (empowering) participation. 
To sum up, I argue in this chapter that to study ideational change, one needs to focus both on the 
creation of political spaces and the emergence of new ideas to fill them. This necessitates paying 
attention not only to the structural variables and impersonal forces, but also to case specific factors 
(i.e. local socio-cultural context) and agency (Berman, 2013, p. 229). The analytical framework for 
understanding ideational realm elaborated in Table 3.2 takes care of this aspect. For instance, state 
ideology as discussed in next chapter is an instance of structural and impersonal force that influences 
outcome of intermediate level decentralization, whilst the empirical chapters focus on case specific 
factors and agency of actors in shaping implementation of decentralization in Madhya Pradesh. 
To further elaborate the application of analytical framework in this dissertation: chapter four focuses 
on elaborating how ideas have influenced irrigation management in India at the national level, and 
have led to creation of a certain ideational realm for irrigation management. This is achieved through 
process tracing of key ideas that emerged due to given political and social structures in context of 
irrigation management in India. In subsequent chapters (five to nine) the focus is on particularistic 
aspects. The focus is on applying the conceptual framework of ideational realm discussed in this 
chapter. These chapters (five to nine) highlight salience of actors in influencing implementation of 
irrigation management policy and thereby obstructing decentralization at the intermediate level. The 
focus is also on elaborating how and what type of idea of participation for irrigation management 
gained salience in the state of Madhya Pradesh and in the SAS Project, which is the case study site. 
Chapter ten is the concluding chapter and brings together the discussion on roadblocks to 
implementation of PIM at the intermediate level. 
3.5 Summing up 
This chapter outlines and clarifies the key terms and the analytical framework that is used to 
understand roadblock to decentralizing irrigation management in this research. Ideational literature 
does not have enough cases that elucidate processes through which ideas become institutionalized 
and affect political outcomes over time. More so, cases that carefully investigate ways in which ideas 
shape or form both actors’ motivations and contexts (Berman, 2013, p. 217), and that is where this 
research contributes conceptually to the discussion by illustrating a case where ideas that gained 
salience earlier in time have slowed down the learning process for new idea (of participatory 
management) to stick through as the earlier idea of irrigation management has institutionalized 
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actors motivations and contexts in a certain way. Additionally, given the criticism of ideational 
research that ‘motivations and causality continue to be somewhat unclear and confused’ (ibid.), the 
case of participatory irrigation management also provides insights in this context in subsequent 
chapters of this dissertation.  
 
                                                          
xxv
 An epistemic community is ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ 
(Haas, 1992, p. 3) 
xxvi
 New theorizing of participation requires posing awkward questions about attitudes and behaviours and to 
understand not only the framing of participation but also the sites from where it is advocated and promoted 
(Bebbington, 2004, pp. 278-279). 
xxvii
 Structuralist account can be manifold, however, all scholars of structure build on the classical social science 
theorists, i.e. Marx’s foundation and Weber’s edifice. To elaborate, both Marx and Weber grappled with 
fundamental transformations associated with rise of capitalism. While Marx developed a general strategy for 
socialist revolution; Weber examined human behaviour in a society through the notion of legitimate authority, 
and thus developed the theoretical and normative demands of the bureaucratic state (Lichbach & Zuckerman, 
1997, pp. 4-5; Weber, 2009, p. 84). Drawing on tradition of Marx and Weber, structuralists draw together long-
standing interests in political and social institutions and provide response to how state and societies interact 
(Lichbach & Zuckerman, 1997, p. 6). 
xxviii
 Ideational research can be categorized into four major types with focus on four main dimensions, viz. 
affective versus cognitive; end versus means; tight consensual versus loose/contested and coherent versus 
incoherent (Parsons, 2007, p. 123). Parsons argues essentiality of (loosely) following one of these 
categorizations (though they are not mutually exclusive), as otherwise the theoretical claims become weak and 
less distinct. 
xxix
 More and more it is being recognized that there needs to be a fine balance of material and non-material 
identities to explain why actors take certain action based on their context, as otherwise it provides only 
lopsided perception (c.f. Friedman, 1996; Green & Shapiro, 1994). 
xxx In liberal democratic theory, civil society has been propagated for its functional as well substantive notions 
(as they act as a realm of mediation between the political and the social) and at the heart of which are NGOs, 
often referred to as the third sector/ third realm (Baker, 2004 p. 43). NGOs have been identified as civil society 
with huge body of literature especially by donor agencies as symbolic civil society, which provides immense 
opportunities to set up development projects especially for democratization or participatory development. 
However departing from this literature, this research acknowledges that NGOs are not synonymous with civil 
society. Rather their association in this context must be treated carefully, relationally and historically 
(Chhotray, 2008, p. 262). 
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4 Ideational realms for irrigation management in India 
Understanding how the Indian state pursued democracy, development and decentralization has 
intrigued scholars as it provides an insight into how state functions and also sheds light on the 
present state of affairs. Why has the Indian state not been able to change over time despite making 
several efforts to decentralize is a critical question to ponder in this context. Most of the responses 
to this question focus on origins of a certain institutional configuration and leave unexplained the 
subsequent reproduction. Thus, analyses like bureaucratic inertia or historical momentum are 
offered in literature as the reason for an unsatisfactory state (Chibber, 2006, p. 11). Chibber argues 
that as long as the political elites are nominally committed to ensuing a development agenda despite 
being aware that the existing state apparatus lacks the capacity to serve its function, it is critical to 
ask why elites abide by a weak state (ibid.). This line of questioning useful for this work as a similar 
question is dealt in this research i.e. why efforts to decentralization have been ineffective despite 
several efforts made in the last few decades. As discussed in chapter one, this research hypothesizes 
that an actor’s ideational realms is crucial for decentralization of irrigation management. This chapter 
reviews and analyzes the irrigation management literature in India to identify various ideational 
(ideology, norms, beliefs, culture, structure) dimensions that influence actors’ ideational realm at the 
national level. Furthermore, this chapter also maps the emergence of a certain idea of irrigation 
management in the Indian policy narrative and how this has influenced actors’ ideational role and 
realm on irrigation management.  
There is no dearth of literature review on irrigation management on India (See GoI, 1972; Gulati, 
Meinzen-Dick, & Raju, 2005; Mollinga, 2003; Ramamurthy, 1995; T. Shah, 2009; inter alia); thus, 
making readers sceptical of reading another review that many may perceive just casts old wine in the 
new bottle. This chapter does not intend to do that. Rather the reasons for undertaking historical 
review of irrigation management are two-fold: First, irrigation management has not been looked till 
now using the lens of ideational realm.xxxi The newness is not only in terms of exploring and/or 
elucidating irrigation management in India through the lens of ideational realm. Rather I argue 
through this research that ideational realm is an important perspective to understand (and influence) 
the maladies that the irrigation sector in India faces today. Any understanding of how the ideational 
realms of actors’ currently involved in irrigation management is incomplete, without understanding 
how actors developed a particular viewpoint or how it has evolved over a period of time. Salience of 
history and time is important in any analysis, but particularly for this research it gains even more 
significance, as actors’ realms are not formed overnight. Rather are formulated, guided and evolve 
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with time and are influenced by structural, socio-political and cultural context (using key 
international cases, salience of these elements for this research was established in chapter two). In 
this chapter historical review and analysis facilitates in elucidating why systemic change is not 
happening, though new ideas have been discussed in context of irrigation management over the last 
century. A critical insight from institutionalist approach is that historically entrenched patterns of 
behaviours and social relations powerfully constrain and shape possible future outcomes. 
Consequently, a predominant viewpoint is that even if institutional reform is desirable, path 
dependency will give a particular cast to how reforms shape up (Bell, 2002, p. 20). However, this 
chapter elucidates that though ideas about content and direction of reform in irrigation management 
are important, diffusion and adoption of ideas largely depends on context/circumstances in which 
they are promoted. Moreover, it is not only circumstances - window of opportunities - that are 
important to identify and understand, but also the ideational processes, which is characterised by 
contestation and reflect the interests, values and power of their upholders or in other words actors’ 
ideational realm. Ideas for irrigation management influence ideational realms only to an extent and 
are contingent on factors -socio-political, cultural or structural rationalities- that gain primacy in 
defining an actors’ ideational role. Mere introduction of a new idea does not guarantee that it will 
gain constituency among all actors. One needs to take a broader/historical viewpoint and understand 
how and when certain ideas gain constituency in actors’ ideational realm and how state policy is 
influenced by it. 
Second, through the lens of ideational realm, three distinct fields of literature on irrigation as 
articulated by Mollinga (2003, pp. 13-14) are brought together: i) intervention or action-oriented 
literature i.e. policy oriented literature on irrigation management; ii) understanding-oriented 
irrigation literature i.e. work being undertaken by universities and research institutions; iii) academic 
literature on irrigation i.e. historical, sociological, political work on irrigation for instance. This diverse 
field of literature provide an overview of different bearing on actors’ and their ideational realms. This 
chapter gleans through various perspectives, for instance, meaning-centred or structure-centred 
accounts in order to understand and explain causation due to perpetuation of certain idea for 
irrigation management. Understanding of class based differential access to resources, for instance, 
does not become clear from static analysis of irrigation management. Rather necessitates a more 
dynamic review as it comes from and is embedded in actors’ ideational realm (who is from different 
classes as well). Focus of most of the literature review on irrigation management in India has been on 
accounting the problems related to irrigation management and the question of rights, however, what 
is lacking is the distinction between different behaviour and beliefs and how that results in origin and 
perpetuation of ideational realms for irrigation management. It is critical to understand political 
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motivations of actors’ or state, as that is a guide to understanding ideational realms, and this 
necessitates reading between lines to glean motivations and perceptions thereby different realms of 
actors’. This exercise has not been done thus far in context of understanding the trajectory of 
irrigation management in India. Furthermore, this interpretation is critical for this research as this 
chapter provides a historical backbone and aids in substantiating and understanding the state of 
affairs in the SAS Project in the subsequent empirical chapters. The aforesaid mentioned reasons are 
significant and merit a discussion on predominant as well as contrasting ideational realms on 
irrigation management and their evolution in the Indian context.  
Contrasting explanations to understand trajectory of irrigation management in 
India 
In academic writing, one of the dominant meta-narrative is that the roots of the present crises (of 
water management) can be traced back to the arrival of British in India, when there was a call for 
technocratic solutions to manage the environment and that has continued till date, despite different 
political regimes/authority. Another predominant idea is that historically, community has had 
customary rights over waterxxxii in India and has been involved in use-management of all natural 
resources (DCAP, 2003). In addition, in contemporary writing, binary explication of ‘traditional’ 
versus ‘modern development’ has been used to explicate changes in water sector (Sengupta, 1985). 
Another narrative is furthered by Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan (2000), D’Souza (2006), Rangan and 
Kull (2009) who posit that emerging pattern of environment transformation cannot be explained by 
this binary explication. Rather deeper exploration of past is necessary. Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan 
(2000, p. 14) explore the role of agrarian change in emerging patterns of environmental 
transformation and conflict, and aver that methodologically it is important to explore the dynamic 
relationship between history and current moments to understand how present is inflected by past 
utopian aspirations (Agrawal & Sivaramakrishnan, 2000, pp. 12,14). The neomalthusian 
explanationxxxiii for understanding ecological change is critiqued by D’Souza (2006, p. 12) and he 
argues that one needs to understand the longue duréexxxiv of environmental history in India.xxxv 
D’Souza in his work emphasises basin histories. Additionally, scholars like Agrawal and 
Sivaramakrishnan (2000), D’Souza (2006), and Skaria (2003) among others, have critiqued Gadgil & 
Guha ( 2002) and Shiva (2002) for not going too far in the history to understand ecological change, 
and in only explaining certain idea of the ‘modernist cathexis of the natural’xxxvi (Skaria, 2003, p. 266). 
It is argued by Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan (2000, p. 19) that the theoretical and conceptual 
relationship between modernity and environment, ought to focus on understanding that the colonial 
or post-colonial variants of modernity are integrally connected to the very production of the idea of 
nature or natural. Thus, importance and emphasis on history to understand environmental change or 
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management becomes evident for any research that aims to understand the root of the present 
problems in irrigation management. So, rather than emphasizing that with modern development 
transformation in water sector occurred it is imperative to understand how modern development 
seeded/influenced the idea of irrigation management in India.  
Therefore, the following section (4.1) analyzes historically how the events during the colonial period 
instituted a certain technocratic (bureaucratic) ideational realm in irrigation management that 
celebrated modern scientific rationality (logic of governing) over traditional management of irrigation 
systems. The emphasis is also on elucidating how this impacted perception of engineers about 
themselves and their work. In Section 4.2, emphasis is on elucidating, how the Indian state engaged 
with the idea of irrigation management post-independence, and how this has reproduced centrist 
state policy as an ideational belief for irrigation management. This section also elucidates role of 
bureaucracy and international organizations in influencing/shaping predominant idea for irrigation 
management and participation in state ideology. Section 4.3 focuses on explicating the turn of events 
post-nineties in India, and how post-nineties the tenets of neoliberalism have influenced ideational 
realm of actors. Section 4.4 briefly summarizes the ideational variables that gain salience from the 
discussion in this chapter. 
4.1 Origin of ideational realms in irrigation management 
Salient ideational factors to understand pre-colonial irrigation management 
Several scholars (A. Agarwal & Narain, 1997b; Bottrall, 1992; Ludden, 1978; Mosse, 1999; Sengupta, 
1985) have accounted for and elaborated on different types of system of irrigation management 
prevalent in pre-colonial and colonial India. For instance, King Krishna Devarãya initiated farmer 
management of irrigation systems by handing over management to local village councils in the 
sixteenth century (Maloney & Raju, 1994, p. 41). The Grand Anicuts currently part of Tamil Nadu 
have historical records dating back to second century AD and is considered an engineering excellence 
of the ancient Indians (Maloney & Raju, 1994; Sengupta, 1985, p. 1920). Similar evidence also exists 
for northern India, for instance, some of the Yamuna canals date back to fourteenth century (World 
Bank, 1991b, p. 1) and were managed by the local community. The ecological zones and cultural 
economy of irrigation in Southern Tamil Nadu between ninth and nineteenth century has been 
studied by Ludden, who posits that ‘institutional basis for (irrigation management) was shaped by 
the complex cultural and historical context under which the irrigation economy developed’ (Ludden, 
1978, p. 4 parenthesis and emphasis added).xxxvii From this brief description, the overall picture of 
pre-colonial India that emerges is that there were well-defined local water rights and quotidian 
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management of water was devolved to local agriculturists (Bottrall, 1992, p. 228). Society during that 
period had a decentralized approach to water management. Furthermore, relations of production 
and management of resources was determined by complex socio-political (structural) and cultural 
ideational factors like caste, political status, material ownership of resources, and institutional 
hierarchy (chieftain, king) played a key role.  
Bureaucratization of water management in the colonial era 
After the advent of the British in India majority of these indigenous irrigation works that were locally 
managed till then were eliminated by the East Indian Company, and these works were bestowed on 
company officials (Sengupta, 1985, p. 1923). The ryotwari settlement is intriguing, as the commonly 
owned properties like eries (tanks) were vested with the government, and the responsibility of 
maintenance lay with the revenue officials. The British learnt their first practical lesson in irrigation 
management when they realized that the formal training of revenue officials was not of any 
particular significance for carrying out the maintenance work; thus, the revenue spent under this 
head was getting wasted (Sengupta, 1985, p. 1924). Therefore, seeking new expertise, civil engineers 
of the army were called in as experts in this area. It was circumstances that made irrigation science a 
subject of civil engineering; the shackles of which it has not been able to break till date (Gilmartin, 
1994, p. 1135; Sengupta, 1985). Once the civil engineers were identified as experts their involvement 
in irrigation development and management gradually increased and canal administration was done 
under ‘Canal and Drainage Act (VIII of 1873)’ in northern India which created institutional hierarchies 
that ran from chief engineer down through superintending engineers to the executive engineers who 
controlled circles of canal sections. Thus, a new cadre of specialist irrigation engineers was created 
(Bottrall, 1992, p. 230). The irrigation engineers underscored new concepts like irrigation efficiency 
and pressed for projects of larger and larger scale that were capable of integrating local irrigation 
works into larger systems which gradually resulted in bureaucratization of canal administration 
(Gilmartin, 1994, p. 1135). At the local level, executive engineers entrusted themselves not only with 
problems of technical design and overall efficiency in operation of canals, but also with managing 
large numbers of local subordinate workers (ibid., pp. 1135-1136).xxxviii Thus, the irrigation 
department was bestowed with all-important rights. Gradually, the system became more integrated 
and the manner of functioning of irrigation engineers was not very different from other colonial 
officers and the bureaucratization process was thus set in place (Gilmartin, 1994, pp. 1135-1136).  
In northern India, water rights of users were in relation to the limited entitlement that farmers had 
to available water, as per the warabandi roster prepared by the irrigation department staff (Bottrall, 
1992, p. 230). The engineers in North were in constant discussion about most relevant management 
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techniques to follow.xxxix The company officials in Northern India experimented with several 
engineering and social control methods for distribution and management of the irrigation systems. 
The engineers did so, as they had strong pressure from higher authorities to ensure that canal’s 
financial and famine prevention objectives were met. Moreover, they were not legally accountable 
to water users, so not much consultation with them was undertaken apart from reaching an 
agreement on how to maintain tertiary watercourse channels (Mollinga, 2005). Overall, an aspect 
that is salient is that the colonial engineers (British and Indian) were oriented towards discussing and 
solving field level problems, however, they were not inclined to take the viewpoint of farmers while 
taking a decision of maintenance of watercourse channels i.e. take into account perception of 
farmers and socio-cultural factors that influence management of water, as they were no such 
directives from the colonial state. Thus, it becomes evident that during this period there was no 
space to for alternative ideas like community based water resource management to develop. 
Moreover, with enactment of laws during the colonial period, there was change in customary rights 
and natural resource management was brought within the control of the colonial state (c.f. Iyer, 
2003, p. 84). In this context, Gadgil and Guha ( 1992) have noted that a strong interventionist colonial 
state asserted its proprietary right over non-private resources, for instance, water and forest which 
primarily led to demise of traditional systems of sustainable resource use. Although, this view has 
been confuted by Mosse (1999) who argues in context of tank irrigation systems in Southern India by 
pointing out that tanks were not maintained and operated by autonomous village institutions, but by 
the wider political relations of the decentralized or ‘segmentary’ (Stein, 1980) pre-colonial states 
(Mosse, 1999, pp. 304-305, 314).  
Further, events of that time created generations of ‘engineer-managers’ who take pride in their 
professional competence and are dedicated to achievement of their assigned tasks through 
adherence to a code of paternalist, quasi-military discipline (Bottrall, 1992, p. 231). For instance, in 
several projects in northern India, canal irrigation was extended without paying attention to tradition 
and they faced popular resistance and/or failed to achieve desired results (ibid., pp. 1924-1925).xl 
Similarly, Mosse (1999, p. 304) argues that colonial government in India ‘formalized, generalized and 
invented customs and traditions of village communities as a basis for minor irrigation 
administration’. However, in case of tank irrigation in South India, the old traditions like 
Kudimaramat were vital for tank maintenance and administration for the colonial state (Mosse, 
1997, p. 379).xli Second, the colonial state legitimized the demand for village labour as long standing 
custom (Mosse, 1999, pp. 311-312). Overall, with colonial rule in India, rights of local community for 
management of irrigation systems were redefined, as the British followed a policy of centralized 
Ideational Realms for Irrigation Management in India 
 
 
 
 
62 
management of irrigation system (Maloney & Raju, 1994), thus water resource management was 
bureaucratized in colonial India. 
Perception of the colonial state about environment and community  
With advent of colonizers in India the relationship between environment (resource use), state and 
community was redefined. To elaborate:  
“Critical for the structure of British rule was the fact that by tying Indians to the land 
(and by legally defining their relationship to the land through institution of private 
property), the British tied them also into a social scientific discourse in which the 
language of ‘community’ and ‘custom’ defined a local social order associated with the 
colonial state. This discourse lay at the heart of ‘scientific empire’” (Gilmartin, 1994, p. 
1133). 
Consequently, irrigation was categorized as major, medium and minor mainly for revenue and 
managerial purpose (Vani, 1992). Thus, the British initiated the process of viewing the environment 
(water/ forest resources) for its productive uses which (in turn) necessitated disciplining water users, 
and the environment in general (Gilmartin, 1995, p. 213). They introduced the notion of colonial 
taxes and policies for water usage, which led to transformation of water into a commodity, which 
until then the community had customary rights over. Given, that the chief interest of colonizers was 
capital maximization (by viewing water resources as a productive resource); they did not pay any 
attention to develop bureaucratic administration as an instrument for instituting socio-economic 
change. Rather the only purpose of the administration was policing (i.e. maintaining law and order) 
and to collect irrigation revenue (Jain & Chaudhuri, 1982, p. 4). Moreover, by using the process of 
revenue settlement, the British enmeshed the local powerful elite (men) to the state. They were 
drawn into the scientific discourse of privilege, which was (primarily) framed within the ‘local idioms 
of customary authority, genealogy and descent’ (Gilmartin, 1994, p. 1133). The local power holders 
became the dealer of local knowledge (irrigation customs, and traditions) irrespective of the fact that 
the value and meanings the two (British administrators and local elites) attached to local practices 
were different. Thus, the colonial state engaged with the local elites who represented the local 
(material) structural and cultural hierarchy and embedded them with the narrative of science, 
planning and management of resources.  
Colonialism also commodified access to water for irrigation purposes. To elaborate, rules of irrigator 
behaviour were framed that allowed the bureaucracy (engineers/ administrators) to control people 
as they controlled water. These rules indicated proper irrigation practices (application of water to 
fields), prohibited cultivation of certain crops in certain areas and were enforced by a system of 
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monitoring and levying fines (Gilmartin, 1995, p. 224). The high extractive revenue agendas 
dismantled community control over natural resources and caused impoverishment of the rural 
communities (D'Souza, 2006, p. 4). It also led to decay and destruction of numerous water harvesting 
systems that were in place.xlii The political imperatives of colonial domination necessitated 
separation of the state from natural environment and the Indian society, as the prevalent concept of 
participation that required maximizing state users was not acceptable to the colonial rulers 
(Gilmartin, 1995, p. 213). The community was made part of the state’s project of environmental 
transformation with the assumption that community’s requirement of water use can be adapted 
with the larger requirements of hydraulic models of planning (ibid., p. 214). Community was re-
defined by the British through codification using ‘census surveys, classifications of castes, tribes, 
languages, and religions to help to lay the foundations for their power’ (Gilmartin, 1994, p. 1127).  
The case of irrigation system in the Indus basin (during the colonial period) highlights how the 
colonial state pursued a system of domination where ‘local irrigators were included within a larger 
hydraulic environment, but were separated from the culture of scientific modelling that defined this 
larger hydraulic system’ (Gilmartin, 1995, p. 232). The British brought with them the ‘notion of 
disciplining the colonial society’, who were seen as the ‘savage other’ (ibid., p. 213). A process of 
othering and naturalization of local community was undertaken and community was bundled with 
the environment - an entity to be controlled (ibid., pp. 214, 227). Similarly, environmental modelling 
(for instance canal building) and change was tied to the larger political process of colonial control and 
the imperative to rule (Gilmartin, 1994, p. 1129). The colonial state was also inherently irreconcilable 
with development of a civil society, as colonial governance was not about self-government. Rather, 
‘it had to function as an aspect of coercion, that is, instituting the sovereignty of alien rulers’ 
(Prakash, 1999, p. 126). There is strong relation between irrigation and nation building, as efforts to 
civilize discipline citizens was an exercise of nation building (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004b, p. 314). Thus, 
water resource management was not only bureaucratized in colonial India; but also boundaries for 
interactions between states, society and environment were set through these categorizations that 
exuberate relations of power in order to control production system. 
Some of the outcomes of the above processes -colonial capitalism- were revenue maximization, 
commercialization, commodification and/or the urgency to extend the agrarian frontiers that were 
critical in transforming the existing relationship between pre-colonial society and nature (D'Souza, 
2006, p. 6). There was transformation of community’s relationship with environment from 
subsistence to the order of British colonizers to meet endless demand for commodities (Agrawal & 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2000, p. 35).xliii Rebuilding of canal in Dehra Dun was undertaken to irrigate large 
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tracts of uncultivated wasteland, and as a consequence of it land prices rose in this area rapidly, as 
European merchants rushed to buy large tracts of land fuelling a surge of land mania in speculation 
of profit (ibid., p. 37). The colonizers set up large scale irrigation work that was controlled centrally 
and provided high revenues (Hardiman, 1995, pp. 189-190). Though, the colonizers claimed 
frequently that they wished to preserve irrigation systems, however, in practice they did little to 
preserve these systems, as low value was put on anything organized by peasantry. Mitchell (2002) in 
context of Egypt talks about the significance of ‘enframing’xliv for the colonial project. The political 
significance of this ordering can be seen in the context of India as well in terms of mathematical 
modelling of the environment that was undertaken in order to discipline water users, to increase 
production, and exercise greater control. Moreover, notion of water management was given a new 
meaning: irrigation manuals were prepared which detailed rules against wastage of water, rules on 
construction and clearance of village watercourses (Gilmartin, 1995, p. 24). The agriculturists were 
believed to be incapable of managing the irrigation system on their own (Hardiman, 1995, pp. 204-
205) given the assumption that the savage other was not capable of managing water on their own. 
The colonial irrigation policy in India drew on the then prevalent international discourse of water 
engineering (Gilmartin, 1995, p. 211).  
Thus, overall new (structural) relations couched in ideas of order/control were put in place, which 
signified the dominant ideational realm (scientific ordering of society for maximization of state profit) 
of the state structure and were influenced/powered by scientific discourse for management of 
resources (forest, water, etc.). The consequence of this idea was perpetuation of what Shah (2011) 
connotes as ‘build-manage-generate-surplus-maintain’ narrative propounded by the colonial state.xlv   
Organizational culture of irrigation bureaucracies 
The relationship between masculinities and irrigation professionalism can shed light on the current 
ideational realm of bureaucrats; however, not much attention has been given to this 
interrelationship (Zwarteveen, 2008). Moreover, the circumstances of the colonial period also shed 
light on how the current organizational culture of irrigation bureaucracies has evolved. The linkages 
between water control and gender in irrigation are identified, and untangled by Zwarteveen:  
“Lynch (1993) postulated that the characteristics and culture of the ‘bureaucratic 
traditions’ to which irrigation institution and polices are tied is one that strongly 
associates decision-making and power with masculinity. The hegemonic strength of this 
tradition has long been maintained, and to some extent continues to be maintained 
through the socialisation of generation of engineers and bureaucrats. Through the 
‘bureaucratic traditions’ masculinity and professional irrigation identity have come to 
belong to each other; they mutually constitute and define each other at symbolic and 
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metaphorical levels. This means that the irrigation profession and the professional status 
of those working in the field of irrigation are partly delineated through a gender 
demarcation. Attributes and skills that are seen as typical characteristics of good 
irrigation professional –such as technical competence, physical strength, being in 
command, self-confidence, and rationality – are normally seen as characteristics 
belonging more to men then to women” (Zwarteveen, 2008, p. 115). 
Additionally, several of the irrigation engineers were army (men) and trained in military colleges 
(Gilmartin, 1994). The imagery of engineers in colonial India was that of ‘pioneering colonial heroes’ 
who did not hesitate to design and construct large irrigation works and get their feet dirtied in the 
mud when the occasion necessitated (Zwarteveen, 2008, p. 115). 
“The ‘masculinity’ of large public irrigation agencies and their staff was linked to the 
historical importance of irrigation in bringing about development. In many countries, 
irrigation agencies were the largest public agencies in terms of budget and numbers of 
staff. Their power and magnitude was largely based on, and legitimized by, the 
ambitious dreams of modernization that irrigation promised to realize, consisting of 
making deserts bloom and bringing prosperity to all through huge infrastructural works” 
(Zwarteveen, 2008, p. 116). 
These associations connote to irrigation engineers an idea of being masculine, an appointment of 
power and prestige, and these therefore became virtues for irrigation engineers and the position 
that they were associated with in the eyes of general public. Moreover, the organizational culture (of 
irrigation bureaucracies) that this imagery of engineers perpetuated was that of an organization 
which is entrusted with great power, role and responsibilities, and for transforming the physical 
landscape through the infrastructural work that they undertake. This organizational culture is also a 
signifier of irrigation engineer’s ideational realm, as it gives an insight into the prevalent normative 
values and ideology that determines how they perceive their role and responsibilities.  
Thus, ideational realm of irrigation engineers during the colonial period stemmed from events of that 
period which considered the local community (farmers) as savage others, an entity to be controlled 
and regulated. Furthermore, at that time the old feudal masculinities (local power holders) and the 
new modern professional masculinities were on tenterhooks. The clash was essentially due to the 
fact that modern engineers based their demand for more water power on argument of technocracy 
and scientific rationality. While, traditional leaders based their water power on history and local 
knowledge (Zwarteveen, 2008, p. 117, citing Gilmartin 1994, 2003).  
Predominant ideas that are embedded in the above discussion of colonial ideology of resource 
management are: first, irrigation management needs to be done centrally and scientifically - a 
capability that local population lacked. Second, irrigation engineers were considered torchbearers for 
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taking forward the scientific rationale for management of resources (i.e. to bring forward the notion 
of modernity brought forth by colonizers). Thirdly, management of an irrigation system can be done 
by co-option of local leaders.  
Overall, this section elaborated how British colonialism through its idea of maximizing colonial state 
capital led to non-politicization of irrigation management, as the narrative of management was 
couched in meaning of scientific control and order, which streamlined rules of irrigation behaviour 
and proper irrigation practices. Further, pre-existing cleavages (for instance, social hierarchy based 
on caste, or material relations) in society were reinforced by the state and normalized through 
various categories like caste, community, and practices like cartographyxlvi. The normalization of 
these social categories led to their politicization. Moreover, colonial policies were beneficial for the 
colonial government and big farmers (elites in villages). However, they were at the expense of poorer 
sections of the community and the environment. In addition, the ideational realm of engineers 
viewed anything organized by farmers as of low value as their perception was of the community as 
the savage other who used traditional methods of irrigation and were not aware of scientific and 
technical know-how.  
4.2 Ideational realm post-independence in India 
Contrasting ideational beliefs for resource management  
During the late colonial rule in India, the developmentalist rationale was brought to forefront by the 
colonizers but it could not overcome the underlying contradictions of the colonial project. Therefore, 
democracy and development was imprisoned within the structures of the colonial past (Makki, 2004, 
pp. 156-157). Thus, when India gained independence in 1947 the ethos of economic nationalism was 
a dominant narrative, as a critique of the colonial rule and to overcome backwardness and poverty 
that was inflicted due to colonialism (Corbridge & Harris, 2000, p. 56). Developmentalism was the 
dominant political rationality (political logic of governing) adopted by the Indian state under the reins 
of the first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru with focus on modernization and industrialization 
through a centrist economy (Corbridge & Harris, 2000, p. 56; Kohli, 2001).xlvii The first few decades of 
development in India are best articulated as an idea embodied in planning, Planning Commission and 
Nehru itself (Corbridge & Harris, 2000, pp. 31-32). Thus, it is noteworthy that the political rationality 
(i.e. the ideational belief) followed by the postcolonial state was different from the colonial state, as 
there were conscious efforts to break away from the colonial past by pursuing policies of economic 
nationalism with the aim to redistribute benefits. Concomitantly, the dominant paradigm of 
development after independence connoted nature’s endowments with power it entailed and thus 
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had to be tamed, managed and controlled. For instance, an advertisement for a cement brand in 
India during those days read ‘the river is furious, but the dam will hold’ (Parajuli, 1991, p. 179). Thus, 
it is not surprising that the Nehruvian state employed the route of planned development (command 
economy) of an industrial society to eliminate poverty, provide social justice, and to create a self-
reliant economy (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1987, p. 62).  
Interestingly, Gandhi’s idea of gram swaraj (village republics) was the first vision of decentralization 
for Independent India which enunciated an alternative ideology of pursuing development which was 
contrastingly different from the centrist state policies propagated by the Nehruvian model. In fact, 
post independence the Indian government called E.F Schumacher as a consultant to help plan the 
development of the country. Schumacher’s (1973) ideas of ‘small is beautiful’ in his book by the same 
title  were in line with Gandhian ideology, however they were not well received by planners of that 
period. Gandhian ideas were rejected by Nehru who envisaged forming a developmental 
interventionist state which could be lodestar of economic development (Dhawan, 1990, p. 43; 
Rudolph & Rudolph, 2001, p. 161). Hence, it is not surprising that post independence the state 
apparatus continued to overlook the collapse of traditional systems of smaller village tanks and 
distributaries (Gadgil & Guha, 1995, pp. 20-21).  
Furthermore, as a consequence of centrist state policies pursued by the Nehruvian state greater 
impetus was on embracing technocratic scientific practices of the colonial state for efficient 
management of resources in order to traverse the path of economic growth and development. For 
instance, the administrative rationale behind managing forest resources, constructing large-scale 
irrigation projects to increase agricultural production is a colonial legacy. Prime Minister Nehru in his 
speech at the industries conference in December 1947, remarked that ‘development of big river 
valley schemes, dams, hydroelectric and thermal power would drive the country forward’ (GoI, 
1983a, p. 100).xlviii Overall, after adoption of policies for planned development, a major priority for 
policy makers in India was harnessing country’s water resources for irrigation and power in order to 
achieve self-sufficiency.xlix Nehru stated: 
“The key industries should be under the state control, partly because it is dangerous for 
those key and basic industries to be controlled by the private interests. (…) When a state 
plans its industrial or other development, planning itself involves a certain measure of 
control and direction from the state. The idea is to utilize our resource to the best 
advantage and going ahead with the people concerned” (GoI, 1983b, p. 142). 
Nehru envisaged state as the guardian of social and economic interest and rapid harnessing of water 
resources was the prime goal and the emphasis was on encouraging and expeditiously developing 
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projects for irrigation, flood control, hydro power generation, etc. and large number of dams and 
barrages were built. The aim was also to provide self sufficiency to a predominantly (65 per cent) 
agrarian population (GoI, 2009b, p. 6).  
From the above discussion salience of state as chief actor to pursue development becomes evident 
which was in consonance with the dominant new classical Keynesian developmental discourse of 
post world war period which posited state intervention as necessary to pursue growth and 
development (c.f. Pieterse, 2009). In light of this discourse, there was no space in the first few 
decades after independence to pursue an alternative model of development for instance, bottom up 
planning. Consequence of this state led interventionist developmental ideology has been what Shah 
(2011) connotes as ‘build-manage-neglect’ narrative. The next section elaborates the effect of this 
narrative on planning, development and viewpoint of actors.  
Perception of engineers as harbinger of growth and progress at the national 
level 
Given the focus on irrigation and development, agriculture, the backbone of Indian economy gained 
emphasis in all Five Year Plans with thrust of investments on large-scale (irrigation) infrastructure 
projects. Moreover, given the impetus on planning for large-scale development/irrigation projects 
there was an obvious orientation towards abstract science of hydrology, hydraulics and civil 
engineering, as was practiced in USA and USSR. The focus was on design of dams and canals, i.e. on 
high tech engineering. This focus on irrigation engineering as science led to decline in orientation of 
engineering science towards field level operational issues (Mollinga, 2005, p. 12). The sheer scale 
with which so many large scale projects were created led to major delay in project completion and 
commissioning and with subsequent budgetary constraints, a generation of irrigation engineers were 
isolated from experiences of day-to-day system management (Bottrall, 1992, p. 235). Engineers were 
thus, raised to the status of statesmen, for instance, the legendary M. Visvesvaraya. For engineers, 
the high-tech orientation became an accepted professional standard and there were no incentives 
for the laborious work of field level engineering. The dominant ideational realm of engineers is self 
explanatory from sentences that they uttered – ‘since democracy came, things have become 
worse’ (Mollinga, 2005, p. 17). Furthermore, importance given to engineers at national level 
becomes lucid from Nehru’s speech while addressing the annual meeting of Central Board of 
Irrigation: 
“I know of no other place in the world, which has tremendous power locked up in it as 
the Himalayas, and the water that comes to the rivers from them. How are we to utilize 
it? There are many ways. Essentially, it is the job of the engineers to tap this tremendous 
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reserve of power for the benefits of the people. (...) The profession and work of an 
engineer in India is of highest importance and significance” (GoI, 1983b, p. 84 emphasis 
added).  
The engineers and planners continued to follow an instrumental approach for water management 
that had a predilection for civil engineering solutions and an affinity to standardize procedures. Thus, 
the first four decades of independent India witnessed vigorous focus on large-scale project (more 
than 90 per cent of public investments in agriculture were for large-scale projects). Given, that 
substantial funds were channelled into making these projects, there was widespread lobbying by 
engineers, irrigation bureaucrats and contractors who had vested interest in construction of large 
dams projects (Bottrall, 1992, p. 235). Consequently, engineers/bureaucrats were perceived as 
harbingers of growth and development. 
Self assigned tutelary role of the state 
The Indian state inherited from the colonial state a common bureaucratic framework; numerous 
legislations, use of vocabularies and techniques of nation-state legitimization; a relatively centralized 
state; a well-functioning civil service; early introduction of elections; and socialization of highest 
political elites in values of liberal democracy (Kohli, 2001, p. 4; S. Roy, 2007a, p. 27) and the same is 
embedded in the Indian system and continues to be in use till date. The Nehruvian ideas worked as 
the congress party was considered the vanguard of the national movement, and had considerable 
legitimacy and popularity. After independence, Nehru and his supporters in the congress party and 
the civil service were free to construct a state suitable for a dominant party system and a planned 
economy with the demise of Gandhi, Sardar Patel, and Subhas Chandra Bose (Rudolph & Rudolph, 
2001, p. 161). Nehru was in cognizance of this fact and employed this inherited political capital wisely 
by bringing on board the rival political class under the larger political umbrella that was congress 
(Kohli, 2001, pp. 6-7). In that era of ‘command politics’ Nehru believed and argued that no Supreme 
Court and no judiciary can stand in judgement over the sovereign will of parliament that represented 
the will of the entire community (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2001, p. 141). Thus, in the Nehruvian era the 
Indian state assumed a self-assigned tutelary role as educator of its people under the high modernist 
societyl. Big infrastructure projects like large dams, city planning like Chandigarh were a result of this 
high modernist ideology in the Indian context. The high modernist ideology by itself tends to relegate 
politics, which was true for the Nehruvian state as well. The high modernist ideology draws attention 
to the ubiquitousness of the Five Year Plans that were followed in India by the Planning Commission 
and the objectification of progress through a series of preconceived goals - largely material and 
quantifiable - which were achieved through savings, labour, and investments in the interim (J. Scott, 
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1998, p. 23). In addition, the most frequently invoked figure of Nehruvian India was that of an 
‘infantile citizenli, and his need for state tutelage and protection in order to realize potential of 
citizenship, itself conceptualized as an infinitely receding horizon rather than an existing bundle of 
rights’ (S. Roy, 2007a, p. 20).  
Two points that are salient from the above discussion are political will to pursue development and 
state structuring to ensure achievement of these goals, for instance by putting faith in planning and 
the Planning Commission. Furthermore, the above ideas of Nehruvian thinking in context of irrigation 
management entailed that water ought to remain under the control of the state; and secondly 
continuing with ‘a pragmatist strand, that favoured ‘keeping what works well'—in this case the 
irrigation departments extremely efficient construction and management machine’ (Bottrall, 
1992, p. 236). Thus, not much emphasis was given to context while taking decisions (Mollinga, 2007, 
p. 12). With unlimited powers to government and the irrigation department, citizen rights did not 
gain primacy (despite a democratic constitution), and colonial legacy of irrigation management 
continued which changed little with respect to surface water development and management, and 
there were scarcely any rights or recognition for water users or general public (Bottrall, 1992, p. 235). 
Moreover, despite the fact that the Indian stated continued its focus on large-scale projects (like the 
British) and adopted rules and regulationslii of the colonial state, there was change in viewpoint and 
functions of the government. The post-colonial Indian state departed from the colonial state ideology 
by approaching development from the standpoint of welfare and well-being of its citizens rather than 
merely being guardians of law and order (Jain & Chaudhuri, 1982, p. 4). Given the focus on economic 
nationalism, bureaucrats, planners, engineers played an important role in carrying out state 
functions.  
Thus, the programmatic framing of that period resulted in the dominant ideational realm being 
guided by it and actors (engineers, bureaucrats, planners) worked within this enframing which 
guided their actions. To elaborate, programmatic framing of that period was enthused with 
rationalization of British colonial rules and regulations which India inherited from the colonial state. 
However, notably as discussed in the previous section through the instance of Kudimaramat, spells of 
British utilitarianism were tempered with ingenuous regard for traditional eminence during the 
colonial period (Kaviraj, 2010, p. 149). Kaviraj argues that this resulted in creation of surrogate 
rationality for upper (senior) bureaucracy to maintain social order and this continued post 
independence as well, though the institutions for governance were fragmented and not 
institutionalised.  To elaborate:  
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“British policy had followed a practice of studied non-interference in the social 
institutions of the colony. In the princely states and, in other spheres of political life, the 
British underwrote the existing styles of pre-capitalist authority. The institutional legacy 
of colonialism was indeed extremely mixed… The acceptance of the British to the pre-
capitalist power structures ensured that structures of irresponsible power existed… The 
modernist decisions-makers at the level of ministries shared no common language with 
the village clerk whose ideas of social reasonableness were radically different.” (Kaviraj, 
2010, pp. 150, 153, 155)  
This impacted the state society relations, and shaped the ideational realm of actors. Notably, the 
bureaucratic culture was deeply afflicted with two cultures in Indian politics as is evident from 
Kaviraj’s exposition. First, modernist decision makers (bureaucracy) of Nehruvian era shared no 
common language with village clerks of the nation. Second, the resistance that centre faced from 
coalitions of caste and culture at the rural and state level resulted in fragmented institutional 
building (Kaviraj, 2010, p. 155). Scholars (Kothari, 1970; Sheth, 1982) have elucidated a crucial 
feature of traditional Indian society, viz. its ability to marginalize the political order. In context of 
water management (for instance, tank irrigation systems), this aspect of the Indian society has also 
been observed by scholars (Mosse, 1999; Stein, 1980) who elucidate that it was the wider social 
relations (social order) of the decentralized segmentary or pre-colonial states rather than the 
administrative village institutions (political order) that determined how water was managed.  
However, post-independence, the modernists were in strength in the realm of policy making, and 
thus the dominant ideational realm (self assigned tutelary role of the state- statist frame) was 
influenced by these centrist ideas that gave enormous importance to role of engineers in 
developmental planning. However, overall there was conflict between logic of political change and 
logic of social order which resulted in emergence of divergent rationalities as an acceptable belief. 
The irrigation engineers adopted these centrist ideas that promoted large-scale development, like 
the British irrigation engineers, and their ideational role and realm were defined by it. Given, this 
scenario, the earlier efforts to decentralize were ineffective, for instance, the Gandhian idea of gram 
swaraj (village republics) which envisaged communitarian ideology. Although, the political structure 
of that time did not allow actors’ (bureaucrats) to break away from the dominant idea i.e. centrist 
state policies that they were operating in. The next sub-section further elucidates the political 
reasons for why efforts to decentralize failed. The next section also elaborates the motivations of 
different actors’ and the mechanisms they applied to ensure and/or obstruct change i.e. 
implementation of decentralization initiatives. 
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4.2.1 Ineffective efforts to shift from large scale planning to decentralized planning 
The first three Five Year Plans (1951-1966) of India eloquently focused on decentralized planning 
after the Planning Commission was constituted in 1950. The first Five Year Plan (1951-1956) 
suggested that the planning process in India ought to be broken into national, state, district and 
community level (PRIA, 2009, p. 4). The Planning Commission for the first time in 1969 issued 
guidelines for district planning. In 1977, the Planning Commission formed a working group chaired by 
Prof. M. L. Dantewala to draw guidelines for block level planning (Rao, 1989). This idea was 
concretized with establishment of the District Development Councils (DDC) that were envisaged to 
consolidate plans prepared at the village level through a participatory process (PRIA, 2009, p. 4). 
However, this focus ebbed off in some of the later plans, as the emphasis was not that explicit. The 
raison d’être for the idea of decentralized planning not taking roots was not only due to resistance 
from local elites, and lack of political will (Kohli, 2001; Rao, 1989), but also because the initial stages 
of development planning in India favoured centralized decisions at higher levels as discussed in the 
previous section.liii  
Additionally, the idea of decentralized planning that Planning Commission envisaged through its Five 
Year Plans in its initial years had little enforcement capacity and thus did not find salience at the state 
level. Nehruvian ideas -and its faith in planning- necessitated that Planning Commission had the 
wherewithal to ensure/discipline state governments in order to implement planning decisions taken 
at the national level. However, Planning Commission was bestowed with responsibilities but was not 
given enforcement authority to ensure implementation of policy ideas like setting up DDCs. Here, the 
causal link between state structure and quality of policy idea and its implementation is evident. 
Furthermore, though Planning Commission was responsible for designing plans, it did not have any 
instruments to implement or monitor these plans for instance, budget, which was under the purview 
of respective ministries (Chibber, 2006, pp. 162, 168).  
To elaborate further on causality of state structuring during this period, the DDCs were aimed to 
provide a link between the state functionaries and the people by consolidating plans prepared at the 
village level. Funds were channelled to district without vesting any power with district related to land 
and water (Misra, Sundaram, & Prakasa Rao, 1974). However, the task of formulation of these 
councils was ultimately entrusted to state governments who were functioning autonomously and 
thus did not give any political significance to the formulations made by the Planning Commission 
(Chibber, 2006, p. 181). Thus, the onus of implementing decentralization was on willing bureaucrats.  
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(Re)introduction of the idea of farmer participation in irrigation management 
The ideology for (irrigation) planning at the national level changed slightly with the end of Nehruvian 
era with Nehru’s death in 1964, when there were calls by political elites as well as bureaucracy to 
overhaul. During this period, a large section of bureaucracy acknowledged that large surface water 
schemes were problematic, and there was need to rethink strategy for water management in the 
country. Thus, a counter idea (against centrist state policy) that started to gain prominence in policy 
circles was the need to (re)think strategy for water management given the huge socio-economic and 
environmental costs associated with large-scale water management projects as evident from 
experiences worldwide (Dhawan, 1990; Patwardhan, 2000; Singh, 2004; WCD, 2000). Consequently, 
a discussion on merits of small-scale community based natural resource management gained salience 
(B. Agarwal, 2001; Agrawal & Gibson, 2001; Chambers, 1988; Wade, 1987 inter alia). In this context, 
Ostrom’s (1990) work on common pool resource management need a mention as it established 
merits of collective action for sustainable management of resources by local communities. 
In India, however, the irrigation department (engineers) resisted to any change in thinking on large-
scale water management schemes. This is not surprising, as the rent seeking behaviour and the nexus 
between irrigation engineers, powerful farmers and politicians was well known in policy circles and 
was also gaining academic inquiry (c.f. Wade, 1982). The irrigation engineers resisted changing, as 
any shift in focus at national level would have curtailed their resource access and make them 
accountable. The department during the 1970s and early 1980s alleged that the problem in water 
management was due to inefficient use of irrigation water by farmers. Thereby arguing that in large 
surface water schemes, management was an issue below the outlet (Chambers, 1988, p. 86).liv The 
above discussion makes evident that irrigation engineers were not ready to rethink their outlook 
towards irrigation management, as it would have also entailed a change in their ideational role of 
harbingers of growth and progress thereby curtailing their access to resources. Rather the blame was 
shifted to farmers, to explicate poor achievements in irrigation sector.  
To substantiate the above-mentioned proposition further: the second irrigation commission report 
of 1972 recommended On-Farm Development (OFD), on-farm management and formation of farmer 
organizations for water management. Additionally in sync with the idea of economic nationalism 
emphasis was on revisiting and resetting the water rates so that irrigation works do not become a 
liability for the state exchequer (Parthasarthy, 2008, p. 125). Subsequently, Command Area 
Development Programme (CADP) was started in 1974 to implement the irrigation commission’s 
recommendations i.e. OFD, farmer organizations and water management (Chambers, 1988, p. 86). 
However, given the resistance of irrigation engineers, CADP did not tackle the vital issue of system 
Ideational Realms for Irrigation Management in India 
 
 
 
 
74 
design and management practice, and focused only on outlet level issues (Bottrall, 1992, p. 237; 
Chambers, 1988, p. 86). Interestingly, this focus on outlet level was buttressed by international 
organizations like the World Bank, as it was easier for them to disburse large sums swiftly for 
infrastructure development. As it was more visible and had tangible results, rather for instance 
outputs of management funding (Chambers, 2013, p. 153).  
Thus, not surprisingly, Command Area Development Authority (CADA) that was set up to implement 
CADP outlined and identified the problem of major and medium irrigation projects primarily in terms 
of physical works.lv Additionally Plan reports elucidate emphasis on farmer participation in scientific 
management of soil and water resources of their area during this period (Pant, 1987, p. 49). Overall, 
the question of main system management was ignored and focus was solely on construction-
oriented approach according to functions enlisted for CADA in the sixth Five Year Plan. Interestingly, 
in its report the irrigation commission emphasized that CADA’s ought to be abolished after ayacuts 
(irrigable area) were fully developed (Chambers, 1988, p. 88). Thus, prevalent policy idea that the 
irrigation engineers furthered during this time period premised that once ayacut development was 
done, and farmers were disciplined (i.e. the warabandi roster enforced) then CADAs could be 
dissolved, as its functions would no longer be required. The assumption here that farmers are 
homogenous entity that can be disciplined insinuates colonial hangover.  
Similarly, the seventh Five Year Plan (1985-90) noting the increasing gap between irrigation potential 
created and utilized (refer to Appendix II) underscored farmer participation as an area that required 
special attention (Pant, 1987, p. 49). Subsequently, there was substantial debate on formation of 
water user organizations for irrigation management, the principal proponents of this debate were 
bureaucrats of the irrigation department, academics, and sector experts and international 
organizations like the World Bank, and the USAID (Satish & Sunder, 1990, p. 1). There are numerous 
reports, workshop proceedings that discuss the issue of farmer participation in irrigation 
management, practicing warabandi in irrigated agriculture, and several other issues that concern 
management of public irrigation systems (GIMS, 1987; GoI, 1981; Maloney & Raju, 1991; Sundar, 
1990). In policy and programmatic discussions (which becomes evident from papers of senior 
bureaucrats, representatives from the World Bank, in these workshops and from documents of CAD, 
national water management programme, etc.) prescriptive model for irrigation management gained 
prominence and the dominant meta-narrative echoed benefits of initiating Participatory Irrigation 
Management (PIM). To substantiate:  
“Management is the only way of getting the best out of whatever resources, good or 
small. (…) Warabandi (rotational method with fixation of time and date/day for supply of 
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water to farmers) is only partial engineering in the conventional sense of the term. It is 
more a social engineering project. So, technological engineering and social engineering 
will have to be blended in appropriate portions” (Swaminathan, 1981, p. 5). 
Thus, in 1980s, a predominant idea that gained salience was that enforcing warabandi could lead to 
desired change in irrigation management.lvi Additionally, the above citation also reflects the 
dominant narrative of the (post-Nehruvian) period wherein engineers and planners were still in high 
demand and considered part of an important vocation.  
Furthermore, the reasons for discussion on irrigation reform that aims at better irrigation 
management has had varied perspectives. For instance, the senior bureaucrats argued for financial 
benefits that would accrue to state exchequer by reducing operating costs of canals by transferring 
this responsibility to farmer organizations. The bureaucracy argued that this would result in equity in 
pricing and greater irrigation efficiency (Satish & Sunder, 1990, pp. 2-3).  These policy ideas were a 
sign of neoliberal development ideology that was beginning to emerge in the national policy 
narrative (discussed in detail in the following sections) with the aim of reducing the financial and 
management burden of state actors. Another prominent ideology that was emerging was of critiques 
that were concerned about the role and representation of these farmer organizations. For instance, 
communitarianism that premised that these organizations would develop as a power base at the 
grass roots level and therefore provide appropriate checks and balances mechanisms for democratic 
decentralization. The idea of communitarianism has emerged from the work of common property 
theorists like Ostrom (1992) who emphasize the role of local institutions and crafting rules for local 
community cooperate with each other. The literature on community based natural resource 
management portrays community as one homogenous group which has a common culture (M. 
Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1999). 
To sum up, this section discusses events and discussions on farmer participation in 1970s and 1980s 
at the national level. From the above discussion it is clear that not all actors considered participation 
of farmers in irrigation management practical. However, the Indian state through its policies was 
swaying towards this idea, given the financial and managerial concerns that irrigation bureaucracies 
were mired with. These discussions for including farmers in irrigation management were not solely 
endogenous. Rather there were few exogenous factors that also influenced and introduced new 
policy ideas for irrigation management. The next section elucidates the role of international 
organizations (which are connoted as ideational brokers in this research) for pushing the idea of 
farmer participation in irrigation management. 
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Role of international organizations as ideational brokers in introducing the 
idea of farmer participation in irrigation management  
Recognizing the need to increase agricultural production United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) proposed to the Indian government a project on irrigation management and 
training in order to have a more integrated and coordinated approach by all the state government 
departments initially for period of seven years from 1983-1990. This project was initiated with focus 
on on-farm management, however, after an internal review between Central Water Commission 
(CWC) and USAID in 1986, the project’s scope was widened to main systems management and the 
project name changed to Water Resource Management and Training (WRMT) project (Wall, Sundar, 
Das Gupta, & Elmore, 1992, p. 3). The WRMT project was designed to enhance the institutional 
capacity of government of India and the select state governments’; to ‘plan, design, construct, 
operate, manage, and maintain efficient and productive irrigation systems; and to conduct river 
basin planning for water resources development’ (ibid., p. vii).lvii The idea behind USAID funding for 
WRMT project succinctly comes out from the following paragraph of the project completion report 
that was submitted to USAID by Irrigation Support Project for Asia and the Near East (ISPAN), 
Arlington: 
“By 1980, Indian engineers had sufficient expertise to plan, design, and construct 
hydraulic structures for storing and conveying water. They did not, however, have all the 
necessary expertise to plan, design, and manage distribution systems at the outlet level, 
considering farmers’ needs, nor the expertise to develop plans for integrated river basin 
development. The WRM&T Project sought to enable engineers to become experts in 
delivering water to farmers' fields and systematically plan development of river basins. It 
provides an in-service training capability to the state irrigation departments through the 
Water and Land Management Institutes (WALMIs) and selected agricultural universities 
and engineering colleges. Likewise, their needs for training in river basin planning are 
served through the central training unit” (Wall et al., p. vii). 
It can be concluded from the about citation that the core idea behind initiating WRMT project was 
that Indian engineers lacked expertise, to plan, design and manage distribution systems at the outlet 
level and hence they had to be made experts in delivering water to farmer fields. There is clear focus 
in the text to enable engineers to move away from ‘construction oriented mind-set’ to ‘management 
mind-set’.lviii Overall, salience of exogenous aspects for changing perceptions becomes evident. In the 
colonial era the British raised the engineering profession to its helm, a tradition the Indian state 
continued with. However, in the 1980s, the international organizations through their funding 
programmes were pushing a move away from the mind-set of colonial era where irrigation 
engineer’s work was mostly restricted to construction aspects to more managerial concerns. This was 
a consequence of the neoliberal development approach that was starting to gain salience in the 
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international arena and envisaged greater role of market forces in management of resources. 
Initiation and pursuance of this approach by international organizations in the late 1980s explains the 
insistence to change in focus from construction to management for engineers through their funding 
programmes, as this ideology envisaged lesser role of the state. Notably, the other prominent 
ideology community based natural resource management also gained prominence in response to the 
poor results from large-scale infrastructure projects like big dams and envisaged greater role of 
community.  
Furthermore, during 1980s, in several states WALMI/Indian Management Training Institutes (IMTI) 
were established through technical and financial collaboration between the concerned states’ and 
USAID. These WALMIs/IMTIs were set up with the objective that they will help irrigation 
departments to train irrigation system managers and improve the efficiency of water use in canal 
command areas (GoI, 2002a, p. 49). Also in the late-1980s, the World Bank supported National Water 
Management Programme (NWMP) was initiated to maintain system facilities and improve water 
management in order to improve efficiency (Vaidyanathan, 2006, p. 25).lix NWMP emphasized farmer 
participation in irrigation management and through this programme efforts were made to build 
capacities of engineers and change their behavioural pattern for better irrigation management. 
NWMP was initiated as the gap between irrigation potential created and utilized (refer to Appendix 
II) was alarming and was recognized that irrigation bureaucracy was bleeding with the diagnosis that 
part of the problem was technical but there were problems also because of socio-organizational 
issues that were at stake both within the farmer community and the irrigation department. Further, 
elite discussion in policy circles recognized the problems with irrigation sector in India was due to 
mismatch between field realities i.e. centres of decision-making – bureaucrats/engineers – were far 
removed from field realities. Moreover, water for irrigation is a sensitive political issue and NWMP 
was not able to address the core problems that the irrigation sector faced and the irrigation 
department was oblivious to change (See Berkoff, 1990, p. 26; Bottrall, 1992, p. 237; IDP, 1993, pp. 5-
6). Evaluation studies of NWMP projects like Bhadrak reservoir in Karnataka elucidate that projects 
undertaken under NWMP were not able to achieve/implement the idea of farmer participation in 
irrigation management, though there were some positive signs in terms of water distribution along 
the distributaries and increase in agricultural output (Sakthivadivel et al., 1999). By the World Bank’s 
own admission, this project failed to achieve its objective in terms of increasing the incremental 
irrigated area, greater cropping intensity, etc. The Bank’s evaluation report elucidates that there was 
little awareness amongst state level bureaucrats for better water management. Though short term 
training programmes were conducted, but they had little impact on project design or 
implementation (World Bank, 1997, p. vi). As a future course of action, the Bank came out with 
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several recommendations viz. first, the need for equity in irrigation by ensuring volumetric water 
supply. Second, the Bank pushed for the idea of high-level farmer participation (mostly nominal) in 
irrigation management to change the status quo, thus, advocating for not only technical change but 
also social change. Third, the Bank argued for strengthening capabilities of irrigation department 
staff, and the need for institutional restructuring to provide emphasis and staff resources to these 
activities (World Bank, 1997, pp. vii-viii).  
Interestingly around this time, (1980s), the Philippines model (discussed in chapter two) influenced 
the way irrigation reforms were undertaken in India. This reform process was promoted by Ford 
Foundation, which in turn supported few NGOs [Society for Promoting Participative Ecosystem 
Management, Samaj Parivartan Kendra] in the state of Maharashtra, and Gujarat for undertaking 
pilot experiments (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004b, p. 293). Under the Ford Foundation programme, few 
piecemeal efforts were made by NGOs in western India in the state of Gujarat and Maharashtra to 
explore, motivate, and organize farmers of irrigation systems into user groups for water 
management (Narain, 2008). Based on experience from these pilot experiments undertaken by NGOs 
there was considerable interest shown by senior bureaucrats for formation of water user 
organizations.  
To sum it, from the above discussion it is evident that CADP is the earliest attempt to initiate 
irrigation sector reforms for participatory irrigation management by the post-colonial state in 1970s 
and 1980s to improve water use efficiency and increase irrigation potential by organizing farmers at 
the outlet level (Thomas & Ballabh, 2008). Thereafter, emphasis in the policy narrative for farmer 
participation continued to increase, what merits attention here, is that the 1987 national water 
policy puts emphasis on farmer participation in management of irrigation water and rationalization 
of water charges; seek assistance of voluntary agencies to educate farmers in efficient water use and 
management (GoI, 1987). So, by the late 1980s the essence of participation and farmer management 
was seeping in as strong ideas in policy language and was also reflected through various programmes 
that were initiated like CADP, watershed management.  
Furthermore, the structural imperatives provided by the colonial state in form of rules, regulations, 
etc. provided the bureaucracy legitimacy to continue their old way of functioning. These structural 
imperatives –lack of devolution of power to districts (for instance, DDCs), structural characteristics of 
development cooperation which focused on micro and/or macro level (for instance WRMT and 
NWMP project resulted in perpetuation of bipolar structure due to strong counter force against 
decentralization by a section of bureaucrats/engineers as discussed in the previous sections. The 
bipolar structure has been explicated by Mollinga (2005) building on Kaviraj (1997) as centralist state 
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dealing with villages, and there is nothing in between, which is explicated as ‘state-village 
dichotomy’. The centre/state (in the state-village dichotomy) relate to a centralistic state 
organization, and the water bureaucracy (ministry and department of water resources) that is 
populated by civil engineers who aim to make the water resource sector efficient. The state-village 
dichotomy has led to conundrum in the management of water resources, especially at the village 
level. Management of water resources, for instance, drinking water, irrigation, and watershed 
management is the responsibility of various ministries at the national and sub-national level. 
Duplication and diffusion of roles and responsibilities is observed while managing water resources, as 
several ministries (and departments) -irrigation, agriculture, environment and forests, rural 
development, urban development, public health engineering- are responsible for one or more 
aspects of water governance. More often than not, these ministries (and departments) operate in 
the same geographical area and lack of synergies between these departments results in sub-optimal 
utilization of scarce resources, leading to creation of lop-sided water policies and schemes and also 
creating confusion at the receiver’s end, (farmer in a village, households in town/ city) (Singh & 
Dasgupta, 2008). Perpetuation of this bipolar structure has resulted in lesser focus on the 
intermediate level, which has remained a vacuum in context of water resource management. 
This section also elucidated how the international organizations through their funding -structural 
element of development cooperation- for various programmes introduced the idea of farmer 
involvement in irrigation management as a solution to maladies that the irrigation sector was facing. 
Appendix III elucidates the accelerating investment and decelerating irrigation benefits at the 
national level. Moreover, the international organizations also brought into forefront the issue of 
capacity building of irrigation staff to ensure not only technical change but also social change. To 
initiate/foster this change, organizations like Ford Foundation also included NGOs and other experts 
in the discussion process, and thus widened the expanse of the debate of designing institutions for 
irrigation management. The irrigation reforms that were needed from the state during this period 
were to initiate more state intervention to ensure that the functionaries of the state (the irrigation 
bureaucracy) would fall in line, however, instead in the 1990s, the Indian state decided to change its 
intervention strategy from tighter intervention to lesser intervention with adoption of the tenets of 
neoliberalism; details of which are discussed in next section.  
Ideational Realms for Irrigation Management in India 
 
 
 
 
80 
4.3 Ideational realm post-nineties in India  
Tenets of neoliberalism 
A change in policy process can be observed since the 1990s after actors’ responding to historical 
challenges turned the balance of power. To elaborate post 1989, there has been shift in ideology for 
governance by the Indian state that is a shift from centralized planned economy to a regulatory state 
that envisaged economic decentralization and more independent and competitive federal state 
(Rudolph & Rudolph, 2001, p. 161). It is noteworthy that India has a federal structure of governance 
and with liberalization there has been greater autonomy for states, as earlier the state government’s 
had little scope to digress from the path being chartered by the central government due to tiedlx 
nature of funding from the central government (Kennedy 2004:32). This kind of influence was 
possible in the pre-liberalization period as public investment was the main determinant of growth, 
and at the sub-national level, states were dependent on central government funding. This changed 
with liberalization and there has been greater autonomy for the state governments’ to formulate and 
implement their own economic policies. With this shift in decision-making there has also been a shift 
in accountability from central government to state government (and to private actors) due to the 
new apparatuses that have been activated by pursuance of neoliberal policies. Some of the 
instruments that have been activated in order to follow neoliberal policies are privatization of 
services, deregulation, disinvestment of the public sector which have been pursued with the 
rationale that the public utilities (for instance, irrigation bureaucracies) the way they were are not 
profit making.  
Comparing this with the post-independence time period, the project of Nehru had an essence of 
national integration, which is in sharp contrast to the present Indian state, which highlights a 
disintegrating trend at the national level (and an integrating trend at the global level).lxi In the 
Nehruvian state, the focus was on modernization and industrialization through a centrist economy 
and now the focus is on globalization, and at the sub-national level states in India are competing with 
each other to lure capital. Thus there is a clear shift in state ideology and 1990s is considered a 
watershed decade for restructuring, divestment and privatization in India as the liberalization 
process formally began and continues to dominate the development agenda till date. The electricity 
sector was one of the first to be privatized and in the past few years the focus has been on 
privatization and institutionalization of regulatory authority for water resource sector.lxii Given, the 
change in state belief, there has been greater interest for farmer involvement in irrigation 
management, as the tenets of neoliberalism favour a leaner state organization. Recognizing the 
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changed political context, the next section evaluates the trajectory and implications of the discussion 
on farmer participation in irrigation management at the national level post 1990s. 
Continued emphasis on farmer participation in irrigation management in the 
1990s 
Series of workshops streamlined the path for what ought to be the desired path for irrigation 
management and focus of discussion at the national level shifted from ‘participation’ to 
‘management’ of infrastructure and several states in India took up PIM as an approach to manage 
water resources (Maloney & Raju, 1994; Nikku, 2006). To elaborate, two workshops that were 
organized by Administrative Staff College of Hyderabad are of particular interest here and need 
mention. The first one was organized in July 1987 with the title ‘people’s participation in Irrigation 
management’. The second workshop was organized in January 1992, with the title ‘farmers 
management in Indian irrigation systems’. Conceptual advances were made in second workshop in 
January 1992 when the word participation was dropped and replaced by the word management 
(Maloney & Raju, 1994, p. 29). During these conference’s one of the rationale for promoting PIM was 
to reduce pressure on government finances, improve performance of irrigated agriculture, and to 
ensure sustainability of irrigation systems (GoI, 1995). At the same time period, Vaidyanathan 
Committee report on ‘pricing of irrigation water’ in 1992 also recommended involvement of user 
groups in management of irrigation systems. In fact the Vaidyanathan Committee report solicited by 
the Planning Commission recommended involvement of farmers not only at the minor level, but also 
envisaged gradual increase in role of farmers at the distributaries and main systems level (GoI, 
1992b, p. xi). The committee recognized and recommended for decentralization at not only the 
micro level but also at the intermediate level. However, it needs to be borne in mind here, that the 
Indian state is extremely bureaucratic which at times results in incoherent policies (Chibber, 2006, p. 
7); so even though issues may be recognized to be of importance, action on the same is not taken 
immediately.  
Subsequent to these discussions at national the level, the ministry made changes in the mandate of 
CADP in 1996 in light of the emerging trends on problems that the irrigation sector faced. Thus, 
components like farmers participation, reclamation of waterlogged areas were included in CADP to 
make this programme more beneficial for farmers. The idea that was being pushed at the policy level 
(through committee recommendations and conferences) was to look at farmers (water users) as 
managers and an equal stakeholder in water management. It was recognized that there were 
differences between farmers (water users) and irrigation agency officials/engineers, and it was 
paramount to bridge this gap to bring in a paradigm shift and involve farmers in irrigation 
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management (L. K. Joshi, 1997, p. 18). It is noteworthy that this line of thinking also resonates with 
community based natural resource management approach that gained salience in 1980s-1990s and 
elaborated the limits of state led top-down ideology of development. This thinking was discussed in 
chapter two as crafting of institutions as propounded by Ostrom (1992) who based on successful 
evidence of small scale resource management argued for crafting rules for institution building and 
resource management at the micro level. Communitarianism by instituting participation of local 
communities for resource management has been propounded by majority of international 
organizations/institutions through development cooperation funding. For instance, Ford foundation, 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), World Bank, Swedish international Development 
Assistance (SIDA), Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA) (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999, 
p. 631) have promoted this idea for resource management through their funding. Although, it is 
noteworthy that idea of communitarianism is premised on greater democratization and voice for the 
publics. Similarly, decentralization and devolution also envisage greater involvement of communities 
however, the idea is essentially premised on tenets of neoliberalism (McCarthy, 2005). Thus, making 
evident that idea of involving local community in natural resource management has had competing 
claims, which are driven and structured by different ideologies. Having discussed the origins of 
communitarian ideology briefly the following paragraphs discuss how the narrative on farmer 
participation in irrigation management was influenced at the national level by these competing 
claims for involvement of farmers in resource management. 
The thrust for irrigation reforms came from international organizations like the World Bank by 
promoting discussion on the subject of farmer participation in irrigation management through their 
publications, reports, and the conferences that sponsored/organized. In 1991, the World Bank came 
out with irrigation sector review of India and concluded that the sector is suffering from poor 
planning and financial management on the one hand and inadequate water management and 
maintenance on the other; the two in tandem have led to mediocre performance (L. K. Joshi, 1997, p. 
12). The sector review argued for restricting the role of public sector to fostering private sector 
investment and greater role for farmers in operation and management of farm level courses, 
channels and drains (micro networks), and also in actual construction (World Bank, 1991a, p. ii). The 
irrigation sector review argued for modelling success by ‘designing institutions’ - by reducing the size 
of irrigation personnel and greater reliance on consultants (for instance, foreign as well as local 
retired engineers); increased role for farmers and women; staff training, improving institutional 
performance by creating greater accountability and transparency, etc. (World Bank, 1991a, pp. 56-
57, 60). Moreover, the Bank reflecting/learning from the implementation of its previous programme 
(NWMP) in the next generation of irrigation projects (water resources consolidation project or sector 
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reforms) incorporated a major focus on improving productivity of irrigation systems through 
modernization linked with farmer involvement (World Bank, 1997). 
During the same period, in 1995 and 1997 two conferences were held on PIM in Delhi. The first one 
was held from 19-23 June 1995. This conference focused on discussing overview of PIM, its legal 
aspects, national issues on PIM, and most importantly preparation of states for preparing action plan 
on PIM. The second workshop cemented the ‘idea of PIM as a new paradigm in irrigation 
management’ by making it title of the conference (GoI, 1995, 1997). The World Bank was one of the 
sponsor’s for these two national workshops, and hence played an active role in pushing for designing 
institutions from the top as it had propounded this idea earlier through its irrigation sector review 
report. Post these two workshops, the Ministry of Water Resources played a promotional role in 
implementation of PIM in the country by providing incentives to state governments in form of 
technical advice, financial assistance, and providing training/ study tour etc. (GoI, 2002a, pp. 35-36).  
Given the discussion that was happening in policy circle at the national level in the 1990s, it is not 
surprising that review of CADP implementation for eighth (1992-97), and ninth (1998-2002) Five Year 
Plan period evinced the need to restructure the programme. The CADP review cited restructuring as 
an essential need given numerous constraints, for instance, deficiencies in the irrigation system 
about the outlet affecting the water supply for farmers; low priority given by state governments to 
extension and training activities; non-revision of costs norms for activities. Taking note of this review, 
Government of India gave huge importance to PIM from ninth Five Year Plan (1998-2002) onwards, 
and constituted a working group on PIM which recommended that farmers involvement in 
management of canal irrigation works should be a priority (Raju & Gulati, 2008, p. 93). Subsequently, 
in February 1998, IndiaNPIM (hereafter INPIM) was established by the Ministry of Water Resources, 
Government of India as a non-profit organization and registered under the Societies Registration Act 
of 1860. INPIM was involved in organizing several international and national events on PIM. INPIM 
organized two all India conventions of presidents of water user associations in 2002 and 2007, and 
have been involved in training and capacity building, advocacy work (INPIM, 1998). However, INPIM 
did not have any permanent source of funding, and this has restricted their work in recent years 
(Interview, Secretary, INPIM December 27, 2011).  
On 5 February 2003 the twelfth national conference of water resources and irrigation ministers was 
held at New Delhi, in which the prime minister released the vision document for integrated water 
resources development and management for the country. Additionally, one of the key 
recommendations of the conference was that CADP ought to be restructured and the programme 
need to be pursued with vigour across the country (GoI, 2003, p. 13).lxiii Interestingly, the need for 
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restructuring CADP had first been made during the eight plan report, and a decade later, it was still 
being pushed for as an idea that will facilitate better management of irrigation resources. Despite 
calls from various quarters (international organizations, experts, academics, policy makers, Planning 
Commission) there was hesitation from the bureaucracy to implement change. Its only when in 
August 2003, when PIM was identified as a ‘thrust area’ for the country and its progress was started 
to be monitored by the Prime Minister’s office (GoI, 2012d, pp. 1-2, 9) that the bureaucracy 
responded to the CADP review and the national conference recommendations. Subsequently, during 
the tenth plan (2002-07) period the programme was restructured to Command Area Development 
and Water Management Programme (CADWM) in order to make it more comprehensive and 
beneficial to farmers (GoI, 1996, 2009a, 2012a). The tenth plan also envisaged ‘decentralizing water 
distribution, collection of water charges and maintenance of local irrigation channels to local water 
distribution co-operatives’ (GoI, 2002c, p. 129). Command area development was thus restructured 
in April 2004 based on the report of the working group of the Planning Commission on CADP (GoI, 
2003, p. 31). After restructuring, funding for CADP from the central government to the state 
governments has had a renewed thrust on PIM. It was mandated that the funding under CADP would 
be allocated only when: 
“i) Central assistance to states has been linked to enactment of PIM legislation. Till this is 
done, alternative arrangements have to be in place for formation and empowerment of 
water users associations (WUAs); ii) WUAs have to be in position before project 
components are taken up so that beneficiaries are involved in the implementing of 
programme activities, since inception; iii) A minimum 10 per cent beneficiary 
contribution has been made mandatory in the construction of field channels, reclamation 
of waterlogged areas and renovation of minor irrigation tanks to ensure increased 
beneficiary participation and thereby improve the quality of works” (GoI, 2006a, p. 19). 
Additionally, under CADP provision was made for one time functional grant to farmer organizations 
at the rate of INR 500 per hectare, the burden of which is shared by the central government and the 
state governments equally, and INR 50 per hectare is the contribution made by farmer organizations. 
The restructuring was undertaken with the aim that the subsequent operation and maintenance 
responsibility, and collection of water rates would be the responsibility of farmers (GoI, 2002a, pp. 
34-35). Consequently, the central government developed an indicative roadmap for initiating PIM for 
states that have not yet enacted the PIM Act (GoI, 2012d, pp. 9-10).lxiv The above description is also 
an instance of salience of structural elements in terms of tied funding that the central government 
used by linking central assistance for water resource management with enactment of PIM legislation 
by state governments in order to shape the ideational landscape at the state level. 
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Furthermore, the Ministry of Water Resources acknowledges that as a result of various 
conferences/seminars organized by them (and restructuring of CADP), there has been an increased 
consciousness and greater incentive for state governments to actively involve farmers in 
management of irrigation systems (GoI, 2011a, p. 22). Overall, the impetus for reforms for state 
government has been external it has come from either the central government or through donor 
funding (Raju & Gulati, 2008, p. 93); though the state of Madhya Pradesh is an exception in this 
regard, as the impetus for reform was more due to internal factors, and this is discussed at length in 
chapter five.  
Apart from the CADP, emphasis on PIM at the national level is evident from policy directives of 2000 
onwards. To elaborate, the second national water policy was introduced in 2002, despite not much 
work done to bring the first policy of 1987 into effect (Iyer, 2003, pp. 53-55). The National Water 
Policy 2002 focused on greater involvement of stakeholders or beneficiaries, and private sector in 
management of water resources from the project planning stage. Furthermore, the policy envisaged 
transfer of management of water resources to user groups eventually.lxv There is clear influence of 
tenets of neoliberalism in the national policy, given the greater focus on private sector for 
management of water resources from the planning stage. However, like the 1987 policy, the 2002 
policy has not resulted in any change on the ground. The National Water Policy 2012 reiterates the 
concern at the national level of widening gap between the irrigation potential created and utilized 
(GoI, 2012c, p. 2).lxvi Specifically on WUAs, the draft policy enunciates more statutory power to them 
to collect and retain a portion of water charges, manage the volumetric quantum of water allotted to 
them, and maintain the distribution system under its jurisdiction.lxvii The policy re-emphasizes like the 
previous national policy of 2002 the importance of involving the local planning bodies like water user 
associations in planning of the projects (ibid., pp. 6-7). The 2012 policy also enunciates: 
“Water resources projects and services should be managed with community 
participation. Wherever the state governments or local governing bodies so decide, the 
private sector can be encouraged to become a service provider in public private 
partnership model to meet agreed terms of service delivery, including penalties for 
failure” (GoI, 2012c, p. 10).  
Overall, the three national water policies are indicative of a gradual shift in thinking, or at least the 
language that the state would like to use, as words like participation, management, greater role for 
gram panchayats (which essentially means decentralization) find space in the policy documents. The 
latest policy is also subtly encouraging the role of private sector, by adopting public-private 
partnership model gradually in few urban areas with respect to water distribution. Though the 
Ministry of Water Resources has been formulating new policies there has not been any successful 
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implementation, as was explicated in the previous section with the change in ideational belief of the 
state there has been lesser role control of the state compared to the Nehruvian era.  
Furthermore, the bipolar structure of governance has also led to dilemmas for state to undertake 
developmental task without establishing appropriate relations of authority across policy agencies 
(Chibber, 2002, p. 953), which was also explicated in the previous section as conundrum in 
management of water resources. In this research I argue that the impediment to bridging the bipolar 
structure is actors’ ideational realm, which I discuss in depth through the empirical case of Madhya 
Pradesh following chapters. Moreover, it becomes evident that there are no appropriate 
mechanisms to take forward the policy decisions taken at the centre to various state governments.  
To sum this section, a prominent idea that pushed for decentralization in rural development in the 
1990s was based on the belief that decentralization will solve existing maladies of irrigation 
management. To wit, if communities are given clear rights to access and use of natural resources, 
they would be better managers of these resources than state bureaucracies, as their livelihoods are 
dependent on it (Mosse, 1999, p. 304). The Ministry of Water Resource’s website is rather lucid and 
points out that the central government has been trying to pursue state governments since 1985 to 
promote participatory irrigation management, for which the central government also came out with 
a roadmap outlining the action points and milestones that ought to be considered (GoI, 2012d, p. 
10). However, it is only in the 1990s that the notion of self-governance and with that the notion of 
participatory management of irrigation system gained momentum in India. Thus, with shift in focus 
there has been also shift in the idea of what is appropriate for irrigation management, i.e. a gradual 
shift from the idea of management of irrigation system which was undertake through CADP, NWMP, 
etc. to the idea of participation at the policy level. Furthermore, By Ministry’s own admission, these 
conferences have facilitated changing the narrative and outlook towards farmers’ participation in 
irrigation management at the national level. Moreover, the idea of farmer participation in irrigation 
management has received extensive support through policy legislations, and the narrative that was 
created at the national level by donors, government functionaries, and NGOs and research 
organizations.  
4.4 Summing up 
This chapter analyzes various ideational variables that resulted in emergence and perpetuation of 
certain idea of irrigation management in India. Furthermore, this chapter also elucidates how the 
ideational paradigm shaped irrigation management in India, and how different political questions 
determined the type of policy that gained salience for irrigation management in a particular period. 
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Table 4.1 provides a snapshot of ideational variables and their influence on irrigation management, 
as discussed in this chapter.  
Table 4. 1: Ideas, ideology and ideational realm for irrigation management in India  
Dimensions Colonial era Post-Colonial era Post 1990s 
Ideational 
variables: 
Ideology, 
beliefs 
Practice of colonialism 
as an ideology led to 
perpetuation of 
legislations for resource 
management 
- State’s belief that for 
democratization centrist 
state policies are best; 
thrust on economic 
nationalism through 
legislations (salience of 
structural rulings  
- Gandhian idea of gram 
swaraj as an alternative 
did not stick in policy 
realm 
Community participation 
in natural resource 
management (irrigation 
management) initiated 
through two competing 
claims: i) state’s belief 
that tenets of 
neoliberalism will solve 
existing problem. ii) 
farmer participation 
couched in the idea of 
communitarianism 
which envisaged greater 
democratization.  
  
Idea Scientific ordering of 
society and natural 
resources for 
maximization of colonial 
state’s profit/capital 
 
Welfare state/ 
developmental 
paradigm to pursue 
growth  
Farmer participation 
through decentralization 
will solve existing 
maladies of (irrigation) 
bureaucracy 
Ideational 
Realm 
Traditional versus 
modern/technocratic/ 
scientific rationality  
- Self-assigned tutelary 
role of the 
developmental 
interventionist state 
- Technocratic scientific 
rationality 
Participatory 
management & good 
governance (lesser role 
of the state is envisaged) 
as a consequence of 
neoliberal and 
communitarian values 
Consequence 
of ideational 
realm on 
irrigation 
management 
and on 
imagery of 
key actors  
- Salience of civil 
engineering & 
heightened role of 
engineers (British & 
Indian) 
- Native population as 
savage other  
- Focus on irrigation 
‘Build-manage-generate-
surpluses-maintain’ 
- Engineers considered 
harbinger of growth & 
development 
- Imagery of infantile 
citizen 
- Focus on irrigation 
‘Build-rebuild-neglect’  
- Weak state  
 -Call for farmer 
participation in irrigation 
management 
- Decentralization 
pursued with renewed 
vigour at national and 
state level in policy 
narrative 
- Focus on irrigation 
‘Build-rebuild-neglect’  
 
* Note: all the above elements were formed, defined, and sustained by structural or cultural ideation by 
perpetuation of certain state structures through rulings/legislations, donor cooperation, and idea of how 
community ought to manage resources as discussed in this chapter. 
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During the colonial era, the British policies were initiated with an aim to accumulate capital from the 
Indian colony, which determined the political logic for governing the colony. The British also 
instituted salience of engineers for irrigation management, and this continued post independence in 
India as well and engineers were connoted as harbinger of growth and development in the 
Nehruvian Era, an era that was defined by centrist state policies that connoted large dams as temples 
of modern India. Thus, in the first two decades after independence the belief of Nehru in centrist 
state policy pushed the development planner to give more attention to large-scale infrastructure 
projects over Gandhian ideas of gram swaraj (village republic) or decentralization. Pursuance of this 
belief by the Indian state led to viewing the problem of gap in irrigation potential and financial woes 
(refer to Appendix II and III) as performance problem that could be solved by focusing on technical 
improvements in the late 1960s and 1970s through OFD programmes. Thus few senior bureaucrats 
promoted this alternative idea of farmer involvement through various reports and programme based 
on their experiential learning. However, this idea did not stick/gain salience with most of the 
bureaucracy and they initiated a counter movement against decentralization, which resulted in 
bipolar structure for governance. Further, post 1990s there has been sustained interest at the 
national level for decentralization, with the Indian state pursuing the tenets of neoliberalism. During 
this period, international organizations played a crucial role in pushing the idea of designing 
institutions for irrigation management along with experts, academics, and select bureaucrats can be 
categorized as an epistemic community (as articulated by Haas, 1992) that took forward the idea of 
decentralizing irrigation management.  
Further, this chapter also demonstrates that ideas do have causal powers and can gain prominence if 
actors take cognizance of it. In this context, recognizing the agenda setters is critical, as all actors may 
not be able to garner same constituency. For instance, the working of Planning Commission 
discussed in this chapter elucidates that members of Planning Commission were not able to exercise 
their idea of state planning in its formative years’ as the ministries at the state level were fragmented 
and not keen on taking forward this idea. Furthermore, the causality of ideas in policymaking is also 
evident from ineffective efforts made for decentralizing irrigation management over the years as 
sizeable section of irrigation bureaucracies was against it. This chapter also discusses how new policy 
ideas have been brought into the policy realm to improve irrigation management, however, new 
policy idea has not gained constituency among all actors. Operationalizing new ideas (PIM) for 
desired policy change has been an issue in the Indian context, despite a strong narrative at the 
national level for PIM. The chapter discussed ineffective efforts to decentralize have resulted in 
bipolar governance structure and multiple organizations that are responsible for management of 
resources, which has resulted in conundrum in management of resource. Second, actors’ 
Ideational Realms for Irrigation Management in India 
 
 
 
 
89 
(bureaucracy/engineers at the national level) pursuing various ideas and ideologies for resource 
management has been a major roadblock as they have been reluctant to embrace change. Further, 
strategies that actors’ (for instance, irrigation engineers putting the blame on farmers to explicate 
poor irrigation management) embrace to influence or resist change are important; as they evince the 
processes that actor’s adopt and is also a reflection of their ideational realm that they subscribe to. 
This chapter also discussed the trajectory of PIM and special focus this idea has received at national 
level through various programmes and policy that have channelled resources and necessitated that 
states comes up with its own legal and regulatory framework to initiate PIM if they want to avail 
funding.  
This chapter demonstrates the political question behind certain policy decisions (for instance, 
influence of donor organizations, or motivations of bureaucrats). Thereby elucidating that the type of 
idea that gains salience is contingent on the interaction between actors, structure and/or 
institutions; and is reflective of whose voice gains most resonance. There has been ideational change 
in state’s thinking as elucidated in Table 4.1. However, the ideational change in actors’ viewpoint has 
been slow, as demonstrated in this chapter, which has resulted in bipolar structure for governance. 
Berman (2013, p. 227) argues that ideational scholars ‘attribute ideational change to either broad 
structural changes for instance in terms of change in legislation and exogenous shocks or local 
political contexts and local political actors rather than to an interaction between them’. To avoid this 
folly, and to have a holistic understanding of ideational change (or its lack thereof) with respect PIM 
the next chapter turns to understanding how the idea of participation gained salience at the sub 
national level through the case of state of Madhya Pradesh.  
Additionally, from the discussion in this chapter it is evident that the current focus of legislations on 
water resource management has led to bipolar governance structure and intermediate level is a 
vacuum. The structural elements like type of legislation, structural feature of development 
cooperation and funding imperatives proposed by central government were discussed in this chapter 
that have reinforced the bipolar structure. However, the cultural elements that reinforce ideational 
paradigm were latent in this chapter and the same are discussed in subsequent empirical chapters.  
Furthermore, having set the historical and ideational landscape that have shaped irrigation 
management at the national level in India, the next chapter outlines the conditions that led to 
adoption of PIM in Madhya Pradesh in the year 2000. Specifically, chapter five discusses how the 
idea of farmer participation in irrigation management in Madhya Pradesh has been rooted in 
different ideologies (interventionist state planning and development, Neoliberal) to pursue irrigation 
management. Madhya Pradesh was selected as the case study site, as it has a long history of 
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decentralization and thus, it was assumed that it would provide a dynamic field to study ideational 
change, as already pointed out in chapter one. Chapter five also focuses on discussing events, 
conditions (political environment) and actors’ that influenced the ideational paradigm in Madhya 
Pradesh with respect to participation of farmers in irrigation management in light of the happenings 
at the national level. 
 
                                                          
xxxi
 Several scholars (Laube, 2007; Naz & Saravanan, 2010; inter alia) have used actor oriented perspective to 
elucidate problems of resource management. Though the notion of ‘ideational realm’ has not been used to 
discuss irrigation management earlier. 
xxxii
 Until the advent of British in India village institutions were responsible for management of drinking water, 
and irrigation systems. 
xxxiii
 Thomas Malthus in 1798 in his now widely critiqued ‘an essay on the principle of population’ argues that it 
is primarily irrational reproductive behaviour of poor people that results in their material deprivation; however, 
Malthus ignored the role of economic systems in creation of poverty. Similarly, neo Malthusians argue that 
population control can solve all problems (Ross, 1998).  
xxxiv
 An approach used by historians to study history. In this context Ferdinand Braudel’s work is quite intriguing 
who employs four notions of time: l’histoire événementielle (short term- events), l’histoire conjoncturelle 
(medium term what he calls conjunctures), the longue durée and l’histoire structurelle and these 
categorizations provide a tool to undertake enquiry of social history in quantitative terms (Braudel, 1980, p. 
30). Braudel explains capitalism as part of the longue durée wherein despite ‘reversals and ruptures’ the shared 
characteristics have persisted over a long time span; thus highlighting that history needs to be understood not 
only in terms of events but in its entire complexity, in its relation to the complex surroundings (ibid., pp. 33, 
38). 
xxxv
 Through his work on Odisha in eastern India, D’Souza argues that ‘the quest to control water and dominate 
rivers in British India is not simply a narrative about engineering triumph or failure but must be disclosed or 
revealed for the many distinct calculations of colonial capitalism and specific imperatives that drove the 
empire’ (D'Souza, 2006, p. 2). Thus, to understand the present better, one needs to understand the 
relationship between ‘capitalism and nature’, and if capitalism relates to nature through a specific path 
(D’Souza, 2002, p. 1261). There is a need to understand the (ecological) rupture brought in by colonial 
capitalism that led to large-scale environmental transformation and conflicts in India (D'Souza, 2006, p. 2). 
xxxvi
 Skaria’s reference to cathexis is not merely ‘natural as imagined’. Rather he argues that it is foregrounded 
in particularly charged imaginings of natural. He posits that ‘the imaginings of nature was not just one more set 
of social practices. It was rather a crucial dimension of anxiety and uncertainty involved in the constitution of 
the modern’ (Skaria, 2003, p. 266). 
xxxvii
 Similarly, three sets of ‘peasant ecotypes’ (mixed wet, dry grain, and dry wet) are identified by Stein (1985) 
in context of explicating cultivation regimes in medieval south India. These ecotypes -are used as signifier to 
explain the system of resource management in the Pallava and Chola period- possessed social and political 
entailments that were derived from the commanding material base of each ecotype (Stein, 1985, p. 57). This 
system of resource management was based not only on the local cultural and religious context, but also was 
influenced by politico-military relations as well as exchange relations, as the three ecotypes were linked to it 
(ibid., p. 58). Thus, in southern India, the means and processes of production were vested with chiefs in local 
farming communities under whose mastery there was sustained and successful development of irrigation 
potentials in the southern peninsula (Stein, 1985, p. 85). 
xxxviii
 Furthermore, they were involved in assessing canal rates, resolving local differences over distribution of 
water, and noting unauthorized irrigation and violations in canal rules (ibid., pp. 1135-1136) 
xxxix
 For instance, the problem of sedimentation in the northern canal system was researched and discussed as a 
managerial issue. In many of these cases, management issues rendered into scientific discussion among 
engineers who were of British as well as Indian origin (Mollinga, 2005, p. 12). 
xl
 However, situation was slightly different in south. The renovation of the Grand Anicut on river Cauvery is 
considered a major success in irrigation development. After renovation of the Grand Anicut, the distribution 
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and allocation of water in this system was done by local management organizations (Sengupta, 1985, p. 1924). 
Though, this was not explicitly mentioned, the local management organizations were able to do so, because at 
the time of development of the renovation plan for the Grand Anicut, Major Arthur Cotton had unknowingly 
also preserved the indigenous method of management. Thus, the Grand Anicut project did not face much 
management difficulty, as the Madras engineers had restricted their role only to repair work, and not 
concerned themselves with distribution and allocation of water (Sengupta, 1985, p. 1924). 
xli
 Kudimaramat is an exemplary instance, of how the idea of community involvement in irrigation management 
originated in the backdrop of organizational problems that tank systems in southern India presented to an 
increasingly centralized public works bureaucracy during the second half of the nineteenth century (Mosse, 
1999, p. 313). However, Kudimaramat can also be viewed as a case of enforcing participation during the 
colonial period (Maloney, Mehta, & Raju, 1991, p. 12), as there was too much state control in enforcing 
Kudimaramat, thus can be categorized as a case of designing institutions from the top. Thus, though the system 
of Kudimaramat failed, it standardized manner of irrigation practices as categorized by efficiency of irrigation 
engineers. 
xlii
 For instance, in Garhwal and Kumaon Himalayan region, community had usufruct rights over all natural 
resources (including water) till the advent of British (DCAP, 2003). The village institutions were responsible for 
creation and management of drinking water systems (naulas and baoris (step wells)), traditional irrigation 
systems like guls (water channels) and gharats (water mill). This situation changed after the colonizers 
established sovereign rights over these territories in 1917 (M. D. Kumar, 2005). ‘Dying wisdom…’ a survey on 
traditional and pre-British water harvesting systems by Centre of Science and Environment, New Delhi, 
provides an exhaustive account of these pre-colonial traditional structures (See A. Agarwal & Narain, 1997b). 
xliii
 For instance, in the Garhwal and Kumaon Himalaya (now in the state of Uttarakhand) three major projects 
were launched to institute commodification viz. commercial production of wheat and sugarcane, cultivation of 
tea and construction of Ganges canal (Agrawal & Sivaramakrishnan, 2000, p. 35). 
xliv
 ‘The importance for the colonial power of forcing colonized societies into an encompassing structure of 
order that was continuous ‘forming unity or whole whose parts were in mechanical and geometric co-
ordination’ (Gilmartin, 1995, p. 212). 
xlv
 For instance, D’Souza (2006) through his work on Odisha argues that the practice of flood control was 
employed by the British to establish them in the Odisha delta. Given that British had a political project, there 
functioning was deeply embedded in social, economic and political calculations of capitalism and colonialism. 
Flood control was used as rubric to organize systems of land revenue, institute private property and shape the 
region’s hydrology with physical infrastructure such as embankments, canal networks and the Hirakud dam. 
xlvi
 Prabhakar and Gadgil (1995) through their case study of Nilgiri hills in Southern India elucidate how maps 
were markers of ecological change and categorized agricultural landscape. 
xlvii
 Furthermore, the nationalist project of the Nehruvian state had a distinct middle class orientation 
(Klingensmith, 2003). 
xlviii
 An often cited quote of Nehru is his projection of large dam projects as temples (secular) of modern 
civilization, on completion of the Bhakra Nangal Project in Punjab (A. Roy, 1999). 
xlix
 The Nehruvian state also pursued with great rigour the schema of river valley schemes on the lines of 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States, arguably to solve the food problem and to provide 
power for industrial growth (D'Souza, 2006, p. 202). This was in consonance with the international happenings, 
as after the second world war, several of the world’s modernizing states initiated gargantuan dam building 
programmes to transform environment and economies (Klingensmith, 2003, p. 123). The United State’s was 
the dominant actor in the international arena after the world war and many of the decolonized countries 
adopted the American engineering approach. Not surprising, the Indian state was also influenced by the 
American approach for large-scale irrigation development, although the eastern European and USSR’s 
approach on this subject also influenced its policies (Mollinga, 2005, p. 12). One of the instances of such 
projects in India is the Damodar Valley Corporation Project though it failed to achieve its goals despite 
assistance from the TVA officials in terms of training and other support. The DVC was to be the model for river 
basin organization in India. However, it did not fulfil its envisaged role and ended up being a power generation 
company and had little role in water management (Briscoe & Malik, 2006, p. 73). Despite failures such as 
Damodar Valley Project, independent India’s water strategy has essentially been a continuation and 
intensification of the multi purpose river valley development paradigm for industrializing river control (D'Souza, 
2003, p. 3785). Other large dam projects which merit a mention in this context are the Bhakra Nangal Project in 
Himachal Pradesh, the Hirakud dam in Orissa and the Saradar Sarovar Project in Madhya Pradesh. 
l
 A defining feature of high modernism is that it envisions not only transformation in people’s material 
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environment but also in improving human nature, the intent being the limitless ambition to transform nature 
to suit man’s purposes (J. Scott, 1998). 
li
 Chatterjee has problematized this imagery and argues that the modernizers in the process of turning the 
subaltern subjects into national citizens encountered resistances from the political society. However, in the 
process of resisting the modernizing project the subaltern classes also embarked on a path of internal 
transformation (2004, p. 51). 
lii
 Most act and policies of the Indian state are based on the colonial policies, for instance the Land Acquisition 
Act of 1894. 
liii
 Several national level committees findings since the 1950s also outline that panchayati raj has not taken 
ground due to unwillingness of the states to devolve substantive power, a resistant bureaucracy and the power 
of local elites (Johnson, 2003, p. 16). 
liv
 To substantiate, one of the evaluation reports of major irrigation project from 1965 observed problem of 
access of water for tail end farmers. The report posits this problem due to carelessness of farming practices in 
upper reaches which results in wastage of water and shortage of water for farmers downstream (GoI, 1965, p. 
3). 
lv
 This becomes evident from functions that were enlisted for CADAs to perform in the sixth Five Year Plan 
(1980-1985): ‘Modernization and efficient operation of the irritation system as well as development of main 
drainage system beyond the farmers blocks of 40 hectares; construction of field channels: land shaping and 
land levelling; construction of field drains; lining of field channels/water courses; exploitation of ground water 
through tube-wells, open wells etc.; adoption and enforcement of a suitable cropping pattern; enforcement of 
a suitable roster system of distribution of water among farmers (warabandi) (…)’ (GoI, 1980) .  
lvi
 It becomes evident from Dr. Swaminathan’s (who was member of Planning Commission at that time) 
presidential address at conference on warabandi in April 1980 that it is subsumed that peoples’ role/function 
in management of irrigation system can be engineered. Furthermore, alluding to terms like social engineering - 
which don’t really mean anything - is indicative of an engineering mind-set wherein it is assumed that human 
beings can be engineered to achieve desired results. Usage of such terms is also indicative of a blueprint 
approach that a conventional planner understands (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004a, p. 4). 
lvii
 The project cost to USAID was $51 million ($41 million in grant funds, $10 million in loan funds), which was 
to be repaid over 40 years. The Indian government provided a rupee equivalent of $28.2 million (Wall et al., 
1992, p. viii). 
lviii It becomes evident that during this period, the thinking at the international level (at least in organizations 
like the USAID) was pondering over engineers taking on the role of management and distributing water as 
advocated by Norman Uphoff through a study commissioned for USAID (Uphoff, 1986a), as also discussed 
earlier in chapter two. Hence it is not surprising that in the 1990s, the idea that gained salience in irrigation 
management was that farmers ought to be enabled in order to become experts in irrigation management. 
lix
 The first phase of the NWMP was from June 1987 to March 1995. The project was carried out in 80 schemes 
in 11 states in India (Sakthivadivel, Thiruvengadachari, & Amarasinghe, 1999, p. 1). NWMP was designed to 
provide additional resources to the state governments to improve water management by upgrading select 
irrigation schemes. The basic objective of NWMP was to reduce the gap between irrigation potential created 
and achieved and to improve agricultural productivity and thereby increase incomes of farmers in the 
command area through a more reliable, predictable and equitable irrigation service (GoI, 2000, p. 5; World 
Bank, 1997). Through NWMP efforts were made to increase accountability of irrigation engineers by involving 
farmers, and local/state officials in developing and approving operational plans for diagnostic analysis (Berkoff, 
1990, p. 26). 
lx
 The tied nature of funding can be explained in terms of selection of beneficiaries for targeted schemes, 
spending priorities, etc. (Kennedy, 2004, p. 32). 
lxi
 Adapted from McMichael (2000, p. 169). 
lxii
 Thrust of water sector restructuring till now has led to ‘reforms of the legal and regulatory framework, 
corporatization of public sector water utilities, increased farmers participation in irrigation management, 
increased water rates, privatization of urban water supply, regulation of ground water, and a policy shift to 
accommodate private interests’ (IELRC, 2006, p. 1). 
lxiii
 Further, during this conference it was emphasized, ‘participatory irrigation management is central to the 
sustainable management of irrigation systems, as also for improving their efficiency’. Recognising this, the 
implementation of the CADP is closely linked with participatory irrigation management, wherein beneficiaries 
are required to bear a small part of the overall costs (GoI, 2003, p. 13) 
lxiv
 This roadmap elaborates six steps that ought to be undertaken, viz.: i) drafting of legislation on PIM and its 
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approval by the assembly at the earliest; ii) preparation of rules and regulations within two months of 
notification of the Act; iii) organising state wide awareness camps for irrigation/water resource department 
functionaries and farmers; iv) forming water user associations and handing them over the requisite 
responsibilities mentioned in the Act; v) covering a target of 25 per cent of the area under major and medium 
irrigation project under the tenth plan period; and lastly forming appropriate state level committees that will 
communicate with the central government the progress on PIM (GoI, 2012d, pp. 9-10) . 
lxv
 There is clear emphasis in the second national water policy on PIM, wherein it is emphasized ‘management 
of water resources for diverse uses should incorporate a participatory approach: by involving not only the 
various governmental agencies but also the users’ and other stakeholders, in an effective and decisive manner, 
in various aspects of planning, design, development and management of the water resources schemes. 
Necessary legal and institutional changes should be made at various levels for the purpose, duly ensuring 
appropriate role for women. Water Users Association (WUA) and local bodies such as municipalities and Gram-
Panchayats should particularly be involved in the operation, maintenance and management of water 
infrastructures/facilities at appropriate levels progressively, with a view to eventually transfer the management 
of such facilities to the user groups/ local bodies’ (GoI, 2002b, p. 5). 
lxvi
 The policy re-emphasizes that water is a common pool resource held by the state, in fact, the policy 
enunciates taking corrective measures, like modifying the existing irrigation and groundwater acts, to ensure 
that the dominant perception that groundwater is a individual property is reconsidered/changed (GoI, 2012c, 
p. 3); and thereby taking groundwater out of the private space into the state’s domain. 
lxvii
 WUAs -according to the draft policy- will also have the freedom to fix rates subject to floor rates determined 
by water regulatory authority, that the policy necessitates should be established in each state (GoI, 2012c, p. 
3). 
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5 Ideas and Ideologies influence Irrigation Reform Process in 
Madhya Pradesh 
Chapter four discusses how the ideational paradigm for irrigation management in India has been 
shaped by historical and structural elements, which has resulted in bipolar structure for water 
resource management. This also resulted in lack of development of intermediate level governance 
structures. This chapter discusses how the ideational paradigm on farmer participation in irrigation 
management gained constituency with different actors in the state (policy makers, bureaucrats, and 
experts), which consequently led to enactment of the Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) Act 
in Madhya Pradesh in 1999. This chapter also maps actors at state level and their role in influencing 
the decentralization process using the analytical framework discussed in chapter three. Moreover, 
this chapter critically evaluates how ideational paradigm for irrigation management in Madhya 
Pradesh has been shaped due to interaction between key actors (bureaucrats and politicians) and 
influenced by existing and structural and cultural factors during a particular period. The focus is also 
on elaborating perpetuation of certain meaning of participation, management through various 
government and development cooperation funding and rootedness of these ideas in ideologies like 
interventionist developmental state, neoliberalism, and community based natural resource 
management (communitarianism for short) has shaped the ideational realm of actors and thus 
influenced irrigation reform process in Madhya Pradesh. 
5.1 Irrigation development and management in Madhya Pradesh 
Madhya Pradesh has a long history of irrigation, and development of irrigation sources started in the 
first century A.D. by Chandel Kings in Khajuraho area. In more recent past, the history of irrigation 
development in Madhya Pradesh cannot be discussed without mention of construction of Wainganga 
Canal System in Balaghat in 1923 and the Pagara Dam in Gwalior district in 1927. Similarly, irrigation 
tank systems were constructed in Palamati in Bhopal and Moorum Nalla in Balaghat in mid 1930s. 
Most of these projects were created for the purpose of protective irrigation with an irrigation 
potential of 0.06 million hectare in the state (GoMP, 2012c).  
Post independence, the thrust on developing irrigation potential in the state was in consonance with 
the central government’s policy (discussed narrative elaborated in chapter four). Additionally, in 
accord with the national happenings the gap between irrigation potential developed and utilized has 
also been a cause of concern for the state government (Figure 5.1).lxviii This figure lucidly illustrates 
that the gap between irrigation potential developed and utilized has not decreased over the years, 
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and this has been a persistent cause of concern for policy makers. According to 2011-12 state plan 
figures, the total irrigation potential created is 2.92 million hectares, while the irrigation potential 
utilized is 1.63 million hectares (GoMP, 2012c). 
Figure 5. 1: Irrigation potential developed and utilized in Madhya Pradesh  
 
 
#
Note: Data for IX plan (1998-99) onwards is for divided Madhya Pradesh as Chhattisgarh was carved as a 
separate state. Hence, there is a drastic fall in developed irrigation potential 1998-99 onwards. 
Source: Design by author based on data from GoMP (2012c) 
Underutilization of irrigation potential is a problem not only in Madhya Pradesh, but also at (and still 
is) the national level, as most of the Indian states are more or less underachievers in this context (as 
is evident from all India figures presented in Appendix I). Some of the reasons for underutilization of 
irrigation potential that were being discussed at the national level viz. poor system management, lack 
of funds for undertaking operation and maintenance, poor involvement of farmers in irrigation 
management, thus, also found resonance in Madhya Pradesh in the 1970s and 1980s (Pandey, 2006, 
p. 3; WALMI, 1988). Thus, institutional and system deficiencies were identified as the reason behind 
poor irrigation management in Madhya Pradesh as well in accord with national narrative which 
perpetuated an interventionist developmental model of planning. Consequently, institutional and 
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legal reforms were initiated in Madhya Pradesh to decentralize, to wit, involve farmers in irrigation 
management. The first effort in this direction was undertaken in 1973, when the state government 
instituted a State Water Resource Utilization Committee. This committee was concerned with 
initiating an integrated approach to project management for optimum utilization of water resources 
across various departments and is recognized as first generation reform that resulted in formation of 
an apex water institution in the state (World Bank, 2004, p. 20).lxix  
In Madhya Pradesh, Command Area Development Programme (CADP) was initiated on September 9, 
1974 in consonance with national happeningslxx that recognized the problem with 
agricultural/irrigation systems was lack of development and management below the outlet. In the 
beginning, CADP was under Department of Agriculture, however, to give more thrust to the 
programme an independent Ayacut (irrigable area) Departmentlxxi was constituted on September 23, 
1980 in Madhya Pradesh (GoMP, 2011a).  
Structural influence of development cooperation funding in shaping irrigation reforms in Madhya 
Pradesh is noteworthy. In the 1970s United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
promoted the idea of farmer participation in irrigation management, as discussed in chapter four. 
This idea was rooted in the ideology of that time period of donor organizations, which were 
beginning to promote the idea of community participation in management (McCarthy, 2005) and 
envisaged lesser role for the state to remedy the financial crisis the irrigation bureaucracies were 
facing worldwide. Consequently, USAID’s Water Resource Management and Training (WRMT) project 
through its funding advocated the idea that farmers ought to be enabled in order to become 
‘experts’ in irrigation management, so that they can take over management work from the irrigation 
bureaucracy. USAID through WRMT project supported 17 projects in 11 states as part of its Action 
Research Programme. Madhya Pradesh was one of the states that benefitted from USAID fundinglxxii 
(LBII & WAPCOS, 1992, p. 2).  
Designing institutions for irrigation management 
Madhya Pradesh was included under the WRM&T project in June 1984 and consequently, Madhya 
Pradesh Water and Land Management Institute (hereafter WALMI) was constituted and registered in 
August 1985 with the objective of increasing effectiveness of irrigation projects.lxxiii One of the 
foremost objectives of setting up WALMI was to have an organization that can promote scientific 
knowledge and integrate theoretical and applied knowledge related to irrigation management and 
thereby ‘promote active participation by farmers in irrigation management for optimal 
utilization/production through social organizations’ (WALMI, 1985, p. 3). The thrust on farmer 
Ideas and Ideologies influence Irrigation Reform Process in Madhya Pradesh 
 
 
 
 
97 
participation for irrigation management in WALMIs objective is not surprising as the action research 
component of the WRMT project envisaged improving quality of training at WALMIs and also to 
improve operation and management of irrigation systems (LBII & WAPCOS, 1992, p. 1). Thus, 
WALMI’s statement of objectives reflects that as well. To elaborate, the main objectives of the Action 
Research Programme of WRMT project were: (i) to improve the water/irrigation use efficiency; (ii) to 
increase crop productivity by improving system operation and management; (iii) to develop field 
training material for faculty and trainees; (iv) to improve participation of farmers in system 
management; and (v) to motivate farmers to organize (ibid.). The last two objectives mentioned 
above, are of particular interest to this research as they envisaged motivating farmers to organize for 
better participation in system management. Through this Action Research Programme, the idea that 
farmer participation will improve irrigation management and thus they ought to participate was 
incorporated and an era of designing institutions based on advice of international organizations like 
USAID began in Madhya Pradesh. Not surprisingly, the Action Research Programme was considered 
the most important activity of WALMI, Bhopal in the initial period and to facilitate it’s working as a 
separate unit -Action Research Unit- was established within WALMI. An interdisciplinary research 
team comprising faculty members and officers from irrigation department, agriculture department 
among others was formed to carry out this exploratory programme in two projects in the state, viz. 
Halali project (which was later renamed as SAS Project, which is also the case study for this research) 
and Ghorapacchar project (WALMI, 1991a, p. 1).lxxiv  
Furthermore, taking cue from the field experiences that were being undertaken during this time, a 
rough draft for constitution of farmer organizations was prepared by few progressive officials of the 
Irrigation Department during that time, informs a senior official of Water Resources Department 
(WRD), Bhopal (Interview, December 16, 2011). Moreover, building on this momentum of designing 
institutions, in 1985 the state government constituted a special committee for farmers’ involvement 
in the operation and maintenance of irrigation projects. This committee was formed under Madhya 
Pradesh minor project with financial support from USAID and comprised chief engineer, two 
superintending engineers and director of WALMI (who was also chief engineer in erstwhile Irrigation 
Department) chaired the committee. The committee had representatives only from the bureaucracy 
and USAID. The committee’s main objective was to examine the ways and means to improve farmer 
involvement in minor irrigation projects and to implement training activities in support of farmer 
organizations. The committee envisaged: 
“(…) We must know how best to organize farmers. The cost of irrigation continues to 
increase. The government can’t do farmers work. This study is to provide direction to the 
government as how to build farmers organizations at all level of irrigation systems 
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having good linkages with the irrigation department” (WALMI, 1991b, p. 3, emphasis 
addded). 
Three points need to be highlighted from the above quotation. First, there was willingness on part of 
state to address the issue of ailing irrigation infrastructure and bleeding irrigation bureaucracies. 
Second, during this period, the best way forward was considered by state bureaucracy and 
representatives of international organizations to organize farmers from the top, i.e. top-down 
designing of institutions. Third, it becomes apparent that during this time period the focus was on 
decentralization at the local/micro level, and not any attention was given to intermediate level 
issues.  
Furthermore, the political motivation for instituting farmer participation or designing institutions was 
partially endogenous (bleeding irrigation bureaucracy and not being able to utilize irrigation potential 
developed) and partially due to exogenous factors (tied-funding from international organizations like 
USAID) which resulted in greater impetus to idea of role of farmers (participation) in irrigation 
management. Thus, it is not surprising that the special committee’s findings argued for constitution 
of farmer organizations based on a diagnostic and perception survey results undertaken in Ratapani 
project. Implementation of these recommendations of the committee was facile for the state 
bureaucracy as Madhya Pradesh already had the Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Act 1931 in place where 
a section of the Irrigation Act was devoted to constitution of sinchai/irrigation panchayatslxxv. The 
salient features of Irrigation Act and Irrigation Rules 1974 (relevant for this research) are discussed in 
Appendix IV. The Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Act 1931 was considered revolutionary for its time, as it 
was the only Act that envisaged sinchai panchayats for water distribution and management before 
any other state in India. Consequently, first generation farmer organizations (i.e. sinchai panchayats) 
for irrigation management were constituted in the state for the first time in the late 1980s and few 
years later as part of the Action Research Programme of USAID, outlet committees were formed in 
select project sites for better irrigation management. However, these first generation farmer 
organizations did not achieve their desired objectives, and lay defunct. The reasons for these are 
manifold, requiring in-depth elaboration, and are thus discussed separately in chapter seven. 
However, what can be succinctly put here is that the idea of constituting and involving farmer 
organization in irrigation management did not lose sheen with two key actors’ –bureaucracy and 
political office bearers- after these first-generation farmer organizations lay defunct in the state. This 
becomes evident from reinvigorate efforts made by these two prominent actors in the mid-1990s 
and early-2000 for constitution of second-generation farmer organizations, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
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Overall, the idea of farmer involvement in irrigation management that was pondered upon and 
discussed at the national level was implemented in the state, through either CADP funding and/or 
through other donor interventions. The ideational paradigm for farmer involvement in irrigation 
management at the state level was shaped by exogenous and endogenous factors. To elaborate, 
exogenous factors in this context are role of international organizations and the central government 
in promoting farmer participation in irrigation management; whilst, the endogenous factors refers to 
initiatives taken by the state actors themselves. Both the exogenous and endogenous factors were 
influenced by the prevalent state ideology for instance developmentalism in post-independence time 
and post 1980s there has been greater influence of neoliberal and/or communitarian ideology as was 
also elaborated in chapter four.  
Moreover, from the above discussion it can be asserted that the ideational paradigm for irrigation 
management was shaped mostly by (state) structural directives which informed the interaction 
(experiences) that actors within the bureaucracy had with existing state organizations like the 
irrigation department or by constituting WALMI as an additional organization to undertake capacity 
building of farmer organizations. As there was a recognition that the irrigation bureaucracy was 
bleeding, i.e. the cost of irrigation was rising, and at the state level, at least in high level committees 
there was this perception that the state cannot undertake farmers work, i.e. management of 
irrigation water.  
5.2 Participatory Irrigation Management in Madhya Pradesh  
Discussion for forming farmer organizations or involving farmers in irrigation management had been 
on going in Madhya Pradesh since 1980s in the bureaucratic circles as is evident from the above 
discussion. In early 1990s, decentralization initiative received a renewed thrust in Madhya Pradesh 
under Digvijay Singh the then Chief Minister of the State belonging to congress party. After the 
central government passed the 73rd and 74th Amendment to the Constitution of India in 1993 for 
constitution of panchayats (lowest tier of governance) in India which was a step to devolve functions, 
and power from macro to micro level in order to reduce the role of the state. Thereafter, the 
Madhya Pradesh government took lead in India to enact relevant legislations to strengthen its 
commitment to decentralization and to cover lacunae in the existing laws in Madhya Pradesh. 
Consequently the panchayat elections were held in the state in 1994. The political willingness to 
decentralize becomes evident from Digvijay Singh’s commitment and initiatives. Moreover, the 
urgency with which decentralization initiatives were implemented by the state government in the 
1990s can be explained using the concept of ‘mimetic isomorphism’ propounded by Di Maggio and 
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Powell (1983:66) who argue that ‘organizations compete not just for resources and customers but 
also for political power and institutional legitimacy’. Given that congress party government was in 
power in the state and at the national level the Digvijay Singh initiated several legislative measures 
like Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj Awam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam and District Planning 
Committees Act to initiate decentralization measures in Madhya Pradesh in order to ensure 
institutional legitimacy to this idea of top-down decentralization propounded by the central 
government. As a consequence of this decentralization drive, 65 farmers organizations (Krishak 
Samitis)lxxvi were constituted on pilot basis under Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Society Act in 1994-
95 to involve farmers in irrigation management; the funding for which was provided by the World 
Bank under National Water Management Programme (NWMP), apprised a senior official of Water 
Resources Department (WRD) in Bhopal (Interview, December 16, 2011).  
Thus, on one hand there was political willingness to decentralize at the state level; on the other hand 
there was urgency to hand over irrigation management to farmers as well in the bureaucratic circles. 
To recall the discussion in chapter four, poor irrigation potential utilizationlxxvii and thus an urgency to 
lessen this gap has been consistently voiced at the national level, which is evident from various 
Government of India reports as well (GoI, 1992b, 1996, 2001b, 2011a). Further, at the national level 
as demonstrated in chapter four, experts argued that for sustainable irrigation management there is 
greater need for participation/commitment/involvement of farmers in management and distribution 
of irrigation water, which was not happening in states at that time (GoI, 1995; L. K. Joshi, 1997, p. 12; 
Parthasarthy, 2008, p. 125; WAPCOS, 1997). The bureaucratic discussions in Madhya Pradesh is not 
that different, as was discussed in the earlier sub section, few piecemeal efforts were made to devise 
ways to have greater involvement of farmers in irrigation management. These efforts were in accord 
with the national narrative on irrigation management and shaped ideational paradigm –i.e. the 
irrigation bureaucracy are bleeding and the farmers need to be involved- for irrigation management 
in Madhya Pradesh through not only various central government or donor funding like CADP, NWMP, 
and USAID but also by introducing the bureaucrats of Bhopal to the idea of participatory irrigation 
management through various conferences, workshops that were organized on the subject - details of 
which were discussed in chapter four (c.f. GIMS, 1987; GoI, 1981, 1995; IDP, 1993; Maloney et al., 
1991; Maloney & Raju, 1991; Sundar, 1990). 
Reflecting on the process of enactment of PIM Act, a senior official in WRD apprised that Digvijay 
Singh’s government provided policy environment conducive for constitution of PIM Act. The chief 
minister set up a committee of senior bureaucrats from Irrigation Department (later renamed WRD), 
all line departments and academics to develop a strategy for initiating PIM in the state. Thereafter, 
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the senior bureaucracy acted as agenda setters for initiating discussion on PIM within WRD 
(Interview, June 6, 2011). The state level bureaucracy (hereafter senior bureaucracy) was keen on 
taking up this idea given poor irrigation potential utilization in the state. Senior bureaucrats cited 
system deficiencies as a reason for poor underutilization of irrigation potential in the state apart 
from deferred system maintenance, lack of funds to meet operation and maintenance cost and lack 
of involvement of farmers in irrigation management (Interview, June 6, 2011; Pandey, 2006). This 
perspective has however, been critiqued by Suhardiman and Mollinga (2012) who posit that fixation 
for deferred maintenance has been a core element of international donor policy though it is not in 
sync with farmers and irrigation agency staff perceptions.  
Nevertheless, cost cutting measures, top-down pressure (in terms of tied-funding by central 
government as discussed in previous section) to implement and imitate the institutional framework 
propounded by the central government played a key role in shaping the ideational framework that 
led to adoption of PIM in the state. Additionally, pursuance of ‘mimetic isomorphism’ to adopt PIM in 
Madhya Pradesh becomes salient from interviews with WRD officials who apprised that they studied 
the PIM Act of Andhra Pradesh (enacted in 1997), and also visited Gujarat, Maharashtra and Andhra 
Pradesh to study different models of PIM being tried. Additionally, experiences of farmer 
organizations in Mexico and Philippines were keenly studied in order to explore/learn from 
experiences of other countries (Interview, June 7, 2011). From, the discussion in the empirical 
chapters it will become evident that enthusiasm for PIM was a just a strategic move of WRD to 
source new funding for command area development in the state. Given that it was tied funding, it 
came with the idea of implementing participation, i.e. specific vocabularies as necessary. Thus, the 
bureaucracy interpreted and implemented participation minimally in the state (see chapter eight to 
ten). 
So, there was not only political willingness to initiate PIM but also curiosity and certain degree of 
willingness within senior bureaucracy at the state level to explore new models of farmer managed 
irrigation systems that was being implemented in Andhra Pradesh (and was being discussed at the 
centre). One of the faculties of WALMI who was part of one of the sub committee’s that drafted the 
PIM Act in Madhya Pradesh posits:  
“Andhra Pradesh was doing some basic study on PIM; suddenly we got news Andhra 
Pradesh enacted the Act. The Irrigation Department here in Bhopal thought Andhra 
Pradesh has done it, so why not we. That is why we went to Andhra Pradesh (…) we had 
sent some senior officers there, who studied the Andhra Pradesh Act and found (realized) 
that it is easier to adopt entire Act rather than experimenting something on our own.  
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So, this state has taken an abrupt decision to go for the model that Andhra Pradesh has 
implemented. They (referring to WRD officials) made some amendments in Act suitable 
to Madhya Pradesh” (Interview, August 30, 2011).  
The above citation makes evident that while drafting the Act the senior bureaucracy did not give 
adequate attention to context specificity. Rather once the chief minister showed inclination to 
decentralize and ordered setting up a committee for initiating PIM, the senior bureaucracy 
implemented this directive without incorporating context specific changes. Thus, it becomes evident 
that the policy translation from national to state level was undertaken without bearing in mind the 
local specificities. To elaborate, Chief Minister Digvijay Singh had initiated the reform process to 
institute greater democratization through decentralization. However, it needs to be noted here that 
the interest to decentralize was not only financial. Rather this was an attempt to widen the voter 
base of Congress party by including lower castes -Other Backward Castes (OBC), Scheduled Caste 
(SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST)- in its fold in the wake of the politics of Mandal Commission (Jaffrelot, 
2008). Jaffrelot posits that this move of Digvijay Singh was informed by the logic of clientelism. 
Another aspect is pointed out by Manor (2009) who argues that the main reason to decentralize was 
utilitarian rather than ideological as it provided greater developmental outcomes and aimed at 
redistribution and taking away power from the village chieftains (Also see Behar, 2003; Johnson, 
Deshingkar, & Start, 2003).  
Furthermore, a senior WRD official noted that PIM legislation was not enacted due to international 
funding pressure in Madhya Pradesh, which is in contrast to Andhra Pradesh where PIM was a donor 
driven process (Interview, June 7, 2011). Although, this viewpoint for reforms in Andhra Pradesh has 
been confuted by scholars (Mooij, 2007; Nikku, 2006) who have argued that that the then Chief 
Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Chandra Babu Naidu, post liberalization of the Indian economy was 
interested in big reform programme in order to consolidate his rural voter base and hence, irrigation 
sector was top priority. Thus the Andhra Pradesh government mobilised international funding to 
support its reform programme. Coming back to reform process in Madhya Pradesh, the senior WRD 
official apprised that that between 1997-98 the state government made efforts to strengthen and 
garner political will at all levels by organizing consultations with farmers of command area, 
panchayats and Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA) on this subject with concluding agreement 
that farmers involvement in operation and maintenance is the only option to improve irrigation 
management in the state. Consequently, the draft bill was constituted in 1999 taking due 
consideration of all participants of the consultative process (ibid.). It is noteworthy, however, that 
Non-Government Organizations (NGO) were not involved in this consultative process which is 
contrast to Andhra Pradesh where NGOs were involved in the consultation process (See Nikku, 
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2006). There are two reasons for NGOs, or civil society of Madhya Pradesh as Manor (2009) puts it, 
for not being part of the consultative process. First, the chief minister had little interaction with civil 
society within the state. Second, the civil society raised inconvenient demands (Manor, 2009, p. 9). 
Another sub-committee member of the drafting committee reveals that senior bureaucrats and 
experts held the key to formulating the Act, and consultations did not have much role in its design. 
This is not surprising given the hierarchical bureaucratic structure; lower level officials (junior 
bureaucracy) are not known to question or suggest changes to their reporting authority. Although, 
the committee did recognize that sharing of power between farmers and engineers could be a 
problem. Moreover, within the department there were reservations about this model where greater 
role for farmers was envisaged (Interview, November 5, 2011), according to institutional design. Prior 
to formulation of the Act the committee also discussed financial sharing of irrigation revenue (about 
30-50 per cent) with WUAs. However, the finance department had reservations about sharing the 
irrigation revenue, which comes to the state exchequer and thus WUAs were not given financial 
autonomy in the Act (Interview, November 5, 2011). In the above discussion, committee’s 
recognition that sharing of power could be a problem acknowledges the prevalent hierarchy and 
reluctance to share power between two key actors –junior bureaucracy and farmers- at the local 
level. Additionally, as previously discussed in chapter four, in the seventies and eighties the problems 
in the irrigation systems were attributed below outlet which led to what scholars (Mollinga, 
Meinzen-Dick, & Merrey, 2007) have connoted as ‘blame the farmer train the farmer’ approach and 
‘organise the farmer reduce the burden’ approach as social engineering solutions to resolve maladies 
of the irrigation system i.e. designing farmer organization. However, as critical scholars (Wade & 
Chambers, 1980) have demonstrated that the problem has been the blind spot i.e. main  system 
management. The crucial issue to discuss is why despite known problems with this approach, 
bureaucrats and donors were still advocating it in policy circles.  
The above discussion sheds some light on this subject, to wit, it becomes evident from the material 
presented above, that the process of formulation of PIM Act was top-down and is an instance of 
policy translation idea adopted without giving attention to context specificity. From ideational 
perspective it is clear, that participation of actors (farmers, junior bureaucracy) in formulation of the 
Act was limited. However, all relevant state departments/organizations like Agriculture, Finance, 
Water and Land Management Institute, Bhopal were part of the consultative process. Mostly senior 
bureaucrats were involved in this process and they worked within their organizational mandate for 
instance the irrigation department, who was not keen on sharing responsibilities (or revenue) with 
farmer organizations as a consequence of that would have been lesser power for them. The role of 
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junior bureaucracy who experience and implement policy legislations is important to understand, 
although was overlooked while formulating policy (c.f. Lipsky, 2010). Additionally, token consultative 
participation (c.f. B. Agarwal, 2001, p. 1624) was undertaken with farmers, panchayats, etc. wherein 
their opinion on farmer organization was solicited, though with no power to influence decision-
making of the committee.  
Overall, participation and discussion was restricted to select senior officials who were appointed to 
be part of the committee. The committee prepared a draft bill, which was discussed in the state 
legislative assembly and subsequently ‘Madhya Pradesh Sinchai Prabandhan Mein Krishkon ki 
Bhagidari Adhiniyam 1999’ (hereafter, PIM Act) was passed in July 1999. The Act came into effect 
from September 1999 and with its enactment passed on management of irrigation networks to 
farmer organizations -delineated on hydraulic basis- to improve system condition (GoMP, 1999). 
From the above discussion, the coalitional and bargaining relation (See Kaviraj, 2010, pp. 107-109) 
between two key actors which fall under the programmatic frame according to Campbell’s (2004) 
formulation, viz. bureaucrats and politicians become evident.  
Some of the salient features of PIM Act are elaborated in Box 5.1.  
 
Box 5. 1: Salient features of Madhya Pradesh PIM Act  
According to the Madhya Pradesh PIM Act, Water User Associations (WUAs) are to be delineated on a 
hydraulic basis in the command area. The canal deputy collector (the district collector) divides a water users’ 
area into Territorial Constituencies (TC) of not less than four and more than ten wards. A WUA comprises 
following members:  
“ (…) All the water users who are land holders in the water users’ area. An amendment to Act was 
made in 2005 that entitled and recognized wives of the land titleholders also as part of the WUA. 
Additionally, women were given the right to vote as well during WUA elections. 
In situations where both owner and tenant are landholders in respect of the same land, the 
tenant is considered part of the WUA.  
All other water users’ in a water users’ area. 
Three ex-officio members one of amin (accountant/ person responsible for revenue collection) 
cadre and one of sub engineer cadre from WRD who will act as coordinator between the 
government departments and farmers association and the third from the Agriculture Department 
or Ayacut Department who will act as Advisor” (GoMP, 1999, pp. 10-11). 
The above members also constitute the general body of the WUA. The general body meetings of a WUA are to 
be held at least twice every year before the kharif and rabi season. Each WUA has a management committee 
according to the Act, which consists of a president, and member from each of the territorial constituencies of 
the water users’ area. Further, the act necessitates co-option of a women member in the management 
committee if the management committee does not have any women member. The Act entrusts the 
management committee with all powers and expects it to perform function of the WUA. The list of functions 
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that WUAs are supposed to undertake is exhaustive, viz. 
“To prepare and implement a warabandi schedule for each irrigation season, consistent with the 
operation plan based upon the entitlement, area, soil and cropping patter as approved by the 
distributory committee, or as the case may be, the project committee. 
To prepare a plan for the maintenance of the irrigation system in the area of its operation and 
the end of each crop season and carry out the maintenance works of both distributory system 
and minor and field drains in its area of operation with the funds of the association from time to 
time and to provide funds for the maintenance of staff including such persons who are placed by 
the state government with the WUA for the purpose of regulation and maintenance of irrigation 
system. 
To regulate the use of water among the various pipe outlet under its area of operation according 
to the warabandi schedule of the systems; To promote economy in the use of water allocated; to 
maintain a register of land holders as published by the revenue department; to monitor the flow 
of water for irrigation; to conduct regular water budgeting and also to produce a periodical social 
audit. 
To prepare and maintain a register of co-opted members, to prepare and maintain an inventory 
of the irrigation system within the area of operation. 
To resolve the disputes if any between the members and water users in its area of operation. 
To raise resources; to maintain accounts; to cause annual audit of its accounts. 
To assist in the conduct of elections to the managing committee; to conduct general body 
meetings as prescribed” (GoMP, 1999). 
Additionally, WUA are expected to work closely with key stakeholders like WRD, Agriculture and other relevant 
line departments for financial and other needs. WUAs are also involved in identifying the problems in the 
physical system through a joint walk through process with engineers of WRD (ibid.). 
 
From the above discussion on PIM Act in Box 5.1 it is evident that the PIM Act transferred 
responsibility of managing state infrastructure to farmer organizations and delineated them on 
hydraulic basis. The state addressed the equity in representation within WUAs by having Territorial 
Constituency (TC) members who are representative of the entire WUAs area. The WUAs have five-
year tenure and the Act provisions for right to recall an elected member after one year. The Act also 
provides financial and administrative autonomy to WUAs so that they can raise additional resources 
for undertaking WUA work (GoMP, 1999). Further, from Box 5.1, it is evident that WUAs have an 
exhaustive list of functions to perform. Thus, to implement the Act i.e. to constitute WUAs and 
enable their smooth functioning, the state government initiated administrative, governance, 
institutional and financial reforms in the state to ensure smooth functioning between farmer 
organization and WRD. Additionally, greater responsibilities were given to farmer organizations in 
implement decentralization. The detailed elaboration of the same is done in section 5.2.1.  
Based on the discussion till now it can be argued that decentralization process in Madhya Pradesh 
has been top-down. The call for reform came from chief minister and efforts to decentralize were 
taken up by progressive senior bureaucrats in the state at the behest of the chief minister. The idea 
of farmer participation propagated through the Act had semblance of programmatic and 
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paradigmatic strands -as elucidated by Campbell (2004), and elaborated in chapter three. The idea of 
farmer participation propagated in Madhya Pradesh was not only influenced by elite assumptions 
that farmer participation will improve irrigation management, as was the discussion in the state in 
the 1990s within the bureaucracy, but also by programmes of international organizations (like USAID, 
and the World Bank) which were propagating farmer participation in irrigation management taking 
cognizance of scholars like Norman Uphoff (1986b). Furthermore, the then chief minister framed the 
discussion of decentralization as greater power/ decision-making authority to local communities in 
order to sell the idea of decentralization to his constituents. Thus, salience of idea of farmers as 
actors capable of taking over management of irrigation system was perpetuated. This was different 
from the ideology and imagery of the tutelary state of Nehruvian era of infantile citizens (see chapter 
four). Moreover, given that the idea of farmer participation in irrigation management is rooted in 
two competing ideologies – neoliberalism and communitarianism (see chapter four) one aims to 
reduce the role of the state and provide greater role to market while the other aims to provide 
greater voice at the local level and deepen democracy. It is noteworthy that in development theory, 
neoliberalism is explicated as an ideology that was initiated with an aim to reduce the role of the 
interventionist state and promote market based interventions, as the state was observed to be a 
barrier rather than a driving force for development. However, lately there has been shift in neoliberal 
development strategy from singular focus on market deregulation to additional emphasis on 
institutional reforms and social development. In this context civil society has emerged as an arena 
wherein these development objectives could be achieved. Thus, in popular development lexicon 
terms like stakeholder assessment, participatory approaches and assessments have become popular 
which has been propagated by institutions like the World Bank to activate civil society arena (Mohan 
& Stokke, 2000, p. 248). It is noteworthy that neoliberal ideology approaches participation 
instrumentally which can be achieved by top-down institutional reforms. While communitarian 
approaches have envisaged a more encompassing and radical meaning of participation, which goes 
beyond collaboration between state and NGOs that work to make institutions more efficient. Here 
distinction between ‘big (D)evelopment and small (d)evelopment’lxxviii NGOs is significant to 
understand the ideology, values and beliefs that NGOs work under. The focus of Big (D)evelopment is 
on alternative forms of interventions, while that of the small (d)evelopment is on systemic changes - 
a fight for an alternative development paradigm where NGOs not merely form a third sector and 
provide other services rather they also depict struggle defined by relations of power (Bebbington et 
al., 2008, p. 5).  
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Having briefly discussed the consistence of different ideologies the next section elaborates how 
actors’ rootedness in different ideologies –developmental interventionist state, neoliberalism and 
communitarianism- shaped implementation of reform process in Madhya Pradesh. 
5.2.1 Reforms to implement PIM in Madhya Pradesh  
Several WRD officials perceive that PIM Act was implemented in haste (discussed in detail in chapter 
nine), states a senior WRD official. He further reveals that the Act was implemented in a haphazard 
system, given the financial crisis that the department was facing (Interview, December 16, 2011). 
Furthermore, the political office bearers and senior bureaucracy have controlled implementation of 
the Act through Madhya Pradesh government’s executive orders vide Principal Secretary, WRD, 
Bhopal who gives directives to WRD to implement the Act (c.f. GoMP, 2010). These executive orders 
have made the Act more users friendly and/or aimed to control the functioning of the WUAs - the 
details of which are discussed in subsequent sub-sections.  
5.2.1.1 Administrative and institutional reforms  
A separate PIM Directorate was constituted in WRD, Bhopal in the year 2000 to monitor and evaluate 
PIM activities at the state level. Two officials, one from executive engineer’s office and one from 
chief engineer’s office were nominated as nodal officers to collect information regarding activities of 
WUAs and compile monthly progress reports on progress of PIM. Furthermore, in the year 2000, the 
district collector was appointed the nodal officer for monitoring the finances of WUAs by the order of 
then Chief Minister to ensure there was no misuse of funds. The PIM Directorate was also made 
responsible for monitoring all PIM related activities (GoMP, 2010, p. 19). Additionally, the Act 
envisages a three-tier farmer organizations set up for irrigation management with competent 
authority as a representative from WRD. To comply with the Act organizational reforms were 
initiated in the state, to implement the three-tier farmer organization set up outlined in the Act 
(Interview June 7, 2011).  
Table 5. 1: Three-tier structure of farmer organizations in Madhya Pradesh  
 Micro level Intermediate level 
Major irrigation project (more 
than 10,000 hectare) 
Water User Associations 
Distributory 
Committee 
Project Committee 
Medium irrigation project (more 
than 2000 hectare and up to 
10,000 hectare) 
Water User Associations - Project Committee 
Minor irrigation project 
(up to 2000 hectare) 
Water User Associations - - 
    
Competent Authority Sub Engineer Sub Division Officer Executive Engineer 
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on GoMP (1999) 
The lowest tier in the institutional hierarchy is a WUA at water user level of the irrigation system. 
Secondary unit is distributory committee at distributory canal level of the irrigation system and 
tertiary unit is project committee at the project level (GoMP, 1999). In Madhya Pradesh all major 
irrigation schemes have the above-mentioned three-tier system. Medium irrigation schemes have a 
two-tier system (with only WUAs and distributory committees); and the minor irrigation projects 
have only one tier structure with WUAs to manage the network of minors. In addition, a state level 
apex committee is formed headed by the minister of WRD and has representatives from project 
committees across the state; two representatives from non-governmental organizations; and three 
senior bureaucrats from WRD (GoMP, 1999).  
Furthermore, to facilitate WUA functioning, farmer organizations were provided functionaries vide 
an order in 2000 which delegated existing lower daily wage functionaries of WRD like watchmen to 
WUAs (GoMP, 2010, p. 18). To provide powers to WUA president, it was noted that the department 
will disburse wages of these functionaries only after the WUA president submitted appropriate forms 
that indicated monthly pay data of these functionaries (GoMP, 2010, p. 44). This order provided 
WUAs with functionaries who could facilitate in quotidian working of WUAs. Moreover, the idea 
behind providing greater power to functionaries at the local level is rooted in the neoliberal ideology 
of top-down designing institutions at the micro level. This approach aimed to provide greater power 
and control to WUA members in order to make the junior functionaries of the department 
accountable to them. Additionally, this model of institutional building and social development 
envisages that powerless can be empowered without making any change to the existing social order 
or extensive social mobilization (Mohan & Stokke, 2000, p. 249). 
Moreover, to ensure closer interaction between farmer organizations and WRD, sub-engineer was 
included as ex-officio members by an executive order in 2000, as competent authority in WUAs, (as 
elaborated in Table 5.1). The sub engineers support WUAs by providing technical assistance and also 
ensure structural safety of the system, aid WUAs in preparation of estimates for operation and 
maintenance, and prioritization of work that ought to be done (GoMP, 1999; 2010, p. 33; Pangare, 
Hooja, & Kaushal, 2003, p. 8). A former WALMI official reveals that in initial period after the 
enactment of the Act there was a suggestion from WRD that secretary of WUA ought to be a sub 
engineer from WRD. Although, the then Chief Minister Digvijay Singh was against creating this 
hierarchy as it would have put the onus of doing the paperwork on farmer organizations, however, 
most of the bureaucrats, experts in the committee wanted sub engineer to be secretary of WUA in 
order to have some control over WUA functioning, and thus sub engineer/competent authority were 
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made secretaries in WUA (Interview, November 5, 2011). Similarly, to ensure greater control over 
WUAs, vide another order in 2002, sub engineers/competent authorities were mandated to be 
invited to general body meetings of WUA. Thus, the essence of administrative and institutional 
reforms initiated on one hand facilitated departmental functioning and on the other ensured that 
‘control’ over farmer organizations was somehow maintained by WRD, for instance, by mandating 
sub engineers to participate in general body meetings. Also, the state bureaucracy ensured that sub 
engineer was made secretary in WUA although the chief minister was against it, as not all sections of 
bureaucracy were willing to lose control that they had over management of the irrigation systems by 
transfer of responsibilities to farmer organizations. Thus, though these reforms were supported to 
facilitate decentralization but instead, the executive class through some of the later executive orders 
limited the scope of decentralization. Interestingly, the bureaucracy was still functioning and 
believed in the ideology of centrist state planning and state supremacy and thus restricted 
devolution of functions to WUAs. The impact of these orders on functioning of WUAs i.e. second-
generation farmer organizations is discussed through the SAS Project case in chapter eight. 
5.2.1.2 Measures undertaken to ensure accountability and transparency 
To institute decentralization, the PIM Directorate was made the nodal agency for organizing capacity 
building programmes for farmer organizations and department functionaries (Interviews, June 6th & 
7th, 2011). To ensure accountability and transparency, the competent authorities were made 
secretaries (as an ex-officio member) in farmer organizations and were made signatory to any 
financial transaction that farmer organization undertakes. The competent authority was also made 
responsible for assisting WUAs in preparing of list of works to be done and to prepare cost 
estimation for the same. In addition, the competent authorities were given power to sign the 
technical clearance of any works that is planned. The technical clearance for special repairs up to INR 
100,000 is with the executive engineer; the sub engineer can give clearance up to INR 10,000; and 
the chief engineer has full power for other higher amounts. In case of ordinary repairs, the executive 
engineer has full powers for the funds that are to be provided to farmer organizations (GoMP, 1999).  
Thus, through inclusion of engineer as competent authority in WUA, greater control was not only 
envisaged over day-to-day functioning of farmer organizations but also over their financial 
transactions. Moreover, it is ironic that to ensure transparency and accountability, the bureaucrats at 
the state government introduced technical clearance, as the idea behind initiating farmer 
organizations at the national level was to foster/design organizations/institutions that would be 
transparent, democratic and self-reliant. Moreover, by giving the competent authority the power to 
sign payments, this power was not decentralized to WUA presidents, which created an environment 
where WUA presidents would always have to seek patronage from the concerned officials. 
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Furthermore, to facilitate functioning of WUAs in 2005, and to institute greater/wider farmer 
participation, an amendment to the PIM Act was made in order to facilitate management committee 
to constitute six sub-committees within WUAs for smoother implementation and to enrol greater 
number of farmers in WUAs. The six sub committees are: i) water distribution management sub-
committee; ii) works sub-committee; iii) canal dispute and crime reduction sub-committee; iv) 
financial audit and social audit of resources sub-committee; v) irrigation cooperative revenue sub-
committee; vi) participation of women sub-committee (GoMP, 1999, p. 44; 2010, p. 53). These sub 
committees were formed in order to have an inclusive process, provide a tool for participatory 
monitoring, and to involve larger group of farmers (and women) in various activities of WUA 
(functioning of these committees is discussed in chapter eight). Thus, the aim of forming these sub 
committees was to make functioning of WUAs more feasible/practical, and to ensure that the 
workload and/or decision-making power is not vested only in the hand of WUA members (who could 
be elite farmers). Rather to have involvement of wider general body of WUA. Additionally, the 
Madhya Pradesh PIM Act is (deemed) visionary by senior bureaucrats in WRD, as it gives voting right 
to women even if the land title is not on their name (but their husband’s). A senior official of WRD 
states that initially when this resolution was proposed there was public resistance to amendment of 
this clause in the Bill, however, eventually this clause was amended to the Bill after extensive 
deliberations in 2005, due to persistence and interest of senior officials in WRD who had support of 
the political office bearers (Interview, June 7, 2011). The state bureaucracy takes pride in this 
amendment as it is was solely due to their efforts that this amendment has been made. However, 
this form of soliciting participation has been criticized for being depoliticizing as it forecloses 
discussion (politics) within a given ‘hierarchy of place and function’, as certain known actors like 
women or marginalized sections are included in the sub committees fully knowing their disposition 
or rather what actors perceive are their dispositions. Thus, public participation in constituting 
committees could be used as a depoliticizing strategy to uphold the dominant hegemonic order 
(Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 268) or ideational realm, for instance, how participation is perceived and 
implemented through perpetuation of this neoliberal communitarian ideology. Thus, it becomes 
evident that bureaucrats at the state level, in accord with the debate propounded by international 
organizations designed politically correct (though non-political) institutions. The SAS Project case 
study elucidates how this affected the dynamics of irrigation management at the intermediate and 
local level empirically.   
Overall, from the above discussion it is apparent that though the Act was enacted in 1999, its 
implementation has been gradual and these orders have aimed to facilitate as well constrain 
participation and functioning of farmer organizations. For instance, delegation of daily wage 
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functionaries is an attempt to facilitate better functioning of WUAs, and gives power to WUAs over 
lower functionaries. Whilst, involvement of sub engineers as secretaries in WUAs is to have some 
control over WUAs and to ensure that the system is not structurally altered. Moreover, the above 
mentioned measures of including sub engineer in WUA is counterproductive to the essence under 
which farmer organization were formed that is WUA members were elected by the people (through a 
secret ballot), and were responsible for maintaining records and taking decisions in a participatory, 
transparent and accountable way. What also becomes evident from the above discussion is that the 
bureaucracy did not have (one voice) consensus on decentralization and were not prepared to alter 
the existing structural status quo. Thus, section of bureaucracy exercised their agency and ensured 
control over WUAs by legislating sub engineer or executive engineer as competent authority in 
WUAs. The above discussion also elucidates the salience of case specific factors and agency to 
understand ideational change in policy making (c.f. Berman, 2013). 
Capacity building efforts for institutional development of farmer organization and irrigation officials 
has been undertaken through three main (and diverse) actors’ till now in Madhya Pradesh, viz. 
WALMI (semi-governmental organization), non-government organizations and through an 
international consultancy firm, and the works of the same and the idea of participation they 
advocated through their work is discussed in the following sub-section. These capacity building 
measures have been initiated in the state as it was recognized by the bureaucracy that there was not 
adequate attention paid to the ground realities (i.e. preparedness of farmers or junior bureaucracy at 
project level to implement the Act) and the Act was being implemented in haste. As mentioned 
earlier, the Act was implemented two years after the Andhra Pradesh Act and once the Madhya 
Pradesh legislative assembly passed the Act in September 1999, it was implemented in six months; 
the first WUA elections were held in April 2000. Thus, there was a felt need for undertaking capacity 
building measures to bring farmers on board about this idea and to capacitate them on their new 
responsibilities.  
Capacity building through Madhya Pradesh WALMI 
A faculty of WALMI who has been associated with training programmes of farmer organizations 
notes that post implementation of the PIM Act, the state government recognized the need to build 
capacities of the newly formed farmer organizations and Irrigation Department officials, as part of a 
broader governance reform with an objective of instituting greater cooperation, commitment and 
participation of these two actors in operation and management of these irrigation network systems. 
Therefore, to meet this objective, a training calendar was prepared by the WRD in Bhopal. Officials 
were sent to Chhattisgarh and other parts of the country to study various models for capacity 
building and a calendar for training programme was developed (Interview, August 30, 2011). In fact, 
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the first phase of training of engineers was initiated prior to handing over the operation and 
maintenance responsibility to farmer organizations in March 2000. This training programme was held 
at WALMI campus in Bhopal. After the first phase of WUA elections were held in the state in April 
2000 the training calendar for capacity building programme was initiated in May 2000. The planning 
for second phase of training programme was concurrent and paid attention to implementation 
aspects within PIM, i.e. how work ought to be done. The two-fold objective behind these 
training/capacity building programmes was to create awareness amongst WUAs (by disseminating 
knowledge to WUA presidents) about their roles and responsibilities and to prepare engineers for 
their new role as facilitators compared to their old role of doers, which was a position of control and 
power and defined their ideational realm. The capacity building programmes were believed to be 
critical as the lower bureaucracy had a lot of un-learning and re-learning to do to overcome their 
(dominant) ideational realm and fit into their new shoes. 140 Master trainers were brought in to 
undertake this massive capacity building exercise in October 2000. RCVP Noronha Academy of 
Administration and Management, Bhopal and WALMI, Bhopal conducted these training programmes 
(Interview, June 6, 2011).lxxix After the second round of WUA elections in 2006, the PIM directorate 
prepared the training calendar for capacity building of newly elected WUAs. WALMI conducted this 
training programme in the second round and the focus was on increasing coordination at the field 
level. Each training program was for three days duration and covered following issues:  
“Powers, duties and responsibilities of WUA; accounting procedures for the WUA; tips for 
better coordination between WUA and competent authority; information about already 
transferred and future schemes for the overall betterment of the WUA; information 
about various relevant provisions of the Act and its amendments; coordination with 
other departments like Agriculture, Rural Development, Forest; information about 
various sub-committees that can be constituted under the provisions of the Act” (WALMI, 
2011, pp. 24-26). 
From the content of the training programme cited above, it is evident that WALMI focused on 
discussing the procedural matters in its trainings - they provided basic information on roles and 
responsibilities of WUA presidents and basic relevancy of the Act and its provisions in order to create 
awareness amongst presidents about their role. The extent to which the training programme of 
WALMI has been useful in building capacities of WUA presidents is discussed in detail in chapter 
eight and nine. None of the WUA trainings were conducted in the field. WUA presidents from across 
the state were invited to WALMI, Bhopal for the training programme, or taken on exposure visits to 
select sites.  
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The above-discussed style of functioning of WALMI evinces a bureaucratic top-down model that is 
being pursued by this interventionist semi-state agency wherein the focus has been on providing a 
list of rulebook and functions to WUA presidents so that they can facilitate effective service delivery 
and reduce the burden of water bureaucracy.  The impact of this model is discussed in chapter eight 
and nine. 
Capacity building through NGOs from 2003-2007 
After initiation of PIM in the state there was considerable hesitation amongst WRD personnel at 
district and local field offices i.e. junior bureaucracy about implementation/consequences of the PIM 
Act. At the state level, however, WRD officials showed reasonably keen interest in implementing the 
Act, but were unsure of how to commence PIM activities. India Canada Environment Facility (ICEF) 
funding for capacity building came under this backdrop in the state and the ICEF managers 
recognized on one hand the uncertainty that WRD officials faced of how the Act would reduce their 
role and on the other hand they were also aware that WUAs in many projects lacked credibility and 
capacity and thus the only way to overcome this problem they perceived was through serious efforts 
at capacity building through select NGOs (ICEF, 2004). Thus, ICEF was a significant ideational broker 
according to Campbell’s (2004) typology and intervened through their funding to initiate capacity 
building measures. Furthermore, ICEF and state officials perceived that the training programmes 
carried by WALMI were not enough. Given, this backdrop, in the year 2003, the ICEF sponsored 
participatory irrigation management project in six locations in Madhya Pradesh ‘to demonstrate the 
process of shift from traditional to pragmatic participatory model’ (GoMP & ASA, 2004). Under ICEF 
funding, four NGOs -Saadhan, Sankalp, Rakshan and MART (names changed) - were selected by WRD, 
Bhopal on the recommendation of a well-known NGO from Jaipur in Rajasthan. A senior official from 
WRD, Bhopal posits that there was significant political pressure on WRD officials to select these four 
NGOs. These four NGOs were selected to support project implementation and strengthen both 
WUAs and WRD teams at six project sites for four and a half years between 2002-2007 (Interview, 
June 6, 2011). Additionally, three more NGOs were associated with this project specifically to impart 
Geographic Information System (GIS) training, exposure visit cum training and for gender 
mainstreaming (ASA, 2005, p. 37).lxxx Specific aspects that the four NGOs needed to address were: 
“Proper maintenance of the system; equitable distribution of water; re-orientation of the 
WRD personnel from executing agent to facilitator; capacity building of farmer 
organizations to enable them to assume their new role; and greater participation of 
women” (ASA, 2005, p. 35).  
Additionally, this funding had come with an assumption that the select projects funded under ICEF 
could be later used for replicating a model of capacity building in Madhya Pradesh and this project of 
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capacity building will bring about attitudinal changes in WRD personnel at all levels (ibid., p. 38). 
Overall, the ICEF project had a total budget of INR 176.6 million. A senior official of WRD apprises 
that to instil cooperation and participation among farmers, ICEF provided 50 per cent of the 
programme money, and it was envisaged that the farmers will give 30 per cent matching 
contribution and 20 per cent matching contribution was to be given by the state government for any 
physical work that will be undertaken. However, after mid-term evaluation of the project in 2005-
2006 it was recognized by WRD and ICEF (apprises a senior WRD official) that farmers were not able 
and/or willing to pay 30 per cent beneficiary contribution and consequently ICEF reduced the 
beneficiary contribution from 30 per cent to 20 per cent (which in turn increased the state 
contribution to 30 per cent and the donor contribution remained at 50 per cent), and eventually to 
10 per cent (which increased the donor contribution to 60 per cent) (Interview, June 6, 2011).  
Given that the ICEF project was based on the theme of ‘active participation’ (to use Agarwal’s (2001) 
typology) of three key groups -WRD, WUAs and NGOs- during one of the first meetings of all the 
project partners in Bhopal in February 2004 it was emphasized by senior project officer from ICEF 
that ‘all physical work under this project will be taken up only through the process of participatory 
walk through, in which beside WRD and NGO maximum number of farmers should also be 
associated’ (GoMP, 2004a). Thus, facet of participation envisaged under ICEF funding focussed on 
beneficiary contribution (to use development parlance) in cash, as an instance of participation. 
Moreover, ICEF funding encouraged activity specific participation, for instance, emphasis on 
participatory walk-through to assess problems in the canals system.  
By mid-2007, the four NGOs based on their experience of capacity building in six select projects had 
initiated a discussion with WRD on several new ideas that could be tried in the field to improve 
functioning and build interest of WUA members in WUA functioning, for instance, proposal that part 
of water revenue collection undertaken by WUAs could be retained by them. Moreover, in order to 
strengthen WUAs and make them financially sustainable different models like the cooperative model 
for marketing were suggested (Minutes of the meeting between Saadhan and Principal Secretary, 
WRD, Bhopal, June 12, 2007). However, the NGOs were not allocated the institutional building 
contract after ICEF funding lapsed (details of which are elaborated in the next section), and thus their 
ideas could not be implemented. Instead an international consultancy firm was recruited for capacity 
building of select WUAs in the state. Here, again case specific factors and actor’s agency as brought 
to the forefront by Berman (2013) and discussed in chapter three as a crucial factor to understand 
ideational realms becomes salient. To elaborate, though irrigation reform process i.e. initiation of 
PIM in the state was not donor drive, ICEF did intervene with its funding in 2003 with the aim to have 
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attitudinal and behavioural change (a change in ideational realm) of bureaucracy. However, once, the 
ICEF funding lapsed, the NGOs funding was not extended under Madhya Pradesh Water Sector 
Restructuring Project (MPWSRP) and the same is elaborated in the next sub-section.   
Institution building through a consultancy firm under MPWSRP 
In the year 2005, the Madhya Pradesh government received World Bank loan of INR 19190 million 
under the MPWSRP. One of the key issues that project rationale for MPWSRP stresses on is to 
strengthen WUAs through motivation, capacity enhancement, empowerment, and adequately 
functioning infrastructure taking cue from successful WUAs in other states (World Bank, 2004, p. 1). 
The working of World Bank in this context also fits under the typology of ideational brokers. To 
elaborate, this was also the time period around which the ICEF funding was lapsing and thus the four 
NGOs showed interest and communicated with WRD for continuing the work of capacity building of 
farmer organizations that they had started under ICEF funding, as they recognized that (about) four 
years of work that they had undertaken was not sufficient to build capacities, transform/change 
perceptions of farmer organizations or the junior functionaries of WRD. Some of the senior 
bureaucrats from WRD during that time suggested that the NGOs could take up this work under 
World Bank funded MPWSRP Project (Minutes of the meeting between Saadhan and Principal 
Secretary, WRD, Bhopal, June 12, 2007). An employee of one of the NGOs that was funded under 
ICEF apprised that initially there were talks about involving NGOS, however, after few closed door 
meetings between World Bank and WRD it was made clear that World Bank will not provide funding 
to NGOs for second round for capacity building programme. The un-official talk in WRD office lobby 
during this time was that WRD officials were not keen on involving local NGOs for the institution 
building activities under MPSWRP. The World Bank eventually allocated the task of institution 
building to an international consultancy firm that hired experts (many retired government officials) 
from Madhya Pradesh as consultants to work for institution building (Interview with NGO staff, 
October 11, 2011). During the time of fieldwork, several attempts were made to interview the 
concerned World Bank official in New Delhi to understand why NGOs were not given a chance, but 
there was no response from the Bank’s side. Further, interview with a very senior bureaucrat of WRD 
elucidates that the department was not keen on working with NGOs: 
“NGOs are civil contractors. NGOs don’t have commitment (…) tell me names of NGOs 
which are committed, where are they? They raise issues make noise. (…) They don’t want 
to work with commitment. (…) Money is not a constraint for the department, but what 
the department is lacking is trained manpower” (Interview, February 8, 2012). 
Further, to implement the institutional building component of MPWSRP; an international 
consultancy firm was recruited in March 2007 through a competitive bidding process. This 
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consultancy firm was responsible for capacity building of WUAs and WRD functionaries in five river 
basins in Madhya Pradesh. This consultancy firm was awarded INR 192.6 million to undertake:  
“ (…) capacity building of a) the members of the management committee of the WUAs 
(WUA-MC) including nominees from MPWRD, Agriculture Department etc. and b) 
awareness raising of the members of the general body of the WUA including in particular 
the women members about the Act and their rights and responsibilities as per the Act 
etc.; WUA-MCs (managing committee) are elected bodies of farmers and other water 
users located in the command area of irrigation schemes and include WRD and 
Agriculture Department functionaries as nominated members” (GoMP, 2008). 
A senior official of WRD apprises that this consultancy firm recruited a multi-disciplinary team, and 
set up its office in Bhopal to undertake the contract awarded under MPWSRP for 36 months 
(Interview, June 6, 2011). This consultancy firm was entrusted to undertake capacity building for 77 
WUAs in six districts in Madhya Pradesh. Given, the large number of WUAs involved for capacity 
building, the consultancy firm prioritized WUAs based on the stage of work they were in: i.e. 
‘construction work is in progress, contract awarded, Scheme Modernization Plan (SMP) either 
approved or in advanced stage, SMP in the stage of preparation’ (SMEC, 2007, pp. 2-3). Moreover, 
given that there were many WUAs to cover, this firm recruited community organizers from local 
villages who were responsible for capacity building of two to four WUAs (depending on the size of 
the irrigation project). The consultancy firm recruited and trained these community organizers who 
in turn were responsible for disseminating information to WUAs. The focus of the training 
programme was on introducing the project and its components; details about the Act and its 
objectives; details about functioning of WUAs; tools for community mobilization; importance of 
managing irrigation water and participation of women in WUAs, and aspects of agricultural 
productivity and marketing (ibid.). The consultancy firm relied on 32 community organizers who were 
employed specifically for this purpose and were trained to disseminate information; overall 
community organizers organized 6217 training programmes. Apart from imparting information 
through these community organizers, 201 training programmes were executed by senior experts of 
the firm for 77 WUAs (ibid.). Overall, this consultancy firm focused on disseminating basic 
information about the roles and responsibilities of WUAs to WUA members. It is noteworthy that the 
consultancy firm recruited by the World Bank pursued neoliberal values and ideology and 
approached capacity building from a functional and instrumental perspective wherein it was 
perceived that 32 community organizers would be sufficient for creating effective service delivery 
mechanism at the micro level by WUAs. The outcome of pursuance of this approach is discussed in 
chapter nine; here it is suffice to say that the firm focused on ensuring that the target number of 
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training programmes that were part of its terms of reference was conducted, however, the WRD was 
not satisfied with the work of this consultancy firm, and their contract was terminated.  
Moreover, under MPWSRP, some of the senior retired WRD officials who were key agenda setters for 
enactment of the PIM Act were recruited as consultants, and thus continued to influence working of 
PIM through their understanding of how things ought to function. Non transparent, closed door 
discussions, close-door agreement between the World Bank and Indian government officials, 
dishonest research and absurdly impractical policies has been recently elucidated in an article by 
Chambers (2013) in context of large scale irrigation projects in South Asia. My observation in the field 
has been similar. For instance, recruiting senior WRD officials as consultants under MPSWRP could be 
viewed as continued patronage of bureaucracy towards Bank’s policies on one hand. On the other 
hand it can also be viewed as state actors’ propounding a cognitive and behavioural lock-in by 
ensuring that non-political organizations like the international consultancy firm was recruited by the 
Bank. It is unknowable who the structural rider is: the Bank officials or the senior state bureaucrats 
who exercise their agency to ensure certain decision-making. The NGOs, clearly could not exercise 
their agency in this context, though they were able to influence decision making in the early 2000s by 
ensuring that NGOs were given the work of capacity building under ICEF funding.  
To sum this section, three different approaches of capacity building i.e. WALMI doing three to five 
day training programme once in a WUA’s tenure; NGO teams stationed in the project areas and 
working towards capacity building through their team; and third, international firm recruiting local 
villagers as community mobilizers for imparting training were pursued by these three different 
organizations to build capacities of farmers, farmer organizations and WRD engineers. The selection 
of these organizations (apart from WALMI, which is the nodal agency for capacity building in the 
state) for capacity building was top-down and done by the department, either with or at the behest 
of international organizations like the World Bank and ICEF. All these organizations aimed at 
instituting participation and greater awareness amongst farmer organization by focusing on creating 
greater awareness about the PIM Act and its rules and regulations.  
This section also sheds light on how WRD excluded NGOs from being involved in institution building 
under MPWSRP, though some of the progressive senior bureaucrats had suggested that NGOs could 
do institution building. Thus, it becomes evident that within bureaucracy there isn’t one perception 
about NGOs, however, diverse perception of bureaucrats gained salience in the discussion at the 
state level, as they were part of the state structure and they were excluded from institution building 
activities under MPWSRP funding. The case study evaluates further how these capacity building 
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programmes have fared in actuality in chapter eight and nine which facilitates in responding the 
central research question, i.e. role of actors in influencing or obstructing decentralization.  
Having discussed briefly various actors who were involved in designing these capacity building 
programmes, the next section elucidates the financial reforms that were undertaken in the state to 
facilitate implementation of the PIM Act. 
5.2.1.3 Financial reforms  
As mentioned previously, the irrigation reforms were not initiated in the state as part of a donor 
driven process and the WRD officials in Bhopal take pride in explicating that it was state’s own 
initiative. Therefore, during the beginning all the financial support for implementation (including 
maintenance and administration) of PIM was provided by the state government itself. As part of 
financial reforms post-PIM, the irrigation water rates have been revised thrice after the enactment of 
the PIM Act in the state.  
Table 5. 2: Irrigation water rates in Madhya Pradesh  
Crop 
Flat water rate (in 
INR/hectare) 
Rate for each watering 
(in INR/hectare) 
1992 1999 2002 2005 
Paddy (kharif season) 59 200 215 85 
Paddy (rabi season) 54 494 525 155 
Wheat (3 watering with palewa*) 62 200 105 125 
Wheat (each extra watering) 15 62 65 75 
Soybean (kharif season) 44 124 130 75 
Soybean (rabi season) 59 247 265 75 
Green fodder crops 45 124 130 50 
* Pre-sowing irrigation of land, to prepare the land for sowing and cultivation. 
Source: Data compiled from (GoMP, 2012a) and SAS Project Office, Division 2, WRD, Vidisha  
From Table 5.2, it is evident that the irrigation water rates were increased exponentially in the year 
1999 from the earlier prevalent water rate charges post enactment of the PIM Act. The irrigation 
water rates have been revised thrice -1999, 2002 and 2005- in the state. The most recent revision of 
2005 has annulled the practice of calculating the irrigation charges through a flat-water fee (for an 
irrigated area) and has begun charging the irrigator for each watering that they avail. The last 
revision has made irrigation more expensive for irrigators and aimed to reduce the financial burden 
of WRD. The increase in irrigation fee also envisaged greater water use efficiency amongst farmers. 
Interestingly, the revision of water chargeslxxxi in Madhya Pradesh has been one of the highest in 
India. Other states which have high irrigation water rates are Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and 
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Gujarat (GoI, 2010b). Rationalization and parity in irrigation water rates has also been done through 
an amendment on October 22, 2012, to rule 120 of the Irrigation Rules of 1974, by bringing water 
rates for farmers that undertake lift irrigation through pump sets at par with water rates that farmers 
in the command area pay (GoMP, 2012b, p. 3).lxxxii These amendments have aimed to ensure greater 
water use efficiency amongst farmers and to simplify work of farmer organizations. 
A former WALMI official who worked closely with drafting of the PIM Act notes that the water 
revisions are a step in the right direction, however, the problem is that in Madhya Pradesh water for 
irrigation is provided to farmers on basis of acreage and not by volume, as there are no measuring 
devices, so it leads to water disputes and is also difficult to monitor how much irrigation revenue 
needs to be realized (Interview, November 5, 2011). However, no efforts yet have been made to 
change this scenario. 
To elucidate, the revenue collection method post reforms. The WRD in Madhya Pradesh is 
responsible for assessment and collection of revenue. Within WRD, the revenue branch is 
responsible for collection of revenue, which is headed by the canal deputy collector and irrigation 
inspector works under him/her. Under the irrigation inspector are amins (accountant/ person 
responsible for revenue collection) who are responsible for inspecting the irrigated areas under 
different crops during the kharif and rabi cropping season and collect water charges accordingly. 
Number of amins in an area depends on the extent of irrigated area. At the division level, the 
executive engineer is responsible for ensuring that the process of revenue collection takes on time 
and WUAs are responsible for facilitating the process of revenue collection (GoI, 2010b, p. 38). Thus, 
it becomes evident that post enactment of the PIM Act, revenue collection has remained with amins 
or in other words with WRD and this responsibility was not handed over to farmer organizations. 
Figure 5.2, illustrates the gap in irrigation revenue assessed and realized in Madhya Pradesh.  
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Figure 5. 2: Gap in revenue assessed and realized during 1991-1992 & 2008-2009 in MP 
 
Source: Design by author based on data from GoI (2010b, p. 88)  
The gap between irrigation revenue assessed and realized in Madhya Pradesh is significant. This gap 
has widened in the last few years and the per cent recovery has been only 33.47 per cent in 2007-
2008 and 42.08 per cent in 2006-2007 (GoI, 2010b, p. 88).lxxxiii Poor rainfall in 2006 to 2008 explicates 
poor recovery during this period. In Figure 5.2, the revenue realized is higher than revenue assessed 
for four years, viz. 1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2004, and 2004-2005. These are also the years when 
the WUA elections were notified and subsequently WUAs were formed. Additional revenue 
realization between year 2000 and 2004 can be explained due to initial enthusiasm of WUAs to 
participate and facilitate in revenue collection in its formative years. Also, for farmers to participate 
in WUA elections all previous unrealized irrigation charges had to be paid, this can also be the reason 
for more irrigation revenue realization then assessed in these years. Overall, however, the gap 
between revenue assessed and realized is significant in Madhya Pradesh even after the irrigation 
reforms were undertaken as part of the decentralization initiative in 2000. It is evident from the 
above discussion that the state has not taken any strict action against defaulters, which explains poor 
revenue recovery. A very senior bureaucrat of WRD explains the reason for not taking any strict 
action against defaulters.  
“Member of Parliaments (MP)/ MLAs play representative politics… this year the Chief 
Minister has said that all the overdue should be collected but next year is election year, 
let’s see if that will happen” (Interview, February 8, 2012).  
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Thus, though WRD is responsible for collection of revenue for the state exchequer, the politicians 
exercise their power to forgo collection of revenue by communicating to senior officials in WRD how 
seriously efforts ought to be made. Moreover, post 2003 Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), a right wing party 
has been power in the state, it is noteworthy however that decentralization reforms were introduced 
during Congress Party regime. Thus, BJP government has not been keen to take forward some of the 
policies elucidated by the Congress government (this aspect is discussed further in chapter nine). 
Overall, the political office bearers have the upper hand and dictate what actions are taken, which is 
not surprising as they have the legislative authority. Second, clientelism is evident from the working 
of the political class, as they don’t want to disturb their vote bank for instance by enforcing revenue 
recovery. Perpetuation of clientelism is an offshoot of an interventionist developmental state 
ideology in India in the 1980s and 1990s as it centralizes power structures by design resulting in 
perpetuation of vote bank politics. To elaborate, the Nehruvian ideology under Congress government 
propagated an affirmative equity enhancing state in India whereas post liberalization there has been 
polarization in class positions which resulted in greater evoking of particularistic identities like caste 
and religion (c.f Heller, 2009, pp. 138-139). It is noteworthy that clientelism and perpetuation of 
particularistic identities thereof is not an institutional problem. Rather its ideological problem, which 
resulted in perpetuation of particularistic identities when liberalization process was ensued in 
India.lxxxiv  
Till now, this chapter focused on elaborating the status of irrigation management and how the idea 
of farmer participation in irrigation management gained constituency in Madhya Pradesh. Further, 
the first two sections (5.1&5.2) of this chapter elucidate how the ideational paradigm for irrigation 
management has shaped gradually, i.e. the state policy has more or less followed the national policy 
framework, and there has been considerable influence of international organizations in instituting 
the state to consider the role of farmer organizations in irrigation management at critical junctures 
through USAID funding in the 1980s and the World Bank funding (NWMP, MPWSRP as part of sector 
reforms) in 1990s and 2000s.. However, it was not only international organizations that influenced 
the ideational paradigm, as discussed in this chapter. The efforts for enactment of PIM Act were 
endogenous and due to interest taken by select state actors viz. at the behest of political office 
bearers in the state. Moreover, senior officials in WRD were not averse to this idea, as they were 
aware of the failing system conditions and thus when the chief minister initiated the decentralization 
drive, they evinced interest and examined different models of PIM that were being experimented 
with across the world and in India. The expert committee was largely responsible for implementation 
of the Act, and consultations with farmers were few, and thus did not play a decisive role. The NGOs 
were not involved in the consultation process, (as already mentioned) and thus it was more or less a 
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closed top-down discussion that led to initiation of reform process in the state. Thus, it was this 
expert group spearheaded by senior WRD officials’ who worked towards changing the institutional 
ideation (or state’s belief) on irrigation management. The expert group diffused new idea of PIM as 
they had the bureaucratic power to do so, after the chief minister gave orders for studying the 
Andhra Pradesh model of PIM, and implementing it in the state.  
This section also discussed the ideational debates that were held by this expert group for instance, to 
include sub engineer, as secretaries in WUAs, which basically determined how much power farmer 
organization would have in the field, to wit, how participation essentially will be implemented in the 
field. WALMI’s training programme targeted only WUA presidents and competent authorities. While 
NGOs under ICEF funding and the international consultancy worked with farmers, farmer 
organizations and engineers. Given, different approach and target groups for capacity building, these 
programmes are determinant of intent to change perception of farmers, farmer organizations and 
bureaucracy about participation of farmers in irrigation management in the select sites. Moreover, 
understanding the content of these capacity-building programmes sheds light on the seriousness 
with which reforms have been undertaken in the state. As essentially, these programmes were 
designed to change people’s beliefs that potentially could lead to change in mind-sets over a period 
of time. The PIM Act was enacted to initiate/enable institutional change in order to transform the 
process of management of irrigation infrastructure and water distribution in Madhya Pradesh. Given, 
the intent to decentralize at the state level, how this intent was implemented needs to be evaluated, 
as merits of decentralization have been discussed many a times (chapter one also reviewed this 
briefly). However, this has not been discussed in context of how ideational factors determine success 
and failure of a reform process. Through the case of SAS Project in Madhya Pradesh, this study 
elucidates why reforms in irrigation have not been successful. Further, the case study underscores 
the importance of ideational factors. This research contends that it does not matter what policy 
model is applied unless ideational factors are taken in to consideration while implementing a policy.  
5.3 Summing up  
This chapter presented the status of irrigation in Madhya Pradesh. Additionally, this chapter also 
elaborated how the idea of irrigation management through farmer participation gained salience in 
Madhya Pradesh’s policy directive that eventually led to constitution of PIM ACT in 1999 after 
formation of different type of farmer organizations like sinchai panchayat. This chapter also 
discussed that for the first time in context of irrigation management, intermediate level committees 
i.e. distributory committee project committee were mandated to be formed legislatively in the state. 
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Given, that this research is about roadblocks to decentralization at the intermediate level. This aspect 
is discussed in detail in chapter nine i.e. what structural and cultural elements restrict their 
functioning through empirical observations. 
Additionally, this chapter elaborated how the ideational paradigm was shaped partly by structural 
constraints i.e. the central government’s directive and donor funding, who introduced the idea of 
farmer involvement in irrigation management. And partly by the endogenous factors that is 
willingness to take forward this idea by political office bearers and sections of bureaucracy. This 
chapter also demonstrates how the reform measures that were taken, for implementing the PIM Act 
decentralized and re-centralized functions at the same time, and thus bureaucracy ensured that few 
powers remained within their decision-making ambit.  
It is also noteworthy from the discussion in this chapter that while designing the policy on PIM the 
state bureaucrats viewed cultural factors instrumentally, as is evident from the discussion on 
involvement of women in WUAs, as mandated by the Act. Furthermore, by amending the Act to 
include women as voters in 2005 provided greater agency and voice to women structurally, however, 
this legalisation was not undertaken bearing in mind the field reality, as the next four empirical 
chapters demonstrate. The inclusion of nominated members from scheduled caste or tribe in farmer 
organizations is similarly an instance of instrumentality. Thus, it becomes evident that the ideational 
landscape at the state level resulted in actors dwelling upon cultural aspects instrumentally as the 
predominant discourse on participation internationally and nationally recognizes and necessitates 
greater involvement of women and other marginalized sections. This has been propagated and 
established as an obvious course to take while drafting of and enacting PIM legislations. This broad 
based view of culture and community dominated the ideational paradigm of state level bureaucracy 
and political office bearers.  Additionally, this chapter also elaborated the rootedness of ideational 
paradigm of actors in ideology and values of neoliberalism, interventionist state or 
communitarianism. 
The next four chapters elucidate how the idea of participation by including farmers in 
organization/management of irrigation system was implemented in the SAS Project. The Project has 
a large command area, the focus of the next four chapters primarily is on two WUAs (Saraswati and 
Betwa- names changed) one on the head reach and the other on the tail end - to explicate how the 
idea of farmer participation in irrigation management, as propounded at the international, national 
and state level has panned out at the micro level. Chapters’ seven to ten also elucidate why 
decentralization is not happening at intermediate level in irrigation management by using the lens of 
ideational realm. 
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lxviii
 In 1980s the gap between the irrigation potential created and utilized in Madhya Pradesh was about 37 per 
cent and efforts were directed to reduce the gap and to improve system efficiency and increase productivity in 
irrigated agriculture (WALMI, 1991a, p. 1). Despite these measures, however, the gap between the total 
irrigation potential created and utilized in Madhya Pradesh has increased from 1980s and according to the 
latest (2011-2012) plan figures is 44 per cent (GoMP, 2012c).  
lxix
 The water resource utilization committee comprised the Chief Secretary, Secretaries of Agriculture, Public 
Health, Industry, Irrigation, Chief Engineer of the concerned river basins and the Secretary of the Control Board 
for major project who was also a Deputy Secretary to Government of Madhya Pradesh (World Bank, 2004, p. 
20). 
lxx
 Events at national level that led to initiation of CADP were discussed in chapter four. 
lxxi
 Ayacut literally means command area (irrigated or irrigable area) served by an irrigation project. Irrigation 
departments were earlier called Ayacut department. 
lxxii
 The other states that were selected for setting up of WALMIs/STIs were Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. Till 1987 
action research work had already begun in Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan before it started in 
Madhya Pradesh (LBII & WAPCOS, 1992, p. 2). The WRM&T project supported 11 water and land management 
institutes (WALMIs), and assisted in their construction, purchase of equipment, training the faculty (in India 
and abroad), facilitate in production of training course material and selection of action research sites (Wall et 
al., 1992, p. 16). 
lxxiii 
The members of the governing body of WALMI at its inception were officials (bureaucrats) from 
departments of Agriculture, Finance and Irrigation, the Ayacut Department, agriculture production 
commissioner, Agriculture University (Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya (JNKVV), Jabalpur), and 
director WALMI (who is also a bureaucrat) (WALMI, 1985, p. 3). 
lxxiv 
Though the main focus of the action research programme was SAS Project and Ghorpacchar Minor Irrigation 
Project, the governing body in its twelfth meeting added four more additional projects for adaptive trial viz. 
Baikhedi minor in Tawa Project, integrated development of watershed lake fringe development of Rani Awanti 
Bai Sagar Project, action research on Rani Awanti Bai Sagar Project, and action research on a minor irrigation 
project of Badera Mohari in Jabalpur district (WALMI, 1991a).  
lxxv
 Sinchai or irrigation panchayats are used interchangeably in the text. During fieldwork, the respondents 
mostly referred to them as sinchai panchayats, though in official documents, the term irrigation panchayat is 
used more often. 
lxxvi
 Status of these committees is discussed in depth in chapter seven. 
lxxvii
 In 1998, of the total 6.72 million hectare irrigated area only 1.97 million hectare was actually irrigated, 
which was 30 per cent of the total irrigation potential created (Pandey, 2006). 
lxxviii Two types of developmental paradigms have been outlined by Bebbington et al. (2008) as ‘big D’ 
development and ‘small d’ development’ NGOs.  The authors problematize the issue ‘can NGOs make a 
difference’ (in the title by the same name) in the neoliberal context and provide a framework to view 
alternative forms of development futures for the world’s poorest and most marginal sections The first element 
of their framework is the distinction between two types of prevalent developmental alternative: small 
(d)evelopment relates to geographically uneven profoundly contradictory set of processes underlying capitalist 
development and Big (D)evelopment focuses on the project of intervention in the third world in context of 
decolonization and the cold war (Bebbington et al., 2008, p. 5). 
lxxix
 I was not able to collect any documentation of this training programme from Academy of Administration; 
the officials from the academy apprised that this is very old information, and according to the state ruling any 
documentation more than five years old can be destroyed to manage storage. Therefore, details on various 
components of this training programme are not available. 
lxxx
 Given, the programmatic approach to GIS as training was undertaken, however, in the case study site data 
on GIS is not being collected by the officials. 
lxxxi
 The water charges for irrigation area in Madhya Pradesh is calculated based on the net additional income 
that farmer earn from irrigating their crops bearing in mind their paying capacity. Other factors that play a role 
in determining irrigation water rates are: ‘i) Geographical unit; ii) System and type of irrigation; iii) Seasons and 
crops; iv) Confessional water rates; v) Location of the project; vi) Agreement rates’ (GoI, 2010b, p. 15).  
lxxxii
 Till 2012, the farmers who availed water through lift irrigation were paying lesser than farmers of the 
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command area for irrigation. This amendment necessitates that prior to lifting water from canals, farmers 
make advance payment in full for crop, area and number of watering that they aim to undertake by entering 
into a formal agreement with the canal officer. These agreements are for short term and any lift irrigation from 
pump sets done without entering into a formal agreement is deemed to be un-authorized and legal actions 
would be taken against the offenders (GoMP, 2012b, p. 3).  
lxxxiii
 Although, overall the gap between revenue assessed and realized is significantly better than other states 
like Andhra Pradesh, where the average percent recovery is 27.75 per cent during the same time period (GoI, 
2010b, p. 80). 
lxxxiv
 This aspect has also been explored by scholars (Ruparelia, Reddy, & Harriss, 2011) as ‘great transformation’ 
in a edited volume with the same title building on Polanyi’s reference to double movement in the historical 
European case wherein attempts to create a market society from above resulted in movement from below. 
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6 Embedded Realities: Ideational Context of SAS Project  
The previous two chapters discussed historical and geographical - national and state level - 
perspective on irrigation management. These two chapters analyzed: i) how the idea of irrigation 
management gained constituency in the Indian policy realm; ii) how the ideational realm of actors’, 
and their role in irrigation management, has been influenced by the state structures and various 
ideas and ideologies on irrigation management viz. interventionist developmental state, 
neoliberalism and communitarianism. Additionally, salience of role of engineers as irrigation 
managers and harbingers of growth and progress was also reinforced by state structures and 
prevalent ideologies and values for resource management. This, chapter introduces the characteristic 
features of Samrat Ashok Sagar (SAS) Project and elaborates on the heterogeneous, and diverse 
background of farmers in the project area. This chapter provides an insight into the social setting in 
which the first generation farmer organizations were constituted at the micro level in the SAS 
Project. The discussion in this chapter also elucidates how resonance of certain idea of irrigation 
management was initiated in the project.  
The following section (6.1) explicates the condition of the canal system and principles that 
determined water allocation, and operation and maintenance of the system from 1978-2000. 
Additionally this section provides an overview of the socio-cultural context of the SAS Project area. 
Section 6.2 elaborates on the process of constitution of these first generation farmer organizations in 
SAS Project.  
6.1 The SAS Project 
The SAS Project is a major irrigation-cum-flood-protection project constructed over Halali River, 
which is a tributary of Betwa River and flows through Vidisha and Raisen District. SAS Project falls in 
the Chambal-Betwa River Basin of Madhya Pradesh and is part of the Malwa Plateau that has a mean 
elevation of 426.7 metres above the sea level. The construction of SAS Project started in 1973 and 
dam stream closure was completed in 1976. Irrigation from SAS Project started in the year 1978. The 
total project cost in the year 1976 was INR 85.7 million (GoMP, 1976). Furthermore, both the 
Districts -Vidisha and Raisen- of the SAS Project area perform poorly in terms of the generic socio-
economic indicators.lxxxv Additionally, they have poor infrastructure, majority of the population lives 
in rural areas and are predominantly agrarian economies (GoI, 2011b). SAS Project is the lifeline for 
farmers of this region. 
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6.1.1 Salient features of the project 
The earthen Halali dam of length 945 metres and with a maximum height of 2956 metres is 
constructed on Halali River and has a catchment area of 699 square kilometres. The dead storage 
level of Halali Dam is 448.66 metres and the irrigation storage level is 458.41 metres (GoMP, 1976). 
The dam can store water up to 462.68 metres safely (GoI, 2006b, p. 64). The project was constructed 
with an aim to reduce intensity of flood in Betwa River by 44 per cent, by providing relief to low lying 
areas along the Betwa River and to Vidisha Town. The project has a gross command area of 37,637 
hectares of which the culturable command area is 27,924 hectares (GoMP, 1976). The main canal of 
the project is 3.28 km in length and runs through a rocky bank with heavy deep cut. Just after the 
turbine pump site there is heavy erosion of soil from the bed and slippage of side slopes of the main 
canal. After about three kilometres the main canal branches out into Right Bank Canal (RBC) and the 
Left Bank Canal (LBC). The LBC branches into Sahodra Branch Canal (SBC) after 12.5 kilometres 
(GoMP, 1976, p. 11; WALMI, 1991a). From RBC there are three main distributaries that branch out 
D1, D2 and D3, and nine direct minors. There are also several direct outlets from RBC that are 
oversize (12 inch diameter pipe outlets) and not proportionate to the chak (group of land holding 
getting water from a single outlet or in other words command area of an outlet) area (WALMI, 
1991a, p. 12). In total, there are five direct minors on D1, six direct minors on D2, and six minors on 
D3. Similarly, from the LBC three major distributaries branch out D1, D2 & D3. There are 12 direct 
minors on D2 of LBC and 13 direct minor channels on D3 of LBC (GoMP, n.d.). In this project, under 
CADP work on construction of watercourses and field channels has been undertaken. Between 1982-
83 and 1995-96 about 99.5 kilometers of field drains in command area of SAS Project were 
constructed under CADP with an expenditure of INR 1.46 million (GoI, 2006b, p. 102). The irrigated 
area in the project for the rabi season (1st November to 31st March) is 25092 hectares while for the 
kharif season (15th July to 15th October) is 12545 hectares (Pangare et al., 2003, p. 3). The project was 
designed to cater to the irrigation needs of farmers for rabi and kharif season. However, at present 
farmers only demand water from the reservoir for the rabi season. 
Photograph 6.1 shows the dam site, Main Canal, LBC and the RBC. From the photograph it is evident 
that the project has earthen canal network apart from parts of LBC, which are now being lined as 
part of World Bank’s Madhya Pradesh Water Sector Restructuring Project (MPWSRP).  
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Photograph 6. 1: Halali Dam and the canals 
 
When the SAS Project was commissioned in 1978, the operation and maintenance of canals up to 
outlet level was with WRD i.e. undertaken by the state government. Here, it may be noted that the 
reservoir was in a good condition with no reports of seepage; however, the condition of the network 
of canals under the SAS Project was bad. The RBC was constructed close to deep cutting near the 
historic Buddhist site of Satdhara and in 1980s was reported to be in poor condition with a capacity 
only to take discharge of 100 cusec of water safely. Notably this was much below its designed 
capacity of 185 cusecs (WALMI, 1991a). Also, the approach road to RBC, LBC and the Main Canal 
were fair weather roads and were usually in deplorable conditions during monsoon. In addition, 
during 1980s, the roads in command area were also in very poor condition, which made the 
command area inaccessible during monsoons unless approached on foot. Further, there were no 
measuring devices at the take-off point of LBC and RBC to measure the volumetric flow of water. 
Also, there were few gates in the entire canal network area to control distribution of water (CWC, 
2006; Field Notes, August 2011). Thus lack of infrastructure, in addition, to absence of night-time 
irrigation in this region led to wastage of water (WALMI, 1991a, p. 15). 
Additionally, when the SAS Project was commissioned (in 1978) the operation and maintenance of 
the network of canal system had a fixed procedure. Erstwhile Irrigation Department, now Water 
Resources Department (WRD), provided water to farmers and all decisions on operational aspects of 
network of canals were taken in the District Water Utilization Committee (DWUC) meeting that was 
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(and still is) chaired by the district collector. The executive engineer was (still is) the secretary of the 
DWUC, and members of DWUC included district heads of department of agriculture, horticulture, 
veterinary, fisheries, and industry and presidents of farmer organization of respective irrigation 
schemes. The water allocation directive, once approved by the chairman of DWUC, was handed over 
to executive engineer to make an Aeelan (announcement) about plan for distribution of water to 
farmer organizations in the area. These DWUC meetings were also attended by few farmer 
organizations of the project region (Minutes of DWUC 1989, SAS Project office, Division 2, WRD, 
Vidisha). The DWUC chairman in consultation with all present in the DWUC meeting also decides the 
date of opening the main canal system, which has been opened every year till date between October 
25th and November 15th. Details on opening and closing dates of the canal along with the reported 
water levels in the dam (at the time of opening) are presented in Appendix V. The opening of canal is 
usually done with great fanfare since the beginning of the project. Senior officials such as the district 
collector, executive engineer of the project and other officials from WRD like the sub division officer 
and sub engineers hold a symbolic prayer along with few farmers of the region. Thereafter, the 
district collector (along with executive engineer of the project) opens the sluice gate marking the 
beginning of the irrigation season. Historically, officials have held the decision-making power and 
have controlled the access to irrigation water. 
The above brief description illustrates that not everything was smooth in the project area in the 
1980s and 1990s. The infrastructure of the system was failing, the water allocation was done from 
head to tail, and management of water was essentially top-down i.e. the state was responsible for 
managing it. The condition of the project was similar to what the irrigation bureaucracies at the 
national and state level wanted to fix/improve. To wit, the project had poor irrigation utilization as is 
evident from Figure 6.1, which illustrates the year wise actual irrigation done in the command area of 
SAS Project against the culturable command area of 27924 hectares. Furthermore, from Figure 6.1, it 
is evident that the project had not achieved 100 per cent irrigation potential against the total 
culturable command area of 27924 hectares until 1999-2000. Year wise actual irrigation against 
planned irrigation area for SAS project since 1978-2011 is illustrated in Appendix VI. 
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Figure 6. 1: Year wise actual irrigation done against cultural command area in SAS Project  
 
Source: Design by author based on data from SAS Project Office, Division No. 2, WRD, Vidisha  
Further, as can be recalled from the discussion in chapter four, poor irrigation potential utilization 
and widening gap between potential created and its utilization, a signifier of poor irrigation 
efficiency, has been a cause of concern for policy makers at the national level (c.f. GoI, 2009b; IIMA, 
2008). The same narrative has also found resonance at the state level, which led to initiation of 
irrigation reforms (discussed in chapter five).  
In the official narrative during this period, however, the onus of poor utilization was put on farmers. 
For instance, a Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI) report states that farmers in general 
were unaware of the irrigation practices and were using flooding method of irrigation that invariably 
led to over-irrigation of their fields. None of the other relatively efficient irrigation methods like 
border strip, checking basin or furrow method of irrigation were being used in the SAS Project’s 
command area in 1980s (WALMI, 1991a, p. 8). In late 1980s, officials from WALMI believed that if 
they introduced new and effective methods of irrigation to farmers then problems of irrigation 
utilization potential could be solved, as it would improve the underlying irrigation practice (WALMI, 
1991a, p. 16). As a result, WALMI directed its efforts towards acquainting farmers with better 
irrigation practices through its Action Research Programme that was supported by United States 
Agency for International development (USAID) (as discussed in chapter four and five). SAS Project 
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was selected as a case study site for Action Research Programme by WALMI, Bhopal in June 1987, 
the criterion for which was:  
“Nearness to WALMI, Bhopal; possibility of implementing the interventions as project 
account was open for further construction; irrigation was being practiced in the project 
area for ten years then; interdisciplinary approach was not practiced earlier in SAS 
Project” (WALMI, 1991a, p. 3). 
Under this research programme, 2649 ha of command area, in one of the distributory of the RBC was 
selected based on location, soil, topography and climate. The tail-end of RBC was selected by WALMI 
officials with a viewpoint that if this programme could increase productivity and water use efficiency 
in the tail end area then it will have an overall positive impact in the project area (ibid., pp. 3-4). An 
initial diagnostic survey by WALMI found 57 outlets on the distributory, which were 12 per cent 
lower than the planned 65 outlets. Further, documentation of late 1980s elucidates that WRD and 
WALMI officials together opined that the outlets were not properly installed and in a number of 
places outlets were placed above the full supply level of minor channel. This resulted in farmers 
availing water by putting obstruction in canals in order to raise the water level (WALMI, 1989, p. 88). 
Based on these observations, WALMI officials concluded that irrigation practices in this region were 
inappropriate and subsequently planned an Action Research Programme (for three to five years) 
from 1989-90 in select sites of the project. In total about 40 outlet committees were made in the 
project area, and efforts were made to build awareness within these outlet committees about water 
distribution techniques through various training programmes (ibid., p. 14). In the late 1980s, when 
the Action Research Programme of WALMI was initiated, only about 52 per cent of the total length of 
the watercourses and 61 per cent of barhas (field channels) were constructed. Incidentally, these 
numbers also include construction of barhas done by farmers and there is no documentation to 
differentiate between barhas made by farmers and/or WRD (WALMI, 1991a, p. 14). Given that the 
network of canal system in SAS Project was made in a piecemeal manner, this also explains poor 
irrigation potential utilization in the initial years after project commissioning.  
Based on the condition of irrigation infrastructure and irrigation practices in the initial years under 
the aegis of Action Research Programme of USAID, WALMI initiated adaptive trails for introduction of 
improved seeds, inter-cropping, irrigation methods, drainage and warabandi (fixed time for 
distribution of water) with a view to improve agriculture production, cropping intensity and 
efficiency of water use (WALMI, 1989, p. 88).lxxxvi As part of this programme, WALMI organized 
exposure visits of farmers to Shree Datta Cooperative Society, in Aurangabad, Maharashtra, which 
during early 1990s was one of the most studied and visited model for farmer managed irrigation 
system in India (Faculty WALMI, December 16, 2011). Additionally, exposure visits for farmers were 
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organized to farmer organizations in Gujarat. The funding for these exposure visits came from USAID 
and also from National Water Management Programme (NWMP) of the World Bank. Additionally, 
another faculty of WALMI apprised that in 1980s they organized training programme for officers of 
the irrigation department and through their seminars for action research project about 20 officers 
were trained for this endeavour (Ibid.). Though, the content of training programme was not available 
with WALMI, Bhopal.  
Till now, this section elaborates on the condition of network of the canal systems, and how the need 
for first generation farmer organization was legitimized by couching it as a necessity to improve 
irrigation practice of farmers through USAID funding for SAS Project (also discussed in chapter five). 
Thus, with the idea of constituting outlet level committees, one of the first generation of farmer 
organizations at the micro level was initiated. Apart from outlet committees other first generation 
farmer organizations in the SAS Project were sinchai panchayats (constituted in 1980s) and the 
Betwa Krishak Samiti (constituted in 1995). However, prior to discussing the process of constitution 
of these farmer organizations, the next section provides an overview of the SAS Project area to 
elucidate how farmer organization are embedded in the socio-economic, and political cultural 
landscape.   
6.1.2 Social landscape of caste, class, gender and politics in the project area  
SAS Project region is not a homogenous society. There are about 163 villages in the SAS Project, 
which avail water directly through canal irrigation (GoMP, 2012a). The project spans across two 
districts boundaries of Vidisha and Raisen. There are diverse caste and class groups in this region. 
Some of the predominant communities residing in the two farmer organizations - Saraswati and 
Betwa (names changed) - where fieldwork was undertaken for this research are Sharma, Rajput, 
Tomar, Chauhan, Gurjar, Solanki, Nai, Pal, Kumhar, Chamar, Mehtar, Basod, Dhanik, Razak, Kacchi, 
Maina, Sahu, Mehar, Patel, etc. (Pandey, 2006; Field notes, January 2012). These groups can be 
classified under four major categories of the Varna system of caste in India, i.e. Brahmin, 
Kshatriya/Rajput, Vaishya and Sudra, with Brahmins being at the top of the hierarchy followed by the 
Kshatriya, Vaishya and Sudra in descending order. The caste system is hierarchical -a hierarchy based 
on birth and reincarnation- and its basic organizing principle centres on inequality in terms of 
following traditional occupation, claims to common origin and/or both these factors (Blunt, 1931, pp. 
5-6). According to the Varna system the lowest in the hierarchy are the outcastes/untouchables that 
fall outside the caste system. Since the late ninetieth early twentieth century several leaders have 
tried to eradicate the practice of untouchability as a social practice, and this led to rise of dalit 
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(earlier referred to as untouchables) liberation movement. Post independence this practice of 
untouchability has been legally abolished (Kshirsagar, 1994). However, social discrimination of lower 
castes has continued as a discursive social practice.  
Matter of food and drink legitimizes the social class of a particular caste, i.e. which caste consumes 
water/food in a particular group (Blunt, 1931, p. 8).lxxxvii In recent past, the dominance of Brahmins 
who have been historically the dominant social caste group in India has been taken over by 
agriculturally landed and numerically strong social groups, which comprise Kshatriya and other caste 
groups. Thus, at present it is the economic and political power structures that define the socially 
stratified contemporary Hindu society (D. Joshi & Fawcett, 2005, p. 45) on one hand. On the other 
hand within brahmanical patriarchy the purity of women has been central, as caste is contingent on 
it (Chakravarti, 1993) and still is a dominant factor for consideration. Consequently, there is not only 
caste and class stratification but also gendered stratification within the Indian society, wherein 
mobility of women (especially upper caste women) has been traditionally restricted.lxxxviii  
The above brief description of three pillars of social structure -caste, class, and gender- also 
manifests in quotidian living of community in SAS project. For instance, in villages where first and 
second generation farmer organization for Betwa and Saraswati were made are segregated on caste, 
class and gender hierarchy. Villagers practice food and drink taboos, and mobility of women 
(especially upper caste women) is restricted. To elaborate, Brahmins being on the top of the 
hierarchy do not consume drinking water in a Scheduled Caste (SC)lxxxix or Scheduled Tribe (ST) 
household. Though, they consume drinking water in a Rajput, Maina or Sahu household. Similarly, 
Rajputs consume water at Brahmin households and all the lower caste groups like Solanki, Nai, 
Kumhar, etc. consumes food and water at Brahmin and Rajput households. Maina consume water in 
Brahmin and Rajput households but not at Chamar Dalit households who belong to SC community. 
The SC community consumes water at all households but none of the caste groups consume water 
from their hands (Pandey, 2006, Field Notes, January 2012).xc Thus, in day-to-day living, social and 
caste norms are dominant factors in SAS project villages, as is evident from the above description of 
the practices related to offering/consuming drinking water in a particular household.xci  
Having established the significance of caste and social class in quotidian living of farmers, I now focus 
on elucidating how caste segregation has resulted in gender specific roles with respect to water 
(irrigation as well as domestic consumption) in SAS Project villages. Women of the SAS Project, and of 
the two studied farmer organizations -Betwa and Saraswati- are largely responsible for collecting 
water for domestic consumption and household chores, which they provision through hand pumps 
and wells in their village. This is cognizant with the fact that gender segregation has been a defining 
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social order of the caste system. This segregation based on maintaining caste purity is observable in 
villages of SAS Project region as well. Moreover, irrigation water is primarily man’s domain in Betwa 
and Saraswati region and due to restrictions on mobility of women. This also manifests itself in their 
non-partaking in irrigation activities. However, this restriction is more observable in Brahmin, Rajput, 
and Maina households, although, if needed elderly women from these caste groups at times do 
assist in weeding and similar agricultural activity on farms close to their homestead. However, the 
older women from upper caste groups do maintain kitchen gardens within their household premises. 
Irrigation water for these kitchen gardens is provided mostly through pump sets (Arjan Singh, 
February 7, 2012; Leela Devi, November 15, 2011). Moreover, (elderly) women from lower caste 
groups engage in agricultural activities on their own farms and take care of irrigation as well, 
especially if it’s a female-headed household. Women from lower caste groups are relatively more 
mobile and vocal in public gatherings as well as opposed to the upper caste women who do not make 
their presence felt in public spaces (Field Notes, October 2011).  
Politically Vidisha, one of the districts through which the network of canal system runs is the bastion 
of right wing fundamentalist party the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), ever since the Vidisha 
parliamentary constituency was constituted in 1967, and Indian National Congress (hereafter 
Congress Party) has only won it twice till now, in 1980 and 1985 elections. Some of the popular BJP 
leaders from Vidisha Parliamentary Constituency -which also includes parts of Raisen district- who 
have a stronghold in the state, and/or national politics are: Sushma Swaraj who is a Member of 
Parliament (MP) and also leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha (lower house of the parliament) 
and Shivraj Singh Chauhan - the present Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh. Thus, Vidisha is 
considered a safe constituency for Hindutva protagonist (N. D. Sharma, 2011). Further, Vidisha is also 
known to be politically active region, as it is the constituency of the present Chief Minister and one of 
the members of parliament (Interview, February 8, 2012). As a result and by extension farmers are 
also political of this region. At this juncture, it may also be noted that the farmer organizations in 
Raisen District also fall under Vidisha Parliamentary Constituency, however, for state elections, the 
legislative constituency in which the farmer organizations in Raisen are located in is a reserved 
category. Consequently, the Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) for this region has alternated 
between BJP and Congress Party candidate. To recall, clientelism as an ideology was elaborated in 
chapter five as a driving force that drives the relationship between political office bearers and the 
political society. 
Delving into material ownership of resources by farmers of this region, in 1980s, the average size of 
landholding in the project area (after the project was commissioned) was relatively higher than the 
Embedded Realities: Ideational Context of SAS Project  
 
 
 
 
135 
rest of the state. In Vidisha the average landholding size in 1980-81 was 6.7 hectares while in Raisen 
it was 5.8 hectare (GoI, 2006b, p. 129). Figure 6.2, elucidates the average land holding size of farmers 
in the SAS Project in around the time period project was commissioned.  
Figure 6. 2: Average landholding size of farmers in SAS project in 1980s 
 
Source: Design by author based on data from WALMI (1991a, p. 5) 
From Figure 6.2 it is evident that about 40 per cent of farmers in this region in 1980s had more than 
five hectares of land, which is almost three times the all India average of 1.82 hectares [Agriculture 
Census 1980-81 (Dhanagare, 1995, p. 75)]. Further, using the Agriculture Census categorization (refer 
to Appendix VII), the farmers of the SAS Project area fall in the range of medium and upper medium 
landholders i.e. have an average landholding of 2.76 to 5.97 hectares. Thus, making evident that 
farmers in this region were better endowed with land (a productive asset) compared to other parts 
of the country in 1980s. It is also noteworthy that predominant occupation of the population in the 
project area is agriculture, and as a result, farmers are heavily dependent on functioning of network 
of canal system for irrigation.  
6.1.3 Agricultural practices before and after project commissioning  
SAS Project has a long history of irrigation. In fact, in Sanchi -a well-known Buddhist site in the SAS 
project area- archaeologists have documented ancient irrigation dams between 1998 and 2000. 
These ancient dams were built to provide irrigation as a response to increased population levels close 
to the Buddhist settlements (Shaw & Sutcliffe, 2003, p. 73). For centuries after, however, local 
agriculture in this region has been rainfed wheat cultivation and absence of irrigation in this region 
has been attributed to high moisture storage capacity of the black cotton soils that is recharged by 
the annual monsoon rains. Another reason for lesser focus on irrigation or increasing agricultural 
productivity historically in this region has been due to series of famines (1896-97 and 1899-1900) in 
eastern Madhya Pradesh that resulted in massive devastation and death of animal and human 
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population that account for many abandoned settlements in this region (Phadnis & Kulshrestha, 
2010, p. 174; Shaw & Sutcliffe, 2003). Thus, the low intensity of local agriculture in nineteenth 
century can be related to demography rather than soil type (Shaw & Sutcliffe, 2003, p. 81).  
In the more recent past, the idea of initiating irrigation-cum-flood-protection projects to ensure 
water security was seeded in this region, as central India had faced two big famines. In the year 1965, 
there were abnormal floods in Betwa River that flows through the project area. The flood resulted in 
damage to property as well human lives and livestock in low-lying areas (Phadnis & Kulshrestha, 
2010, p. 174). Thus, it is only after the project was commissioned in 1978 that irrigation started on a 
large-scale in this region. About 48 per cent of the area in the central and western part of Madhya 
Pradesh has black cotton soil (WALMI, 1991a, p. 3). SAS Project also falls in this black cotton soil 
region and compared to other parts of the country and the state, the practice of irrigation in this 
region started much later (in more recent past) one of the primary reasons for this was the soil type. 
The black cotton soil of the region (which is free from salts) retains moisture after monsoons and rabi 
(1st November to 31st March) wheat could be easily cultivated in this region without irrigating fields 
as the drainage of this area was considered to be good (WALMI, 1991a). However, without irrigation 
the agricultural production was substantially lesser. Figure 6.3, elaborates the cropping pattern prior 
to commission of the project in 1978.  
Figure 6. 3: Cropping pattern before commission of SAS project 
 
 
Source: Design by author based on data from WALMI (1991a, p. 5) 
From Figure 6.3, it is evident that few crops were irrigated in this region. Wheat which is the primary 
crop grown in this region was mostly cultivated rainfed during the rabi season. For kharif (15th July to 
15th October) cultivation, irrigation was not required as post-monsoons the soil retained some 
Embedded Realities: Ideational Context of SAS Project  
 
 
 
 
137 
moisture and jowar (sorghum), toor, maize, and other pulses could be cultivated without irrigation. 
Apart from pissi (wheat), other crops that were grown in this region prior to commissioning of the 
project were chana (gram or chickpea), masoor (pulses), and alsi (linseed) (Arjan Singh, February 7, 
2012; GoI, 2006b, p. 114).  
Box 6.1 elaborates on irrigation experience of few progressive farmers in late 1950s who had access 
to irrigation prior to SAS Project.  
Box 6. 1: Collective farming by (few) progressive farmers  
Some of the progressive farmers of Saronj started practicing irrigated agriculture in this region in the late 
1950s, much before the SAS Project was commissioned. Few farmers in Saronj had availed 20 horsepower 
diesel pump set from then newly formed Madhya Pradesh state. Saronj is strategically located on the bank of a 
river. Thus, farmers could lift water from the river for irrigation. The state government in the 1950s was 
promoting improvement of agricultural practices by promoting new varieties of seeds, fertilizer and pump set 
schemes. The pump sets were available to wiling group of farmers from the block office. The farmers had to 
pay INR 1.5 per hour for three years for using the pump set for irrigation. The block officials had an operator 
stationed at the village who used to operate the pump set and the state paid the fuel cost. During that period, 
Mohan Lal, one of the progressive farmers’ from Saronj points out that farmers did not know about fertilizers 
and only organic manure was used. Farmers during that time were apprehensive to use urea as they thought 
that it would ruin their crop. Thus, initially only about ten farmers gained from this government programme 
and their agricultural production improved. Subsequently, a group of farmers bought 40.46 hectares of land in 
Samaykheri to undertake collective farming. They experimented and grew crops that were not yet cultivated in 
this region like sugarcane. During that time as SAS Project had not yet started in this region, irrigation was 
undertaken through diesel pump sets. These progressive farmers were also the first few to practice 
mechanized agriculture in this region through tractors, and other implements. 
 
Source: Interview with Mohan Lal, December 14, 2011 
Given, that there was not significant irrigated agriculture being practiced in this region till the 1980s, 
only 404.68 hectares of area was irrigated in total, prior to commissioning of SAS Project (GoMP, 
1976). Rest of the agriculture was rainfed. Farmers in this area were poor and dependent on 
traditional agricultural practices. The crop yield in this region was very low as there were no contour 
bunds to retain monsoon rainfall in the soil (WALMI, 1991a). To give an instance of crop yield, in dry 
farming, 12.5 quintals of wheat was produced in a hectare. This number increased substantially to 50 
quintal per hectare after farmers started availing irrigation from the canal system post 1980 
(Bhagwan Singh, December 10, 2012). Official records indicate that yield for wheat crop varies from 
22 quintals per hectare to 40.20 quintals per hectare with an average yield of 32.87 quintals per 
hectare (GoI, 2006b, p. 120).  
Although, farmers started reaping benefits of irrigation after the project was commissioned, most of 
the farmers during their interview argued that availability of water was a problem during the 1980s 
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and 1990s. Farmers at the tail end, as opposed to the head and middle reach, listed timely water 
availability as a problem. This is not an unexpected finding as the canal network (as discussed earlier) 
was completed piecemeal and it was only in 1990s that farmers in the tail end received water. For 
instance, the tail end villages of Betwa farmer organization like Saronj and Radhakheri only started 
receiving water in 1985 and 1990 respectively (Maharaj Singh Jat, December 11, 2011; Rakesh 
Tiwary, January 10, 2012). Official records also verify that the canal system was completed on a 
piecemeal basis due to paucity of funds, land acquisition problem, etc. As a result, work of canal and 
distribution system was taken up in different phases under various central/state government 
schemes viz. USAID funding, NWMP funding, state funds, CADA, etc. (GoI, 2006b, p. 103). 
Consequently, the cropping pattern in this area changed gradually as farmers gained access to 
irrigation services, and new crops like Soybean were popularized by the department as proposed in 
the detailed project report of the SAS Project (GoMP, 1976). The cropping pattern in this region post 
1990s is elaborated in Table 6.1. 
Table 6. 1: Cropping pattern in SAS Project in the 1990s 
Season Irrigated Rainfed 
Kharif Soybean Soybean, Jowar (Sorghum), Toor and other pulses 
Rabi Wheat HYV, Wheat (local), Gram Wheat (local), Gram, Alsi (linseed), Masoor, Batla, Tiwda 
Source: Puranik (1997) and Field notes, December 19, 2011 
There has been significant change in the kharif crop after irrigated agriculture in this region. Soybean 
as a cash crop became popular in the region in 1990s, prior to that only wheat was the only 
predominant cash crop. However, in the rabi season wheat and gram are still the predominant crop 
in this region. Detailed cropping pattern vis-à-vis percentage cropped area for SAS Project is 
presented in Appendix VIII. Interestingly, the purpose of the project was to provide irrigation water 
for both kharif and rabi cultivation, however, Soybean is still cultivated rainfed in this region and 
irritation water from Halali dam is only used for rabi cultivation.  
One of the structural designs of the project envisaged that farmers could be convinced to change 
their agricultural practice from dry and/or rainfed farming in kharif to irrigation in kharif season 
through extensive agriculture extension work (GoMP, 1976), however, this did not happen in the 
1990s. At first, water use efficiency was not very high in the project, which led to wastage of water 
by farmers, and there wasn’t enough water in the dam for provisioning water for two irrigation 
seasons. Second, the thrust of agriculture extension work in the area was not adequate apart from 
the impetus provided by Action Research Programme of WALMI to create awareness about better 
cropping practices in Betwa farmer organization (Field Notes, December 2011; GoI, 2006b, pp. Ec-
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10). Further, it is noteworthy that Soybean was designed to be part of the cropping pattern but only 
for 10 per cent of the cropped area, but by end of 1990s it was the most extensively cultivated crop 
in kharif season. The rest of area was distributed in the designed cropping pattern between jowar 
(sorghum) and maize (50 per cent), pulses (5 per cent), ground nut (5 per cent), paddy (20 per cent), 
fodder (5 per cent) in kharif season and hybrid wheat (42 per cent) and ordinary wheat (22.57 per 
cent) in rabi cultivation season. Additionally, Sugarcane was envisaged as a perennial crop in 35.43 
per cent of area (GoMP, 1976). Hence, it is fair to conclude that the designed cropping pattern had 
not become a reality by the 1990s in this area.  
Overall, farmers in this region have learnt from experience and have gradually changed their 
cropping practices only once they internalized the benefits of proper irrigation and usage of 
agricultural inputs. For instance, wheat crop is now being irrigated four times (including for 
palewaxcii) (Maharaj Singh Jat, December 19, 2011). Further, since the 1990s, mechanized agriculture 
is being practiced in this region, which has reduced the requirement for labour drastically. Farmers 
use substantial quantity of inorganic fertilizers and pesticides in their farming. Farmers, especially 
large farmers prefer to use tractors for tilling and harvesters for harvesting their agricultural produce. 
It is noteworthy that not many people migrate from this region for seeking better employment 
opportunities. There is, however, shortage of agricultural labour in the command area of the SAS 
Project (Field notes, December 2011). Overall, the above discussion indicates that land is a 
productive asset and provides enough income to farmers in this region to sustain and is also the main 
source of sustenance. 
6.2 Initiating participatory approach – first generation farmer 
organizations in the project 
In the SAS Project region three types of farmer organizations were constituted by WRD as an attempt 
to decentralize irrigation management at the micro level till 1999. These were the sinchai panchayats 
that were formed in late 1980s, outlet committees that were formed in 1990-91 as part of the Action 
Research Programme of WALMI, and finally the Betwa Krishak Samiti that was constituted in 1995 at 
the behest of the then Chief Minister (Digvijay Singh) of the state of Madhya Pradesh as an initiative 
to decentralize (Field Notes, August 2011; Puranik, 1997, p. 142). All the three committees were at 
the micro level, though there is slight variation in terms of expanse of their functioning.  
The sinchai panchayat usually comprised members from five to six villages and thus had the entire 
network of minor channels of respective villages under its functioning. Whilst the outlet committees 
were at outlet level, and had all farmers who availed water from an outlet/chak (mostly comprised 
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farmers from one village). Whilst Betwa Krishak Samiti was constituted on a minor channel and had 
select farmers from five villages/hamlets as its members, whose land was irrigated through this 
particular minor channel. Farmer organizations like the sinchai panchayats were formed in the entire 
SAS region, but the focus of discussion in this chapter is on elaborating farmer organizations (like the 
sinchai panchayats and the Betwa Krishak Samiti) that were formed in the two selected case study 
sites. The next section describes the process of constitution of these first generation organizations as 
an initiative to decentralize. 
6.2.1 Constitution of farmer organizations in SAS Project 
At the onset it is noteworthy, that in SAS Project region (and in the two case study sites) several 
attempts were made to make farmer organizations in a short period of less than a decade (from 
1985-1995). Thus, farmers (if not very active, or part of these committees) were not able to 
distinguish one committee from the other, and their responses sometimes overlapped, as they would 
begin recalling details of, for instance - sinchai panchayats, and conclude the discussion with talking 
about outlet committees (Field Notes, September 2011). One of the reasons for this could be that 
during the time of the fieldwork, two decades had already passed since the old committees were 
constituted and (now) lay defunct. This, however, is also indicative of not enough attention paid by 
the state to build awareness amongst farmers about new institutions that were being designed in 
this region on a pilot basis to improve farmer participation in irrigation management.  
It is noteworthy that farmers did not have any prior experience of irrigation in this region (see section 
6.1.3 and Box 6.1), hence, irrigation and involvement of farmers in irrigation management was a new 
notion for them. Furthermore, during the course of fieldwork I was not able to collect any secondary 
information (like number of farmer organizations, membership pattern within farmer organization, 
minutes of meeting of these organizations, finances disbursed, area under farmer organizations, 
details of capacity building programmes) on any of these old/first generation farmer organizations as 
the generic response during the fieldwork by officials from WRD, Vidisha was that this was very old 
information and it was not available or they had no idea where it is. The state of affairs of small town 
government office is evident from Photograph 6.2, which is telling. 
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Photograph 6. 2: Documents stored in project office 
 
Sinchai panchayats  
Sinchai panchayats were constituted in Madhya Pradesh in mid-1980s. These panchayats were 
constituted under Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Act of 1931 (salient features of the Act discussed in 
Appendix IV). The sinchai panchayats were constituted in the state under Section 62(i) of Irrigation 
Act and were mandated to perform four main functions: 
“Assist the officer of the irrigation department in detecting and preventing 
encroachments on canal lands prevent damage to irrigation works and report any wilful 
damage caused to irrigation works. Assist the officers of the irrigation department in 
arranging for the construction of water course, in recording and checking of irrigation 
and in making measurements and settling disputes. Collect irrigation revenue and remit 
to the treasury. Arrange for the repair of watercourses” (GoMP, 1931, Section 62(2); 
emphasis added). 
From the above citation it is apparent that structural constraints were instituted in sinchai 
panchayats by design by envisaging sinchai panchayat members as mere assistants to WRD officials 
rather than providing the members any decision-making power. This is in sync with the state’s 
ideational landscape that heralded centrist state policies. It is noteworthy that by late 1980s at the 
national level, ideas and ideologies of neoliberalism were seeping in and thus there was call for lesser 
role of the state in management of irrigation as a consequence of poor financial condition of the 
irrigation bureaucracies (discussed in chapter four and five). However, it is known that ideas take 
time to travel and institutionalize. Thus, in Madhya Pradesh in the late 1980s the first farmer 
organization that were formed still insinuated top-down role for farmers as these organizations were 
constituted based on the colonial Irrigation Act 1931 of Madhya Pradesh which state ‘the member of 
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irrigation panchayat shall be deemed to be a Public Servant for the purpose of Indian Penal Code’ 
(GoMP, 1931; 1981, p. 127). Moreover, panchayat members were paid an honorarium at the rate of 
3 per cent for the first INR 1000 collected and an additional 2 per cent subsequent collection. The 
collected amount was to be distributed amongst members of panchayat (CWC, 2010, p. 38). Payment 
of honorarium was considered to be an incentive for smooth functioning and better performance of 
panchayat functions.  
Moreover, the district collector was a powerful actor at the intermediate level and held key to 
decentralization at the micro level in context of constitution of the sinchai panchayats that were set 
up in the state. The district collector played an essential role both in constitution and dissolution of 
sinchai panchayats, as selection for the sinchai panchayat members was done with support from 
district collector’s office. Further, number of members to be elected in one sinchai panchayat was 
not fixed according to the Irrigation Act. Rather was determined by the district collectors’ office 
bearing in mind recommendations of the executive engineer’s office. The average term of a sinchai 
panchayat according to the Irrigation Act 1931 was three years, though the district collector had the 
power to extend the term of office of a sinchai panchayat for a period not exceeding three years in 
aggregate (GoMP, 1975, Rule 143, 144(a)). The district collector had the power to nominate one 
member of the sinchai panchayat and s/he also had power to dissolve these panchayats by merely 
giving an order in writing (GoMP, 1975, Rule 144(c)). Overall, the district collector’s office was the 
primary decision making body for conducting sinchai panchayat elections along with the executive 
engineer (from the Irrigation Department) who was responsible for making proposals that outlined 
number of members to be fixed for a sinchai panchayat and also fix date, time and place for 
elections. Subsequently, the proposal for constitution of sinchai panchayats was submitted to district 
collector’s office for consideration and approval, and the district collector had the final authority on 
decision-making. From the Irrigation Department, the sub division officer was responsible for 
ensuring formation and functioning of these panchayats. The sub division officer undertook this work 
with the aid of amins (accountant/ person responsible for revenue collection) and junior 
functionaries (like time keeper, watchman) to distribute water to a sinchai panchayat (GoI, 1989). 
The election for sinchai panchayat president was done through nomination. All permanent 
landholders within the command area were considered electors for a sinchai panchayat. These 
electors were identified/defined by the executive engineer responsible for managing the canal 
system (GoMP, 1975, Rule 147(a)). The primary decision-making body for constitution, and selection 
of members was with officials (district collector and executive engineer) at the intermediate level. 
The above discussion highlights the power intermediate level bureaucrats had over decentralizing 
the micro level. It is noteworthy that no efforts/inclination was shown to decentralize the 
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intermediate level functioning by involving farmer organizations at this juncture. This is consonance 
with deliberation in chapter four on including farmers in management of irrigation system. Here it 
also needs to be noted that Madhya Pradesh has a long history of struggle for agrarian and 
environmental movement. This peaked in the late 1980s and 1990s in form of the Narmada Bachao 
Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement), which is a social movement struggle against 300 small and 
large dams in India, and this struggle peaked with contestation over building of Sardar Sarovar 
Project in southern Madhya Pradesh. The movement contested knowledge claims role and 
hegemony of method of development being pursued and which displaced local population and 
neglected existing local knowledge of subaltern groups (Singh, 2004). Contrastingly to 
happenings in central and southern Madhya Pradesh, however, the command area of the SAS 
project did not witness similar contestation and first generation farmer organization like sinchai 
panchayats were constituted by state ruling.  
Outlet committees 
Additionally, outlet committees were formed as part of the Action Research Programme in select 
area in SAS Project area. According to WRD an opening from a canal is identified as an outlet when a 
9 to 12 inch wide RCC un-gated pipes are fitted in the embankment to serve as an outlet for water in 
the chak or outlet command area (WALMI, 1991a, p. 13). Outlets committees were informally 
organized, and as a result were not registered. Each committee had 40 hectares under its command 
area. Thokdars (outlet committee leaders) were responsible for distributing water in respective 
outlet command areas during irrigation season. Puranik (1997, pp. 143, 146) researched these 
committees in the SAS Project and observes that they were active only during the irrigation season 
and during the rest of the year they laid dormant. The outlet committees were formed by WALMI, 
who held meetings with farmers on a pre-decided date and time. All permanent landholders in an 
outlet were members of the outlet committee, and thokdars were selected by nomination as leaders 
of outlet committee (WALMI, 1991a, p. 29). Interestingly, description of selection of thokdars in the 
Action Research Programme report of WALMI is: ‘frequent interaction with clients had given fair 
ideas about the influential people (who could be) acting as group leaders’ (ibid.). Two points that 
need to be elaborated from the above citation is that elite farmers’ in the outlet’s command/chak 
area were given preference and selected as thokdars. Furthermore, influential farmers during that 
period were either the village patel’s (traditional authority) of the village or those individuals who 
were favoured by the village patel. Given, that WALMI officials, selected group leaders or thokdars 
on this criterion, hence, only medium or large landholding farmers gained from this selection 
process.  
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As part of the capacity building programme for outlet committee members, select farmers from each 
outlet committee were taken for field visit to Maharashtra to interact with farmers in Maharashtra 
and to learn irrigation methods employed them. The objective of the field visit for WALMI was to 
motivate select farmers who in turn were responsible to create further awareness in their villages 
about salience of farmer organization for better irrigation management (WALMI, 1991a, p. 30). 
Additionally, training programme for farmers was also organized by WALMI in a close by town on 
May 20, 1988 where the then MLA from the region emphasized that officers of the irrigation 
department ought to meet the farmers more frequently to solve their problems (WALMI, 1991a, p. 
9). Despite these efforts made for capacity building, these outlet committees were not successful and 
were more on paper rather than actuality. Moreover, from name of these committees, it is self-
evident that their focus was also on micro level irrigation management i.e. the outlet level and 
intermediate level issues were not considered.  
To recall from chapter five, in the early 1990s Chief Minister Digvijay Singh had initiated 
decentralization drive in Madhya Pradesh and as an outcome of this decentralization drive, few of 
these outlet committee areas were shortlisted for registration under Madhya Pradesh Societies 
Registration Act of 1973. One of them was Betwa Krishak Samiti in the same region that earlier had 
Betwa sinchai panchayat, and needs further elaboration.  
Betwa Krishak Samiti  
In the year 1994-1995, in order to decentralize irrigation management in the state, a total of 65 
farmer organizations were formed on pilot basis under Madhya Pradesh Societies Registration Act of 
1973. Of these 65 farmer organizations, Betwa Krishak Samiti (hereafter Krishak Samiti), in the SAS 
Project area was the first farmer organization that was constituted in Madhya Pradesh on July 20, 
1995 for instituting cooperation of farmers in irrigation management as part of the decentralization 
drive of the 1990s. This samiti was registered under the Madhya Pradesh Societies Registration Act 
on August 22, 1995 and was formed on one of the tail end minor of the canal. The Krishak Samiti had 
504.43 hectares of land (162 farmer fields) in its command area and was spread across five 
villages/hamlets in adjacent districts of Raisen and Vidisha (SAS Krishak Samiti, 1995). The Betwa 
Krishak Samiti was not very different from the sinchai panchayat that were constituted in the state in 
the 1980s. The only difference being that sinchai panchayat had several minor channels and/or 
distributory under its functioning while Betwa Krishak Samiti had one of the tail end minors under it. 
Funding for constituting Betwa Krishak Samiti was provisioned under National Water Management 
Programme of the World Bank (Interview, Senior WRD official, December 16, 2011).  
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6.3 Summing up 
This chapter introduces the SAS project as a case study site and also discusses the three forms of first 
generation farmer organizations that were constituted in the project region at the micro level. Table 
6.2 summarises the salient features of these first generation farmer organizations. 
Table 6. 2: First generation farmer organizations  
Farmer 
organization  
Year of 
constitution 
(approximate) 
Level and expanse of 
operation  
Number of 
villages/hamlets 
Legal status 
Sinchai 
panchayat 
mid to late 
1980s 
- Micro level 
- Its expanse included several 
minor channels and/or 
distributory. More than 1000 
hectares of land under its 
command area 
5-6 villages 
Mention of sinchai 
panchayat in Irrigation Act 
of 1931. Recognized by the 
irrigation department and 
made in the entire state 
Outlet 
committee 
From late 
1980s to early 
1990s 
- Micro level 
- On one outlet of the canal 
system. Each outlet had 
about 40 hectares of land 
under its command area 
Mostly farmers 
from one village 
i.e. all farmer 
fields being 
served by an 
outlet 
Informally constituted by 
WALMI, not registered. 
Only constituted in the 
regions where Action 
Research Programme was 
carried out 
Betwa 
Krishak 
Samiti  
1995 
- Micro level 
- On one minor channel of 
the canal system. About 504 
hectares of land under its 
command area. 
Five 
village/hamlets 
Formed across the state as 
part of Chief Minister’s 
decentralization drive in 
1990s. Registered with 
Madhya Pradesh Societies 
Registration Act 1973 
 
From Table 6.2 it is evident that all the three type of farmer organization were constituted at the 
micro level and there were no efforts made to decentralize the intermediate level of irrigation 
management i.e. in terms of devolution of funds, functions or functionaries during this time period. 
The micro level organizations were constituted, as the state structural mandate demanded so. The 
happenings at the state level that shaped the ideational landscape for constitution of farmer 
organization as a consequence of tied funding from the central government and funding from donor 
organizations was discussed in chapter five. Building on chapter five, this chapter demonstrated 
salience of structural factors like legislative rulings, and donor funding emerge as important factors 
that shape the ideational landscape at micro level and thus the process for initiation of first 
generation farmer organization in the project.  
Additionally, this chapter elaborated the socio-cultural and political context of the SAS Project in 
which the local actors i.e. farmers, farmer organization and junior bureaucracy and junior 
functionaries of the department are embedded-in and which shapes their ideational landscape. The 
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chapter also elucidated SAS Project situatedness in a dynamic context with diverse heterogeneous 
community. Thus, socio-cultural and structural factors like caste, class, gender, position on the canal 
network emerged as important factors that need to be borne in mind to understand ideational realm 
of actors. Building on this discussion, the next chapter elucidates the process of selection of farmer 
organization members and its leaders in the two select case study sites, practices of water 
distribution, and relation of farmers with bureaucracy using the conceptual frame of ideational realm 
elaborated in chapter three. 
 
  
                                                          
lxxxv
 Vidisha District is primarily populated in rural areas and of the total 297419 households in the district, 
231876 (78 per cent) reside in the rural areas (GoI, 2011b). About 75 per cent of rural households in Vidisha use 
hand pumps to meet their domestic water needs; and about 11 per cent have hand pump within their premise 
(GoI, 2011b). These statistics are similar for Raisen District, and of the total 274219 households in the district, 
214616 (78 per cent) households reside in the rural areas. About 71 per cent of the rural households use hand 
pumps in rural Raisen to meet their domestic water requirements of which only about one percent have hand 
pump within their premise (GoI, 2011b). Vidisha and Raisen District also have one of the poorest sex ratio in 
the state. According to Census 2011, the sex ratio in Vidisha District is 897 females against 1000 males while in 
Raisen District it is 899 females against 1000 males (GoI, 2011c). The figures are not any better if data on basic 
sanitation facilities is delved into. In Vidisha District, 75.3 per cent of households according to Census 2011 
don’t have latrines. The figures are slightly better for Raisen District with 69.9 per cent households not having 
their private latrines. 61 per cent of households in Vidisha District have access to electricity while 70.9 per cent 
have access to electricity in Raisen District. The figures for literacy rate are relatively better for this region, with 
72.10 per cent literate in Vidisha District and 74.3 per cent literate in Raisen District (GoI, 2012b). 
lxxxvi
 This programme was done in collaboration with scientists from RAK College of Agriculture and from Zonal 
Agriculture Research Station Powarkheda and WALMI officials (WALMI, 1989). 
lxxxvii
 One explication of caste system traditionally is as workers guild, at the top of which are Brahmins who are 
priests by vocation, then comes the Kshatriya/Rajput who are the warriors/rulers, third in the hierarchy are the 
Vaishyas who are predominantly merchants, traders and then are the Sudra who are unskilled workers, 
followed by the outcastes/dalit/untouchables who did menial jobs in society. Moreover, within these four 
major groups there are sub categories as well (Blunt, 1931, p. 8). 
lxxxviii
 To elaborate, ‘safeguarding of the caste structure is achieved through the highly restricted movement of 
women or even through female seclusion. Women are regarded as gate-ways-literally points of entrance into 
the caste system. The lower caste male whose sexuality is a threat to-upper caste purity has to be 
institutionally prevented from having sexual access to women of the higher castes so women must be carefully 
guarded’ (Chakravarti, 1993, p. 579). 
lxxxix
 The Indian state categorizes the society into four groups, viz. General, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, 
and Other Backward Caste to identify historically marginalized/wronged sections. Based on this categorization 
the state provides specific groups greater benefits through its affirmative action policy with the intent to bring 
them at par with the general population which comprises for instance Brahmin, Rajput, Kayasth, etc.   
xc
 Observation of Pandey(2006) are similar who undertook an ethnography of one village in this Project. 
xci
 Similar norm can be observed for instance, while drawing water from well or hand pump. The upper caste 
person draws water first and then the lower caste person draws water (Pandey, 2006, p. 34). However, these 
norms are changing gradually and people are questioning the validity of some of these practices. For instance, 
during the time of fieldwork respondents (men and women) were always curious about my caste, and families 
from lower caste were hesitant to offer water as they (wrongly) assumed that I would not consume it. Further, 
my first field assistant was from the upper caste (Brahmin) community and he did not consume water in SC 
households. When I confronted him why he was not consuming water, given with time people’s attitudes are 
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changing, he responded, ‘he did not have a problem with consuming water from a SC household. But everyone 
in this area knows him (as he is a local) and he has to observe the norm as otherwise people will start talking’ 
(Field notes, December 9, 2011). 
xcii
 Pre-sowing irrigation or palewa is practiced in this region for rabi crop. Palewa is required in fields where 
kharif crop has been taken earlier. Palewa is provided for ‘land preparation to ensure proper seed-soil contact; 
to provide necessary moisture for germination; to meet evapotranspiration requirement up to first irrigation’ 
(WALMI, 1993, p. 1). 
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7 Mansikta of First Generation Farmer Organizations 
Chapter six discussed the embeddedness of actors within the socio-cultural reality and thus set the 
context to unpack the ideational realm of farmers, farmer organizations, and bureaucracy from 1978-
2000 when the first generation farmer organizations were constituted in the state. Following on that 
discussion, this chapter discusses dominant ideational realm of actors’ i.e. their mansikta (mind-set) 
when farmer organizations were constituted in 1980s and 1990s in the SAS Project area. The 
importance of structural and cultural ideational factors gains prominence in this context, and 
facilitates in building an imagery of perception and rationality of actors, viz. farmer organizations’, 
farmers and the bureaucracy about participation, corruption, role of state in context of irrigation 
management.xciii  
It is noteworthy that ideational effect is simpler to trace at the macro level, as policy directives, 
minutes of meetings, and similar secondary literature are reasonable sources to grasp the ideational 
effects of introducing new idea(s), and the bottlenecks thereof that are faced in implementing it. 
Ideational effect and its impact are more challenging to trace at the intermediate and/or micro level, 
as the material effects of introducing new ideas, interposed with norms, values, worldviews of actors 
creates a dynamic field for analysis. To undertake methodological analysis, perception of actors’ in 
this section is evaluated in reference to election of farmer organization (leaders and members), key 
roles and responsibilities enunciated for farmer organization, and their perception and relation to 
bureaucracy. The rationality of actors is evaluated against envisaged functions as elaborated in the 
Irrigation Act 1931 under which sinchai panchayat were constituted and the byelaws of Madhya 
Pradesh Societies Registration Act of 1973 under which Betwa Krishak Samiti was constituted. 
Discussion on outlet committees is brief as they were non-starter from the beginning. Furthermore, 
this chapter analyzes how underlying structural and cultural factors moulded actors’ perception and 
selection and functioning of first generation farmer organizations in the two select case study sites.  
This chapter puts forth the idea, that bureaucracy worked under a technical and managerial mind-set 
(harbingers of growth and progress), whilst the farmers and farmer organizations’ perception about 
‘self’ and their capabilities was influenced by their socio-political, cultural setting and their 
perception about the material, socio-cultural and political leverage that they had accumulated. 
Moreover, salience of prevalent ideas and ideologies on irrigation management in shaping actors 
perception are also elucidated. Specifically, section 7.1 and 7.2 elaborates the ideational realm of 
actors’ with respect to irrigation management, whilst section 7.3 highlights the significance of 
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structural and cultural factors influencing the ideational realm of actors in first generation farmer 
organization in SAS Project and provides a summary conclusion.  
7.1. Selection process of first generation farmer organization members and 
its leaders  
This section discusses the election process of first generation farmer organization in the two select 
case study sites, viz. where Betwa and Saraswati sinchai panchayat were made in late 1980s and 
Betwa Krishak Samiti was made in mid 1990s. Figure 7.1 illustrates the location of these farmer 
organizations on the map.  
Figure 7. 1: Map of SAS Project 
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Source: WALMI (2011, p. 30) 
7.1.1 Betwa Sinchai Panchayat  
Betwa sinchai panchayat is on the middle/tail end of the canal and had about 16 villages in its 
jurisdiction demarcated on hydraulic basis, and had in total about 15-20 members in the sinchai 
panchayat. The meeting for nomination and selection of members of Betwa sinchai panchayat was 
done in Betwa village in the late 1980s, and farmers from nearby villages (Chapna, Amla, Saronj, 
Karamkheri, Radhakheri, Sadhai, Kanakheri, Sagwaan, etc.) that were notified to be part of Betwa 
sinchai panchayat came for the meeting held at Betwa village. Although despite prior notification 
about the time and venue for the meeting by the chowkidaar (watchman) from the irrigation 
department there wasn’t representation from all the 16 villages (Samar Malik, December 9, 2011 and 
Bhagwan Singh, December 10, 2011). Approximately 40 villagers came to Betwa village for selecting 
the sinchai panchayat members, now almost three decades ago. It is noteworthy, that in the late 
1980s, this region had very poor connectivity and there were only fair weather roads in the area. 
Moreover, there were very few farmers who had motorcycles or any other mechanized means of 
transport (Samar Malik, December 9, 2011). Mode of commute was mostly on foot or on bicycles / 
motorcycles, if (some) farmers owned them. Given this context, presence of about 40 farmers for 
village meeting was considered (by farmers) a good turnout for selection of sinchai panchayat 
members and president. Officials from the irrigation department and district collector’s office were 
also present at the meeting held in Betwa village, and were responsible for convening the meeting 
and documenting/reporting the entire process (Field Notes, December 10, 2011).  
Given, that there wasn’t representation from all the villages delineated under the sinchai panchayat 
for this meeting, the villagers present nominated sinchai panchayat members mostly from Betwa (six 
members), Saronj (three members), Sadhai (one member), Karamkheri (one member), Chapna (one 
member) and Amla (one member) villages. Farmers present also nominated few members from 
villages missing representation in this meeting including one member from the dalit (belonging to 
scheduled caste) community (Samar Malik, December 9, 2011). There was, however, no 
representation of women, even for the sake of tokenism, in Betwa sinchai panchayat, which is not 
surprising as co-opting women in the sinchai panchayat is not elaborated in the Irrigation Act 1931 
(c.f. GoMP, 1931).  
Samar Malik from Betwa village was the former president of Betwa sinchai panchayat. He describes 
the entire election ‘process as just a formality’ (ibid.). Explaining the process of his nomination and 
selection as president, he posits: 
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“My name was proposed for president in the meeting held in Betwa village. I was not 
considered an advanced farmer in agricultural practices, but was educated and an expert 
in talking to officials. People did not want to ruin their work, so they thought that let us 
propose his name (…). All influential people and big farmers had proposed my name like 
the former tehsildar from Betwa village; Nahan Singh from Saronj village, who was 
former sarpanch (leader of Betwa Panchayat) and is a Congressi (person associated with 
Congress party); Bhagwan Singh from Saronj; Rakesh Sharma from Amla, etc.  
Everyone knew my political affiliations were with Congress Party and this was 
synchronous with the political leanings of some of the other farmers who nominated my 
name. Thus, there was huge uproar to my nomination as president in the meeting. 
People who belonged to the BJP camp objected to my nomination, for instance, Kanhaiya 
Lal Saxena and Bhawar Singh who were from my village, also opposed my candidature. 
However, this opposition did not change the election result, as majority was on my side 
including support from farmers who were affiliated with BJP. So all the big people 
shouted at those opposing my candidature and shut them up. Vote was not given on 
party lines but on the basis of personality of the candidate in the end. The people who 
were opposing me were less educated (had studied up till secondary school or lesser)” 
(Interview, December 9, 2011). 
Box 7.1 provides a short profile of Samar Malik, which further substantiates the reason for him being 
elected as Betwa sinchai panchayat president. 
 
Box 7. 1:Profile of former Betwa sinchai panchayat president 
Samar Malik is an active septuagenarian. He comes from the Muslim community, which is a minority 
community in Betwa sinchai panchayat. Despite being from the minority community he was elected president 
of the sinchai panchayat around 1990. His family owned 14.56 hectares of land in 1980s, when the land 
reforms had not yet happened, and his father and the three brothers owned this land collectively. Currently, he 
owns about 6.07 hectares of land. He completed his secondary schooling from nearby area, and completed his 
senior secondary school from Bhopal. Samar Malik completed his undergraduate degree in 1969 and started 
teaching in a school close to Betwa village. He taught in two schools in the area for 15 years, and 
simultaneously during this period studied law in Vidisha. After completing his law degree, he resigned from his 
teaching job and started practicing law between 1975 and 1990 at the district headquarters. Samar Malik 
discontinued his law practice and returned to Betwa village in 1990 after his father died. Since then he has 
been practicing agriculture in this region, though, he does not practice hands on agriculture - all agricultural 
work is done by hired labourers. After his return to Betwa he was selected the sinchai panchayat president. 
Additionally, in mid 1990s, he was member of bees-sutra samiti of the Congress Party at the block level for five 
years.  
Samar Malik has sharp memory and recounts with clarity the events that led to constitution of sinchai 
panchayat for the first time in this region. He also recalled how WALMI was constituted under the aegis of 
some American funding organization (referring to USAID). Evidently, the WALMI officials and staff 
communicated this to him. Samar Malik is astute and agile for his age, and is still actively involved in his 
(agricultural) occupation.   
Source: Interview, Samar Malik, December 9, 2011 
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From description in Box 7.1, it becomes evident that Samar Malik was not merely nominated. Rather 
his selection/election needs to be viewed in context of salience of structures i.e. he was materially 
endowed (owned 14.56 hectares of land), had access to education and thus privy to 
knowledge/information. There were not many farmers in Betwa sinchai panchayat who had similar 
capacities. Additionally, he was well travelled, which was rare during that period. 
To elaborate further, the process of selection of farmers as sinchai panchayat members by the 
villagers during the meeting was based on several criterions. First, perception of farmers about the 
nominee being progressive and active i.e. someone who will bring new knowledge and information 
to them For instance, Bhagwan Singh, from Saronj was un-educated but considered a progressive 
farmer who tried new agricultural practices (Interview, December 10, 2011). Thus, he was nominated 
to be one of the members of sinchai panchayat from Saronj. 
Second, was the educational qualification of the nominees. During this period, there were not many 
people who were educated in this region. In fact the literacy rate is still poor in this region. So, 
farmers present for the meeting nominated literate farmers, for instance, Samar Malik as president, 
and Mohan Lal from Samaykheri as member of sinchai panchayat. Maharaj Singh Jat from Saronj, 
another member of sinchai panchayat elucidates that during the meeting Samar Malik was selected 
as president as farmers stated ‘you are a lawyer, you should take some time out and get involved in 
management as that can improve the situation’ (Interview, December 11, 2011). 
Third, was how vocal the nominated members were in their respective villages and in their 
interaction with outsiders, for instance, officials from the local district and block office.  
Fourth, critical factor was ownership of landholdings (Field Notes, December 9, 2011). Although, 
members of sinchai panchayat did not per se, deem landholding as an important criterion for their 
nomination, however, delving into their personal details illuminates that many of the members of 
Betwa sinchai panchayat were large landholders, for instance, Bhagwan Singh from Saronj (26.30 
hectares), Rakesh Sharma from Amla (20.23 hectares), Ravindar Prasad from Ranakheri (20.23 
hectares), Mohan Lal from Samaykheri (24.28 hectares), Behram Singh Yadav from Chapna (14.16), 
etc. (Samar Malik, December 9, 2011). Thus, it (also) becomes evident that landholding did play a 
critical role in selection of farmers as sinchai panchayat members, apart from perception of these 
farmers being progressive. Additionally, almost all the above-mentioned members of sinchai 
panchayat belong to upper caste, apart from Behram Singh who belongs to Other Backward Caste 
(OBC). For instance, Bhagwan Singh and Mohan Lal are Rajputs, Rakesh Sharma is a Brahmin and 
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Ravindar Prasad is a Kayasth (a sub-caste between Rajputs and Brahmins). Some of these members 
were from village patel (traditional village authority) family, viz. Mohan lal, and Bhagwan Singh.  
Moreover, farmers were connoted progressive if they were educated, active in their villages and 
vocal. These aforementioned criterions -progressive, educated, village patels and/or large 
landholders- by definition excluded the marginalized sections of the community. Thus, it is fair to 
conclude that in the late 1980s the process of selection of sinchai panchayat members and president 
was biased towards the better-off sections in the Betwa sinchai panchayat villages. Table 7.1, 
summarizes the characteristics of Betwa sinchai panchayat committee members discussed till now.  
Table 7. 1: Characteristics of select Betwa sinchai panchayat committee members 
Sinchai 
panchayat  
members 
Name
#
 
Land 
ownership 
(in 
hectare) 
Caste/ 
Religion 
Village/hamlet 
Education 
level 
Dominant perception 
about SP members & their 
party affiliations 
President 
Samar 
Malik 
14.56 Muslim Betwa
1
 Law degree 
Well-travelled, Congress 
Party 
Member 
Bhagwan 
Singh 
26.30 Rajput Saronj
2
 Illiterate 
Progressive farmer, good 
relations with officials, well-
travelled, village patel, 
vocal, BJP 
Member Mohan Lal 24.28 Rajput Samaykheri
1
 
Secondary 
school 
Village patel, BJP 
Member 
Maharaj 
Singh Jat 
80.9 Rajput Saronj
2
 
Secondary 
school  
Well-travelled, Village 
patel, BJP 
Member 
Rakesh 
Sharma 
20.23 Brahmin Amla
2
 Illiterate 
Vocal, good relations with 
officials, Congress Party 
Member 
Behram 
Singh  
14.16 Sudra  Chapna
1
 Primary school  
Active farmer, good 
relations with officials, BJP 
Member 
Ravindar 
Prasad 
20.23 Kayasth*  Ranakkheri
2
 
Senior 
secondary 
school 
Village patel, Congress 
party 
 
# 
Pseudonyms are used to maintain anonymity of respondents 
* Sub-caste between Rajput and Brahmin 
1 
Middle reach village
 
2 
Tail end village 
 
Reiterating, from Table 7.1, it becomes evident that farmers selected those individuals, as sinchai 
panchayat members who they believed were active, vocal, well educated, had good relations with 
officials and were considered progressive. Incidentally, all these are also criterion of good leaders. 
However, all the farmers listed in Table 7.1 were large landholders of this region, which points that 
material structuresxciv also played a role in selection of members. Furthermore, most of the farmers 
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were also from the predominant caste group (Rajput) of the region. So, it is fair to conclude that all 
members of the sinchai panchayat were well endowed with one or many of these qualities and were 
leaders, elites of their villages. Thus, the rationale for selection of sinchai panchayat members was 
contingent on farmers’ perception about selected members, which was guided by their beliefs about 
progressiveness of farmers, education, social and material status and hierarchy. For the selection of 
sinchai panchayats members, farmers’ beliefs about potential farmer organization member, and the 
value they attached to the candidature of an individual was important. Furthermore, the above 
discussion elucidates that it was not the individual beliefs, but the intersubjective beliefs on the type 
of candidate that ought to be sinchai panchayats members that shaped actors worldview/mansikta 
for selecting sinchai panchayats members.  
7.1.2 Saraswati Sinchai Panchayat 
Likewise, Saraswati sinchai panchayat was formed after a notification letter for constitution of the 
sinchai panchayat came from the erstwhile irrigation department to six villages (Saraswati, Mangod, 
Tarasi, Karonj, Sadaiya, Amlakheri), which were delineated on a hydraulic basis to be under the 
sinchai panchayat. Saraswati sinchai panchayat was formed on head reach of the canal system. Here, 
it may be noted that though the panchayat boundaries were delineated on hydraulic basis, there 
were villages within the panchayat on head, middle and tail end. For instance, Sadaiya, Amlakheri are 
the tail end villages within the Saraswati sinchai panchayat.  
Abhay Singh Maina, former president of Saraswati sinchai panchayat is from Sadaiya, and reflecting 
on the process of formation of the sinchai panchayat points out that he was chosen president by 
nomination/delegation. There were five members in total in Saraswati sinchai panchayat, and one 
nominated dalit (from Scheduled Caste community) member. There was no women representative in 
Saraswati sinchai panchayat as well (Abhay Singh Maina, December 6, 2011 and Arjan Singh, 
February 7, 2012). Abhay Singh Maina belongs to OBC, which is another predominant landholding 
group in this area.  
The process of constitution and selection of sinchai panchayat members was similar to that of Betwa 
sinchai panchayat (as elaborated in the section above), Although slightly more democratic, as the 
consensus for the post of president was not achieved during the first two rounds of elections given 
that there were two contenders for the post of president (Abhay Singh Maina and Surjan Singh). 
Surjan Singh is from one of the hamlets of Saraswati village i.e. Baagkheri, which falls on the middle 
reach and is habited close to the canal). Surjan Singh, as opposed to Abhay Singh Maina is a Rajput by 
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caste and is a big landholder of Baagkheri. A minor channel from the canal provides water to farmers 
of Baagkheri. Though, few farmers of Baagkheri also avail water directly through outlet on the canal.  
The process of selection of Saraswati sinchai panchayat president was mired by controversies. There 
was politicking by the two contenders to garner support for their nomination. The first two rounds of 
elections were inconclusive as both Abhay Singh Maina and Surjan Singh had equal votes. Eventually, 
the selection of Saraswati sinchai panchayat president was done through nomination by the then 
Irrigation Minster’s (Digvijay Singh) office. During the interview, Abhay Singh Maina whose political 
views are in line with Congress party’s emphasized the good relations he had with the then irrigation 
minister from Congress party. Apart from selection of Abhay Singh Maina as the sinchai panchayat 
president, representation from dalit community was also ensured in the sinchai panchayat by 
nomination of Nannu, as one of the members (Abhay Singh Maina, December 6, 2012 & Arjan Singh, 
February 7, 2012). Table 7.2, provides a summary of the characteristic features of Saraswati sinchai 
panchayat members. 
Table 7. 2: Characteristics of Saraswati sinchai panchayat committee members 
Sinchai 
panchayat 
(SP)  
Name
#
 
Land 
ownership 
(in hectare) 
Caste Village/hamlet 
Education 
level 
Dominant perception 
about SP members & 
their party affiliations 
President 
Abhay 
Singh 
Maina 
8.25 OBC Sadaiya
3
 Illiterate 
Active farmer, good 
relations with officials, 
village patel, Congress 
Party 
Member 
Surjan 
Singh 
48.12 Rajput Baagkheri
2
 Illiterate 
Active, village patel, 
Congress Party 
Member Mangu Lal 21.24 Vaishya Mangod
1
 
Primary 
school 
Vocal, active farmer, 
good relation with 
officials, Congress Party 
Member Amar Singh 27.82 Rajput Karonj
1
 
Primary 
school 
Progressive farmer, BJP 
Member Arjan Singh 7.25 Rajput Tarasi
2
 
Primary 
school 
Active & progressive, 
farmer, well-travelled, 
BJP 
Member Nannu 0.4 Dalit/SC Saraswati
1
 Illiterate 
Nominated as he is a 
dalit 
# 
Pseudonyms are used to maintain anonymity of respondents 
1 
Head reach village
 
2 
Middle reach village
 
3 
Tail end village 
 
Table 7.2, indicates that there is wide variation in landholding size of farmers in Sarasawati sinchai 
panchayat compared to Betwa sinchai panchayat. This variation explicates the reasons for 
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controversies/differences between farmers. Additionally, many of the members were large land 
holding farmers and thus influence of material ideation in influencing farmer perception is evident in 
this case as well. Furthermore, the president of the sinchai panchayat is from Maina community, 
which is another predominant caste group (OBC) in this region. Moreover, given that Abhay Singh 
Maina’s name was nominated by the Irrigation Minister’s office, and the former sinchai panchayat 
president takes pride in his connection with the minister it is safe to conclude that proximity to the 
minister - the socio-political leverage that he commanded in the region - played a role in securing 
sinchai panchayat president post for Abhay Singh Maina. Moreover, from Table 7.2 it is evident that 
membership of Nannu in Saraswati sinchai panchayat is an exception - he was made member by 
nomination in order to have representation from marginal dalit/SC in sinchai panchayat. It is 
however noteworthy that his selection was apolitical. 
From the above discussion it becomes evident that clientelism also played a role in selection of 
Saraswati sinchai panchayat president as Abhay Singh Maina used his political connection with the 
irrigation minister to leverage support in his favour for nomination as president. This was possible as 
the selection process was not through secret ballot vote rather through nomination and the district 
collector’s office had the final authority to decide the candidate who decided in favour of Abhay 
Singh Maina. Here, different beliefs that shape the worldview of actors and thereby the process of 
selection of leaders also becomes salient that is in Saraswati sinchai panchayats the two 
predominant leaders were selected given their position in the social hierarchy of caste and proximity 
to the political office bearers. This is in contrast to the downstream Betwa sinchai panchayats where 
selection apart from social hierarchy of caste was also contingent on progressiveness and 
educational status. The above discussion elucidates different beliefs like progressiveness or 
education as a signifier of quality of good leader that shaped the ideational realm/mansikta of 
farmers. 
7.1.3 Betwa Krishak Samiti  
The selection of Krishak Samiti members was done in a meeting organized by the irrigation 
department at the village temple close to Karamkheri. Five members of the management committee 
were selected through nomination: Mehtab Patel (Rajput by caste and from the family of village 
patel) from Karamkheri was nominated for president (he was earlier sarpanch of Betwa panchayat); 
Madhav Ram (Rajput by caste) from Ranakheri was selected as co-president. Prakash Narayan 
(Rajput by caste) from Ranakheri was the secretary. Ram Patel (Rajput by caste and village patel) was 
the co-secretary and Rakesh Tiwary (Brahmin by caste) was the cashier, both were from Radhakheri. 
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Another prominent member of the samiti was Nahan Singh (Rajput by caste) who was also a member 
in the earlier constituted Betwa sinchai panchayat, and was elected sarpanch of the sinchai 
panchayat. In total there were 22 members in the Krishak Samiti. Two women members were also 
part of this committee. Overall, majority of members selected for this committee were from upper 
caste, and like the previous sinchai panchayat members, had large landholdings and were active 
farmers, or village patels (traditional authority). Thus, most of the committee members were 
powerful elites of their village. Moreover, most of the members of this committee were from 
prominent patel families and/or were rich farmers, for instance, one of them owned a shop in the 
close by town, another had an agriculture farm (SAS Krishak Samiti, 1995). Several of the members of 
the Krishak Samiti were affiliated with Congress Party and had been also members of the Congress 
Party Committee at the district level.  
According to the regulations of the Krishak Samiti to become a guardian member, farmers had to pay 
INR 500 to the committee fund within a year, and to be a lifelong member one had to pay INR 200 to 
the samiti fund. General members had to pay INR 24 for a year (SAS Krishak Samiti, 1995). The 
Krishak Samiti lasted for about five years, till Water User Associations (WUAs) were introduced in the 
state in the year 2000.  
Chief Engineer, Operation and Maintenance (O&M) did the inaugural for the constitution of the 
committee with great fanfare on April 4, 1995 (ibid.). Mehtab Patel, president of Krishak Samiti (also) 
remembers the inaugural ceremony for the samiti, as a big event, invitation cards were printed and 
sent out in advance to all officials. Further, he posits ‘we were given lot of importance then, there 
were programmes of us on the radio where we shared the process of constitution of Krishak Samiti 
with the audience’ (Interview, September 30, 2011). The opening lines of byelaws of the Krishak 
Samiti elucidates that constitution of this committee was the dream of the then Chief Minister 
Digvijay Singh and the then Irrigation Minister Rajendra Prasad Shukla (SAS Krishak Samiti, 1995). 
This indicates the importance Digvijay Singh had given to decentralization policies and practices in 
Madhya Pradesh in the 1990s, which was also discussed in chapter five. From this discussion it 
becomes evident that the Krishak Samiti (and similar samitis across the state) was enunciated as 
harbingers of decentralization in the state narrative in the mid-1990s and a big event was planned to 
mark the inauguration of Krishak Samiti as there was willingness from the political class for the same.  
This section elaborated how the process of constitution of these committee members was influenced 
by farmers worldview which was shaped by their normative beliefs about progressiveness of 
potential sinchai panchayats member, their education status, their social networks, political 
connections and material ownership. Moreover, from the discussion it is evident that the selection 
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process reinforced existing structural and social hierarchies. This is not surprising, as the rulings of 
Irrigation Act 1931 which were followed to constitute sinchai panchayats did not envisage any 
change in the village status quo by design in terms of confronting/altering existing power centres. 
The impact of this on management efforts by farmer organization is discussed in the following 
section. The next section analyzes how these first generation farmer organizations performed by 
analyzing the functioning and ideational effect of introducing farmer organizations in the two 
selected case study sites.  
7.2 Perception of farmers & farmer organizations’ and their relation with 
bureaucracy  
The main aim of constituting farmer organizations was to institute greater ethos of participation 
amongst farmers or in other words to involve farmers in management of canal network. The raison 
d’être for involving farmers in management of canal networks at the macro (international, national 
and state) level was elucidated in chapter two, four and five. Here, however, the focus is on arguing 
how the idea of farmer involvement for irrigation management that gained salience in policy 
directives, still did not alter the existing irrigation practices. Moreover, these farmer organizations 
could not fulfil their desired functions, and in this context ideational explication lucidly demonstrates 
how such reform processes can be side-lined/derailed. 
7.2.1 Nominal participation of members and/or farmers in farmer organization 
given lack of financial autonomy  
Participation of users in functioning of farmer organizations can be gauged from the experiences and 
reflections of members of farmer organizations. For instance, Bhagwan Singh a large land holding 
farmer (26.30 hectares), and one of the elected members of the Betwa sinchai panchayat recalls the 
main work of the sinchai panchayat, as assisting in operation and maintenance of network of canals 
and distribution of water within the Betwa panchayat. Further, reflecting on functions that sinchai 
panchayat performed, he posits:  
“Sinchai panchayats did not receive any financial resources, to ensure that work was 
done. The sinchai panchayats did not have any power, and the irrigation department did 
most of the work… vasooli (collection of irrigation fee) was the job of sinchai panchayat 
president” (Interview, December 10, 2011). 
Interestingly, collecting irrigation fee was one of the main responsibility of sinchai panchayat 
according to the Irrigation Act 1931, apart from providing assistance to irrigation officials in ensuring 
smooth operation of canals (c.f. GoMP, 1931, section 62 (2)). However, Bhagwan Singh posits that 
vasooli was not the responsibility of sinchai panchayat members, rather just the Betwa sinchai 
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panchayat president’s, which is indicative of his partial knowledge about one of the key role and 
function of sinchai panchayat. On the other hand, Samar Malik (president Betwa sinchai panchayat) 
reflecting on his tenure posits that collecting irrigation fee was a murky business. To elaborate: 
“I was provided a list (of name) of farmers along with their irrigation dues to the state, 
and a receipt book. The irrigation dues were calculated by amin (accountant/ person 
responsible for revenue collection) by undertaking a survey of farmer fields. I did not 
want to be involved in collection of irrigation fee, as I did not want any burai (acrimony) 
unnecessarily. I was aware that amin’s do not accurately report actual area irrigated and 
dues that ought to be collected. They under and/or over report area irrigated from the 
canal water (…) Burai happens because if the patwari (another term for amin) was doing 
the collection himself then they make money on one hand; and on the other hand 
farmers also pay lesser irrigation fee. Let me explain that…for instance, patwari may 
calculate INR 2500 as the irrigation fee. A farmer generally negotiates and would agree 
to pay INR 2000. Patwari however will agree to take INR 2000 but will give receipt for 
only INR 1200. This whole mechanism of collecting irrigation fee was win-win for both 
patwari and farmer. If I would have intervened and asked farmers to pay their rightful 
dues then farmers would be upset with me and would not have appreciated my action. 
So I decided why should I get burai and get involved in this process of collecting irrigation 
revenue” (Samar Malik, December 9, 2011). 
From the above citation, it becomes evident that Samar Malik decided unilaterally that Betwa sinchai 
panchayat would not assist WRD officials in collecting irrigation revenue without consulting the 
sinchai panchayat members. Further, from the aforementioned two instances, it also becomes 
evident that there was no (extensive) discussion, on the role of sinchai panchayat president or its 
members prior to formation of the sinchai panchayat. For Bhagwan Singh it is a given that sinchai 
panchayat members were not responsible for collection of irrigation fee and thus non collection of 
irrigation revenue was a lived and accepted reality for Betwa sinchai panchayat members in general.  
It is also noteworthy, that Bhagwan Singh, though uneducated, is not an ignorant farmer. Rather he 
is well respected, and is considered as one of the progressive and knowledgeable farmers of this 
region. A brief profile of Bhagwan Singh is presented in Box 7.2. 
 
Box 7. 2: Bhagwan Singh - a progressive farmer  
In Saronj one of the villages that is on the tail end of the RBC, Bhagwan Singh who is more than ninety years old 
reminisces about the era gone by, while narrating his experiences of irrigation management in this region. 
Bhagwan Singh is from upper caste; he is a Rajput, which is one of the predominant landholding groups in this 
region. Bhagwan Singh is an illiterate but progressive farmer and very well respected not only in Saronj but also 
in the nearby villages, and has been practicing agriculture for more than six decades. Bhagwan Singh along with 
his brother and another peer (Ram Singh Jat and Param Singh Jat) were the first ones to start irrigation in this 
region before Halali dam was even planned in this region. Bhagwan Singh was also member of Betwa sinchai 
panchayat, and also part of the outlet committees that were formed by WAMLI in Saronj.   
Bhagwan Singh’s eyes shine when he starts talking about the 1950s when India had just gained independence,  
and the Indian state under the aegis of Prime Minister Nehru, who had organized Bharat darshan (tour of 
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India) for farmers who were willing to pay INR 300 (which was a substantial amount during the 1950s.). 
Bhagwan Singh participated in this tour, and visited sites across India, including the Bhakra Nangal Dam. 
Bhagwan Singh recalls his experience with great enthusiasm and also fills in that he along with 500 other 
farmers were deeply disappointed when they were informed that Pandit Nehru (referring to Prime Minister 
Nehru) could not meet them due to an unscheduled meeting at the end of the tour. Reacting to this, Bhagwan 
Singh told his Block Development Officer (BDO) that he plans to organize a hunger strike (along with other 
farmers) to solicit a meeting with Nehru. Their insistence led to Nehru sparing three minutes for agitating 
farmers. For Bhagwan Singh, those three minutes meant a lot, as it defined his life, and his enthusiasm, to 
pursue new endeavours. Furthermore, the Bharat darshan elevated his stature in Saronj and nearby villages, as 
people appreciated what he had to say, as he had seen the world (i.e. travelled far and wide) and was privy to 
information/knowledge, which others in the village did not have. Bhagwan Singh considers this as one of the 
foremost reason for him being nominated as a member of Betwa sinchai panchayat. Further, he considers 
himself to be honest, and posits that in earlier times honesty was a virtue and only honest individuals were 
selected, sadly that is not the case anymore.  
Bhagwan Singh has a keen thirst for knowledge and motivation to do things differently. Remembering his 
experiences, he posits that he was an avid listener when any government official came to the village with new 
information about various government schemes; he tried to make the most of the information he received. 
Thus, it is not surprising that he was (also) very popular with government officials and they contacted him 
regarding new schemes, etc. Bhagwan Singh says with great pride, ‘we adopted all the schemes that the 
government came out with. Village Saronj has been productive since the beginning’.  
Bhagwan Singh (along with few more farmers) is considered a pioneer in this region for trying new agricultural 
practices. He, along with about 20 more farmer of this region, had formed a joint farming society, of which he 
was the chairman. The group of farmers purchased about 40.46 hectares of land in late 1960s close to the 
highway and they jointly practiced new crops like sugarcane (which was not being grown in the area) through 
piped water irrigation. Given that he was part of joint farming society, he ran for elections for the post of public 
representative for the district cooperative banks for three terms from 1972-1984.  
Bhagwan Singh was also part of the local natak mandali (drama) in his village, and was famous in his youth for 
doing a special dance with sticks and mare, and for organizing educative plays in Saronj, and nearby areas. 
Reminiscing about the era gone by and to explicate the essence of development/progress that they propagated 
through their natak mandli, during the interview, Bhagwan Singh breaks out into a song that he used to sing to 
bring awareness in Saronj and nearby areas. 
 
Echoes in the wind sing along, this is a popular song…. 
Panchayati raj (decentralization) is ours… 
There shall be no filth or dirt…neither in our house nor in our hearth 
Clean shall be our homes…with sparkling walls 
There shall no more be a muddle to slow our gait…paved shall be our roads 
There shall be no more darkness, no fear no fright 
We shall light up lamps…keep our streets alive until late in the night 
Panchayati raj (decentralization) is ours… 
 
Our decisions small and big… shall be ours 
We shall resolve small issues, through panchayats 
We shall be empowered to solve our own feud  
We shall not have to petition in courts  
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Panchayati raj (decentralization) is ours… 
 
Awake; rejoice…painted black will be the face of the corrupt 
Panchayati raj (decentralization) is ours… 
 
Source: Interview with Bhagwan Singh, December 10, 2011  
From Box 7.2, it is evident that Bhagwan Singh operated under the normative realm of what ought to 
be the development of Saronj and nearby areas, as elucidated through his song on panchayati raj 
(decentralization). Bhagwan Singh also through his natak mandali (drama) in villages was initiating a 
deliberative discussion on need for bottom up decision-making. However, contrastingly Bhagwan 
Singh does not view his role in functioning of Betwa sinchai panchayat, as there were no discussions 
that were held in the villages prior to constitution of these committees about its functioning. 
Moreover, from Bhagwan Singh and Samar Malik’s interview it is evident that honesty and 
transparency were considered important ideals for development and management of resources. 
Given, that the processes were not ideal, the Betwa sinchai panchayat president and member 
decided to not participate in sinchai panchayats activity. Moreover, from the above discussion it is 
apparent that Bhagwan Singh had an idealistic understanding/belief of participation which the lyrics 
of the song elucidate (see Box 7.2) which ought to result in corrupt, clean, and empowered rural 
public. 
Additionally, user’s participation at that time was restricted to active farmers’ of this region. For 
instance, Maharaj Singh Jat argues: 
“I was identified as an active farmer of this region, I was ahead of other farmers and 
officials from block, or agricultural department always used to approach me. As they 
knew I was one step ahead of others, in terms of method of practicing agriculture. 
Several times, my agricultural fields were used as demonstration sites for other farmers 
so that they could see and adopt new practices” (Interview, December 11, 2011).  
Given, that member of farmer organizations’ were not completely involved in its functioning during 
this period, participation of user’s i.e. farmers was even lesser, as during this period no meetings 
were held of either the sinchai panchayat or the Betwa Krishak Samiti, where farmers could discuss 
their grievances with sinchai panchayat president or its members. In case of any 
conflict/disagreement over water, farmers used to approach mostly the irrigation department 
officials or staff for grievance redressal (Field Notes, December 2011). Given, lack of discussion about 
constitution of these committees at the local level prior to constituting them, farmers believed that 
irrigation department officials held the power to resolve their grievances, and rightly so. As was 
discussed in this section, the farmer organizations were mostly envisaged as assistants to irrigation 
officials and had no decision-making power. Sinchai panchayat presidents’, however, noted that in 
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few cases farmers did approach them for grievance redressal. Some of the problems with which 
farmers of Betwa and Saraswati sinchai panchayats’ approached their president during this time 
were related to timely availability of water, farmers obstructing minors that led to overflow of water 
into close-by farmer fields, need to get adequate water, improving the system by putting pipes in 
outlets in required spots (Interview, December 19, 2011). The sinchai panchayat presidents’ then 
contacted the irrigation engineers about these issues to get them resolved. Thus, the ultimate 
authority due to structural design of farmer organizations was with the irrigation department, and 
farmers were aware of it as well that sinchai panchayat presidents’ or the Krishak Samiti president 
were merely middlemen with no benefit or power but a list of responsibilities. 
Interestingly, a unique instance, of bottom-up organization of farmer groups for management of 
irrigation water over one outlet happened in Saronj in the mid-1980s, and the same is elaborated in 
Box 7.3. 
 
Box 7. 3: Case of bottom-up crafting of farmer organization for management of water 
In Saronj, in the mid-1980s, a group of farmers started warabandi (of sort) on one outlet from the distributory 
of the RBC. A group of 15-20 farmers came together, at the behest of Bhagwan Singh of Saronj and made their 
own rules for water distribution. Bhagwan Singh is a well-known and respected farmer of Saronj, who other 
farmers listened to (see Box 7.2). The farmer’s collective made a system where they used to draw out names 
through a blind token system to decide who would draw water first from the water course channel. All the 
farmers in the chak cooperated and adhered to this token system. The warabandi was not in terms of fixing 
time for availing irrigation water. Rather in terms of turn to take irrigation water. 
The initiation of cooperation amongst farmers’ here was not at the behest of any external actor. Rather, 
farmers between themselves agreed on this innovative system, as there were several instances of conflicts 
over who would access water first. This token system was initiated in 1984-1985 and lasted for roughly five 
years after which this system collapsed and farmers returned to their old system wherein those who were on 
the head reach of the outlet received water first. Farmers of Saronj were not able to give a clear response of 
why the system collapsed, however, what is now known is that during this time sinchai panchayats were being 
made in this region and WALMI’s action research programme also started, which focused on Saronj. Few 
farmers insinuated that new organizations, outlet committees were being set by the department, which 
resulted in slowly fading away (collapse) of this particular outlet committee.  
Source: Bhagwan Singh, Narendra Singh and Mahesh Singh Jat (Interview, December 10, 2011) 
This bottom-up crafted samiti (committee) performed well, until new committees were introduced in 
the region by design through state ruling and which ultimately led to demise of this organically 
created institutional arrangement for irrigation management by farmers. The committee was 
constituted through deliberative discussion at the local level by farmers themselves and thus they 
took interest in its functioning (rotational water supply) and used to resolve conflicts within 
themselves. This committee was an instance of Gandhian idea of village republic.  
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7.2.2 Awareness about roles/responsibilities, and functioning of farmer 
organization  
Most of the Betwa sinchai panchayat members were not aware of their roles and responsibilities 
with respect to functioning of sinchai panchayat. In fact they posit that they did not undertake any 
work in their position as members of sinchai panchayat. As a result, functioning of Betwa sinchai 
panchayat was restricted to sinchai panchayat president and the panchayat members did not play 
any role. Further, elaborating on the functioning of Betwa sinchai panchayat, Samar Malik, the 
president elaborates: 
“I restricted my work to supervision of the canal system. Farmers used to come to me to 
inform me about problems that they face with respect to accessing irrigation water and I 
used to pass on this information to the officials from the irrigation department. 
Additionally, in my role as sinchai panchayat president I did not do any paperwork for the 
organization, apart from giving complaints in writing to the irrigation department.  
I had good relations with officials (…). Sinchai panchayat members did not have any 
contact with officials from irrigation department. They also did not have any power. The 
sinchai panchayat had no meetings during this time” (Interview, December 9, 2011). 
The above citation demonstrates that the Betwa sinchai panchayat president did not involve other 
panchayat members in quotidian management of affairs. The president undertook the work that was 
envisaged for him, that is assisting the irrigation officials in supervision of canals, or in informing the 
officials about water related disputes.  
Juxtaposing findings from Betwa sinchai panchayat with Saraswati sinchai panchayat, however, does 
provide some variation in responses. The president of Saraswati sinchai panchayat, Abhay Singh 
Maina collected irrigation fee, which is in sharp contrast to Betwa sinchai panchayat, whose 
president Samar Malik refused to collect irrigation fee. Thus did not undertake one of the important 
roles of the sinchai panchayat as envisaged in the Irrigation Act of 1931. To elaborate:  
“I used to collect irrigation fee from farmers under Saraswati sinchai panchayat and hand 
over the collected money to irrigation department every Saturday. I collected the 
irrigation fee during the irrigation season. During summers, farmers were notified to 
come to the local town haat (market) and they paid the fee directly to the amin (person 
responsible to collect irrigation revenue) on the notified day and time. I also used to be 
present during the time of collection of irrigation revenue at the haat.  
With the help of chowkidaar (watchman), I notified all villagers that I will collect 
irrigation fee at a particular time and venue, and farmers used to come and pay their 
irrigation dues. Sometimes farmers did not have money and asked for time to pay the fee 
later at the town haat. For collecting irrigation fee, I received an honorarium, which was 
2 per cent of the irrigation fee collected. I collected in total between INR 0.1-0.15 million. 
The transportation cost of collecting the irrigation fee was quite high for me. 
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Additionally, in some villages, I had to take my tractor, as these villages were not 
accessible by motorcycle.  
I stopped collecting the irrigation fee, as I was spending (in terms of time and money) 
more than I was receiving. (…) I used to spend a lot of time in collection. Once, the 
officials’ left me close to Karonj village with INR 15000, and said that I can return to my 
village from Karonj on my own. I told them that it is late in the night, and if someone 
comes with a stick to steal the money, what will I do. I asked them to drop me closer to 
my village, but they refused and said that they had to go back to Bhopal and they were 
getting late. My village was about six kilometres from Karonj. I stopped doing recovery of 
irrigation revenue after this incident. I was alone and these three officials from the 
department who were in a jeep did not bother to drop me back to my village. I was 
carrying INR 15000, which was large amount in those days and I was very scared (…). 
Moreover, I thought, why should I follow someone orders, the engineers were doing their 
work, as orders for constitution and implementation of sinchai panchayat had come from 
the top” (Interview, December 6, 2011). 
It becomes evident from the above citation that in Saraswati sinchai panchayat, irrigation revenue 
recovery by the president happened for approximately a year. The sinchai panchayat members were 
not involved in collection of revenue recovery in this case as well, and the president (Abhay Singh 
Maina) did revenue recovery on his own. The president argues that the sinchai panchayat members 
did not aid in collection of revenue, as they were not getting any financial benefit (ibid.). Though, this 
is not true, as the regulations under the Irrigation Act 1931 elucidated that the benefits from the 
revenue recovery ought to be shared equally between the sinchai panchayat members. From the 
discussion, it can be safely concluded that the sinchai panchayat presidents’ did not want to share 
responsibility with the sinchai panchayat members, as the financial and social (in terms of status) 
gains would have to be shared. Here, importance that the sinchai panchayat president gave to state 
structure becomes salient, as he perceived the post of president alleviated his status in the village 
and thus, in both the sinchai panchayats the presidents’ did not want to share role and responsibility 
with other members.  
Additionally, from the above lengthy discussion it is evident that the ideational realm of the sinchai 
panchayats members was shaped by how the junior level bureaucracy related/interacted with 
farmer organizations. To recall, Abhay Singh Maina was selected as president as he enjoyed political 
patronage and support of the intermediate level bureaucracy. However, the above-narrated 
encounter of the sinchai panchayats president with junior bureaucracy led him weighing and shaping 
his worldview that it was not worthwhile to collect the irrigation fee anymore.   
Furthermore, apart from assisting the irrigation department officials in irrigation works, other 
responsibilities assigned to the sinchai panchayat sarpanch (president) were: 
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“Irrigation panchayat may maintain the account of income and expenditure of the 
panchayat… which shall be shall be checked by a Canal Officer, Irrigation Inspector or 
section subordinate (…) An irrigation panchayat shall maintain the following books and 
papers: (i) Panchayat fund account book in Form, 16; (ii) Counterfoil receipt book in 
Form, 17; (iii) Proceedings book in Form, 15; (Iv) Correspondence and notices issued by 
the panchayat (GoMP, 1975, Section 62, Rule No. 167, 168, 169)” 
The above citation elucidates a lot of paperwork, procedural functions that ought to be performed by 
the sinchai panchayat president. However, sinchai panchayat presidents did not undertake these 
administrative tasks; in fact during the interview the respondents did not mention this as one of the 
functions of the sinchai panchayats. The above discussion discerns the beliefs that first generation 
leaders functioned under, which led to sinchai panchayats not collecting irrigation revenue, for 
instance. Overall, formation of intesubjecitve belief (understanding) of farmers in the region about 
roles and responsibilities about the sinchai panchayats become evident.  
SAS Krishak Samiti was constituted about half a decade later, but the functioning of this committee 
was also similar to sinchai panchayats. The main functions that the Krishak Samiti was envisaged to 
perform were:  
“i) facilitate distribution of irrigation water through pipes or other means in the 
command area; ii) create awareness about improved agricultural and irrigation 
practices; facilitate water distribution and selection of crops in the command area; 
organize training programmes for members of the samiti on better agricultural 
production techniques; undertake regional developmental work” (SAS Krishak Samiti, 
1995). 
However, Krishak Samiti like sinchai panchayats did not have any meetings. Mehtab Patel, president 
of the committee during his interview pointed out that ‘meetings were a formality. We all knew each 
other; we had no facilities, why would people come for meeting when there were no incentives, not 
even chai nashta (refreshments- signifier of hospitality and respect)’ (Mehtab Patel, September 30, 
2011). Also, there wasn’t much involvement of members in committee’s functioning or of farmers. 
Reflecting on the functioning of the Krishak Samiti, Mehtab Patel posits: 
“We were not given any work, so there were no tangible results that the Krishak Samiti 
performed. We did not have any financial autonomy. We were given in total about INR 
0.25 million in the committee fund. But we could spend only the interest that we earned 
on the principal amount for day-to-day functioning of the samiti. So we could buy 
furniture, supplies for our office in the sinchai (irrigation) colony, spend on any travel 
done related to matters of irrigation or to meet the irrigation department officials (…) 
the money given to us was of no importance, for instance, we could not make a road on 
the canal if we wanted to, we were just caretakers and had money in the account but we 
could not use it (…) we lost interest in doing any work for the samiti with time (…) Our 
work was to give suggestions to officials about water. We had ensured that water 
reaches everyone in the tail end of our minor” (Interview September 30, 2011, emphasis 
added). 
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From the above citation, it is evident that the president of Krishak Samiti perceives that Krishak 
Samiti was not delegated any functions and their role was of a caretaker with no power given to 
undertake work. The role of Krishak Samiti members as per the byelaws was also restricted to 
‘facilitating’ distribution of water, selection of crops; creating awareness and organizing training 
programmes (SAS Krishak Samiti, 1995). Thus, the farmers read/perceived the situation correctly, 
and were aware that they had no power and were mere assistants to the irrigation officials. The 
Krishak Samiti president posits that there has been money in the account, but they never had 
legitimate authority or power to use this money (Interview September 30, 2011), thereby 
questioning the relevance of constituting the samiti. The structural constraint (role of samiti 
members as facilitators) that was introduced in the organizational design restricted participation of 
farmers. From the above discussion lack of legitimacy of first generation farmer organizations in the 
mind-set of members due to limited devolution of funds and functions (an institutional problem), led 
to shaping their ideational landscape, which further restricted their participation.  
A contrasting viewpoint on functioning of Krishak Samiti is provided by a senior WRD official: 
“One of the reasons for Krishak Samiti to lay defunct was lack of clarity on committee’s 
roles and responsibility. Another reason for it being defunct was internal strife between 
members of the committee. There were differences between Rakesh Tiwary of 
Radhakheri who was the cashier and other members of the committee from Karamkheri 
like the samiti president Mehtab Patel. Internal differences of the committee members 
made the functioning of the committee very difficult” (Interview, December 16, 2012).  
To elaborate, Radhakheri is situated further downstream of Karamkheri and is a small habitation of 
mostly SC population, with few Brahmin households like Rakesh Tiwary’s and few patel households 
(related to patels of Karamkheri). The patels of Karamkheri are supporters of Congress party while 
Rakesh Tiwary supports BJP and was an active karyakarta (party worker) and known to browbeat to 
get what he wanted in his youth. The two factions had differences over accessing water. Moreover, 
Radhakheri being the last village on the tail minor started receiving water only post 1990s after the 
entire network of canal system was completed.xcv Even then, the availability of water was contingent 
on farmers upstream not obstructing the canal, so for few years Rakesh Tiwary used his might to 
ensure access to water for all farmers of Radhakheri, this resulted in arguments between Karamkheri 
and Radhakheri farmers (Field notes, January 2011; Rakesh Tiwary, December 20, 2012). 
Consequently, the Krishak Samiti lay defunct. Overall, the reason for Krishak Samiti being defunct is 
structural (that is not being delegated role and responsibility and merely directed to facilitate) as well 
as cultural that is lack of cooperation between farmers due to inherent categorical inequalities like 
caste, affiliations with different political parties, and/or personal rivalries. From the above discussion 
the ideational landscape that shaped the ideational realm of bureaucracy is lucid. The junior 
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bureaucracy did not perceive limited devolution of funds, functions or functionaries as a problem. 
Rather, they perceived the problem lay with ‘cognitive pattern’xcvi of farmers which was shaped by 
the local social structure. This resulted in conflicts and concomitantly poor functioning of Krishak 
Samiti.  
Few aspects that become evident from the above interviews is the importance of social structure in 
providing a higher playing field to the already empowered sections, this was evident from the 
selection procedure of the sinchai panchayat and the Betwa Krishak Samiti. In case of sinchai 
panchayat the Irrigation Act provided an opportunity for sinchai panchayats to charter their own 
course within the mandate given to them. The sinchai panchayat presidents took this as an 
opportunity and exercised their influence agency in different ways: for instance, by choosing to 
collect or not to collect irrigation dues. Farmer organizations mansikta was influenced by their 
worldview, which was populated by their beliefs, values, and normative assumptions about the 
situation: i) the socio-political, and caste cleavages in which they were embedded in, ii) friendly 
relation with local politicians. The state structural ruling further empowered and enabled this 
decision as it provided greater legitimacy to them. The two presidents of the sinchai panchayat 
reacted differently basing their decision on how they will be perceived in the region. For instance, 
the Betwa sinchai panchayat president based his prior knowledge and impression of functioning of 
the irrigation system (and collection of irrigation revenue) on the first ten years of project life that he 
had witnessed. Samar Malik deduced that corruption in irrigation systems is structural and cannot be 
changed as the farmers were also benefitting from this practice. To elaborate, given that Samar Malik 
had travelled extensively and lived outside the village for few years, he internalized his experience 
and his perception of how things functioned as an outcome of his lived reality in the village (as an 
educated medium land holder) and that of studying and working outside. Moreover, being a lawyer 
and having practiced law for few years, before he moved back to the village, he perceived corruption 
as a structural given as part of state society interaction based on his lived experience.xcvii Additionally, 
Samar Malik did not want to take any action to curb this practice, as he did not want any burai 
(acrimony) from the community, more so, because he was from the minority Muslim community in 
the village. Thus, Samar Malik refused to collect irrigation fee on behalf of the irrigation department 
when he was made the sinchai panchayat president, as he was too deeply embedded in the socio-
cultural setting and did not want to take a decision that could alter his social ties within the 
community. Thus, refusing to participate in functioning of Betwa sinchai panchayat despite being the 
president signifies Samar Malik’s dissent with the prevalent way of functioning and also reflects his 
view on participation. He perceived that he could not make any change in the existing modus 
operandi by participating in the functioning of farmer organization.  
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Abhay Singh Maina the president of Saraswati sinchai panchayat on the other hand worked 
differently through his tenure as president. Abhay Singh Maina is not educated but was politically 
active during his youth, and used to be part of local Congress Party rallies. He was a low level 
karyakarta (party worker) and had political ambitions. He became the sinchai panchayat president 
when he turned 35 years and his selection as sinchai panchayat president is questioned in the sinchai 
panchayat villages even today when this issue is broached, as nomination for his name came directly 
from the irrigation minister’s office. Abhay Singh Maina followed a more instrumental approach 
(initially). He took upon the opportunity of sinchai panchayat president with great enthusiasm and 
performed devolved functions including collection of irrigation fee. However, after a year he re-
evaluated his position and the work he had done and deduced that the benefits that he was receiving 
were lesser than the cost in terms of time and resources spent in travelling. Thus, the ideational 
realm of Abhay Singh Maina altered with time, based on his experience of working with junior 
bureaucracy and his own assessment of benefits from his social status as sinchai panchayat 
president. To elaborate, the sinchai panchayat president perceived that the officials were not very 
cooperative and open to (institutional) change i.e. increasing role of farmers in irrigation 
management. Therefore, he decided not to collect irrigation fee in later years of his presidency.  
In addition, in case of both the sinchai panchayats, the panchayat presidents’ did not work towards 
making the functioning of panchayat inclusive. The presidents’ of these farmer organizations 
perceived the post of president as an exclusive position of elevated status, and they did not want to 
share responsibility (or even information) with other members of these farmer organizations.  
7.2.3 Principles that guided farmer ideational realm to access water for irrigation 
There was no organized system of water distribution since the beginning in the SAS Project. The 
canals were operated on a continuous basis and full supply level was maintained by means of cross 
regulation method (Puranik, 1997, p. 140).xcviii The department practiced osrabandixcix and regulated 
water supply to ensure that the network of canal structures do not break given the earthen system. 
Thus, farmers like Bhagwan Singh perceived and rightly elaborate that farmers upstream availed the 
canal waters first and once their requirement was fulfilled the downstream farmers received canal 
water (Interview, December 19, 2011). Social status i.e. caste and social class did not play a role in 
accessing water. Explicating why the guidelinesc for irrigation management were not followed, 
president of Saraswati sinchai panchayat posits: 
“We were given rules by the officials on how to manage water, but who was going to 
follow rules? At that time, the samiti (committee/sinchai panchayat) was new, and 
farmers had no idea about irrigation or its management, as in how much water is 
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required for a crop, where should culverts be made, etc. Additionally, this was also the 
period, when the earthen canals were still new and thus not settled, so there were 
problems of seepage, breakage, etc. in the canal network” (Interview, December 6, 
2011). 
The sinchai panchayat president in the above citation is referring to long list of Irrigation Rules of 
1974 that were handed over to sinchai panchayats which outlined acceptable irrigation norms and 
behaviour, irrigation offences, need to practice warabandi, how field channels ought to be 
constructed, conflict resolution by sinchai panchayat president with amin, etc. (GoMP, 1975).ci 
However, as discussed, sinchai panchayat members were not aware about their roles and 
responsibilities, and there was no initiative taken by the department to create awareness either. For 
instance, in the 1990s, several farmers reported that there were instances of conflict for accessing 
canal water for irrigation. Maharaj Singh Jat narrates that upstream farmers like (Rakesh Sharma 
from Amla) used to put obstructions in the canal to stop the flow of water; there was no system for 
water management from the side of the government as well. When we went to the irrigation officials 
(overseer/engineer) to complain nothing happened. As the upstream patels used to bribe (INR 100) 
the overseer and tell the chowkidaar (watchman) to let the patels (traditional authority) take water 
first (Interview, December 19, 2011). Interestingly, Maharaj Singh Jat is also from a patel family, and 
has 31.1 hectares of land, which he has now redistributed amongst his children. Maharaj Singh is 
from Saronj village but for the last few years he has been living in Vidisha town. He lives in two-
storey house and owns a high-end luxury sport utility vehicle. While narrating this conflict with 
upstream farmers, Maharaj Singh Jat posits: 
“I did not have to bribe to access water. People were scared of me! I knew access to 
water is my right; I used to collect 8-10 farmers and get water through might. If I had to 
complain I used to go to the local MLA (Ram Prakash) with whom I had good relations 
with; and he could not overlook what I said. I remember when I went to him and 
complained about upstream farmers he scolded irrigation officials and explained 
upstream farmers that downstream farmers also have the right to water.  
Farmers were totally dependent on officials and reported to them on any problems they 
had with the canal network. They used to approach officials for any maintenance work 
that had to be carried out (…) Earlier work was done by drafting of muster roll, however, 
not even 10 per cent of the work was done compared to the labour that was enumerated 
in the muster roll. Making fake muster roll had become a profession for these officials, 
but no one said anything. Farmers considered officials as godly figures who were revered 
and were considered malik (master)” (Interview, December 19, 2011). 
Dharam Singh Maina of Sadhai, who is a Congress karyakarta (party worker) and till a decade ago 
used to supervise the operation and maintenance work of the canals before WUA elections were 
held, makes a similar observation based on his experiencecii: 
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“The operation and maintenance work was completed in 15 days after the monsoons 
(…). During pre-WUA time, officials from the irrigation department used to make fake 
muster rolls and show more work being done, than in actuality. They were corrupt and 
usurped money” (Interview, February 11, 2012). 
Kamlesh Narayan Sharma from Saraswati village used to do labour work on the canals when 
operation and maintenance work was carried out post-monsoons. He also corroborated that the 
department officials falsified the muster roll for operation and maintenance work done, to avail 
financial benefits (Interview, January 21, 2012).  
The above citations illustrate the prevalent principles for irrigation in the SAS region: first, farmers 
who had muscle power claim their right to water, to wit, the unwritten rule ‘might is right’ applies for 
accessing water for irrigation. Second, upstream farmers claimed their right to water/irrigation first 
notwithstanding the plight of farmers downstream. Hence, farmer’s access to water was in relation 
to the location of their fields, rather than caste or social status. Third, networks were important, for 
instance farmers like Maharaj Singh Jat do not hesitate to flaunt their political connections and 
thereby highlight salience of networks in securing access to water. Fourth, the corrupt practices 
pursued by the irrigation officials, by falsifying the muster rolls. Thus, farmer ideational realm was 
populated by these factors which determined how they perceived access to water and the strategies 
that they undertook to ensure access to water. Moreover, class differentiation also inherently 
determined access in case of farmers who enjoyed strong political connections and used their 
political cleavage to ensure access to water. The above discussion also elucidates how people’s 
beliefs gained intersubjective understanding and became an acceptable norm for agricultural water 
use in the area. 
Additionally, the above citations highlight the influence of state structure in irrigation management. 
The bureaucracy was aware during this period that constitution of sinchai panchayat or Krishak 
Samiti was for tokenism (given limited devolution of funds, functions and functionaries) and they did 
not make any effort to empower these organizations by disseminating information to the sinchai 
panchayat members or the Krishak Samiti members about their roles and responsibilities.  
7.2.4 Perception and relation with bureaucracy 
To recall from the discussion in chapter five, role of street level bureaucracy (see also Lipsky, 2010) or 
what is referred to in this work as junior bureaucracy is critical to ponder, especially in a government 
initiated PIM project. This section thus focuses on elaborating the relationship between farmers and 
bureaucracy. 
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Relationship of farmers and farmer organizations’ with officials from the irrigation department 
becomes evident from the following assertions of farmers and members of farmer organizations’: 
“Officials did not listen to us then; they were not available at site when required. In case 
of any dispute, farmers used to resolve conflict on their own. We did not get any support 
from officials (…). Water distribution is in the hands of patwari (person responsible for 
collecting revenue) and sub engineers; they used to decide how much water we could 
get” (Abhay Singh Maina, December 6, 2011). 
“The officials were not happy with constitution of sinchai panchayats, it lowered their 
status and necessitated that they come down and talk to us. At that time, sinchai 
panchayat were newly constituted and the irrigation officials did minimal work to comply 
with orders” (Abhay Singh Maina, December 6, 2011). 
“Farmers are not that big landholders in Saronj compared to other villages close by. But 
they have been aware since the beginning. We had connections with department people 
so we knew how to get work done (…) Earlier department’s thinking was also different, 
they believed that farmers cannot get work done on their own, for instance, the 
aqueduct close to Saronj village had been dysfunctional for many years. Officials knew 
that farmers couldn’t get this work done on their own (…). How will they (referring to 
farmers) get it done, it’s not possible for them” (Mahesh Singh Jat, December 10, 2011). 
“Ours was a powerful samiti; officials listened to us and did our work, as the chief 
minister made our Krishak Samiti. We had political support (…). The officials had all the 
power… if there was, for instance, any seepage or breakage in the canals then they were 
responsible, we could not do anything, we had no power (…). We had good relations with 
officials, we had to, as we are on the tail end, we can (only) request them to increase or 
decrease water. We also had support from officials as our samiti was constituted at the 
behest of the chief minister” (Mehtab Patel, September 30, 2011).  
Few aspects that become evident from the above citations are that the relationship between farmers 
and bureaucracy was clearly an unequal one. Although participatory norm, that was discussed at the 
national and state level in policy narratives envisaged greater participation and coordination 
between farmers and bureaucrats. To recall, in the 1980s, at the national level, it was argued that 
problem with large scale irrigation projects was at the outlet level, and thus the first generation 
farmer organization like the ones discussed here were formed without disturbing the status quo i.e. 
the department’s way of functioning or delving into management aspects at the intermediate level 
(c.f. Bottrall, 1992; Chambers, 1988). The perceived inequality in position between the department 
officials and farmer organizations presidents’ is evident from Mehtab Patel’s comment that they only 
could request the officials to increase/decrease water. 
Interview with officials from irrigation department and WALMI, brought forth several other reasons 
for farmer organizations not functioning well in the 1980s and the 1990s. For instance, a senior 
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official from irrigation department who was involved with assisting WALMI in the Action Research 
Programme argues that farmer organizations were not successful in SAS Project region due to the 
socio-cultural and political cleavages within villages. To elaborate, given that one of the focuses of 
the irrigation department was water management, and to pursue this endeavour the department 
had directed its efforts to rationalize number of outlets, to wit, reduce the number of (un)authorized 
outlets on the canal and form outlet committee to ensure proper water management in the early 
1990s. In order to rationalize outlets, the department functionaries and WALMI worked to bring 
together select farmers from Saronj, Sadhai and Betwa villages and solicited their cooperation to 
forgo availing water from unauthorized outlets. The department functionaries were successful to an 
extent and were able to broker consensus between farmers of two tail end villages - Saronj and 
Sadhai. However they were not able solicit cooperation for reducing outlets from few upstream 
farmers from Betwa village. These farmers refused to let go of their outlets because of personal 
conflicts between the downstream villages, and thus did not want to cooperate (Interview, 
December 16, 2011). The department officials could not do anything, because these farmers were 
networked with local politicians. Citing this instance, the senior official from WRD believes that part 
of the reason for defunct farmer organizations were the existing socio-cultural and political reality of 
the village and the local leadership.  
“Farmer organizations were functional in villages where the president was active. In the 
1980s, village patels (traditional authority) were given lot of respect and their words 
were adhered to. The villages were organized and worked under this customary village 
leadership system. All major decisions were made by the village patel. They used to 
regulate information and people used to respect his word, does not matter if it was 
correct or not. So, the sinchai panchayat that were made, functioned limitedly and 
participation of farmers in these committees was restricted” (Interview, December 16, 
2011). 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the irrigation department engineer puts the onus of 
failure of farmer organization on the disagreement that villagers of Betwa had with villagers of Saronj 
and Sadhai. The irrigation department in this particular instance, followed the regulation of reducing 
unauthorized outlets on the canal, and also directed its efforts to dissipate the conflict, but were not 
successful. The officials perceive that local (village) dynamics resulted in conflict and thus lack of 
cooperation for smooth functioning of farmer organizations. The understanding of this particular 
WRD official is in accord with the narrative that irrigation woes were due to problems below the 
outlet and farmer organization not working well, and has been cited as a primary reason in writings 
related to irrigation management, especially in the 1980s and the 1990s. Chapter four had also 
analyzed this as dominant narrative at the national level through secondary sources. This, however, 
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is a simplistic explanation and does not take into account the ideational realm of bureaucracy and 
needs to be delved deeper. On probing the irrigation official further, he reflected on his tenure in the 
project, and stated that at that juncture the thinking (of people in the department) was different:  
“People did not have understanding on how to implement sinchai panchayat; the state 
did not promote cooperative movement. 
For people to be involved in social cause they need to feel different kind of pressure; they 
need to invest time; otherwise the whole exercise is unfruitful. You just get burai 
(acrimony). You are worried anyway about your home front, and then you will also be 
worried about your work front. People need to have a certain kind of inclination to work, 
but only limited people have that” (Interview, December 16, 2011).  
It becomes evident from the above citation that not everyone in the SAS Project office was 
comfortable with the idea of sharing responsibility with farmer organizations for irrigation 
management. Additionally, the department official elucidates that state expects you to follow certain 
rules and regulations, and as an employee that is what the irrigation department officials were 
supposed to do - follow the organization ruling provided by the irrigation department’s office in 
Bhopal. Moreover, the interventionist developmental state ideology becomes evident from the 
above discussion, as the focus was on implementing policy legislations without taking into account 
the local reality or instituting cooperation among state and society. 
Moreover, the mind-set of irrigation bureaucracy during that period looked at working with farmer 
organizations, as an additional job, as a social cause that needs rectification and required time, and 
resources. This was not what the engineers were trained for, and thus were reluctant to take up this 
responsibility. This is in accord with the discussion on organization culture of bureaucracies in 
chapter four where decision-making is associated with power and masculinity, and socialization of 
generations of engineers had resulted in top-down bureaucratic traditions and a perception of 
superiority. Thus, the language of cooperation and allocating more time and knowledge to create 
awareness amongst farmer organization was not a bureaucratic tradition that officials were familiar 
with. This was also an outcome of the interventionist developmental policy pursued by the state. 
Although, notably an alternative explanation for reluctance is the material interest that the 
bureaucracy had to control the irrigation system (See Wade, 1982). It is acknowledged that part of 
the reason could be that, however, solely material interest does not explain sufficiently the 
reluctance to decentralize, and the ideational landscape and bureaucratic traditions were also key 
influencing factors.  
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To substantiate further, a WALMI faculty familiar with SAS Project and the Action Research 
Programme argues that the reason for sinchai panchayat not working was vested interests of 
political parties, irrigation officials and other powerful leader like farmers in villages. These actors 
changed the dynamics of irrigation organization and given that these organizations were new, were 
not functioning cohesively, and did not have enough awareness about the Irrigation Act or capacities 
to sustain any complexity, they collapsed. As they were primarily one-person samitis i.e. the 
president was the samiti as was discussed in the earlier section and they took decisions unilaterally, 
for instance, collection of irrigation fee. Thus, it appears the interventionist developmental model led 
to pursuance and perpetuation of existing power centres within the village in the first generation 
farmer organizations. The WALMI faculty further elucidates his perception of the socio-cultural 
context in which these samitis were grounded which sheds light on his own ideational realm as well. 
“Sinchai panchayat was a good model in those days as there was harmony among 
people, however, the moment people started realizing that irrigation is a quick way to 
become rich, and irrigation (water) is easy to access as there is no key and lock system 
available in the water canal system (…) and if people wish they can take away the share 
of others as it gives them more benefit (…) people started breaching canals and all 
malpractices happened (…) and irrigation organization and panchayat model became 
defunct” (Interview, August 30, 2011). 
From the above citation it is evident that this WALMI faculty argued that defunct farmer 
organizations were due to problem of self-discipline and organization within farmers. This again 
reeks of the ideology of the developmental interventionist state that aimed to disciple and tutelage 
the infantile citizen. Additionally, farmers were perceived as irrational actors who pursued only self-
interest without any cognizance of the greater benefit of cooperation.  
Overall, bureaucracy put the onus of non-functioning farmer organizations on lack of coordination 
between farmers, and argued that farmers short sightedness (i.e. non-cooperation to avail irrigation 
water first) resulting in defunct farmer organizations in the 1980s and 1990s in the project area. 
Thus, in 1980s as mentioned earlier the problem was perceived as below the outlet, due to 
mismanagement, and farmers taking water out of the turn. The bureaucracy did not delve deeper 
into the problems with the project at the system level, for instance, lack of gates (lock and key 
reference in the above citation), lack of enforcing warabandi as envisaged according to amended 
Irrigation Rules 1974 (GoMP, 1975). Rather, the bureaucracy cited societal and cultural factors as the 
reason for dysfunctional farmer organizations. A collective consensus for defending the existing 
bureaucratic set up (a structural given) becomes evident from the above discussion. Another official 
of WALMI, reflecting on the work that was done in the 1990s by WALMI posits: 
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“We had a very farmer centric approach; however, people from department would not 
even sit with farmers. WALMI started rapport building; we used to have late night 
meetings, and studied the status of water to build trust (…) Earlier only irrigation 
department was involved in water management. We made cross regulators in the 
system, as the department was cash strapped so we did small interventions. We also 
talked about providing water through a line system” (Interview, December 16, 2011).   
From the above citation the perceived inequality in position between farmers and officials becomes 
evident. The bureaucracy did not like mingling with farmers, or even sitting with them. Thus lack of 
willingness to cooperate is also evident. In addition, the reluctance of bureaucrats to work with 
farmers, or go to the field gets accentuated from the fact that the officers of the irrigation 
department were comfortable with undertaking coordination for irrigation management at the 
district level, through district level meetings that were held, for instance, DWUC. However, officer 
visits to field area were limited (WALMI, 1991a, p. 9).  
What becomes evident from the above discussion is that the bureaucracy was functioning in an 
ideational realm similar to that of colonial engineers discussed in chapter four. The officials of the 
irrigation department had a technical mind-set and were interested in only overseeing the work, 
which was legitimized by their roles and responsibilities defined under the Irrigation Act 1931 and 
Irrigation Rules 1974. These were based on the colonial law and did not necessitate any other 
function from them. This finding is in consonance with the discussion with chapter four where I had 
elaborated how post-independence the Indian state continued functioning within the existing 
bureaucratic framework and had adopted rules and regulations and legislations of the colonial state 
(see S. Roy, 2007b). 
Further, initiation of farmer organizations was a decision that had been thrust on them from the top 
and they were not particularly keen on following it through. In the Irrigation Act 1931 there is no 
mention of how irrigation officials are supposed to facilitate formation or strengthening of farmer 
organization. Only lower functionaries like amin (person who collects revenue) were supposed to 
work with sinchai panchayats (GoMP, 1931, 1981). Apart from this, functions that a sinchai 
panchayat president or member are expected to perform are also mentioned in the Act and 
subsequent rules. For instance, according to the Irrigation Rules of 1974, the sinchai panchayats 
could ‘sanction expenditure from the irrigation panchayat fund up to the amount actually in hand for 
any work of public utility in the village that has been approved by the Collector’ (GoMP, 1975, 
Section 62, Rule No. 167, 168, 169). Though, the sinchai panchayat presidents’ did not 
disburse/sanction any fund (Interview, December 6 & 9, 2011). The district collector had the final 
authority to approve/sanction expenditure for sinchai panchayats under the public utility fund 
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category and in majority of cases did not approve any fund to be disbursed under discretion of 
sinchai panchayats. This also illustrates the unwillingness to decentralize the local level by the 
intermediate level authority i.e. the district collector, as they did not want to change the existing 
structural reality or lower their stature, power and authority to manage and distribute agricultural 
water. 
The above discussion summarizes that the bureaucracy did not have an inclination or training to 
involve farmers in irrigation management, as they were aware of the absence of any state structural 
directive that necessitated them to work with farmer organizations. The mandate of farmer 
organizations formed during this period was to assist officials and staff of the irrigation department 
in irrigation management. In fact, decentralization that was envisaged through sinchai panchayats or 
Krishak Samiti was tokenism, as the farmer organizations were not given any decision making power 
and were mere assistants to bureaucracy which they also perceived and hence resisted to 
participate. The officials were not threatened by the newly formed farmer organizations, and 
continued working within their existing mind-set and did not perceive the need to change their way 
of functioning. 
Furthermore, the organizational culture of irrigation bureaucracies as elaborated in chapter four, 
enunciated engineers with a position of power and prestige and had vertical/hierarchical structure of 
functioning which is contrastingly opposite to the ethos of participatory norm that these farmer 
organizations were constituted under. The officials believed that the farmers were not capable of 
doing technical work for instance repairs of the aqueduct on their own and thus members of farmer 
organization were additional labour (as assistants) for irrigation officials. This perspective of farmers 
as labour resonates with a top down enforced idea of participation like the Kudimaramat discussed 
in chapter four during the colonial period in Tamil Nadu which legitimized the demand for village 
labour in irrigation works (See Mosse, 1999).   
Additionally, farmer organizations were constituted suddenly without creating any prior 
awareness/disseminating information about their roles and functions. Thus most of the farmers were 
unaware of the role or functions that these panchayats or samiti were expected to perform. 
Furthermore, the officials and staff of the irrigation department were also not comfortable with this 
new directive as it was a top-down decision that had been thrust on them from Bhopal, the state 
headquarters. The bureaucratic realm populated by values of centrist state ideology perceived 
constitution of farmer organization as threat to their professional position that could restrict their 
functioning. Given that farmer organizations during this period were only envisaged to assist officials, 
the bureaucracy resisted to this structural change by not creating any awareness about farmer 
Mansikta of First Generation Farmer Organizations 
 
 
 
 
177 
organization and their roles and responsibilities. To wit, the officials did not disseminate the 
knowledge necessary to facilitate functioning of the committees. For instance, the sinchai panchayat 
members were not aware of their roles and responsibility, i.e. they had to facilitate collection of 
irrigation revenue, or resolve disputes. There was no policy directive, which made dissemination of 
this information necessary. 
Additionally, officials during this period perceived farmers as ignorant about agricultural practice. 
They were not aware of technical aspects related to irrigation management or improvement in 
agricultural practices and thus through Action Research Programme and other funding like CADP 
disseminating information and provided resources to improve cultivation practice. This was a 
consequence of the Indian state’s belief during that time of self-assigned tutelary role as discussed in 
chapter four. Consequently, farmers in this region were introduced to efficient irrigation practices. 
Additionally, irrigation officials, WALMI and other line departments through agriculture extension 
services introduced new crops like Soybean in this region. In the 1980s and 1990s farmers perceived 
the benefits that the state was providing them and looked up to officials for guidance, assistance, 
and to resolve issues. Thus, perception of farmers were influenced by state structure i.e. knowledge 
that the state could provide support and the key to accessing water lay in the hands of officials. For 
instance, Bhagwan Singh’s ideational realm is quite influenced by state structure and he gives a lot of 
merit to hierarchy and listening to bureaucracy/officials (Field Notes, October 3, 2012). 
7.3 Discussion  
Farmers of the SAS Project region in general were content in the 1980s and 1990s as after 
commissioning of the project they started practicing irrigated agriculture and acknowledged the 
benefits from increased agricultural production. In this context, the discussion in this chapter 
highlights several aspects about ideational perspectives of farmers and farmer organizations during 
this period. First, the influence of state structure is salient: as farmers were aware that key to 
irrigation lay with officials of the irrigation department. Thus, farmers with large tracts of land, in 
order to ensure their access to water did not hesitate to pay bribes to officials of irrigation 
department. This also makes evident that corruption was perceived as structural and normalized 
through everyday practices. To clarify from the discussion in this chapter it is evident that state 
structure is understood by farmers/farmer organizations as a collective that comprises bureaucracy 
and their control over water resources given their organizational affiliation. Hence bureaucracy as 
well as farmers viewed structural factors resulting in position of power with legitimate authority to 
control the irrigation network during this time period.  
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Additionally, during this time period, the lower bureaucracy was aware that they held the (k)ey to 
irrigation, and farmer organizations did not have any power over the irrigation system. The only 
power that the farmers had to influence irrigation flow for their benefit was based on their 
relationship with the local MLAs. Though, not all farmers claimed that local MLAs were within their 
approach. It is again the village patels (traditional authority) and/or farmers with large landholding, 
or farmers with interest in party politics and who were working as karyakarta (party workers) who 
could approach, request and or exercise influence through the local MLAs. For an average 
landholding farmer, the irrigation officials held the key to accessing water, and it is them they 
approached. Thus, reinforcing that the farmers in general perceived officials as a position of 
authority and they knew they could avail personal benefits, only if they respected existing structural 
boundaries.  
Overall the first generation farmer organizations’ lay defunct after few years as they were primarily 
designed to assist the irrigation functionaries and did not have any other substantive function to 
perform. In case of sinchai panchayats they had power to disburse funds at the village level, though 
it was contingent on the discretionary power of the district collector who decided if sinchai 
panchayat ought to be allocated this fund. In the case of two-sinchai panchayats’ this decision-
making power was not allocated to them.  
In context of understanding politics of irrigation management, one aspect that becomes evident from 
the finding is that actors’ not only exert influence by what they say but also one needs to bear in 
mind how they are seen and heard, as this impacts how other actors perceive them. Thus, taking 
cognizance of the social embeddedness of actors in the local social political context is crucial. For 
instance, Bhagwan Singh perceived officials and staff from the irrigation department as 
having/coming from a position of power, as they introduced new schemes to the villages, and/or 
were gatekeepers to ensure access of water to farmers. Moreover, given that in this period farmer 
organizations were being constituted on experimental basis their work was restricted to assisting in 
distribution of water below the outlet or in case of sinchai panchayat collecting irrigation revenue. 
The officials did not want to lose their position of power. Moreover, they had no incentive to do so 
and thus followed the directive of forming farmer organizations in the SAS Project on paper, but in 
essence they did not take any action to strengthen or support these farmer organizations as they 
were not bothered and there was no structural directive according to the Irrigation Act 1931 which 
necessitated so. The above discussion highlights another element of the structure i.e. pursuance of 
legislations/directives as mandated by state organizations.  
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Additionally, most of the officials from irrigation department who were implementing constitution of 
farmer organizations did not want to share the management of irrigation system with farmer 
organizations, as this implied a change in outlook towards farmers and brought them on a relatively 
equal field. Consequently, participation of farmers through farmer organizations in this period was 
more or less for tokenism as is evident from the findings. There were no efforts made to bolster 
awareness about the role of farmer organizations in irrigation management, or any training provided 
to farmers to prepare them for their role in assisting in irrigation management. Except the two 
exposure visits that were done by WALMI, there was no other capacity building programme for 
farmer organizations. The need for decentralization had been stressed in policy circles but the 
rationale and consensus for the same had not yet been achieved, which explains the reluctance of 
officials to share management of irrigation system, even if for tokenism in the lower tiers of 
bureaucracy i.e. at the project level.  
The ethos of participation that the state implemented through constitution of these farmer 
organizations was limited, as not sufficient efforts were made to bolster confidence of farmer 
organizations to take up the responsibility that they were given. This is evident from the discussion of 
members of sinchai panchayat who were not aware about their roles and responsibilities.  
Further, during this period irrigation was still relatively new for farmers in this region, and they were 
still experimenting with new cultivation practices. The village community was a cohesive unit and 
decisions were taken collectively. For instance, Bhagwan Singh reminisces that during this time, there 
was lesser gandagi (dirt, euphemism for corruption), and that farmers collectively had organized 
colaba samiti (outlet committee), as they were not receiving water on time. Though, this samiti was 
informal, the farmers’ collective decided to register it with irrigation department, as they did not 
want themselves to be considered illegal, as they had made a colaba on the distributory (Bhagwan 
Singh, December 10, 2011). This highlights the simultaneous importance of state and social structure 
in lives of farmers. Additionally, during this period, only big land holding farmers who were from 
upper castes and/or village patels, or those who were educated were elected to be part of sinchai 
panchayat or Krishak Samiti. The small land holding farmers were not part of the farmer 
organizations. Participation from farmers of lower caste groups and women was also absent in these 
organizations, except when they were nominated. Salience of cultural ideation i.e. caste or gender 
hierarchy as a signifier of acceptable social structure among individuals who followed tacit rules 
which social hierarchy and bestowed decision-making power to certain individuals like village pastels 
in the villages. These embedded social structures also provided access to certain social networks and 
political connections for farmers to tap in order to avail irrigation.  
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Coming to the discussion on participation, overall participation of farmers in irrigation management 
was limited till the year 2000, and this chapter delved into two basic aspects of participation, actual 
participation and attitude towards participation with respect to the functioning of farmer 
organizations, availability of water and irrigation management thereof. What becomes evident from 
the field findings is that farmers perception gave primacy to the structural presence of the state 
more than the farmer organizations’ for accessing irrigation water, as they considered the officials of 
the state as powerful actors who brought irrigation to this region and were providing the technical 
know-how and knowledge for better agricultural production.  
Furthermore, findings of this chapter also elucidate that during this period no effort was made to 
decentralize the intermediate level, and the focus was solely on decentralizing the micro level. This 
objective also, however, did not achieve any tangible outcome, as the essence of decentralization 
propagated through involvement of farmers in first generation farmer organization was mere 
tokenism and envisaged farmers as assistants to the bureaucracy. Building on these aspects, chapter 
eight elaborates about how the ideational paradigm was shaped for second generation farmer 
organizations i.e. WUAs in SAS Project. 
 
                                                          
xciii
 It is acknowledged, however, that the purpose of highlighting certain perception of actors is not to 
homogenize and argue that these were the only prevalent perceptions during that period. The author 
recognizes the heterogeneity within and across groups and is (only) putting forth for discussion the perceptions 
of actors that gained salience during the course of field research (and analysis). 
xciv
 I explicate material claims as structural basing it on Parsons (2007, p. 12) approach that structural claims 
explicate what people do as a function of their position vis-à-vis exogenously given ‘material’ structures like 
geography, distribution of wealth, or distribution of physical power. 
xcv
 The first attempt to organize farmers for irrigation management was made ten years after project 
commissioning. Given that the network of earthen canal systems was made piecemeal, some of the areas in 
the tail end of the canal system started receiving water much later then the head reach.  
xcvi
 The explication of cognitive patterns of actors here resonates with that of Mielke, Schetter & Wilde (2011) 
xcvii
 An interesting discussion on how corruption is perpetuated and differentiates social class and caste is 
provided by Jeffrey (2002) in context of rural north India.  
xcviii
 Water level in the supply channel is raised for delivering water to water courses from the minors, from 
distributaries to minors and from canal/branch to distributaries is done by operating cross regulators (GoMP, 
1981, p. 69). 
xcix
 A schedule of release of water in different distributaries and minors of canal system showing the discharge, 
duration of supply and area to be irrigated or in other words arrangement of rotational water supply to 
irrigators. 
c
 It is noteworthy that according to a departmental notification the irrigation rules of 1974 were corrected and 
the words osrabandi were deleted from Irrigation Rules 1974 and replaced by warabandi in 1982 (GoMP, 
1982), brief discussion of the same is provided in Appendix IV. However, this change in notification was not 
implemented. 
ci
 Salient feature of Irrigation Act 1931 and Irrigation Rules 1974 are discussed in Appendix IV. 
cii
 Dharam Singh Maina was also up-sarpanch in the panchayat between 2000-2005 (Interview, February 11, 
2012). 
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8 Quotidian Practices Shape Functioning of WUA 
Chapter six demonstrated how the network of irrigation system that was set up by the state in the 
early 1970s changed the agricultural and social landscape of the Samrat Ashok Sagar (SAS) Project 
area by 1990s. This region was more or less devoid of irrigation, except for few progressive farmers 
who took benefit of the pump set programme of the 1960s initiated by the state government. For 
majority of farmers, however, access to irrigation materialized only post commissioning of the SAS 
Project in 1978. Chapter seven discussed the constitution of first generation farmer organizations viz. 
Sinchai Panchayats and Krishak Samiti in the project area at the micro level to assist irrigation 
bureaucracy in operation and management of the irrigation network. Chapter seven also provided 
evidence that these first generation farmer organizations were unsuccessful as: i) limited role and 
functions were devolved to them, ii) there was little or no effort made by irrigation bureaucracy to 
create awareness about these farmer organizations within the community, iii) the leaders of these 
farmer organizations did not share information and/or knowledge about functioning of farmer 
organization with local community or other members of the committee; iv) the attitude and 
perception of bureaucracy was a roadblock for having a good working relationship and/or sharing of 
information between irrigation bureaucracy and Sinchai Panchayat or Krishak Samiti leaders. 
Furthermore, the chapter discussed how the ideational realm of farmers developed through 
interaction between state institutions and their cognitive patterns which was contingent on various 
external and internal factors. This led to constitution of actors’ ideational realm/mansikta/worldview 
on beliefs, norms and values associated with availing irrigation water, and functioning of first 
generation farmer organizations. The previous chapter also discussed how these beliefs, norms and 
values were influenced by the socio-cultural context, and till end of 1990s all efforts to decentralize 
irrigation management were targeted at the micro level. There was no effort made to decentralize 
the intermediate level of irrigation management in the state. Additionally, the chapter elaborated 
that though there were different viewpoint on how farmer organizations ought to function, there 
was no overt clash between farmer organization members and bureaucracy as a prevailing belief 
during this time period heralded salience of state and state actor and the ideational belief and values 
of both farmers and bureaucracy were populated by this notion. Likewise, state society interaction 
and petty corruption that it invoked was normalized as an everyday practice.  
However, post 2000, the situation changed when Madhya Pradesh enacted the Participatory 
Irrigation Management (PIM) Act in 1999 with an aim to handover operation and management of 
irrigation systems to farmer organizations. The debate that led to this change at the state level and 
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ideational factors that influenced the reform process for implementing the PIM legislation have been 
discussed in chapter five. Building on these factors, the focus of this chapter is on the current status 
and mode of functioning of farmer organizations after enactment of the PIM Act, i.e. from 2000-
2012. To recall, Madhya Pradesh PIM Act envisaged decentralizing irrigation management by 
constituting three-tier farmer organization i.e. for the first time efforts were directed to have 
intermediate level farmer organizations apart from farmer organization at micro level. Although, 
interestingly the state government has held elections for intermediate level farmer organizations 
only once post the first round of Water User Associations (WUA) elections in 2000. Therefore, the 
focus of this chapter is on identifying roadblocks to intermediate level decentralization.  
The following section (8.1) elaborates on the processes that were instituted to devolve 3 Fs (funds, 
functions and functionaries) at the intermediate and micro level in the SAS Project through the case 
of Saraswati and Betwa WUA. Section 8.2 focuses on elaborating the processes -structural and 
cultural ideational factors- that have resulted in predominant ideational realm on functioning of 
farmer organizations. Section 8.3 briefly summarizes the findings of this chapter. 
8.1 Initiation of PIM in SAS Project to devolve 3 Fs to the intermediate and 
micro level 
The PIM Act was enacted by Madhya Pradesh legislative assembly in September 1999 and within six 
months -in April 2000- WUA elections were held across the state and subsequently operation and 
maintenance of canals and minor channels was passed by the Water Resources Department (WRD) 
to these newly designed farmer organizations at micro level, which were delineated on a hydrological 
basis.ciii Given that PIM was initiated -as a new form of governance- with an aim to decentralize 
irrigation management, post WUA elections in 2000, the operation and maintenance of canals and 
minor channels were passed to these farmer organizations. As a result, the management of 
1,100,000 hectares of land under the command area of irrigation projects in Madhya Pradesh was 
handed over to these newly created/designed farmer organizations.  
As elaborated in chapter five, these farmer organizations had a three-tier structure with WUAs at the 
micro level. These WUAs in major irrigation project were federated at the distributory level to form 
distributory committees, the elections for which were held in the project area on February 17, 2001. 
At the third tier (i.e. the project level) were the project committees for which elections were held on 
August 3, 2003 (CWC, 2006, p. 96; Pandey, 2006, p. 42). These distributory committee and project 
committee are the intermediate level farmer organizations that were enunciated as part of the PIM 
Act to decentralize and initiate participation of farmers at the intermediate level. The elections for 
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distributory committee and project committee were held indirectly and only WUA Presidents and 
Territorial Constituency (TC) members participated in the voting process (GoMP, 1999).  
Ideally, the SAS Project ought to have three distributory committees and one project committee. 
However, at present there are no distributory and project committee under the project (or in any 
other project in Madhya Pradesh), as the state government held the distributory and project 
committee elections only once -after the first round of WUA elections in the year 2000. The focus of 
this chapter, hence, is on elaborating why the intermediate level farmer organizations have not been 
created. Findings evince that state has used poor functioning of micro level farmer organizations i.e. 
WUAs as a sign to not decentralize the intermediate level. Therefore this chapter focuses on 
elucidating functioning of these WUAs using the conceptual frame of ideational realm.  
The WUA elections have been held thrice in the SAS Project area on April 18, 2000, February 7, 2006 
and on September 15, 2011. The SAS Project till the year 2012 had 19 WUAs delineated on hydraulic 
basis. In the year 2000, when the first WUA elections were held, there were 16 WUAs delineated 
under the project. Each WUA is divided into wards (of not more than 100 ha) and there are four to 
ten ward members or TC members in each WUA. At present, there are seven WUAs on the Right 
Bank Canal (RBC), five on the Left Bank Canal (LBC) and seven on the Sahodra Bank Canal (SBC). I 
carried out my research on two WUAs one on the head reach (Saraswati) and the other at the tail 
end (Betwa) of the network of canal system (see Figure 7.1, chapter seven for the location on map).  
As mentioned in chapter five, SAS was one of the projects selected for India Canada Environment 
Facility (ICEF) funding to build capacities of WUAs and engineers. Two NGOs -Saadhan and Rakshan- 
were selected for capacity building of WUAs and engineers in their demarcated areas within the SAS 
Project. Rakshan followed a PIM-plus approach i.e. focused on building capacities of farmer 
organization through improving agricultural services in select WUAs of the project, apprised one of 
the senior member of Rakshan who was involved with the activity (Interview, November 6, 2011). 
Saadhan, on the other hand, as apprised by the then team leader of Saadhan field office focused on 
questioning and engaging with existing power structures in villages and with WRD in order to bring 
greater awareness, and to engage with greater number of farmers to encourage them to take over 
management of irrigation systems (Interview, August 23. 2011). As a result, the two NGOs 
approached capacity building through very different strategies in the same project area, though in 
different WUAs. This mismatch in approach was also recognized by ICEF and in one of its 
communication to PIM directorate, they noted that there is ‘serious lack of coordination between 
the two NGOs’ in SAS Project on strategies and approach to the capacity building programme (ICEF, 
2004). In this chapter, work undertaken by Saadhan is discussed in details, as the two WUAs selected 
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for the case study -Sarwaswati and Betwa- were in its region. Additionally, as part of institution 
building under Madhya Pradesh Water Sector Restructuring Project (MPWSRP), an international 
consultancy also carried out training programmes for select WUAs in the project area, the work of 
which is also discussed in subsequent sections.  
Having given a brief overview of how PIM was initiated in SAS Project area, the next sub-section 
further elaborates on WUA elections that were held in this region, thrice since the year 2000. The 
elections in two WUAs are discussed with reference to the existing categorical inequality based on 
caste, class and gender, which are the defining characteristics of this region. This discussion also 
facilitates in elaborating the ideas, values and ideologies that guide the ideational realm of farmers 
who were elected to be part of second generation farmer organization. 
8.1.1 Saraswati WUA- existing categorical inequality and its influence on WUA 
elections  
The present day Saraswati WUA is constituted in same villages where Saraswati sinchai panchayat 
was formed in the late 1980s (narrative discussed in chapter seven). Saraswati WUA has a command 
area of 1128 hectares and has been delineated on hydraulic basis. Saraswati WUA has nine villages in 
its command area of which six villages receive irrigation through canals and three villages avail water 
through lift irrigation (GoMP, 2012a).civ Figure 8.1, illustrates per unit area owned by different 
category of farmers in Saraswati WUA in the head reach, middle reach and the tail end. The figure 
also illustrates the social composition i.e. Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST) or general 
category which comprises Brahmins, Rajputs, etc. that farmers belong to vis-à-vis the size of 
landholdings.  
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Figure 8. 1: Per unit area (in hectares) owned by farmers in Saraswati WUA   
 
Source: Design by author based on data collected from Saadhan’s field office
cv
 
From Figure 8.1, it is evident that in Saraswati WUA there are greater number of large landholding 
farmers (with greater per unit area) in the tail end and head reach followed by medium farmers. 
Likewise, the middle reach and tail end also have greater number of large farmers with greater per 
unit area followed by medium farmers and the small farmers. Additionally, majority of farmers in the 
tail end, followed by head reach and middle reach are in the general category. The figure also 
illustrates that most of the SC/ ST farmers are in middle or head reach followed by tail end. From this 
figure, it is evident that majority of farmers in Saraswati WUA are large landholders. To recall 
discussion in chapter six, average landholding in the project area was higher than the national 
average, which is also indicative of the higher economic status of farmers of this region. Moreover, 
the predominant land holding caste group in Saraswati WUA are Kshatriya/Rajputs followed by 
Maina community, which belongs to the Other Backward Class (OBC). The majority of large farmers 
in Figure 8.1 are Rajputs and/or from Maina community. Additionally, women also have land titles in 
the SAS Project area. However, the reason for this is that the large farmers in order to avoid losing 
land to the state have distributed land amongst all family members (Field notes, December 2011). 
The effect of caste differentiation on social class and its implications of food and drink taboo in 
reference to interaction within community were discussed in chapter six. Through the discussion I 
had highlighted social segregation within the community in the project region, and the salience of 
context i.e. patels (traditional authority/customary leaders) taking decisions at the village level. 
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Chapter six had also demonstrated that ideational values of farmers were embedded in the local 
setting, and thus influenced by social hierarchies for instance as patels were considered a legitimate 
social authority whose voice was respected. 
Given this backdrop the following paragraphs discuss how WUA elections -a step towards democratic 
decentralization- for irrigation management unfolded in Saraswati WUA one and half decade later. 
Wherein caste and social differentiation has made WUA elections fiercely contested, however when 
it comes to functioning of WUAs caste dynamics is not the only driver that led to management 
decisions (discussed in section 8.2). There is a dichotomy in how leaders are chosen and how 
management work undertaken thereafter. Ideational analysis here facilitates in unraveling this 
dichotomy. 
To elaborate, Saraswati WUA has predominant population of Rajputs and Maina in the region and 
there has always been a contestation between these two groups during elections since 1980s. For 
instance, Abhay Singh Maina (OBC) of Sadaiya contested against Surjan Singh (Rajput/Kshatriya by 
caste) of Baagkheri in Saraswati sinchai panchayats elections (see chapter seven).  This contestation 
and rivalry between the two groups continued when the WUA elections were announced in 2000, 
discussed further in the following sections.  
Table 8.1 illustrates the characteristic of WUA presidents of Saraswati WUA. From the table it is 
evident that large land holding farmers from Rajput community have won all the three terms of WUA 
elections.  
Table 8. 1: Characteristics of WUA presidents’ elected in Saraswati WUA  
 
1
 Head reach village 
2 
Middle reach village 
 
The first round of WUA elections were held in the year 2000 in Saraswati WUA and during that time 
there were multiple contenders for post of WUA president and TC members in this region. The prime 
Year of 
election 
WUA 
President 
Caste 
Village/ 
hamlet 
Land 
ownership  
(in hectares) 
Political party 
affiliation 
Total number 
of contestants 
for president 
post  
2000 Surjan Singh Rajput Baagkheri
2
 
48.12 Indian National 
Congress Party 
Four 
2006 Samrat Singh Rajput Saraswati
1
 
30 Bhartiya Janata Party 
(BJP) 
Four 
2011 Samrat Singh Rajput Saraswati
1
 
30 BJP Seven 
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contenders for WUA president post in the year 2000 were distributed between the head, middle and 
tail end villages viz. former Saraswati sinchai panchayat president Abhay Singh Maina of Amlakheri 
(tail end village; Maina/OBC); Tamar Singh from Amlakheri (tail end village; Maina/OBC); Ramesh 
Sharma from Saraswati village (head reach village; Brahmin); and Surjan Singh of Baagkheri (middle 
reach village) stood for elections (Ramesh Sharma, January 21, 2012; Radhey Shyam, January 14, 
2012). Although, of the five contenders, Ramesh Sharma was not serious about elections, and states 
‘I contested elections to divert my mind, as I had recently lost my arm (handicapped) (…) elections 
are serious business, I thought will get something’ and thus contested elections. Despite this self-
recognition about his intent for elections not being serious, Ramesh Sharma provides an important 
insight into why there was a rush for contesting elections in the year 2000. He posits that farmers 
perceived that they would benefit by being part of the WUA. Similar, reflection is made by Abhay 
Singh Maina ‘several people contested for greed as farmers thought that WUA position comes with 
benefits’ (Interview, February 7, 2013). The above citations illustrate that not enough attention was 
paid to create awareness about WUAs and its purpose with farmers before conducting WUA 
elections. This is not surprising as WUA elections were held within six months of enactment of the 
PIM Act.  
Given there were five contenders for Saraswati WUA election in 2000, vote was divided on caste and 
social or physical proximity to the leader. Finally, Surjan Singhcvi from Baagkheri -one of the 
downstream hamlets of Saraswati village- won the WUA president post with a small margin. Surjan 
Singh’s family owns 48.12 hectares land, and is a Kshatriya/Rajput by caste. He is sixty years old, and 
is well respected in his community.  
The second WUA elections were held in 2006. By this time, Saadhan had already initiated work in this 
region as part of ICEF funding with the objective of creating greater awareness amongst farmers and 
WUA members about irrigation management. The team leader of Saadhan, narrating his experience 
in this region, states that after initiating work in SAS Project area for an year in 2004, and by 
observing and understanding the field dynamics, Saadhan strategized to break the existing power 
structure in WUA, by encouraging/motivating active men in villages to participate in WUA activities 
and contest for WUA elections in 2006, as they observed that most of the WUA presidents who got 
elected in the first term considered WUA presidency as a stepping stone to politics. Farmers had 
seen how panchayats (lowest tier of locally elected body) have flourished and assumed that WUAs 
would have similar roles and rights, and thus scrambled for this post when the first WUA elections 
were announced in 2000. Observing this field reality Saadhan decided to challenge the existing 
power structures in WUAs by motivating active men in WUA villages to contest elections in 2006. 
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Saadhan worked in its capacity of ideational broker to change the field dynamics and narrative for 
management of irrigation in select WUAs. This required questioning the existing power structures 
(for instance, Suraj Singh of Saraswati WUA) and engaging with farmers deeper cognitive spheres in 
order to question the legitimacy of the existing practices and leadership (c.f. Mielke et al., 2011, p. 
15). Saadhan’s efforts led to change in leadership and Samrat Singh emerged as a successful leader in 
Saraswati WUA in 2006 who contested elections after receiving encouragement from Saadhan (Team 
leader, Saadhan, August 30, 2011). Interestingly, Samrat Singh is nephew of Surjan Singh who was 
elected WUA president in the first term. Samrat Singh also comes from a predominant land holding 
family of Saraswati village, and has strong political ties. However, he is much younger than Surjan 
Singh, his uncle. He is in his late thirties and is active in local politics. For the last two generations, his 
family has supported Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Samrat Singh’s father had strong ties with one of 
the prominent minister in the state government, and Samrat Singh has continued nurturing these 
ties and is not shy about mentioning his closeness to the minister or his party affiliations. Samrat 
Singh though an active farmer with keen interest in politics and irrigation issues prefers to base his 
campaign on caste affiliations and social relations. He does not even campaign in downstream 
villages of Sadaiya, Amlakheri, etc., as he is aware that farmers there will not vote for him. Apart 
from caste, proximity also matters in elections and farmers of a village generally vote for contestant 
from their village. Apart from Surjan Singh, other two contestants for WUA president post in 2006 
were Tamar Singh from Amlakheri (tail end village; Maina/OBC) and Misri Lal (head reach village; Pal) 
from Tarasi. In case of 2006 elections, votes for Saraswati WUA were divided on caste, position on 
canal, and social ties. Farmers were not too happy with Surjan Singh’s work during his tenure as WUA 
president, hence, many Rajputs voted for Samrat Singh. Farmers from smaller hamlets (like 
Jamunkheri) of Saraswati village also voted for him.   
Samrat Singh won the Saraswati WUA election in 2011 as well and is considered an active WUA 
president by farmers and also by WRD. In 2011, there were six contenders against Samrat Singh from 
the usual villages and groups i.e. Thakur of Amlakheri (tail end village), two contenders from Rajput 
community of Tarasi (head reach village), Rajput from Karonj (head reach village), Rajputs from 
Manoharkheri (head reach village) and another Rajput contestant from Mangod. Given so many 
contestants, the votes got divided on caste and locational proximity. Interestingly, women although 
do not take part in irrigation activity, have the right to vote in WUA elections according to the PIM 
act. Thus, on Election Day there was scramble for making sure that all the electorates cast their vote. 
Given that voting for Saraswati WUA happens in Saraswati village, which is far away from tail end 
villages all contestants took out their tractors, hired vans, etc. to ensure that farmers and womenfolk 
from their village and their allies caste vote in their favour. Additionally, there are lot of absentee 
Quotidian Practices Shape Functioning of WUA 
 
 
 
 
189 
farmers in this region, and contestants make sure that they also return to cast vote in their favour. 
Samrat Singh won the election by about 30 votes in 2011.  
Similar has been the case with respect to selection of TC members for Saraswati WUA. There are six 
TC members in Saraswati WUA, who are representative of the entire WUA (as wards for TC members 
are delineated according to area). Additionally, there is one nominated member from backward 
caste and one nominated women member in the Saraswati WUA. Further, there have been new TC 
members after every election in Saraswati WUA, except for Ram Prakash from Jamunkheri who has 
been elected twice as TC member in the year 2000 and 2006. TC member posts are also fought 
competitively in this region, for instance, Arjan Singh, who was elected as TC member from Saraswati 
WUA in the second term points out that he had filed papers for TC member post in the first term but 
withdrew as there was another aspirant (Hemant Singh) from his community to contest for the TC 
post. To reduce competition and avoid division of community votes, Arjan Singh withdrew his 
electoral form, and supported Hemant Singh from Baagkheri. In the second term Arjan Singh again 
filed his nomination for TC post and convinced Hemant Singh not to contest for the TC post and thus 
got elected as TC member in 2006. Similarly, in 2011 for instance, from the ward in Saraswati village 
initially there were two contestants Tilak Singh who is Samrat Singh’s estranged cousin brother and 
Samrat Singh’s Sister Radha Singh. Interestingly, Radha Singh is married and does not even live in 
Saraswati village anymore but Samrat Singh had filed her name for TC member to ensure greater 
control over TC. However, farmers like Tilak Singh objected to her candidature forcing Samrat Singh 
to withdraw Radha Singh’s nomination, and Tilak Singh emerged as winner for TC post of Saraswati 
village.  
Having discussed briefly, the dynamics of elections in Saraswati WUA, it becomes evident that WUA 
elections have been contested on caste and social affiliations, apart from that farmers vote for 
contestants from their village/area. Table 8.2 illustrates the profile of WUA members elected in 2011.  
Table 8. 2: Profile of Saraswati WUA members elected in 2011 
Saraswati WUA Name 
Land ownership (in 
hectare) 
Caste Village/hamlet 
President Samrat Singh 30 Rajput Saraswati
1
 
TC Member 
Dilip Singh 
Maina 
90 OBC Sadaiya
3
 
TC Member Gulab Singh 10 Rajput Mangod
1
 
TC Member Gainda Singh 15 Rajput Tarasi
1
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Saraswati WUA Name 
Land ownership (in 
hectare) 
Caste Village/hamlet 
TC Member Tilak Singh 30 Rajput Saraswati
1
 
TC Member Bikram Singh 25 Rajput Manoharkheri 
1
 
TC Member Sailesh Singh 26 Rajput Amlakheri
3
 
Nominated 
Member 
Kalyan .80 Dalit/SC Saraswati
1
 
Nominated 
Member 
Radha Devi 2 OBC Manoharkheri
1
 
1
 Head reach village 
3
 Tail end village 
 
Table 8.2 illustrates that most of the WUA members are from predominant landed caste of this 
region i.e. Rajputs. Farmers from marginal communities SC/ST did not contest elections, and thus to 
ensure their participation in WUA, as mandated by the PIM Act, Kalyan and Radha Devi were 
nominated into Saraswati WUA. It is noteworthy that this practice of nominating marginalized 
sections, a signifier of apolitical participation, continued from first generation farmer organizations. 
When I met Kalyan and Radha Devi they were not aware about WUA activities though were aware 
that their names were noted as WUA management committee members. Additionally, the discussion 
above elucidates that Rajputs are not a homogenous community, and there are differences within 
them as well, based on social, familial rivalry and position on the canal. Thus, findings reveal that 
caste -a defining social strand of Indian society- was not the sole determinant of how actors 
perceived their options for voting in WUA elections.  
The next section elucidates more about the socio economic setting in which Betwa WUA is 
embedded and elaborates on the election process further. 
8.1.2 Betwa WUA- existing categorical inequality and its influence on WUA elections  
Betwa WUA was constituted in the region where Betwa sinchai panchayat was delineated in the late 
1980s. Thus, in the year 2000, when Betwa WUA was delineated, it comprised 17 villages and had a 
total area of about 1878 hectares under it. Given the large number of villages (and area) under Betwa 
WUA, before 2006 WUA elections, Betwa WUA was divided into two WUAs by the WRD i.e. another 
WUA Chapna was carved out of it on hydraulic principles. At present, Betwa WUA has seven villages 
in its command area of which six receive water through canal and lift irrigation while one receives 
water only through canal irrigation. The total command area of Betwa WUA is 1034 hectarescvii 
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(GoMP, 2012a, pp. 21, 23). Figure 8.2, illustrates the per unit area (in hectares) owned by different 
category of farmers in Betwa WUA in the middle reach and the tail end.  
Figure 8. 2: Per unit area (in hectares) owned by farmers in Betwa WUA 
 
Source: Design by author based on data collected from Saadhan’s field office
cviii
 
From Figure 8.2, it is evident that in Betwa WUA, majority of large landholding farmers’ vis-à-vis per 
unit area are in the middle reach followed by tail end. The proportion of farmers with medium 
landholdings is same for middle reach and tail end. Additionally, the proportion of farmers belonging 
to general population is almost similar in middle reach and tail end, while there is a higher 
population of SC/ST farmers in the middle reach as compared to the tail end. Like Saraswati WUA, in 
Betwa WUA also, women have land titles on their name but they rarely take part in irrigation 
activities. Predominant caste group in Betwa WUA are Patels (Rajput) and Maina community. 
Thus, it is not surprising that in the SAS Project area, not even one women WUA president has been 
elected, however, there are few instances of women WUA presidents being elected from other parts 
of the state. Women in general don’t play any role in organization and management of water in this 
region as previously elaborated in chapter six and seven. Further, women especially from upper class 
and caste households are not involved at all in farming activity. Women from poorer households, still 
undertake small work in agriculture fields, but are not involved in irrigation activity on large scale. 
Saadhan in its ideational belief of broker worked towards involving women in irrigation management 
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activities and decision making process by encouraging them to form Self Help Groups (SHGs) and 
built their capacities and created awareness by conducting training programmes and taking them on 
exposure visits. Most of these SHGs are still functional in Saadhan’s work area and continue to 
engage in thrift and credit activity; however this has not led to long-term involvement of women in 
irrigation activity. Table 8.3 provides a snapshot of three WUA presidents elected in Betwa WUA till 
now.  
Table 8. 3: Characteristics of WUA presidents elected in Betwa WUA 
2 
Middle reach village 
3 Tail end village 
* Also elected distributory committee president in 2001  
 
In the year 2000, Behram Singh was elected the president of Betwa WUA. Similar to the case of 
Saraswati WUA, he was not elected the WUA president un-opposed. Given, that the WUA elections 
were held for the first time in the year 2000, there was immense hype about the post of WUA 
president, and there were several contenders for this post. Behram Singh had campaigned heavily for 
his candidature, and he was able to garner support based on party lines.cix Behram Singh is a wealthy 
farmer who owns two harvesters and tractors, apart from land. He is also an active member of BJP 
and also has close ties with a former BJP Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) from this region. 
However, despite being an active and popular president, Behram Singh lost WUA elections in 2006. 
There are many narratives in this region to explicate his loss in elections: i) Behram Singh claims that 
everyone knew that he supports BJP and all his opponents from congress party gathered to ensure 
his defeat, ii) his opponent from the newly carved Chapna WUA spent about INR 0.7 million to win 
WUA elections, iii) some farmers claimed that he slacked work in last years of his presidency (Field 
notes, August 2011).cx  
In the second term of WUA elections in 2006 Kamraj Singh was elected un-opposed the WUA 
president for Betwa WUA. Here, it may be noted that Betwa WUA was already much smaller in area 
Year of 
election 
WUA 
President 
Caste Village/hamlet 
Political party 
Affiliation 
Land 
ownership 
(in hectares) 
Number of 
contestants 
2000 
Behram 
Singh* 
OBC Chapna
2
 
BJP 14.16 Four 
2006 Kamraj Singh OBC Sadhai
3
 
INC 200-300 No other 
contestant. Won 
election 
unopposed 
2011 Mohan Patel Rajput Karamkheri
3
 
INC 25 Three 
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as Chapna WUA was carved out of it. Interestingly, Kamraj Singh is a large landlord, from the Maina 
community and owns hundreds of hectares of land in this region.cxi Apart from being a large 
landholder, Kamraj Singh’s family has also held the sarpanch post in panchayat for the last two 
decades. Recalling the 2006 election, Raghav Raj, another contender for the post of WUA president 
from Amla village (middle reach village; Brahmin), who has contested for this post in all three terms, 
states that he also had filed papers for contesting elections for WUA president in 2006. However, he 
withdrew his nomination papers last minute, as his grandfather and Kamraj Singh’s father had good 
relations. As mark of mutual respect and to continue good relations between the two families, he 
withdrew his candidature (Raghav Raj, December 19, 2011). Raghav Raj, however, regrets this 
decision as Kamraj Singh never acknowledged/showed gratitude for the sacrifice he made i.e. 
deciding not to contest WUA elections in 2006. 
Kamraj Singh’s case is noteworthy to be elaborated further as he was elected unopposed the 
president of Betwa WUA in 2006. Interestingly, Kamraj Singh did not have any interest in WUA 
activity from 2000-2006. To elaborate, few farmers along with Saadhan (NGO recruited for capacity 
building under ICEF funding) and WRD employees approached him in 2004 for beneficiary 
contribution to extend one of the minor channels by building a culvert so that water could be availed 
by farmers downstream. However, Kamraj Singh refused out rightly stating that he had no interest in 
contributing. He did not want water from the minor channel as he had other ways of ensuring access 
to water. Eventually the culvert was made by contribution given by other farmers and through 
support of ICEF funding. Kamraj Singh also benefitted from this development as his fields are close to 
the minor channel and thus his access to canal water improved (Maharaj Singh Jat, December 11, 
2011). From the above discussion it becomes evident that though Kamraj Singh did not have any 
interest in fostering the ethos of cooperation, partnership and participation for irrigation 
management, and just by merely being a large landholder, he was considered influential in this 
region, and was elected unopposed as WUA president in 2006 when he announced his candidature 
for WUA election. However, Kamraj Singh lost the legitimacy of being an influential farmer, (by being 
a large landholder) i.e. structural ideation in farmers’ perception, when after his election in 2006 he 
did not do any work to improve access of irrigation water to downstream farmers; resolve water 
conflict; and other day to day operational matters of WUAs. Farmers in Betwa WUA region openly 
criticized his lack of interest in WUA functioning during field discussion, a criticism that he was aware 
of as well. Consequently, Kamraj Singh chose not to stand for WUA elections in 2011. 
The 2011 Betwa WUA election was relatively competitive as three candidates viz. Raghav Raj from 
Amla (middle reach village; Brahmin), Mohan Patel from Karamkheri (tail end village; Rajput) and 
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Narendra Singh of Saronj (tail end village) contested the election. Voting was divided on caste and 
village lines, and farmers voted for representatives that were from their caste, village and social 
network. Mohan Patel from Karamkheri, a downstream village (almost tail end of Betwa WUA), won 
the election by a small margin. 
Functioning of WUAs was not new to Mohan Patel, the winner of 2011 WUA elections, as he had 
been elected TC member of Betwa WUA earlier as well. In 2011, he had won the post of both WUA 
president and TC from his region. He subsequently resigned from the TC post to take over the post of 
WUA president. Mohan Patel belongs to the patel (traditional authority) family of earlier times. His 
elder brother Mehtab Patel was the president of SAS Krishak Samiti in the late 1990s. Mehtab Patel 
was also elected as TC member in Betwa WUA in 2011, after Mohan Patel resigned from the TC post 
to take over the WUA president post. Apart from Mohan Patel, none of the TC members in Betwa 
WUA have been re-elected for a second term. Mohan Patel is Congress party karyakarta (worker) 
and undertakes low-key party work. Table 8.4 illustrates the profile of Betwa WUA members elected 
in 2011.  
Table 8. 4: Profile of Betwa WUA members elected in 2011 
Betwa WUA Name 
Land 
ownership 
(in hectare) 
Caste Village/hamlet 
President 
Mohan 
Patel 
25 Rajput Karamkheri
3
 
TC Member Paras Nath 2.4 OBC Betwa
2
 
TC Member 
Gainda 
Ram 
12 Rajput Sadhai
3
 
TC Member 
Nayan 
Singh 
15 Rajput Saronj
3
 
TC Member 
Mehtab 
Patel 
25 Rajput Karamkheri
3
 
Nominated 
Member 
Leela Devi 3 OBC Karamkheri
3
 
Nominated 
member 
Rajesh Ram 0.7 SC/dalit Radhakheri
3
 
2 
Middle reach village 
3
 Tail end village 
 
When I was doing fieldwork in 2011, I witnessed the excitement and importance that farmers 
(particularly large farmers) gave to WUA elections. For instance, Photograph 8.1 is illustrative of the 
earnestness that contestants portray to garner votes.  
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Photograph 8. 1: Electoral announcement by a contestant to campaign for WUA elections  
 
The electoral announcement is also illustrative of the seriousness that candidates attach to 
contesting elections. It is common for contestants to print electoral announcements with their 
picture and election symbol to request for votes. The contestants approach this process 
professionally, and print these announcements in advance and paste them in prominent places in 
their constituencies. Campaigning is done not only through these printed election announcements, 
but financial resources are also spent to get wall paintings done at strategic locations, to make their 
presence felt. Additionally, aspiring WUA presidents spend a lot of time, and financial resources (up 
to INR 0.3 to 0.8 million) to campaign for their candidature. However, it is noteworthy that in 2011 
elections, the contestants did not evoke the issue of water or its management as an electoral issue. 
Field discussions reveal that water management was not an electoral issue in the earlier two WUA 
elections as well. In this context, Raghav Raj explicates the voting politics in this region succinctly 
(Interview, December 19, 2011): 
“After the practice of voting for selection of farmer organizations has started in this 
region, work being done by farmer organizations’ is biased. People are winning elections 
by using monetary power. Everywhere the system is same, even in the legislative 
assembly, criminals are being elected. If a person is dabang (bold), people (reluctantly) 
vote for him (…) Other than that farmers cast vote based on caste affiliations, character 
of the contestant and at times votes are bought as well (…) Caste affiliations play a 
bigger role in farmers mind to decide who they vote for rather than land ownership”. 
My observations for 2011 elections are also similar: it was not fought on issue of water (availability or 
its management). Rather, farmers voted based on socio-cultural factors viz. caste affiliations, social 
relations with other farmers in the village, village affiliations, and/or familial relations. Farmers vote 
mostly based on their perceptions - within/for their social group i.e. farmers give primacy to social 
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cultural ideation while voting. This section also highlighted that elections have been populist, mostly 
large landholding farmers have been elected as presidents.  
Even at the SAS Project level, most of the WUA President that have been elected are large/medium 
land holding farmers of which many have houses in nearby towns and divide time between the 
village and town. Many WUA presidents in this region have held low level karyakarta (party worker) 
posts in either BJP or Indian National Congress Party (hereafter Congress Party) and their motivation 
to contest election is not just restricted to an altruistic motive of facilitating better and timely 
availability of water to irrigators in their command area. Rather there are different motivations 
(greater power, control and visibility) and ideas (stepping stone to get involved and gain visibility in 
party politics) that guide their actions and how they carry out work of WUA. For instance, Ramdhari 
from another WUA of SAS project has been elected WUA president thrice and is son of a former MLA 
from this region and who currently holds district level post in Congress Party office. Another TC 
member is president of the state Maina community and aspires to be a MLA. He owns large tracts of 
land (about 90 hectares) and lives in a nearby town. Behram Singh is another influential and rich 
WUA president who owns two harvesters, tractors and large tracts of land. He has been elected 
president twice (in 2000 and 2011), and is also an active karyakarta (party worker) of BJP. He held 
the position of treasurer for the local party office, few years ago. Interestingly, the state government 
is also interested in knowing the political inclination of WUA presidents. One of the sub engineers in 
WRD, Vidisha informed that the state government solicits information on party affiliations of WUA 
presidents after every election (Informal discussion, December 15, 2011).  
Comparing the selection of WUA presidents with the process of selection of presidents in first 
generation farmer organizations in chapter seven, it becomes evident that during earlier time, 
farmers gave primacy to progressiveness, greater learning about issues, education, etc. as a reason 
for selection of candidates. During 1980s and 1990s perception of farmers was heavily influenced by 
idea of progressiveness and education. In the last decade or so, caste politics has gained primacy and 
is becoming a decisive factor in election. Thus, as far as voting pattern is concerned caste appears as 
a strong parameter that drives voting pattern. Moreover, many farmers agreed that party affiliations 
also drive farmer’s vote, especially if the contestant is a party karyakarta (worker) and has a large 
group of opposing political party supporters in the area, for instance the case of Behram Singh 
mentioned earlier. Additionally, the contestants for WUA elections as well did not raise the issue of 
water management in their respective campaigns. From the above discussion of the election process, 
it also becomes evident that the state bureaucracy did not change their approach to irrigation 
management, for instance, making farmers aware of the objectives of conducting WUA elections. 
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This was clear from field discussion and is also self-evident as WUA elections were conducted six 
months after the PIM Act was enacted. The only difference between first generational and second 
was inclusion of NGOs under ICEF funding for capacity building of WUA, which was due to external 
factors like funding pressure. 
Having discussed the election process in two select WUAs the next section elucidates the functioning 
of WUAs guided by core aspects –participation, corruption, state control- that the idea of 
participatory irrigation management aimed to address in some way. 
8.2 Ideational realm influences perception of farmer organizations’ and its 
functioning 
The idea of farmer participation in irrigation management is not new for farmers of Saraswati and 
Betwa WUA, the first phase of participation and farmer management initiatives were tried in the 
1980s and 1990s in this region, which has been discussed in detail in chapter six and seven. In this 
section, the focus is on evaluating functioning of WUAs with respect to key aspects stipulated under 
the PIM Act and how ideational realm of farmers i.e. their mansikta (mind-set) influences the 
functioning of farmer organizations. This section also evaluates to what extent the directives 
mentioned in the PIM Act have been implemented and how these directives have shaped ideational 
role and realm of farmer organizations. To recall, WUA according to the PIM Act includes the 
president, TC members, secretary, amin (accountant/person responsible for revenue collection), 
representative from department of agriculture and the general body, which comprises all the land 
titleholders in the command area of the WUA.  
8.2.1 Functioning of WUA: meetings and sub committees  
According to the Madhya Pradesh PIM Actcxii, the WUA meetings are to be held once a month and (at 
least) two general body meetings in an irrigation season ought to be organized. During the time of 
fieldwork, however, I did not observe/hear about any general body meeting that was held in the two 
selected WUAs. This was (also) confirmed during interviews with farmers from both the WUAs. They 
stated that they generally do not get information on general body meetings. Additionally, monthly 
management committee meetings of WUA are also a formality and happen on paper rather than in 
actuality. After WUA elections were held in September 2011, only one management committee 
meeting of WUA was held during the beginning of the irrigation season to welcome and initiate the 
new members into Betwa WUA. In case of Saraswati WUA, Samrat Singh’s family was going through 
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a personal crisis in 2011 and Samrat Singh was not that actively involved in WUA matters. Thus, the 
WUA meetings were not that frequent in either WUA (Field notes, January 2012).  
There are multiple reasons why WUA meetings do not happen as stipulated in the Act, viz. lack of 
awareness/knowledge about meetings; lack of enthusiasm/interest by WUA members and farmers to 
take part in WUA activities; or disagreements/differences in perceptions on WUA functioning, and 
between WUA members and officials. In the following paragraphs, I provide evidence for assertions 
mentioned here. 
Some of the present and former TC members of Betwa WUA elucidate that frequency of WUA 
meetings are contingent on how active the WUA president is. For instance, Gainda Ram, present TC 
member of Betwa WUA asserts that during the first term of Betwa WUA, Behram Singh (WUA 
president) was very active, and farmers were aware of when the meetings were held, there was also 
more enthusiasm and curiosity amongst farmers and WUA members, as farmer organizations for 
irrigation management were established for the first time through elections in this region (Interview, 
February 11, 2012). However, the second and third WUA presidents of Betwa WUA have not been 
very active and not many WUA meetings have been organized. Paras Nath was elected as TC member 
in 2011 of Betwa WUA, and is also one of the signatories for undertaking any financial transaction of 
the WUA, candidly remarks: 
“I have no idea when WUA meetings happen. There was only one WUA meeting before 
Diwali (an Indian festival which in 2011 was in October-end). I have not spoken to the 
president since then. I have no idea what my responsibilities as TC member are! TC is not 
a vishesh pad (significant post)” (Interview, January 12, 2012). 
To elucidate the background of Paras Nath, he owns 2.4 hectares of land, and considers himself a 
small farmer compared to other large farmers in the region who on an average own 15 hectares. 
Though, a TC member, Paras Nath does not take any interest in WUA activities. His papers for 
nomination as TC member were filed last minute at the behest of one of the contenders for WUA 
president post Raghav Raj of Amla village, as there was no one from Betwa village who had shown 
interest in being elected as TC member. Given, Paras Nath was the only who filed papers for the post 
of TC member, he was elected without any contestation in September 2011.  
Interestingly, competent authority/sub engineer ensures signature of TC members in the minute’s 
book for WUA meetings, although they don’t go for meetings. Paras Nath further reports that the 
sub engineer or one of the irrigation functionaries (watchmen/timekeeper) gets his signature on the 
minutes book, although he had been to only one meeting (till December). According to Agarwal’s 
(2001, p. 1624) typology, Paras Nath’s participation in WUA meetings and functioning falls between 
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nominal and passive participation. As he does not really undertake any WUA work, but because he is 
one of the signatory in Betwa WUA to withdraw money from WUA account, he is informed ex post 
facto of decisions. Furthermore, given, that competent authority comes to Paras Nath to get his 
signature on minutes of the meeting, though he has not attended any, it becomes evident that there 
is an effort made to carry forward an official narrative in which everything is fine (meetings are 
happening on time, quorum of meeting is maintained, etc.), even though the reality is different. 
Efforts made by sub engineers/competent authorities to maintain official records are reflective of the 
structural constraints that they face which necessitates them to maintain records up-to-date. 
Informally, the officials in SAS project office are aware that the situation being portrayed is incorrect, 
but no one wants to make efforts and change the official narrative/discourse, and the status quo is 
being maintained (Field notes, December 2011). Another TC member, Madhav Ram, of Betwa WUA 
in the second term (from 2006-2011) remarks, ‘there is no point of WUAs. Presidents’ here are not 
very active. Vidisha (district) is more active politically and has more prosperous farmers’ (Interview, 
February 11, 2012).  
Coming to the situation in Saraswati WUA, Dilip Singh Maina (TC member of Saraswati WUA) 
narrates his experience of participating in one of the meeting that executive engineer of SAS Project 
organized to take stock of the water situation. Reflecting on his participation in meetings, he points 
to the inherent bias that department officials have against farmers, which becomes evident from 
their interactions. He argues, ‘officials in these meetings are very uptight and don’t let farmers speak 
up and there have been several occasions when farmers opinion on management (of irrigation 
water) are ridiculed/rebutted by officials’ (Dilip Singh Maina, December 6, 2012). A similar account is 
presented by another former WUA president, who narrates his experience with a former executive 
engineer of SAS Project, ‘the executive engineer did not provide space for the presidents’ to present 
their proposals on water management in meetings’. Furthermore, comparing the attitude and 
behaviour of two executive engineers of SAS Project, this former WUA president posits that the 
former executive engineer was better as he respected them, and offered them tea (signifier of basic 
courtesy). However the other executive engineer did not even make provisions for tea during the 
meetings. Mahesh Singh further argues: 
“The executive engineer was doing it on purpose to make them feel the hierarchy and 
show the presidents that they were below him. This is evident from his behaviour. You 
can call us president or consumer; all officials are lower than the consumer. But today 
opposite is happening. Even farmer are not able to understand that their standing is 
above officials. They think that their standing is below officials, I don’t know when this 
feeling will change and there will be awareness among the farmers as well” (Interview, 
December 10, 2011).  
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My observation is similar from few meetings I attended at the WRD office in Vidisha. The structural 
superiority that the officials think they have because of being part of WRD is quite evident. The WRD 
officials are aware that they hold the key to irrigation in this region given that irrigation projects are 
state property and farmer organization only have responsibility to manage water. Thus, bureaucracy 
addresses (as is evident from above citations) participation of farmers in WUA as a procedural 
matter, which can be achieved by ensuring that all the paperwork is up to date. This belief is coming 
from the statist mind-set of an interventionist developmental state. Although it is noteworthy, PIM 
was initiated at the national and state level due to discussion on two contrasting ideologies 
neoliberalism and communitarianism – both of which emphasize farmer participation in irrigation 
management and lesser role of state. There has been change in ideology (to an extent) in the 
national and state narrative; however, the modus operandi of the junior bureaucracy has not 
changed who still holds on to old worldview of functioning. Thus, this resistance within bureaucracy 
also signifies the clash between two ideologies that they grapple with in their day-to-day functioning. 
As the change in state ideology demands a change in their mode of functioning but junior 
bureaucracy is still holding on to earlier statist ideology and beliefs. 
The importance members of farmer organizations give to state structure is also evident from minutes 
of meetings of WRD, ICEF and WUA president. In one such meeting after the first tenure of WUAs, 
some of the WUA presidents’ resolved to ensure attendance of all WUA presidents by institutional 
shaming. To elaborate, perusing through minutes of the meeting makes it evident that WUA 
presidents agreed that if any WUA president does not come for two meetings consecutively then this 
should be reported to the PIM director, WRD Bhopal (GoMP, 2004b). This is indicative of importance 
of state structure in WUA presidents’ ideational realm who rather than using peer pressure to ensure 
presence of other presidents’ in meetings suggested that the PIM Director in Bhopal should be 
informed. Minutes of the meeting also elucidate that WUA presidents believe that state and its 
functionaries are supreme and based on this belief they suggest that institutional shaming could 
force the absentee presidents to attend meetings related to irrigation management. Here farmer 
organization members’ viewpoint on participation is not something voluntary that they ought to do 
to ensure better management. Rather the idea of participation in ideational realm of farmer 
organization members’ connotes it to an obligation that can be achieved if the PIM Directorate 
intervenes and thus legitimacy of state structure and state ideology becomes evident.  
A former WUA president echoes a similar viewpoint, ‘only proper meetings that happen are the one 
in district collector’s office (referring to the District Water Utilization Committee Meeting). 
Otherwise, no one really does meetings. All work happens through informal conversation over phone 
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or when farmers meet each other in villages’ (Interview, December 10, 2011). To recall from 
discussion in chapter six, DWUC is an intermediary level committee that is chaired by district 
collector and has representatives from all relevant departments wherein decision on when to open 
canals and water distribution is taken since the late 1980s when the project was commissioned. 
Farmers attend the DWUC meeting; however, the district collector and executive engineer are the 
key decision makers. Whilst, distributory and project committee were envisaged after the enactment 
of the PIM Act to take over management of water at the regional level. However, the idea of having 
distributory committee and project committee was to devolve responsibility to farmers through 
these committees though this has not happened. 
Additionally, reflecting on the issue of lack of participation by farmers in WUAs, the current president 
of Saraswati WUA Samrat Singh states, ‘participation, is not happening as people are not educated 
enough, so they cannot understand the system, and perhaps we cannot explain them as well’ 
(Interview, August 9, 2011). It becomes evident that Samrat Singh reflected on his position and the 
situation around him and thus posits that institutional strengthening and legitimacy of farmer 
organizations has not happened.cxiii This awareness of Samrat Singh comes from his reflection of field 
reality he argues for greater discussion at the WUA/village level to bring awareness about role of 
farmer organizations. Here, there is an assumption that farmers are not aware as they are 
uneducated and thus do not understand the importance of these organizations. Samar Singh is elite 
of the village as discussed earlier, and his belief/understanding about Samrat Singh is an offshoot of 
colonial and interventionist developmental state ideology. Wherein it was presumed that 
management of system can be done by co-option of local leaders who in turn can manage their 
subjects without change in status quo (see chapter four). Although, Kaviraj (2010) has indicated that 
the centrist project of the state against pre-capitalist social relations has been ineffective, which 
brings forth the dichotomy of traditional versus modern in irrigation (See Sengupta, 1985). 
Additionally, this indicates that the idea of statist mind-set at the local level needs to be further 
unpacked, which is done subsequently in this dissertation. Furthermore, the bureaucratic structure 
has been also affected by the shadows of class and culture at least at the lower level. Kaviraj (1990, 
p. 156) in fact posits that acknowledgement of double movement - logic of political change and logic 
of social order - is necessary to understand how the change in quotidian living is extraordinarily long 
compared to change in politics and ideas at higher levels. 
To substantiate, constitution and functioning of sub committees as directed by the Act has not 
happened. Sub-committees formed are mostly on paper. For instance, Samrat Singh, President of 
Saraswati WUA points out that they have only three sub committees: works committee, dispute 
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resolution committee and finance and accounts committee (Interview, August 5, 2011). The current 
WUA president of Betwa WUA has no idea about sub committees, he remarks that ‘yes, on paper sub 
committees are there, but not really functioning’ (Interview, February 14, 2012). The current TC 
members of Betwa WUA expressed no awareness or knowledge about sub committees or their 
functioning (Interview, January 12 and February 11, 2012). Additionally, level of participation of 
other line departments i.e. agriculture, horticulture, fisheries, and animal husbandry in the 
management committee meetings is very low/limited/negligible (Strategy Report of Betwa Basin 
prepared by SMEC and submitted to Executive Engineer, SAS Project, Division No. 2, WRD).  
8.2.2 Function of WUA: maintenance of records 
One of the responsibilities that were handed over to farmer organizations, post WUA elections, was 
maintenance of records. The PIM Act necessitates all WUA records and documentation ought to be 
with WUAs.cxiv Consequently, as stipulated in the Act, WRD transferred all relevant records (and their 
maintenance) to WUAs through sub engineers (competent authorities) who also hold post of 
secretary in WUAs with the intent that these records would be easily accessible to WUA members. In 
actuality, however, the situation of maintenance of records is different.  
Field discussion with president of Saraswati and Betwa WUA and with several other (thirteen) WUA 
presidents of the SAS Project elucidates that records as stipulated in the Act are not being 
maintained by WUAs. Most of the WUA presidents’ denied having records with them, though, 
presidents like Samrat Singh recognize the importance of records being with them (Interview, August 
5, 2011). In case of Saraswati WUA some basic records, and maps are available with Samrat Singh at 
his home (he lives in a close by town) but book of accounts, minute’s book, etc. are maintained and 
kept by sub engineer either at his home or in Vidisha office.cxv Contrastingly, the current president 
(Mohan Patel) of Betwa WUA seemed reluctant to keep the WUA records with himself and considers 
it as an additional responsibility. Mohan Patel has been part of Betwa WUA in the first two terms as 
TC member and since 2011 as WUA President. Therefore, he is aware of the details of WUA 
functioning, but is reluctant to confront WRD officials. (Interview, December 7, 2011). In fact, Mohan 
Patel does not even take much interest in WUA functioning. In 2011 while doing fieldwork, it became 
apparent that Mohan Patel rarely attended meetings organized by the executive engineer’s office to 
take stock of the water and irrigation situation in the project region (Field notes, February 2012).  
There are several structural reasons for WUAs not maintaining the records: the Act does not 
specify/provision for office space for WUAs. Without office space, WUA presidents like Samrat Singh 
(president Saraswati WUA) are reluctant to keep records. Additionally, according to the act INR 5000 
Quotidian Practices Shape Functioning of WUA 
 
 
 
 
203 
are given to WUAs to purchase office supplies annually. Enquiries about how this money is spent, did 
not elicit any clear response by WUA presidents or sub engineers -they cursorily remarked that 
adjustments are made in the budget by falsifying bills, for instance, to make up for the fuel spent on 
travels done for WUA work. Moreover, WUA presidents’ (of Saraswati and Betwa WUA) expressed 
their displeasure that they have to do work without being paid any honorarium. They also lamented 
that they are not paid anything to cover for the fuel cost that they spend on (Interview, August 5, 
2011; August 29, 2011). Thus, it is not surprising that adjustments are made for taking account of INR 
5000 on paper.cxvi The above narration elucidates embedding of corruption as a given in the 
ideational realm of both farmer organization members and bureaucracy. As corruption has been 
normalized and perceived as a given in the worldview of both the bureaucracy and elite farmers. In 
context of rural north India, Jeffrey (2002, p. 21) has discussed the interrelationship between 
corruption and class production wherein he articulates how low-level corruption by junior officials is 
manifested in their role as patrons or brokers in disbursement of state resources to rich farmers. It is 
a symbiotic relationship, which is beneficial for both the patron and client.cxvii This depiction is correct 
to an extent. However, with WUA Presidents being one of the signatories the relationship no longer 
can be explicated only as a patron-client one. As the neoliberal ideology embedded as tenets of PIM 
envisages greater role for farmer organization and they have equal if not larger share in 
management. The change in state ideology has resulted in change in ideational role. However, 
change in actors’ ideational beliefs and values have not been instant with change in state structural 
rulings. Thus, again mismatch between two ideologies at the micro level becomes evident which has 
complicated the landscape in which policies are implemented.  
Interestingly, however the official narrative portrays the situation in the field better than in actuality, 
a case of justifying sanctity of existing institutional structure.  
“Availability of records has increased as these are being maintained at WUA level only 
(…) competent authorities are good at maintaining the measurement books and similar 
records due to virtue of their experience in the department with record maintenance and 
they continue to do so. Overall, it appears that there has been an improving trend in 
record maintenance and there is better water accounting at WUA level in the project has 
also increased and there speedier availability of updated irrigation records” (MP WALMI, 
2011, p. 55).  
Two things that need to be highlighted from this quotation: first, officials perceive that competent 
authorities are adept at maintaining technical accounts and secondly, another dominant narrative 
that is being created is that there is an improving trend in record maintenance. Though, this was not 
observed in the field. A former WALMI employee and team leader of the consultancy firm recruited 
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under MPWSRP, concurs with the above finding and states that handing over of records has been a 
problem; engineers don’t feel accountable to WUAs and thus have devised ways of not giving up 
these records to WUAs (Interview, November 5, 2011).  
It is also noteworthy that reluctance to give away records also signifies unwillingness of bureaucracy 
to comply with participatory approach diktat. Maintenance of records traditionally has been with the 
bureaucracy, which gave them complete power to falsify records as per their will. However, with 
change in the ideology for irrigation management and lesser role envisaged for state actors under 
neoliberal ideology, farmer organization have been mandated to take over this responsibility. Thus, 
the relationship between (elite) farmers and bureaucracy has changed from earlier patron client 
relationship to now equal partner members in WUA (engineers are secretaries in WUA). Not 
surprisingly, junior bureaucracy has resisted this new diktat by foot dragging the handing over 
process.   
8.2.3 Function of WUA: conflict resolution 
Conflict resolution is one of the responsibilities of WUAs. Most common conflict in this region arises 
due to farmers’ ploughing/erasing of barha (mud field channel) in their fields. There are many 
reasons for farmers ploughing barhas. First, there are umpteen instances where large upstream 
farmers have ploughed barhas that pass from their fields to trouble downstream farmers in order to 
pressurize them to sell their land. Second, in years of poor rainfall there was not enough water for 
irrigation and barhas were not used, thus farmers upstream ploughed them to use that area to 
cultivate. Third, there are no barha maps and once erased conflict arises over where they ought to be 
made. Fourth, many barhas have been erased by farmers due to personal conflict that they have 
with farmers downstream (Field notes, December 2011). However, not all barha conflicts have been 
resolved by WUA (presidents), as presidents have their biases against voters who did not vote for 
them, and this also gets reflected in level of grievance redressal in a particular village of WUA. For 
instance, a former WUA president narrates his experience of resolving a barha issue:  
“Farmers don’t come to presidents to complain/ raise issue. In my tenure I received only 
2-3 complaints in total. Once, Rama (a farmer from one of the upstream villages) had 
come to me for conflict resolution. The situation had become very tense, and there was a 
chance of escalation of conflict. Bhagwan Singh of Saronj village has given his land to 
Rama to cultivate on lease. Rama few years back decided to curtail access of water for 
Sukar Singh (a farmer downstream) by ploughing the barha (field channel) that was 
passing through the middle of his field. Sukar Singh approached me and complained that 
Rama has curtailed his access to irrigation water. In this particular case, I along with sub 
engineer sahab (sir) came up with a solution that de-escalated the conflict. We 
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suggested to Rama that he allow Sukar Singh to make a barha along the field bund 
instead. Similar complaints came to me about not having access to water …” (Mahesh 
Singh, December 10, 2011).  
Mahesh Singh resolved this particular barha issue, as Bhagwan Singh is an influential farmer and 
owner of the land that Rama has taken on lease. Mahesh Singh has strong social ties with Bhagwan 
Singh’s family; he lives in the same village as Bhagwan Singh who is very well respectedcxviii in this 
region. In the aforesaid instance, the interaction between the material and social structures as a 
raison d’étre for shaping Mahesh Singh’s ideational realm/mansikta becomes evident. Given that 
Bhagwan Singh is perceived as an influential farmer, this barha issue was resolved quickly. However, 
there have been cases when two influential farmers clash over barha issues and in such cases the 
resolution is much harder to seek, and the matter ends in court. Additionally, if barha issue involves 
farmers who are not part of the same social group and have opposed the president for instance, then 
WUA presidents do not take much interest to solve barha issue.  
Additionally, post constitution of WUAs, officials do not take interest in conflict resolution, apprises a 
TC member of Saraswati WUA (Dilip Singh Maina, February 7, 2012). This is not surprising as conflict 
resolution is primarily WUAs responsibilities, and engineers do not consider this their primary 
responsibility. However, engineers as competent authority are secretary in WUAs and thus do have 
responsibility to arbitrate conflict being part of the WUA. The competent authority gets involved 
when farmers file written complaint at the department office and then they need to take some 
action. Especially in cases where farmers of more than one WUA are involved, given no distributory 
committee in the project to arbitrate, this work needs to be undertaken by WRD officials. In such 
cases also the competent authority are required to get in touch with WUA presidents’ to resolve 
conflict. The sub engineers try to resolve conflict through discussion with respective WUA presidents 
and farmers. However, given that ploughing of barha is widespread in this region there are numerous 
court cases on conflicts that arise due to ploughing of barhas. A competent authority of the SAS 
Project referring to this problem posited ‘the department has overburdened them with so much 
work – who has the time to do paper work for all these court cases. It takes years to resolve issues, 
better to resolve them informally. Some cases are given priority if local MLAs start taking interest in 
this matter’ (Informal discussion, December 15, 2011). Thus, what becomes evident from the above 
discussion is that conflict resolution mostly happens informally and engineers take action only when 
they are pressurized by MLAs. Similar observation is made by Wade (1982) who has given an 
excellent exposition of problem with canal irrigation from an institutional perspective by pinpointing 
the supply side aspects -personnel transfer- that thrive and sustain the corruption in canal irrigated 
agriculture. However, taking an institutional perspective would entail that bureaucracy (any state 
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functionary) is enchained in their envisaged institutional role, and values. However, this would be a 
simplified understanding of how actors’ function as it would entail overlooking the role of ideas, 
ideology and beliefs, which guides ideational role of actors. For instance, problem of ploughing of 
barhas is recognized in officials meetings. To elaborate: ‘big farmers are not allowing small farmers 
to lay pipes in their fields or to draw irrigation water from their wells. In these villages, capacity 
building of WUAs needs to be done to reduce the social difference between groups’ (Minutes of ICEF 
WRD PIM Project Vidisha, October 31, 2003). Moreover from the above citation it is clear that at the 
project level and in project meetings social/material differentiation as a cause of inequitable access 
to irrigation water is recognized by all actors’ -bureaucracy, NGOs, and WUAs- present in the 
meeting. However, the problem is that this differentiation is also perpetuated by at least two of 
these actors: first, quite actively by WUAs and second, discursively by engineers through their 
actions, which becomes apparent from whose houses they go to when they are in a village, who has 
access to their telephone numbers and who can contact them. The small farmers are hesitant to 
contact/ approach the sub engineer’s directly, and go to the prominent village leaders or WUA 
presidents for grievance redressal. This has resulted in perpetuation of the existing categorical 
inequalities and in conflict resolution. Thus, it becomes evident that class and caste differentiation 
also enriches ideational perspective of actors and thus determinant of their action. 
8.2.4 Function of WUA: water allocation and distribution 
Opening of network of canal: After initiation of decentralization initiative, the decision (date/time) to 
open the canal systems has continued to rest with the chair (district collector) of the District Water 
Utilization Committee (DWUC), as was the case prior to initiation of PIM (see chapter six). Moreover, 
after handing over operation and management of irrigation system to farmer organization the 
ceremonial opening of the canal systems is also still being undertaken by district collector and the 
executive engineer of the project. In year 2011, when I was doing fieldwork, apart from the WRD 
officials, there was presence of local media, few WUA presidents’ and few farmers for the opening 
ceremony. Additionally, a local politician belonging to the right wing political party BJP was also 
present, indicating the significance of the canal in local politics. Photograph 8.2, shows the formal 
opening of the sluice gate by the district collector and executive engineer, which marks the beginning 
of the irrigation season for SAS Project.  
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Photograph 8. 2: Formal opening of the canal network for irrigation in November 2011  
 
After opening of the sluice gate, a short meeting is held at the sluice village where the district 
collector and executive engineer respond to media queries on water availability for upcoming 
irrigation season. The opening ceremony concludes with taking journalists, officials and few farmers 
for a boat ride in the dam waters post lunch. Hierarchy is pervasive in the entire ceremony, which is 
self-evident from Photograph 8.2 as well. Only officials are part of the small ceremonial ritual, while 
farmers and rest of the officials stand at a distance and are silent spectators. Moreover, it is 
noteworthy that although through PIM ethos of decentralized management has been initiated, the 
power to decide date and time of opening of the canal system or the ceremonial opening of the 
system remained with the district collector and executive engineer, which is a signifier of authority 
and power that still vests with bureaucrats, and there have been no efforts to hand over even 
ceremonial openings to farmer organizations. This is an issue of significance as display of power and 
hierarchy during opening of the canal system signifies and reinforces farmer worldview that state is 
still an important actor and controls water distribution. Thus, it becomes evident that the current 
approach to irrigation management has misread the pulse of two significant actors’ junior 
bureaucracy and farmers who are at loggerheads and guided by their worldview on how institutions 
for irrigation management ought to function. The following sections further advance this discussion 
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by elaborating how divergent ideologies and beliefs of farmers, farmer organization members and 
junior bureaucracy has been a roadblock for functioning of WUAs. 
The sluice gate opens water from the dam into the main canal. Flow of water from main canal to RBC 
and LBC is controlled by gate where main canal bifurcates into RBC and LBC (see Figure 8.3).  
Figure 8. 3: Canal network of SAS Project 
 
Source: SAS Project Office, Division No. 2, WRD, Vidisha 
From Figure 8.3, it is evident that canal network of the SAS Project is big. However, there are 
minimum required gates in the canal network, only at spots where canals bifurcate into 
distributaries, which also makes water regulation difficult. Additionally, volumetric water supply for 
water distribution is not being undertaken in the project. 
Water budgeting: According to the PIM Act, farmer organizations are supposed to prepare a 
tentative programme for releasing water through various distributaries i.e. prepare water budget. As 
mentioned previously SAS Project does not have distributory and project committee at the 
intermediate level. Therefore, overall water distribution at the project level and at distributory level 
i.e. for LBC, RBC and SBC is still in the rein of WRD officials.  
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At the micro level, WUAs are responsible to prepare a water budget for their respective area. 
However, in actuality WUA Presidents do not prepare water budget. In fact, the executive engineer 
of the project posits that in WUA meetings he has urged WUA presidents to prepare a water budget 
and plan for water allocation (Interview, October 12, 2011; December 7, 2011). I have also witnessed 
him urging WUA presidents to take up this responsibility in one of the meetings. However, WUAs 
have not shown keenness to take up this responsibility. Reflecting on the reasons for WUAs not 
taking up this responsibility, Prabhat Singh, who has been WUA president for a decade now, points 
out: 
“Problem is that at present the department manages water allocation and has the 
responsibility of opening and closing the gates of the canal network. Until this 
responsibility/control is given to farmer organizations, it is very difficult to change 
anything, as farmers are aware that department (functionaries) has control over water 
as they operate the gates” (Interview, December 17, 2011).  
Prabhat Singh evinces the futility of making a water budget given the knowledge that operation of 
gates i.e. control of the network is in the hands of WRD. WUA presidents can exercise control only by 
keeping in touch with lower functionaries of WRD and competent authority and asking them to 
increase/decrease the flow of water. The strength of WUA president’s assertion depends on their 
personality, thus, is individual centric. For instance, the president of Saraswati WUA (Samrat Singh) is 
a young and dynamic leader and keeps regularly in touch with department functionaries. Although, 
he does not live in the village, he travels often to select WUA villages (which are on the head and 
middle reach) from where he received vote to listen/resolve any irrigation water related problems.  
Contrastingly, the current president of Betwa WUA (Mohan Patel) who is from patel (traditional 
authority) family of Karamkheri and also resides in the village does not go to other villages of Betwa 
WUA to assess water availability for farmers or curtail wastage of water or for conflict resolution. 
During the time of data collection, Mohan Patel was busy with construction of his house and did not 
spare much time for WUA activity. Farmers observed that they saw him only once at the canal, to 
resolve problem of a farmer he has familial ties with in Betwa village (Field notes, February 2012).  
Here viewpoint on participation of active farmer organization members like Prabhat Singh is evident. 
They seek a more substantial role for farmer organization rather than tokenism, which is being 
perpetuated by bureaucracy strategically by keeping control of intermediate level distribution of 
water (discussed in following section). The idea of substantial participation emerges from beliefs and 
success stories of community based natural resource management, which farmers in the region are 
aware of. Moreover, Mohan Patel’s disinterest in WUA activities is a sign of disenchantment from the 
Quotidian Practices Shape Functioning of WUA 
 
 
 
 
210 
institutionalized idea of participation. Mohan Patel’s learning is coming from his knowledge of WUA 
functioning since the beginning first as a TC member and most recently as WUA president, he 
recognizes and has internalized the limited scope for undertaking participatory work through WUAs 
in the current scenario. It is noteworthy that institutionalist explanations here would explicate lack of 
appropriate participatory climate in WUAs due to institutional reluctance, path dependence and 
inertia. However, as noted in chapter three: ideas, ideology, beliefs, values, norms matter and thus it 
can be argued that reluctance of Mohan Patel to actively participate in WUA is due to his 
internalization of the instrumental idea of participation having taken a certain institutional form in 
WUAs due to salience of actor’s ideational realm. However, Mohan Patel despite being aware of the 
scenario still has been associated with WUA as he has political ambitions and being the president 
heightens his social status. Thus, it becomes evident that different ideas, belief systems drive actors’ 
worldview and this impacts functioning of WUA. 
Distribution of water: A former WUA president and resident of Betwa WUA, reflecting on the current 
practice of water distribution states: 
“Till the Act is implemented in letter, nothing will change… all presidents think 
(obviously) about their vote bank only; and ensures that they get as many rounds of 
irrigation (water) they require (…). Presidents downstream can only request for water, 
they cannot do anything else. If the president upstream shows some reham dilli (kind 
heartedness) then perhaps the farmers downstream will benefit” (Mahesh Singh, 
December 10, 2011).  
In the above citation the former WUA president is referring to lack of intermediate level committees 
as a roadblock for WUAs to function fully. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, water 
budgeting is not being done by WUAs, as there are no gates or volumetric devices to 
control/measure water. This also necessitates having a modernized irrigation network to ensure that 
WUA presidents can do their work. Behram Singh the distributory committee president in the first 
term posits that during his presidency of distributory committee, they had tried to bring all 
presidents on board and had initiated a system of discussing water needs and requirement of 
upstream and downstream farmers. But after the distributory committee’s tenure ended, it has been 
difficult to initiate any talk with upstream and downstream presidents and it’s the department, which 
controls water distribution. Thus, it becomes evident that lack of intermediate level committees -a 
structural constraint- has resulted in poor coordination between upstream and downstream WUAs. 
Furthermore, stability/resilience of any organization is tested by how it performs during crisis. WUAs 
of this region also faced this test during the time of water scarcity from 2007-2010.cxix In these years 
canals were run for shorter period of time, for instance in the year 2007, the canal was run only for 
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about 30 days. During this time period, WUA president’s interest (and participation thereof) in 
irrigation matters dwindled. However, these are the times when politics of water access and 
allocation becomes most evident. Two currently serving WUA presidents’ (Samrat Singh and 
Ramdhari) narrating their experience of this time (of scarcity) state:  
“During the first term of WUAs most of the presidents were active, however, in the 
second term due to poor rainfall presidents’ and farmers did not take much interest in 
WUA activity. Everyone got tube wells installed” (Interview, August 9, 2011).  
However, access of water for WUAs cannot be explicated this simplistically. A former WUA President 
and project committee president in the first term provides another narrative, and elucidates that 
during scarcity, one of the WUA president had approached the local BJP MLA who pressurized the 
department officials to ensure water for his vote bank. Giving into political pressure, this tail end 
area was provided with water by stopping water flow in all other canals (Bhagwan Singh, October 3, 
2012; Interview, December 17, 2011). From the above distinct citations two crucial aspects that drive 
notion of ideational realm are evident: first, active WUA presidents connote their participation in 
WUAs to them being responsible to provide water to farmers in his WUA. However, being aware of 
the local situation they know that they have limited control over water distribution (as discussed 
above). Thus some of them tap their friendly political connections to ensure farmers get water. Local 
MLAs generally oblige in such situations as this legitimizes their position in the political society. Thus, 
farmers who pursue and thrive on tenets of patron client ideology approach the MLA. However, give 
that not all WUA presidents took interest in their work it also led to many farmers getting their own 
tube wells installed especially in Betwa WUA which also signifies disenchantment at the local level of 
the current ideology, beliefs and values that drives irrigation management. 
WUAs need to propagate cropping calendar in sync with water availability: After SAS project was 
commissioned a crop calendar conducive for irrigated agriculture in kharif and rabi season was 
prepared. According to this cropping calendar, farmers in SAS project ought to cultivate hybrid and 
ordinary variety of wheat in the rabi season and paddy, fodder, groundnut, pulses, and some 
soybean in the kharif season. Sugarcane was also planned/suggested as a perennial crop for 
cultivation in this region (GoMP, 1976). Additionally, during time of scarcity farmers are advised to 
cultivate low water intensive crops. However, (upstream) farmers do not practice crop diversification 
in times of scarcity and these results in greater stress for farmers downstream. Interestingly, the 
cropping pattern of this region has not changed much since the 1990s (see annexure VIII for details 
on per unit area cropped). Farmers of this region still cultivate soybean in kharif season, and wheat is 
the favoured crop for rabi cultivation. Given, that soybean continues to gain popularity as kharif 
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crop, in SAS Project region there has still not been any demand from farmers for (irrigation) water for 
kharif season as soybean is mostly rainfed. So, the basic tenet for irrigation management that was 
there in 1980s and 1990s continues unabated, i.e. farmers have more than required quantity of 
water for irrigation for rabi cropping and this leads to wastage of water. WUAs have not been able to 
propagate crop varieties in sync with water availability (especially for upstream farmers).  
Additionally, as discussed in chapter seven, in the 1980s and 1990s efforts made for judicious 
management of irrigation water by farmer organizations or the bureaucracy were also not successful. 
A Central Water Commission report, points towards the unwillingness of officials to change initially 
as the reason for non-adoption of kharif cultivation practices as envisaged for the SAS Project in its 
detailed project report (CWC, 2006, p. 104).  
8.2.5 Function of WUA: operation and maintenance of canals 
Condition of canals and budget for operation and maintenance: When WUA presidents were elected 
for first time in 2000, there was much more enthusiasm amongst them to get work done. A former 
president of Betwa WUA, Behram Singh who was also elected the distributory committee president 
in the first term points out: 
“When the canals were handed over to the WUAs in 2000, the condition of canals was 
poor, and one could not release more than 125-130 cusec of water through minor 
channels, as otherwise there was lot of seepage and breeches. It’s only after we have 
deepened the minor channels that we were able to even run 200-300 cusec; SDO sahab 
(sir) was not in favour of this, and made sure that I had given it in writing that I was 
running the canal with more than its designed capacity (…).  
After WUA elections were held, farmers used to approach me for irrigation water related 
issue. Farmers are related to us, and if they did not receive water they used to call me to 
address this issue. The command area of the canal network is quite big, it expanses to 
35-40 kilometres. In such a big area, some farmers are automatically left out. One needs 
to take risk, without taking risk it is not possible to ensure access of water for farmers, 
and thereby meet requirement of farmers who are in my area. 
Work on canals is not done according to the Act. Rules are made in offices, and not by 
looking at the field reality. There is not enough budget with a WUA to undertake physical 
work, they should either increase budget or stop conducting elections, as there is no 
point really of WUAs as one cannot get any work done in INR 50 per hectare…for 
instance, in context of Betwa WUA, how can one get work done on 10 minor canals 
(approximately 1000 hectares) in INR 50,000. I even met MLAs from both BJP and 
Congress at the state level to increase the budget and get more funds for my WUA. I was 
able to get money from the local MLA for building a footbridge and also for doing some 
O&M work at the deep cut site” (Interview, August 29, 2011). 
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It becomes evident from the above quotation that Behram Singh during his first tenure as Betwa 
WUA president had taken huge risks to ensure access of water for his electorate. As mentioned 
previously he is a dynamic leader, who has political connections and was very close to the then local 
MLA from BJP. Interestingly, this MLA had personal stake in this area, he owns about ten hectares of 
land in Chapna (Behram Singh’s village). So, he also supported Behram Singh’s work and had given 
funds to Betwa WUA to make a footbridge to improve commute for farmers. Behram Singh is an 
active WUA president so was able to raise funds for footbridge through the MLA fund. However, not 
all presidents are active and are neither successful in mobilizing additional resources for WUA 
functioning. Additionally, from the above lengthy citation the problems with the current procedural 
approach to irrigation management are evident, wherein not enough funds are provided to carry out 
operation and maintenance of canals. To recall, financial bleeding of irrigation bureaucracy was the 
reason to hand over management of irrigation systems to farmer organizations. However, the 
current approach to devolution of functions has not fostered creation of sustainable independent 
farmer organizations. This has led to farmer organization presidents likes Behram Singh approach 
local MLAs for additional funds which has nurtured vote bank politics at the local level - a defining 
feature of patron client relationship. Pursuance of this belief has also led to greater divide between 
bureaucracy and farmer organizations as WUA presidents exercise their agency by approaching the 
MLAs for action. This approach to participation (viewed here as getting WUA work done i.e. 
providing water to farmers) has created a rift between farmer organization members and junior 
bureaucracy and made implementation of PIM a complex endeavour. Likewise, Samrat Singh, 
president of Saraswati WUA, reflects on the state of affairs in the last decade:  
“Sensible and educated presidents take irrigation work seriously. Those who are aware 
about the basics of what samitis (committees) ought to have, what are its powers they 
can change management process. But presidents who are not aware of the basics don’t 
know what samiti ought to have and thus initiating any change or questioning the status 
quo is obviously out of question. We need more dabang (bold) presidents. 
Furthermore, the budget for operation and maintenance was prepared in the first term (i.e. in the 
year 2000) by the WUA presidents with the aid of sub engineers. Two politically active WUA 
presidents from SAS Project posit that this changed approximately after 2003-04 (Interview, August 
9, 2011). cxx  
“The atmosphere, was good till then, things were neat and clean. About then they 
started asking us for commission from the WUA operation and maintenance budget. If 
we did not give commission to WRD functionaries then they used to find problem with 
our estimates. They used to say that we did not do accounts correctly, or used to verbally 
give us an approval that budget will be approved so we used to get physical work done. 
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But later they used to find problems with the budget estimation and argued that 
paperwork is incorrect so we will be paid lesser. They troubled presidents like this for 
some time and gradually they took over the paperwork as presidents refuse to function 
like this. We had even complained to the principal secretary WRD, but he was also 
corrupt, so what will he do. There are cases against him”. 
Samrat Singh further recounts that this situation worsened in 2009. To elaborate: 
In 2009 the executive engineer sahib (sir) was asking for 10 per cent commission instead 
of the regular 5-7 per cent, to release the budget for operation and maintenance. 
Fourteen of us (referring to other WUA presidents) got together and presented the 
budget and requested for its approval. We told the executive engineer that we will go to 
the district collector and collectively submit our resignations if he does not release the 
budget. The executive engineer told us not to submit our resignations and go to the 
collector, as entire administration from top to the bottom will be shaken up if fourteen 
presidents from a major project resign simultaneously (…) the executive engineer then 
called all sub engineers and threatened them that he will suspend everyone if he does 
not get his commission, and he does not care if the sub engineers give it from their own 
pocket (…) the executive engineer did not care about the status of the canals as long as 
he received his commission. Sub engineers then had no choice. They devised ways to take 
out the extra money from the WUA budget. For instance, they indicated on paper that 
JCBs (earth excavator machine) run for 60 hours when they run it only for 40 hours. This 
misreporting does not get reflected in social audits as sub engineer does the audit 
himself. So, on paper, everything is correct (…) it is very important to have active 
presidents. There are only about five active presidents in this project. If presidents are 
not active then too much stake is in hands of sub engineers (…) we get about INR 60,000 
for undertaking repair and maintenance, and this is not enough. INR 5000 anyway gets 
wasted in giving commission, as everyone takes their share. I don’t give commission but 
sub engineer does, I don’t know how he manages (…) Saadhan also facilitated in 
questioning the status quo. Saadhan had complained to officials in Bhopal about this 
commission nexus and after that the executive engineer started taking commission from 
sub engineers and not WUA presidents (…) now sub engineer’s trouble us. They make 
wrong estimates and only listen to what we have to say if we agree to pay commission” 
(Interview, August 5, 2011).  
The WUA presidents were threatening to resign as the executive engineer wanted to increase his 
commission to 10 per cent from the earlier accepted norm of 5-7 per cent. Therefore, in this context, 
Samrat Singh laments that there are not enough WUA presidents who are aware about basics of 
WUA functioning and who can question the status quo. Moreover, it becomes evident that 
corruption is pervasive in operation and maintenance work and institutionalized in irrigation 
management.cxxi Thus, is an accepted norm in elite farmers (WUA members) ideational realm. 
Additionally the above citation highlights the consequence of introducing participatory process in 
irrigation management i.e. questioning the existing status quo - the established rent seeking practice 
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in operation and maintenance of irrigation system. The confrontation by WUA presidents led to 
shifting of the burden of paying commission to get budget approval from the WUA to sub engineers. 
However, the blasé approach of the executive engineer to irrigation management cannot be 
overlooked either. The executive engineer’s confidence to approach corruption so blatantly gains 
strength from institutional backing of state structure. Although, the above narration also highlights 
salience of an alternative belief that is strength of participatory processes (though still in its 
rudimentary stage) and deliberative discussion process that has been activated due to change in 
ideology for resource management. Thus, due to change in ideology there are varying ideational 
realms guided by old and new ideas, beliefs, which have confronted the existing status quo. Role of 
Saadhan in facilitating deliberation at the micro level in context of highlighting and questioning rent 
seeking practices also needs a mention, as they not only created awareness which resulted in lesser 
corruption at local level, but they also raised this issue with WRD officials in Bhopal. 
Overall, president of Saraswati WUA (which is on the head reach) is more active than the one of 
Betwa WUA (tail end). Samrat Singh, though active also has biases against farmers who did not vote 
for him. For instance, he does not visit tail end villages like Amlakheri and Sadaiya that have 
predominantly Maina community. Additionally, from these two villages there have been contenders 
for WUA president post in the last three elections. It is also noteworthy that the command area of 
Saraswati WUA is huge, and if one takes the road from Saraswati to Amlakheri or Sadaiya the 
distance is about 30-35 km. Hence, a huge command area is also a reason for WUA presidents not 
being able to travel everywhere, especially given that the president post is not salaried or receive any 
honorarium. Similarly, biases of presidents’ also are reflected in what work is prioritized for repair 
and maintenance; frequency and level of grievance redressal in a particular village of WUA; and 
accessibility in terms of time of WUA president to their opposing groups in WUA.  
Mohan Patel president of Betwa WUA was not active during the time I was undertaking fieldwork. As 
mentioned earlier, he did not go for meetings at the executive engineer’s office, and also did not visit 
the rest of the Betwa command area. Although, Mohan Patel was also clear that he would only visit 
areas where he received vote from, which primarily was Karamkheri, Sadhai and Radhakheri. Rest of 
the villages in Betwa WUA, he had not even gone to campaign for his candidature as there were 
other contestants from those villages. Additionally, these areas are also where there have been past 
social rivalry between patels of Karamkheri and Rajput’s (Bhagvan Singh’s family) of Saronj, for 
instance.  
Lack of functionaries: WUAs in the SAS project region are toothless tigers. For instance, Samrat Singh 
posits that in Saraswati WUA, earlier there were four chowkidaars (watchmen), two however died 
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and two have retired. Thus, at present there are not enough chowkidaars /functionaries in Saraswati 
WUA. The same is the case for other WUAs. Furthermore, he posits ‘WUA president is a position 
without any resource, so, what is the point of doing decentralization’ (ibid.). According to the Act 
there is no provision for recruiting new chowkidaars in the department, as WUAs are envisaged to do 
protection and management of irrigation system by soliciting farmer participation.cxxii  
The idea and essence of operation and maintenance by farmer organization is that WUAs will provide 
water to farmer’s at most appropriate time and in requisite quantities. This necessitates, regulating 
the flow of water, patrolling over canals to ensure there is no out of turn irrigation or canal breaches, 
and to curtail wastage of water. From the discussion in this section, it is evident that regulating flow 
of water is not in hands of farmer organizations yet. Additionally, for patrolling there are not enough 
chowkidaars (watchmen) with WUAs to undertake proper patrolling of canals. The department has 
not made any new recruitment for lower functionary and many of the old chowkidaar have retired or 
died. So, WUAs currently have shortage of chowkidaar in the SAS Project. The PIM Act necessitates 
that WUAs will be responsible for patrolling and it was expected that farmers will participate, in fact 
take over patrolling, therefore no additional funds are available to recruit chowkidaar at present. 
However, patrolling has not been taken over by farmers. To recall from findings of chapter seven, the 
irrigation bureaucracy had functionaries to assist in water distribution. This is not the case, at present 
though.  
8.2.6 Function of WUA: facilitate collection of irrigation fee 
One of the responsibilities of WUAs under the PIM Act is to facilitate amin (accountant/person 
responsible for revenue collection) in collection of irrigation fees. Additionally, WUAs can also 
mobilize their own resources and impose penalties (GoMP, 1999). Figure 8.4 illustrates status of 
revenue recovery in SAS Project since its inception.  
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Figure 8. 4:  Year wise revenue recovery in SAS Project 
 
Source: Design by author based on data from GoMP (2011b) 
From Figure 8.4, it is evident that revenue recovery in the SAS Project has been abysmal. The highest 
revenue recovery (about 49 per cent) in the project was in 1981-82, in its initial years. The lowest 
revenue recovery in the project was in 1990-1991 i.e. 5.42 per cent. Figure 8.4 also illustrates that 
post constitution of WUAs there has been no significant improvement in revenue recovery. Poor 
rainfall and consequently less water in the dam from 2007-2011 has been one of reasons for poor 
revenue recovery in the last few years. However, given the abysmal revenue recovery in general it is 
evident that poor revenue recovery is not just contingent on poor rainfall or climatic factors. Rather 
is a systemic problem, as revenue recovery was poor even when WUAs were not constituted and 
during good rainfall years too. To elaborate, the state has not taken any strict political measures to 
enforce irrigation revenue recovery from defaulters. For instance, the irrigation revenue recovery in 
Saraswati WUA is about 60 per cent and there were 144 defaulters by in 2011 (SAS Office, Division 
No. 2, WRD Vidisha). Whilst situation in Betwa WUA is even worse, given that it is on the tail end. 
Saadhan’s closure report also points out the poor revenue recovery in Betwa WUA and other WUAs 
where it worked.  
The irrigation fee for each WUA annually is contingent on how many farmers sign an agreement with 
the department every year for availing irrigation water. Irrigation fee depends on number of 
watering, type of crop and whether the watering is for palewa (pre sowing) or post sowing. For 
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instance, palewa costs INR 125 per hectare; wheat costs INR 125 per hectare for each watering; gram 
costs INR 75 per watering (GoMP, 2012a, p. 8). Post constitution of WUAs, the WUA presidents of 
Saraswati and Betwa WUA have handled this responsibility of facilitating collection of irrigation 
revenue differently. WUA presidents’ of Saraswati WUA, Surjan Singh and Samrat Singh had taken 
interest in revenue recovery. They accompanied amin (accountant/person responsible for revenue 
collection) at designated days and time to villages where farmers gathered to pay revenue (Amin, 
Saraswati WUA, February 10, 2012). The situation has been different in Betwa WUA where only the 
first WUA president, Behram Singh took interest in facilitating revenue recovery (Field notes, August 
2011). Chapter seven elucidates cases of how amins under and/or over report irrigated area by 
taking bribes from farmers. After implementation of the PIM Act and constitution of WUAs, this 
practice of under and/or over reporting has continued and farmers in both the select WUAs have 
benefitted from paying lesser irrigation dues at the cost of state treasury (Field notes, January 2012).  
An interesting initiative was started by Saraswati WUA president in early 2012 (at almost the end of 
my field research) to curb corruption in collection of irrigation revenue. Samrat Singh was making an 
inventory of area irrigated per farmer in select WUA villages in order to calculate how much irrigation 
revenue ought to be collected by the treasury. Samrat Singh was undertaking this exercise to assess 
what is the gap in collection of irrigation fee and if he could use this information to pressurize the 
amin to be fairer in collecting irrigation dues - a persistent problem in this region (Interview, 
February 12, 2012). It is evident from this initiative of Samrat Singh, that he was devising new 
strategies to question the status quo i.e. the existing norm that makes it acceptable for amin to 
falsify records and collect lesser irrigation revenue for the exchequer. Thus, it becomes evident that 
Samrat Singh was initiating a new ‘politics of presence’cxxiii by initiating new process of participation 
by and contesting the current approach of amin to collect irrigation revenue. 
8.2.7 Other critical issues 
Capacity building: Various capacity building programmes for farmer organization that have been 
undertaken by the state government since 2001 was mentioned in chapter five. Briefly, I elucidate 
the effectiveness of these capacity building programmes in facilitating WUAs to function better. A 
former WUA president narrates his experience of capacity building programme:   
“The capacity building by WALMI is just a formality (…). Capacity building programme 
under MPWSRP has been a farce; no one came to train us. Moreover, their practices 
were corrupt. They came to the village and recruited people as community organizers 
who had no knowledge/experience (…). Work of Saadhan under ICEF was better. If they 
had continued their work here, then farmers definitely would have been more aware of 
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PIM Act. Farmers paid more attention to work done under ICEF scheme, as they had 
given 10 per cent contribution to get work done. ICEF was a good scheme as people 
reflected during that time about state of affairs (as they had contributed money). They 
were more conscious/attentive and were questioning things (…) Boys from our village 
who worked with Saadhan have become more active and empowered (…) if awareness 
among farmers increases then situation can change” (Mahesh Singh, December 10, 
2011).  
Behram Singh, the first president of Betwa WUA narrating his experience of capacity building 
programmes points out usefulness of WUA training. He posits when he was elected WUA president 
in 2000, he was not aware of the role and responsibilities that the post demanded. WALMI’s training 
programme was useful in providing information about roles and responsibilities of WUA president. 
But this training was done only once during his first tenure as WUA president in Bhopal. Further, the 
exposure visits to Gujarat and Pondicherry were beneficial for him to understand how work was 
being done in other states (Interview, August 29, 2011). Reflecting on some of the experience he 
gained from exposure visits, Behram Singh notes ‘that farmers in Gujarat are active and united and 
don’t hesitate to take initiative. This unfortunately is not true for this region (referring to Betwa WUA 
villages)’ (ibid.). Some other WUA presidents echo similar viewpoint with reference to training 
programmes:  
“The training programme is repetitive and has nothing new to offer (…) the training 
programme will be more helpful if they are done in villages rather than in Bhopal, as 
then there will be scope for TC members and farmers to participate as well” (Samrat 
Singh, August 5, 2011).  
“In the first five years of WUAs tenure, everyone took interest in the work, but in the 
second tenure officials did not take much interest, and there has been lesser 
participation and inclination to work from bureaucracy (…) if there was lesser rainfall 
greater capacity building programmes were required to tell farmers to curtail wastage of 
water, but that did not happen… in the first five years some tail end farmers who had 
never received water earlier, also received water, but after poor rainfall and water 
scarcity years, the interest of bureaucrats and WUAs waned” (Samrat Singh & Ramdhari, 
August 9, 2011). 
Overall, interview with several WUA presidents in SAS Project region corroborates this viewpoint that 
training programme undertaken by WALMI leave lot to be desired. Most of the WUA presidents 
recalled that in every term of WUA training, same issues are highlighted/ repeated. From above 
citations the procedural approach to training programme adopted by WALMI is evident as an 
amalgamation of statist and neoliberal ideology is evident. In tune with state style of functioning 
WALMI officials designed capacity building programmes, which provided information about 
procedures, etc. However, this approach to building capacity does not encourage creation of 
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deliberative publics i.e. fostering of farmer organization that could engage with farmers of the 
region. This is not surprising, as capacity building for irrigation management has been approached as 
a neutral technical process till now. Craig (2007) argues paying attention to power and ideology and 
how these are mediated through structures and processes while undertaking capacity building and 
not mere procedural approach which promotes false consensus about goals and interests. The 
outcome of this approach has been that WUA presidents find WALMI programmes repetitive and 
uninspiring as evident from Samrat Singh’s interview. 
The above response is not surprising if one dwells into the process of creation of training calendar for 
conducting training programmes. Interview with officials from PIM Directorate, Bhopal on the 
process revealed that officials start preparing a training calendar only after WUA elections are held, 
this leads to time lag between election/selection of the WUA president and the training programme 
to build awareness of the WUA presidents about the post. For instance, in case of SAS Project, eleven 
new farmers were selected as WUA president in 2011 and they took up the role of WUA president 
without being aware of their rights and/or responsibilities (Field notes February 2012). The training 
of WUA presidents had not been initiated till March 2012, whilst WUA elections were held in 
September 2011. Additionally, with no focus on building capacities of TC members - it’s a post that 
farmers don’t comprehend, and consider primarily the WUA President as the WUA. As the focus of 
WALMI training programmes has been solely on WUA presidents and secretaries of WUA i.e. sub 
engineers. The outcome of this neutral procedural approach to capacity building has been 
reinforcement of status quo i.e. existing power, local field dynamics, and farmer ideologies and 
beliefs and has not provided space to build alterative leadership. Moreover, this approach to capacity 
building assumes that farmers lack capability and knowledge to undertake work, and hence 
capacities ought to be developed (c.f. Botes & Van Rensburg, 2000; Craig, 2007; Kenny, 2007). This 
paternalistic approach is an outcome of statist ideology which only aims to preserve the status quo 
and thus the capacity building programmes are viewed as an end by itself and the only utility they 
serve is of positive check mark that training programme has been completed and are followed by 
reporting of number of WUA presidents trained and snippets of cases that describe success stories. 
Additionally, these training programmes also reflect the imagery of participation perpetuated by 
trainers i.e. of limited/selective and restrictive participation of farmer organization members by 
design as even the TC members are not made aware of their role or the decision making processes in 
WUA. 
Contrastingly, reflecting on the capacity building work of the Saadhan the NGO under ICEF funding, 
Samrat Singh found their work inspiring, as Saadhan tried to create greater transparency in WUA 
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functioning and questioned the status quo. However, WUA presidents found capacity building 
initiatives of the consultancy recruited under MPWSRP unsatisfactory and not many people recalled 
any substantial work done by them. For instance, Samrat Singh narrates: 
“Generally three people used to come in a car, they used to ask us to collect 10-20 
farmers and they used to arrange for refreshments and disseminate some information. 
The community organizers that this firm had recruited did not come to Saraswati village 
often. He used to live in Vidisha” (Interview, August 5, 2011).  
Overall, the capacity building of WUAs has been unsatisfactory. WUA presidents’ perceive that work 
done under ICEF funding by Saadhan was better, given that farmers had to give beneficiary 
contribution they were more interested in bhagidari (participation) during that time period. The 
work of Saadhan also led to greater deliberative discussion (even though for short duration) in their 
work area, as they constantly engaged with farmers and WUA members through their stationed field 
staff on issues of participation, corruption, better resource management, etc. thus at least initiated 
an ideology of ‘participation of presence’, for instance, Samrat Singh’s initiative of curbing corruption 
in collection of irrigation revenue. 
Although, it is noteworthy that the essence behind all these training programmes has been to 
promote greater community development work and lesser role of the state. However, pursuance of 
this approach till now only reveals a false sense of handing over functions to farmer organizations. As 
farmer organizations do not have any control or say in the capacity building process and it is not 
developed based on their felt needs though is ironically for their capacity building.  
Furthermore, salience of external funding agencies like the World Bank in propagating a discussion 
that encourages community development as a top-down solution for predetermined goals like 
irrigation management within tight fiscal control measures ought to be stressed as well (c.f. Craig, 
2007, p. 349). As this led to recruitment of a consultancy firm for capacity building whose work has 
been deplorable, which brings into question this entire approach to capacity building for irrigation 
management which has not achieved anything, unless perpetuation of institutional decadence is 
considered an outcome.   
Communication within WUAs: Clear and transparent communication within WUA is crucial to ensure 
that PIM Act is followed in essence, however, this is lacking at present in the two selected WUAs. For 
instance, as mentioned earlier, within WUAs there is no clear communication to WUA members or to 
farmers about when WUA meetings are held. Additionally, farmers in both WUAs were not aware 
about general body meetings, or have any information about social audits that present information 
of work done by a WUA in a year (Field notes, January 2012). Lack of transparency and information 
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about meetings also has created a lot of misperception about WUA work in the respective WUAs. For 
instance, Mohan Lal a large land holding farmer from Samaykheri posits, ‘presidents don’t disclose 
information about how much money is spent on operation and maintenance. They always say that 
they have put additional funds of their own to carry out operation and maintenance’ (Interview, 
December 14, 2011). Mohan Lal’s statement is in concurrence with my interviews with WUA 
presidents’ from the two select WUAs and other WUAs of the SAS Project as well. The WUA 
presidents’ on the question of operation and maintenance always have had a two-pronged response: 
first, there are not enough funds to carry out proper operation and maintenance, which was also 
acknowledged by department functionaries. Secondly, that they use their own funds to carry out 
operation and maintenance (Field notes, December 2011). On question of their motive for spending 
from their pockets, the most common response was that if work is not done in time because of lack 
of funds then farmers will not receive water on time; and the reason why they chose to become 
presidents is to serve people. Some of the presidents like Samrat Singh of Saraswati WUA and 
Behram Singh of Betwa WUA indicated that they would take the money from sub engineer later 
(Interview, February 12, 2012; ibid.). If public social audits were undertaken then some of these 
aspects would be clearer. Lack of transparency and accountability is evident in present WUA 
functioning. Additionally, WUA presidents claim that they spend their own finances is a reflection of 
their patronizing belief system wherein they portray themselves as guardians of the irrigation system 
and control access to information. Gate keeping by local elites (WUA presidents) to control decision 
making and accumulate financial resources prior to disbursing has also been discussed by Botes & 
Van Rensburg (2000), Pattenden (2011) inter alia in context of decentralization and capacity building. 
Communication between WUAs and WRD: there isn’t clear communication between WRD and WUA. 
Department functionaries only communicate basic minimum information to WUA members and at 
times they misinform. For instance, after constitution of WUAs in the initial years, WUA presidents’ 
were signing papers for releasing salaries of timekeeper and watchman. This provided WUA 
presidents’ (some) influence/control over the lower functionaries of the department, however, since 
the last three years the competent authority is signing these forms. Thus, the presidents have no 
control over the lower functionaries of the department. Interestingly, in one of the meetings of WUA 
presidents and executive engineer of the project in Vidisha, one of the WUA president’s had raised 
this issue. To which the executive engineer did not give a lucid response and remarked that they can 
sign, no one is stopping them (Field notes, December 7, 2011). The above-narrated incidents also 
indicates a case of slow re-centralization rather than decentralization that is happening in the SAS 
Project region to ensure that existing bureaucratic norm of functioning does not lose its salience. 
Furthermore, many a times during discussion with WUA presidents’ it became evident that WUA 
Quotidian Practices Shape Functioning of WUA 
 
 
 
 
223 
presidents were not always aware of WUA meetings that were organized by executive engineer in his 
office or were informed last minute by competent authority (Interview, December 6, 2011; 
December 7, 2011).  
Furthermore, communication between WUA and department is also contingent on what perception 
one has of the other, and how these perceptions play out in their interactions. Instances of how 
executive engineer treats WUA presidents’ in meetings were elaborated upon earlier in this chapter. 
Further building on it, how WUA presidents perceive department functionaries also affects WUA 
functioning. For instance, a former WUA president posits:  
“One of the executive engineers of the SAS Project had very strong political connections; 
he is a big man. The previous executive engineer was hundred times better than the 
current one. He is a badmaash aadmi (notorious man) (…). The department wants that 
farmers should not be aware about irrigation management (…). Department’s 
functioning depends on how the executive engineer is (…) Officials are corrupt and 
usurping money at present. They do not give any money to president. Karmchari khane 
wale hai (officials are corrupt)! 
I had good relations with earlier executive engineer; the current one is not very good. We 
have complained about him two three times to the principal secretary water resources 
department, but nothing happened. All presidents had gone together, as the executive 
engineer was not releasing money without getting his commission. After we complained 
about him to the principal secretary, things have become worse. He does not pay 
attention to us at all” (Mahesh Singh, December 10, 2011). 
Samrat Singh, president of Saraswati WUA and another former WUA president echoed similar 
sentiments during their interviews (Samrat Singh, August 5, 2011; Interview August, 29, 2011). Some 
of the active dabang (bold) farmers (like Dilip Singh Maina, Samrat Singh and his elder brother, 
project committee president, Santosh Singh) who have political aspirations started Halali Sangharsh 
Samiti (Halali conflict committee) to raise issues related to mismanagement at the project level. This 
samiti (committee) was used as a platform to raise the issue of poor quality of work -lining of canals- 
being done by the contractors under MPWSRP (Dilip Singh Maina, February 7, 2012). The local media 
had also raised this issue. Given that farmers and media raised this issue, the administration took 
notice of this situation and the contractor was asked to make amends. However, this incident 
happened during the second term of WUAs and some of the new presidents who were elected in 
2011 were not part of this mobilization. Given, there is no continuity of WUA members (they are 
elected every five years) this also affects communication as it takes time for new association 
members to understand and take on their role and responsibilities. The bureaucracy gains advantage 
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in this situation, as their position (relatively) has a semblance of continuity and thus they are able to 
capitalize on this notion of legitimacy of their position in farmer’s worldview. 
Overall, from the above discussion, another gate keeper (junior bureaucracy) and their function 
become salient that they restrict flow of communication about meetings, etc. to farmer organization 
members. Restricting information, signing papers are instances of repertoires that junior bureaucracy 
uses to exercise political and administrative control over functioning of second-generation farmer 
organizations like they had over first generation farmer organizations. The above repertoires are an 
effort by junior bureaucracy to maintain power and control which the ideas and ideology of 
developmental interventionist state supported. There has been change in state ideology to pursue 
development since then as discussed, and with it change in functions of junior bureaucracy. 
However, the resistance by bureaucracy to give up power and control over the irrigation systems is 
evident, as they perceive that lesser power and control would reduce their legitimacy in front of 
farmers and thus their privileges and status. Clearly, in this instance, the clash between two 
ideologies developmental interventionist state and neoliberal state is evident in the junior 
bureaucracy’s worldview who are expected to change their mode of functioning with change in 
institutional ideology. However, as the empirical evidence indicates junior bureaucracy worldview 
has resisted change, which brings one to question the current approach to irrigation management on 
one hand which is blind to this crucial factor i.e. actors ideational realm and only treats it as a 
procedural issue which can be altered by building capacities. On the other hand, creation of elected 
farmer organization at the micro level and has provided farmer organization members like WUA 
president’s greater power which they have used to expose cases of mismanagement with aid of local 
newspapers. There has been change in worldview of (elite) farmers who now equipped with notional 
powers are contesting bureaucracy’s way of functioning which is in contrast to the functioning and 
worldview of leaders of the first generation farmer organizations in the project. Clearly, state-societal 
interaction has changed with change in state ideology and this has resulted in greater contestation 
for management of resources and usurping of finances at the micro level between two prominent 
actors junior bureaucracy and farmer organization members like WUA president. 
8.3 Summing up 
Irrigation management in the SAS Project is far from perfect. The performance of WUAs is abysmal, 
and necessitates much to be desired. This chapter demonstrates that though PIM was initiated in 
Madhya Pradesh with much fanfare, it did not really change situation in SAS Project as many 
functions like collection of irrigation revenue, distribution of water and administrative control and 
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WUAs are still within the rein of WRD. To wit, devolution of funds, functions and functionaries to the 
micro level has not happened.  
Additionally, this chapter demonstrates that some of the responsibilities that were devolved to 
WUAs were gradually withdrawn through strategic practices of bureaucracy at project level, for 
instance, cases of maintaining paperwork, or releasing the salaries of watchmen and timekeeper. In 
the two studied WUAs department functionaries (junior bureaucracy) have on one hand maintained 
the sanctity of basic structural mandate i.e. what the rulings demand. On the other hand they have 
exercised their agency for their self-interest to ensure their access to commission that they enjoyed 
prior to constitution of WUAs is not curtailed. The engineers have been able to exercise this influence 
by withholding information from WUA members/farmers about its roles and responsibilities, and 
thus they have reclaimed discursively some of the works that was delegated to WUAs in 2000. They 
have been able to do so, as the state structure -in this case legislations- necessitates, for instance, 
that records of WUA about meetings are up to date. However, the content or the process of record 
keeping is something, which the junior bureaucracy have strategically altered as the findings of this 
chapter indicate. Further, during scarcity years when there was not adequate water in the dam, the 
interest of farmers and WUA members in canal activity weaned. This was also the time when second 
term of WUA elections were held, and the new WUA members were unaware of their roles and 
responsibilities and only few active WUA presidents, who were motivated by Saadhan (as an 
alternate second line of leadership) showed interest and inclination to improve irrigation 
management, and challenged the status quo. The disinterest of WUA members (for instance, the 
state of functioning of Betwa WUA under Kamraj Singh’s presidency) and farmers in canal 
functioning provided an opportunity for officials to reclaim some of the works, for instance, by 
troubling WUA (presidents) about not being efficient in budget estimation and preparation, or in 
taking over the function of releasing salaries of chowkidaars (watchmen). Thus, it becomes evident 
that actors’ ideational perspective hold greater tenacity then structural mandate. Moreover, this 
chapter also discussed the ideational clash of worldviews due to change in state ideology and the 
implementation process for irrigation management thereof, which has slowed down the reform 
process. To elaborate by comparing field findings in chapter seven with this chapter illustrated an 
alternative framing of farmer organizations from ‘being assistants to engineers’ when sinchai 
panchayat and SAS Krishak Samiti were constituted to a role reversal (of sort) with ‘engineers 
mandated to assist/advise’ (hand hold) the work of farmer organizations for irrigation management. 
This role reversal mandated by structural ruling, provided an alternative frame for viewing the 
existing socio political relations in these villages. Additionally, elements of cultural ideation like caste, 
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position in the village, social networks, and friendly political connections determined election of 
WUA members and also WUA functioning as discussed in this chapter.  
The notion and practice of participation that is being inculcated in this region also needs a mention. 
This chapter demonstrates that though participation according to the Act necessitates regular 
monthly meeting for WUAs and at least two general body meeting. This does not happen in actuality. 
The essence of participation that has been implemented in the two WUAs and in the project is 
instrumental in nature, which merely ensures that basic tenets that the legislations (structure) 
demands are fulfilled, which is ensured by keeping the paperwork up-to-date. Although, farmer 
organization members like WUA presidents understand ‘participation’ as greater role for them in 
financial and administrative decision-making and have used their elected position to raise issues of 
corruption.  
Overall, this chapter discussed in detail WUA functioning and how the functioning has been curtailed 
due to structural and cultural constraints. Specifically, this chapter elaborates one of the reasons that 
the state government has used for not decentralizing the intermediate level i.e. poor functioning of 
micro level farmer organizations that is WUAs has been used as a signifier to not decentralize the 
intermediate level. However, the reality is not that simple. Therefore, as continuation of this chapter, 
the next chapter presents diverse beliefs, values, perception actors that have been a roadblock to 
decentralizing the intermediate level. The findings of this chapter elucidate roadblocks for WUA 
functioning, which also ought to be viewed as factors that need greater attention in order to 
strengthen WUAs. 
Moreover, some of the key issues that need to be pondered upon based on the evidence discussed in 
this chapter are: who has the authority over managing the irrigation system; what is the legitimacy of 
WUAs; how/if cooperation between farmers and WUAs can be arranged; why is there lack of 
collective action in WUAs? The next chapter provides answers to these questions by elucidating the 
ideational realm/world view/mansikta of farmers, and bureaucracy towards WUAs and on irrigation 
management. Additionally, non-functioning of WUAs, which has been connoted as a roadblock to 
intermediate level decentralization is also discussed. Chapter nine also sheds light on other structural 
and cultural ideational factors - that are roadblock for intermediate level decentralization.  
 
                                                          
ciii
 Salient features of the PIM Act and discussion on politics that ensued post enactment of the Act which 
resulted in limited administrative, and governance reforms has been discussed in chapter five. 
civ
 While discussing the number of villages in Saraswati sinchai panchayat in the previous chapter, seven villages 
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are mentioned. In Saraswati WUA, three additional villages were included which comprised primarily farmers 
who are availing water through lift irrigation. The lift irrigators, however, do not have the primary right to 
water, therefore they do not cast vote in WUA elections.  
cv
 This data is from a representative sample of farmers from Saraswati WUA. Saadhan collected this data from 
the project WUAs in year 2007. 
cvi
 Interestingly, this was not the first time Surjan Singh contested for a position. He had also contested for 
Saraswati sinchai panchayat president election in the late 1980s. However, during that time, the election 
results were inconclusive (as elaborated in chapter seven) and the Saraswati sinchai panchayat president name 
was eventually nominated by irrigation minister’s office from the state capital Bhopal. 
cvii
 The command area figures cited here include area irrigated through lift irrigation as well. 
cviii
 This data is from a representative sample of farmers from Betwa WUA. Saadhan collected this data from the 
project WUAs in year 2007. 
cix
 Additionally, his work during the first term as WUA president is (still) appreciated by farmers of Betwa WUA 
and by department officials. 
cx
 Interestingly, Behram Singh won again in the last WUA elections (in 2011) with thumping majority and is 
currently President of Chapna WUA. 
cxi
 There are several rumours about Kamraj Singh owning 200-300 hectare of land. Different farmers give 
different figures, about his land ownership. Kamraj Singh, himself did not confirm this figure, and had merely 
smiled when asked this question. 
cxii
 Salient features of Act have been discussed in detail in chapter five. 
cxiii
 The reason for non-legitimization of WUA in the ideational realm of farmers is discussed in chapter nine.  
cxiv
 For instance, map of structures and distributory network of the area; statement of assets and liabilities; 
minutes book; books of account showing receipts and payments; books of accounts of all purchases and sales 
of goods by the farmer organization; register of measurement books, level field books, work order; copies of 
audit reports and enquiry reports; stock register; list of users with details of land holdings. 
cxv
 These field findings are in concurrence with findings of the international consultancy which was hired for 
capacity building under MPWRSRP, that is of the fourteen type of records that WUAs ought to maintain, only 
three records, viz. cash book, meetings register and basic records register/ inventory property are maintained 
by WUAs in all earnestness (Strategy Report of Betwa Basin prepared by SMEC and submitted to Executive 
Engineer, SAS Project, Division No. 2, WRD). 
cxvi
 A former WAMI employee and team leader of the consultancy firm which did institutional development 
under MPWSRP posited on this issue that the chief minster (Digvijay Singh) was against paying honorarium to 
WUA presidents as the work was envisaged to be done with the tenets of participation (Interview, November 5, 
2011). 
cxvii
 Likewise, Wade (1982) specifically in context of canal irrigation talks about deep seeded corruption in India. 
cxviii
 See chapter seven. 
cxix
 Data from storage water level in dam (see Annexure V) corroborates that in 2007-08 there was not enough 
water in the dam only 453.54 metre, while in the year 2008-09, the canal system was not opened as the water 
was below its dead storage level, i.e. 448.66 metre. 
cxx
 Incidentally this was the time when project committee elections were held in the state. 
cxxi
 Additionally, social audits are being done on paper, rather then in actuality as mandated by the Act.  
cxxii
 However, farmers are not interested in participating and do not perceive ownership over the canal network, 
which also creates hurdles for WUAs to maintain the canal network. To elaborate first Betwa WUA president 
Behram Singh, states ‘farmers don’t consider canals/minors as their own property and cause damage to the 
canals/minors by putting colaba (outlet) in wrong spot and without paying any attention to design of the canal’ 
(Interview, August 29, 2011). For details see chapter nine. 
cxxiii
 See Rai (2007), for an interesting discussion on ‘politics of presence’ in context of limits of deliberative 
democracy wherein she posits that ‘politics of presence and politics of ideas do not always coincide leading to 
undermining of deliberative processes’.  
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9 Diverse Ideational Realms on Irrigation Management - 
Roadblock to Intermediate Level Decentralization 
Chapter eight elaborated on functioning of Water User Associations (WUAs) vis-à-vis Participatory 
Irrigation Management (PIM) guidelines. The chapter identified structural and cultural ideational 
factors that are salient to understand poor functioning of micro level farmer organizations i.e. Water 
User Association (WUA). As a continuation of discussion in chapter eight, this chapter elucidates 
diverse perceptions of farmers, farmer organization members and bureaucracy guided by different 
ideas and ideologies have shaped their ideational realm on irrigation management. Ideational realms 
are guided by different perceptions of actors that over time fortify as mind-sets due to categorical 
inequalities (caste, class, friendly relations with political parties or elites in the region), and ideas and 
ideologies, values belief systems that determine cognitive patterns of actors based on their internal 
assessment which define/guide their action. For instance, previous chapter had elaborated that 
junior bureaucracy’s ideational perspective are still guided by old developmental state ideology 
thought the state now is pursing neoliberal perspective on development with great fervour. This has 
resulted in an ideological clash between junior bureaucracy and WUA presidents (discussed in 
previous chapter) and junior and senior bureaucracy (discussed in this chapter). Furthermore, 
discussion on different realms does not imply that these actors are functioning in a particular realm 
as they are bounded by a particular institutional value. Rather it is surmised that there are not only 
structural constraints that guide an actor’s action but also cultural norms, beliefs that structure how 
actors operate and there is a constant strife due to different ideational role (for instance, decision 
makers, framers, constituents, brokers) that different ideas and ideology necessitate which results in 
actors performing in a particular manner. Farmers perform the ideational role of constituents 
according to Campbell’s (2004, p. 101) framework, whilst senior bureaucrats are decision makers, 
and NGO Saadhan is a broker. Thus, mansikta or ideational realm i.e. of farmer, elite farmer (who are 
part of farmer organizations), senior or junior bureaucracy on core issues like participation, 
corruption, state control facilitate in understanding why there is sluggish decentralization at the 
intermediate level. Additionally, modus operandi of functioning of NGO Saadhan is elaborated to 
discuss efforts they made to institute change in perception on current practices of irrigation 
management.  
Additionally, this chapter elaborates on how the idea of participation and management through 
farmer organizations that has been propounded at national and state level unfolds at local level 
differently for different actors’. Specifically, the chapter discusses how ideas define actors’ ideational 
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realm i.e. mansikta. Given that ideational realms are not watertight and work on interface of 
different ideas: focus is on elaborating how this has affected perception on management of irrigation 
water in the two select WUAs in the SAS Project area. This chapter demonstrates that senior 
bureaucracy works under a technical and managerial mind-set, while junior bureaucracy and farmers 
have been guided by their perception about self and their capabilities and is influenced by the 
categorical inequalities i.e. socio-political and cultural setting and their perception of material, socio-
cultural and political leverage that they have accumulated. Overall, conflicting worldviews have 
resulted in limited/nominal participation as an acceptable norm and thus hindered decentralization. 
The following section elaborates on processes related to irrigation management that have 
influenced/fortified mansikta of select actors’. Section 9.1 discusses status of intermediate level 
committees. Thereafter focus is on discussing how dysfunctional intermediate level committee have 
resulted in scramble among user groups at the micro level. Through this discussion the ideational 
realm/mansikta of actors’ i.e. farmers, bureaucrats and NGOs are elaborated in Section 9.2, 9.3, and 
9.4. Section 9.5 discusses implications for intermediate level decentralization and section 9.6 
concludes with discussing major ideational factors that have influenced understanding of 
participation, corruption and implementation of decentralization in the case study WUAs.  
9.1 Intermediate level committees 
As mentioned in chapter eight, in Madhya Pradesh the distributory and project committee elections 
were held only once during the first term i.e. after the first WUA elections in 2000. The raison d'être 
for not conducting elections after 2006 and 2011 WUA elections are several, and the response of 
interviewees differs based on the ideas and ideologies that guide their perception. Overall, interview 
with senior officials (in Bhopal and Vidisha) and discussion with Saadhan elucidates that there is lack 
of political and bureaucratic will to conduct elections. For instance, team leader of Saadhan posits: 
“The three-tier system of irrigation management if implemented in a major irrigation 
project creates lot of power dynamics, this was realized by the state government after 
the first round of distributory and project committee elections. The project committee 
president governs the entire irrigation system and in major irrigation projects like SAS 
Project, the president became very powerful at the project level, more powerful than the 
sansad (Member of Legislative Assembly) (…) Irrigation department is a big organization 
and if they implement another alternative organizational structure (referring to three-
tier farmer organization) to oversee water management, there is bound to be conflict. 
Even they (referring to project committee) will start taking some decision at project level 
and decide how irrigation water ought to be distributed or about collection of revenue. 
The department did not think through problems and conflicts that would arise when the 
Act would be implemented in its entirety. These are grey areas and clear thought was not 
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given to this issue. This is the reason why distributory and project committee elections 
are not being conducted (…) If distributory and project committee are elected then joint 
management system will work (…) we need more maturity at state level. You would also 
have realized that if you talk to people (referring to SAS Project officials) in Vidisha it is 
different from water resource department her, as a sub engineer who is in mid-fifties will 
never talk about management of the system” (Interview, August 30, 2011). 
Similarly, a former distributory committee president of SAS Project perceives that ‘not conducting 
elections is in interest of engineers, as they have control over the entire project and don’t have to 
share power with elected representatives’ (Behram Singh, August 29, 2011).  
Moreover, lack of distributory and project committees have created an institutional vacuum between 
WUAs and the Water Resource Department (WRD). Former president of one of the distributory 
committee states that in absence of distributory and project committees the executive engineer is 
responsible for operation and maintenance work of distributory committees and at the main canal 
level. In the first term when project committee was elected, few project committee meetings were 
held wherein how much water needs to be allocated for each distributory was decided (Behram 
Singh, August 29, 2011). At present, WUA presidents’ are not even aware of all information 
pertaining to canal works, and they only know what is communicated to them by sub engineers or 
executive engineer (through occasional meetings that are organized) (Ibid.). Two presently serving 
WUA presidents (Samrat Singh and Ramdhari) state that they were informally apprised by WRD, 
Bhopal that the former irrigation minister from BJP did not want distributory and project committee 
elections to be held, as in the first term 60 per cent of the WUA presidents in Madhya Pradesh 
happened to be Congressi (anyone associated with Congress party is referred to as Congressi 
colloquially). The distributory and project committee in major irrigation projects are posts that 
command greater power than local Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) and that is why the 
political class had indicated to the state administration that distributory and project committee 
elections should not to be held for now (Interview, August 9, 2011). This is not surprising as Congress 
party was voted out of power in November 2003 in Madhya Pradesh a few months after the project 
committee elections were held, and the state government since then has not held distributory and 
project committee elections. BJP has been in power for the last two terms in the state and has not 
taken as much interest in devolution of 3Fs (funds, functions, and functionaries) compared to 
congress party led state government.  
Another reason cited often by WRD officials and also corroborated by WUA presidents’ is that there 
was scramble to be elected for the post of project committee president in the first term in SAS 
Project as there was a rumour that the post of project committee president will command enormous 
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power, and will be provided a lal batti (literally means red beacon on an official vehicle. It is 
considered a status symbol and is associated with power and authority which only people in high 
office or significant influence can have, as it is authorized by the state) vehicle as well. A former WUA 
president (and farmer of Betwa WUA) recalls that the project committee election in SAS was mired 
with controversies, there was too much corruption in project committee election procedure - votes 
were bought for INR 25,000 each (Mahesh Singh, December 10, 2011; Executive Engineer SAS 
Vidisha, June 7, 2011). Most of the WUA presidents’ corroborated that project committee president 
had used unethical means to win the president post, however, by not conducting elections for 
distributory and project committees in the second and third term, the bureaucracy has ensured that 
farmer organization don’t have the same leverage and power, states a former WUA president 
(Mahesh Singh, December 10, 2011). Thus, elite farmers perceive that bureaucrats have ensured that 
distributory and project committee elections are not organized. Small farmers are not aware about 
distributory committee and project committee functioning. Interview with officials in Bhopal evinces 
similar findings for other regions in Madhya Pradesh as well. 
Interestingly, instead of introducing check and balance mechanisms to curb corruption in elections, 
the state curtailed power given to WUAs, for instance, by not providing information to WUAs and 
farmers about if and when elections would be held. The state has been silent on this matter after the 
second and third term of WUA elections, which has led to emergence of multiple narratives of why 
distributory and project committee elections are not being held. Thus, at one level, there has been 
lack of political willingness to conduct elections, as the MLAs prefer to play representative vote bank 
politics, and cater to their clients. Thus, they have not pressurized the bureaucracy to hold elections. 
On the other hand bureaucracy in Bhopal has been able to evade the distributory and project 
committee election issue, as the PIM Act does not give any specific guidelines on when it should be 
held. The ambiguity in the Act has given space to WRD officials to exercise discretion and reinforce 
their worldview that they are the controller of power and water. Thus, both the political office 
bearers and the bureaucracy have evaded devolution one guided by their worldview to play populist 
vote bank politics, while the other guided by ideas and ideologies of developmental interventionist 
state and neoliberal development ideology which aims to reduce rent seeking practices by seeking 
greater autonomy from state. The worldview of junior and senior bureaucracy has further 
complicated implementation of reforms at the micro and intermediate level as they are guided by 
these two competing ideologies (this aspect is discussed further in following sections). Overall, not 
holding distributory and project committee elections is an instance of recentralization rather than 
decentralization which instead of reducing state autonomy as maintained rather reversed the reform 
process. 
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Having discussed the dysfunctional intermediate committees in the SAS Project region. The next 
section delves into how this has impacted the worldview of actors at micro level. To recall, details of 
poor WUA functioning was discussed in previous chapter.   
9.2 Salience of categorical inequalities in shaping mansikta of farmers  
Farmers in two select WUAs (Saraswati and Betwa) of the SAS Project are not homogenous entity 
and can be categorized based on caste or class affiliations, social status, or because of their friendly 
associations with influential people like MLAs, sub engineers, caste group heads, or by just being a 
dynamic personality. The socio-economic diversity of WUAs was discussed in chapter seven and 
eight. In this section the focus is on elucidating how diversity influences farmer ideational realm on 
irrigation management. Due to categorical inequalities (for instance, due to caste, class, gender, 
access to leadership) farmers have different repertoires to exercise their influence to gain access to 
irrigation water. To recall, chapter six and eight had elucidated that SAS region has a significant 
section of large land holding farmers compared to the national average. Additionally, previous two 
chapters had elucidated predominance of Rajputs (from general caste) and Maina (Other Backward 
class) as two large landholding caste groups in the two select WUAs.   
9.2.1 Access to irrigation water 
Categorical inequalities based on different ideas and ideologies on state societal relations define 
access of farmers to irrigation water. To elaborate: 
“Large upstream rich farmers are empowered and use might if they have to, in order to 
ensure their access to irrigation water first. In fact, there have been cases when the 
upstream farmers have taken violent overtures (by showing their shoe and escalating 
conflict) towards junior functionaries of the department to ensure that they get water 
first” (Raghav Raj, December 19, 2011; emphasis added).  
“Who do we complain to if our acquaintances only stop the flow of water in canals 
upstream? For instance, Madhav Jee is a respected person in this area and used to put 
temporary obstructions in the minor channel and place his cot on top of it (and sit there) 
to ensure that no one could remove the obstruction and he receives water first; what can 
we do in situations like this. We have to respect him; he is an old man (an octogenarian), 
we cannot really lodge a complaint against him” (Maharaj Singh Jat, December 11, 
2011).  
“It is difficult to change mansikta (mind-set) of farmers, as everyone wants to access 
irrigation water first. So, when water flows from the minor channel close to their fields 
they do not listen to anyone. The administration will have to be very strict and alert to 
initiate change in current practices” (Raghav Raj, December 19, 2011). 
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The above quotations elucidate the current practice of irrigation management i.e. the norm ‘might is 
right’. Furthermore, the rule of thumb for water allocation in this region is that farmer’s upstream 
access water first by putting temporary obstructions in minor channels. Only when demand of 
farmers for water upstream is fulfilled they remove temporary obstructions from minor channels and 
allow water to flow further downstream. Photograph 9.1 illustrates an instance of temporary 
obstruction that has been placed in a minor channel in Betwa village by upstream farmers to fulfil 
their irrigation requirement first.   
Photograph 9. 1: Obstructing the flow of water in a minor channel in Betwa village 
 
Furthermore, from Raghav Raj’s (Brahmin from Amla- a middle reach village) comment it becomes 
evident that he perceives that onus of change (for bettering irrigation management) is on 
department and not on farmers. In this project from the beginning i.e. early 1980s, farmers at the 
head reach have availed water for irrigation first and this over time has resulted in farmers at the 
head reach considering accessing water first as their right - an acceptable social norm. This past 
perception of farmers that availing water first is their right cannot be changed without strong 
structural support, as farmers consider it as an embedded reality, and second generation 
irrigators/farmers have only seen this norm as an acceptable and dominant practice with respect to 
accessing irrigation water. From Raghav Raj’s comment it becomes evident that despite being an 
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upper caste Brahmin with large landholding his worldview perceives that state control is the only 
way to change the existing norm on irrigation management. 
Additionally, findings in chapter seven elucidated that in the pre PIM era, the access and availability 
of water for tail end farmers from the canal network was poor. Contrastingly, most of the tail end 
farmers claim that water availability has improved for them in the last decade. Some of the tail end 
villages like Radhakheri in Betwa WUA, for instance, were not receiving any water from the canals 
earlier are now receiving water. A recent WALMI report also concurs ‘discussions with farmers in the 
area, it was pointed out that there has been a gradual improvement in water delivery, especially in 
tails end areas’ (MP WALMI, 2011, p. 44). Though water availability in general for tail end farmers has 
improved, there is no organized system of water allocation and management that is in place. And 
geographical location i.e. upstream or downstream, influences access to irrigation water. Thus, the 
idea and ethos of participatory irrigation management that the PIM Act envisages has not been 
implemented in essence. This is in consonance with discussion in chapter eight, which elucidated 
that WUAs played limited role in water distribution due to structural constraints. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that familial ties do not result in greater cooperation over water in this 
region. For instance, Rajput’s of Saraswati village and Rajput’s of Saronj (tail end village of Betwa 
WUA) have familial ties. However, upstream farmers like Mewa Singh who are related to 
downstream farmers did not consider familial ties as a reason to alter their irrigation practice during 
scarcity years as well (like between 2007-2010). On asking the question of maintaining prudence in 
scarcity years, by cultivating less water intensive crops, Mewa Singh (Rajput from Saraswati village) 
laughingly remarked that familial relations has nothing to do with consuming less water, he was 
higher up on the network of the canal system and thus he had the right to irrigation water foremost 
(Interview December 13, 2011). 
Moreover, the above quotations also elucidate that dabang (bold) large land holding farmers can use 
their muscle power to get what they want and are not threatened by WRD functionaries who work to 
ensure access of water for farmers downstream. Additionally, the norm of ‘might is right’ is not only 
applied by farmers in the head reach of Saraswati WUA but also by middle reach farmers of Betwa 
WUA. For instance, Madhav Jee is from Betwa WUA, he is an octogenarian, a Brahmin by caste, and 
has large land holding. Madhav Jee is respected in this area not only because of his age but also 
because he is known to be very active and vocal since his youth and has had good relations with 
officials from all departments. Madhav Jee (Brahmin from Amla) is like Bhagwan Singh (Brahmin) of 
Saronj (whose profile was discussed in chapter seven, see Box 7.2) whose interest in development 
made him popular with department functionaries. Madhav Jee reports with pride that during his 
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youth any department functionary who used to come to this region would definitely come to his 
house for a cup of tea (Interview, January 16, 2012). The only difference between Madhav Jee and 
Bhagwan Singh is that the former has more aggressive personality. He used aggressive overtures (like 
placing the cot on minor channel) and did not even hesitate from using force of lathi (stick) in his 
youth to ensure his access to irrigation water first. Farmers in this region do not stop Madhav Jee’s 
access to water, as he is perceived as a well-respected (rich) old man from upper caste, who also has 
good relations with authority (i.e. department officials). Farmers are aware of good relations that 
Madhav Jee’s family has with department official and thus, do not want to antagonize their 
relationship with his family as if they have any problems related to irrigation, they also approach 
Madhav Jee’s son (who is more active now, given Madhav Jee’s age) for help. The play of structural 
and cultural factors makes Madhav Jee a respected person of this region, and farmers do not want to 
question him. Here again salience of statist ideology that is belief in state structure, its institutions 
and its representatives organizing body that maintains social order is evident. As a consequence of 
this worldview farmers appropriate greater primacy to anyone associated with state for instance 
through friendly connections (like Madhav Jee and Bhagwan Singh) or state representatives (like sub 
engineer) and this perspective determines to an extent water distribution in absence of distributory 
and project committees.   
Additionally, it is only dabang downstream farmers that exercise might to access irrigation water. To 
elaborate farmer from downstream Betwa WUA posits, ‘if water is less, farmers don’t exercise that 
much pressure as they know they will not get water anyway’ (Bhagwan Singh, October 3, 2012). One 
of the WUA upstream of Betwa has a gate from where water to the main canal of Betwa gets 
regulated. Farmers of Betwa WUA are aware and point out that in times of scarcity for instance, from 
2007-2010, the downstream farmers (of Betwa WUA) did not exercise pressure on the WUA 
president to gain access to water. Rather most of them made alternative arrangements like buying a 
tube well, taking tube well water from nearby farmer for a cost, or by cultivating less water intensive 
crops like gram or desi (local) variety of wheat. As they were aware that farmers of this middle reach 
WUA will break gate if it comes to that to ensure that they get access to water first (ibid.). It can be 
recalled from the previous chapter, that WUAs are supposed to implement a cropping calendar in 
light of the available water for irrigation in the dam. However, as indicated earlier, WUAs have not 
been able to do this especially change the viewpoint of upstream farmers, and downstream farmers 
have learnt from their past experience, and choose low water intensive wheat varieties during the 
time of scarcity on their own.  
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2011 was a good monsoon year, when I did my fieldwork. Water was abundant in Halali dam and 
farmers did not have any problem in accessing water if they followed the prevalent social norm for 
water distribution (discussed above). This resulted in downstream farmer receiving water only 15-20 
days after canals were opened. Given, that palewa (pre-sowing irrigation) is an established practice 
in the region most of the downstream farmers either did palewa late or those who had access to 
tube well, used ground water for irrigation. Consequently, downstream farmers also sow their crop 
later than upstream farmers if they use canal water for palewa.  
Access to elite farmers/ WUA president can ensure access to water 
Unequal relationship between farmers and WUA presidents is evident in the select WUAs. To 
elaborate: 
“Dabang (bold) farmers get more support; poor farmers do not get the same level of 
support” (Raghav Raj, December 19, 2011). 
“Raghav Raj is an influential farmer; if he reports to the sub engineer any problem 
related to irrigation (like issue of overflow of water from the minor channel), the sub 
engineer listens to him” (Paras Nath, January 12, 2012). 
“Officials are not interested in solving farmer’s problems; they say it on our face that 
these things are not in their purview. They cannot do anything. Farmers should resolve 
conflict between themselves on their own” (Raghav Raj, December 19, 2011). 
“Large farmers do listen to woes of powerless people from their caste; if they will not 
support them they will also not oppose them. They are aware that everyone from their 
social group will get together against them, and then they will have a lot of face saving 
to do (….) I don’t remember a single case when a big farmer has fought for the cause of 
small farmer (…) sometimes I have observed that if 70 per cent of poor farmers support a 
cause but it is opposed by a powerful person in the village, then there is a drastic change 
and only two three or persons have the courage to question him, though people feel bad 
but they don’t say anything” (Raghav Raj, December 19, 2011). 
From the above citations, it is evident that farmers are aware of the unequal relationship that they 
have with WUA Presidents, depending on their own social standing (caste and economic status) in 
their respective villages. They are aware that WUA presidents will only listen to their woes and 
broker a solution if they have good relations with them. They are (also) aware of favouritism that 
exists (WUA Presidents only listen to people who are close to them, and do not give any attention to 
other farmers) and therefore they prefer to approach the junior bureaucracy i.e. department 
functionaries for solving their water woes. Here, again faith in state institutions and its 
representatives becomes a guiding idea that has shaped ideational perspective of farmers especially 
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poor farmers whose voices are not heeded to by large farmers. However, statist ideology is not the 
only worldview that guides the ideational realm of small farmers. Many small farmers have resorted 
to market solutions viz. purchasing tube wells, or renting pump sets to irrigate their fields, as they 
have internalized state apathy in resolving their conflicts. Additionally, another reason for section of 
farmers putting the onus of management on state is to avoid unpleasant questions on their own 
conduct, for instance, by ensuring access to water first by might as right or by stealing water. 
To substantiate further, there are several instances that elucidate this working of caste and class 
relations by curtailing access to water for small farmers downstream by large land holding farmers by 
ploughing barhas (field channels) that pass through their fields. Few reasons of why large land 
holding farmers have done this were discussed in chapter eight to recall, the most common response 
given by farmers is that in last few years there was not enough water in Halali dam and these barhas 
(field channels) were (anyway) not being used so the upstream farmers ploughed them. However, 
this is not the sole reason, in last few years the land prices in this region have escalated exponentially 
(roughly half a hectare of land costs INR 0.8 to one million from earlier price of INR 0.1 million). 
Given, such steep appreciation in land prices, large upstream farmers have forced small farmers to 
sell their (small tracts of) land with an aim to benefit from these distress sales. Several of the small 
land holding farmers, however, to avoid this conflict and to avoid selling their land have made 
alternative arrangements for irrigation by investing in tube wells and thus resorted to irrigation 
through groundwater. To give an instance of barha conflict: an upstream farmer was harassing 
Sunderlal (Pal from one of the villages of Betwa WUA) by restricting his access to water from the 
barha. Sunderlal had complained to WUA President (Kamraj Singh) and competent authority but no 
action was taken. The competent authority directed him to talk to the WUA president to get the 
issue resolved with the upstream farmer. Kamraj Singh did not take any interest in resolving this 
conflict, as mentioned earlier, he belongs to the Maina community and is a large landholding farmer 
and did not spare any time for WUA activities. The WUA president did not have any particular stake 
to resolve Sunderlal’s barha (field channel) problem. Sunderlal eventually sold his land and moved 
away from the village. Interestingly, one of the upstream farmers who restricted Sunderlal’s access 
to water works as a chowkidaar (watchman) with WRD and is responsible for working with WUAs to 
facilitate participatory irrigation management (Field notes, December 19, 2011; Raghav Raj, 
December 19, 2011). However, being a watchman for thirty years with the department, Kirori Lal 
(Brahmin from Amla middle reach village) is aware that he can get away with ploughing the barha. 
Kirori Lal is aware that due to his organizational affiliation he can plough the barha without being 
penalized or facing any social sanction.  
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Paras Nath (Pal from Betwa village) has similar experience. Between his land and the minor channel 
there are two fields of an influential farmer from Amla. Kishori Lal, the farmer upstream curtailed 
Paras Nath’s access to irrigation water during Kamraj Singh presidency from 2006-2011. Paras Nath 
had complained about this to the WUA President Kamraj Singh, tehsildar and the district collector’s 
office, however, no action was taken against Kishori Lal. Paras Nath while narrating the incident 
notes, ‘perhaps because he is not too educated he did not know how to approach the officials and 
resolve the barha (field channel) issue’. Eventually, Paras Nath purchased a tube well through the aid 
of Saadhan’s women Self Help Group (SHG), of which his wife is a member, and now mostly uses 
groundwater for irrigation as there are lesser altercations. Interestingly, Paras Nath is currently also 
the TC member of Betwa WUA, but still prefers to use groundwater for irrigation rather than wait for 
his turn to receive canal water, which is (always) about 15-20 days after the main canal is opened as 
he is from one of the tail end WUAs of the canal (Interview, January 12, 2012).  
The above discussion elucidates that either farmer have made these alternative arrangements for 
irrigation due to water scarcity and/or to avoid facing these arm twisting tactics that large farmers 
are using in this region to usurp their land, and therefore are now not too inclined to get involved 
with WUA matters. Additionally, there are farmers who have not faced barha related conflict but 
consider irrigation management and WUA politics as a vocation only for elites in villages, who have 
time and resources to spare (Field notes, December 2011). Overall, small land holding farmers don’t 
want conflict and don’t want to be involved in conflict. They prefer to make adjustments, or retract 
from their position as their past experiences have reduced their faith in state institutions as well as 
elite farmers who have become new gatekeepers for irrigation management (discussed in chapter 
eight). Thus, small farmers wait for upstream farmers to release water as they believe that social 
environment in villages has changed and not amicable like earlier (Maharaj Singh Jat, December 11, 
2011). Box 9.1 further substantiates through the case of lack of access to timely information about 
urea (inexpensive nitrogen fertilizer), another instance of how categorical inequality plays out in the 
field. 
Box 9. 1: Categorical inequality restricts flow of information for farmers 
An instance of how inequality in access to resource/ information becomes apparent from the crisis of 
availability of urea in 2011. When I was in the field in the late 2011, there was not enough supply of urea to 
meet the demand of all the farmers in this region. This had also delayed sowing for lot of farmers who could 
not access urea in time. When will urea be available in the cooperative store or the local market was a 
conversation that was bound to happen if few farmers got together. In this time of scarcity, access to 
information was not same for all farmers. The big farmers knew in advance that there would be shortage of 
urea and had stocked it. Moreover, information flow was restricted and while small farmers were returned 
empty handed from cooperative store, the big farmers would be called early morning to ensure that they get 
their requirement when fresh supplies arrive. The cooperative model is similar to WUAs and there are regular 
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elections held for cooperatives and structure of leadership is similar, however, what the above instance 
demonstrates is the lack of transparency and restricted information flow and thus access to Urea for big and 
small farmers. The big farmers pressurized cooperative workers - they abuse them, and do netagiri (politics) to 
ensure they get what they want. 
Source: Field notes (November & December 2011) 
The discussion till now elucidates categorical inequalities that exist in villages due to social standing 
(caste and class) and/or political affiliations and how decisions are influenced due to these factors. 
Furthermore, small and marginal farmers opine that canals are state property and state has the onus 
to carry out operation and maintenance work on irrigation system (Field notes, December 2011).  
This belief of farmers evinces their strategic nature as they marginalize the political order (of WUAs) 
by positing that management is state’s responsibility. Notably, another interpretation of the 
management of irrigation system in SAS Project could be that it is managed by farmers although 
rules of management are different, viz. stealing water, exercising their political or social network or 
following the established practice and social norm for availing water. Thus, it can be argued that 
wider social relations that determine how water is managed in the system.  
Moreover, from the above discussion it becomes evident that the established practices and beliefs of 
farmers of water distribution is guided by their past perceptions and understanding of state-society 
interaction which is influenced by statist ideology, as well as coalitional and bargaining relations that 
they are embedded in and are defined by social hierarchy like caste and class relations, friendly 
relations with influential farmers, local MLAs, bureaucracy. Thus, an amalgamation of these factors 
drive farmers ideational realm and has also resulted in marginal farmers resorting to market 
based solutions instead of approach the WUA presidents for issues related to irrigation. It is 
noteworthy that in the above discussion the differentiation between farmers indicates that farmers 
are not a homogenous entity guided by a singular ideology, values and beliefs systems. Rather 
different sections of farmers have different worldviews. The next section elaborates further how 
these different perspectives have resulted in different understanding of participation and politics. 
9.2.2 Perception of farmers about WUA (president), participation and politics  
Farmers of the two select WUAs have diverse understanding on WUAs, participation and politics, and 
this in turn shapes their mansikta. To elaborate: 
“Adhikari (official) is for life, WUA president is for five years, why should we listen to 
WUA presidents. President comes to the village only if work is required. Collector has 
come twice to see the work being done under MPWSRP work. Sub engineer sahib (sir) 
does not come often to the village; time keeper comes often to the area” (Misri Lal, 
January 22, 2012). 
Diverse Ideational Realms on Irrigation Management: Roadblock to Intermediate Level Decentralization 
 
 
 
 
240 
“This year’s irrigation season is about to end, but I have not seen any irrigation 
department official. They don’t come to our door to check if water is being distributed 
well. Presidents’ also sit in their village and do not come to check how work is being 
done” (Bhagwan Singh, December 10, 2011).  
“Canal work is not being done in an organized manner. There isn’t enough money to get 
all the work done, and the presidents’ don’t take interest in getting work done” 
(Narendra Singh, October 3, 2012). 
It becomes evident from the above citation that for an average farmer, the post of WUA president is 
not yet institutionalized in their perception. Despite a decade, since WUAs have been constituted in 
the project area farmers still give greater salience to engineers. WUA presidents are not considered a 
constant; though (most of them) reside in the same area. Interestingly, officials also are transferred 
and department officials do not maintain continuity either. However, Misri Lal still perceives 
department functionaries as a given while his understanding of WUA president’s post is of individuals 
who come and go and thus do not/cannot provide continuity for irrigation management. The above 
citation also portrays the import to state institutions and structure that farmers give in this region, 
which signifies their worldview that is enriched by statist ideology. 
Categorical inequality restricts access to WUA presidents and shape 
understanding on participation 
Often farmers in WUA villages are hesitant to contact the WUA president if they have opposed his 
candidature during elections as they posit that at times they have reluctantly contacted them, 
however, the president’s did not resolve their problem. For instance, Abhay Singh Maina who was 
also sinchai panchayat president of Saraswati WUA resides in the tail end village of Saraswati WUA. 
Being from different communities (Maina and Rajput), Abhay Singh Maina had not supported Samrat 
Singh’s candidature and is aware that his water woes will not be resolved by him (Interview, 
December 9, 2011):  
“If we have any problem related to water access, we inform the president through 
telephone that we are not receiving water. Although, the president has not been to our 
village even once and this is his second term as WUA President. Samrat Singh will not 
come to this area, as he knows that his supporters are not in this area; we opposed his 
candidature during elections (…) few meetings were held in the first term of Saraswati 
WUA (during Surjan Singh’s tenure), I had also gone to some of these meetings. During 
these meetings, at my behest, few resolutions were also taken to improve access to 
water. However, given that we are from the tail end village of Saraswati WUA we never 
receive water in time i.e. for palewa (pre-sowing irrigation) around 15th November or 
after sowing in December. Though, the samiti (committee) passed resolutions at my 
behest, there was no follow up on those resolutions. So, I stopped going to WUA 
meetings (…) Presidents’ are there because of people. If people don’t vote then president 
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will not be elected, it does not matter if it is Samrat Singh or Surjan Singh. The president 
should treat all farmers in his WUA equally in spite of the fact that they voted for them or 
not. But what happens in actuality is that presidents weigh if a person has voted for 
them or not and then decide if they will do any work for them” (Abhay Singh Maina, 
December 9, 2011).  
Similar observation was also made by Ram Prasad and Tamar Singh of Amlakheri the tail end village 
of Saraswati. From the above citation another interesting idea that shapes actors worldview is 
illuminated. To wit, to have greater role of local population in management of resources i.e. 
communitarian approach, which has strands of neoliberal ideology in the way it has been 
implemented (see chapter four and five). However, as the above citation illustrates there has been 
greater politicization between farming communities, which has instead of creating deliberative 
publics has marginalized farmers who are from lower castes and don’t enjoy friendly social networks. 
Moreover, the idea behind political decentralization is to provide greater space to farming 
communities to participate in their resource management.cxxiv  
Interestingly, during field discussion, most common response of farmers to idea of farmer 
participation in irrigation management was: 
“Why will farmers go for general body meetings; they participate by casting their vote 
during elections. Farmers send their representatives who are aware of issues that need 
to be handled. We talk to TC members, and it is their responsibility to take this discussion 
to WUAs. The TC member ought to convey problems to WUA president and ensure that 
resolutions are passed and necessary action taken (…) everything is just for namesake. 
On paper you see funds are coming, and there is a nice system in place, but in practice 
that is not the case (…) The reason why TC members do not work is because they have no 
say in any matter; however, officials don’t report this (i.e. TC members are not doing 
anything). Samitis (committee, referring to WUA here) don’t have anything (…) Samitis 
are like paper tigers” (Maharaj Singh Jat, December 11, 2011). 
“(…) there is no awareness in the region about meetings i.e. farmers are not aware when 
meetings are held. No genuine efforts have been made by WUAs to create awareness 
about WUA meetings. Second, (big) farmers also do not give much attention to WUAs, as 
they don’t want to get too involved. Some of these farmers use their political connections 
to threaten and ensure their access to water (…). At present in villages, there is a culture 
of complaining to politicians (MLAs) to get work done, which politicians have 
welcomed/encouraged” (Mahesh Singh, December 10, 2011).  
“People are becoming aware and know that they will get water anyway if there is 
enough water in the dam; so they don’t see the point of participating in meetings” (Dilip 
Singh Maina, February 7, 2012). 
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Another common understanding of participation that is evoked is ‘farmers can give time, and also 
give beneficiary contribution if it is within their means’ (Amar Singh, December 9, 2011). Financial 
contribution is understood as participation by majority of farmers, coming from their most recent 
memory of paying beneficiary contribution under ICEF project and also from many other 
development projects that are tailored on the idea of participation as operationalized by beneficiary 
contribution in cash or kind, which depoliticized the essence of bhagidari (participation). Here, tenets 
of neoliberal ideology -perpetuated by institutions like the World Bank and ICEF- were observed to 
have seeped into the worldview of medium and small landholding farmers wherein participation is 
understood as beneficiary contribution. And thus farmers do not consider participation in meetings 
as a necessity. 
An alternative understanding on participation is provided by farmer of one of the tail end village 
(Sadaiya) of Saraswati WUA who argues that participation in meetings can be assured if there is some 
surety/knowing for farmers that there will be positive outcome from attending WUA meetings; and 
the department will hear their woes.  
“There is a need to publicize issues discussed in meetings; otherwise no one listens to us 
in meetings. If media is present during meetings then issues will get publicized and will 
be within earshot of administration. Otherwise, if someone lodges a complaint, they just 
keep a written copy of it. What is the use of that, nothing happens! It is wastage of their 
and my time. They (WUA members) come for meetings and just pass resolutions; there 
needs to be (more) noise for change to happen. If meetings happen in presence of media 
then information will reach the administration, otherwise nothing will happen” (Amar 
Singh, December 9, 2011).  
The above citation (again) points towards the weightage and confidence farmers have on state 
(structures) to institute change. Furthermore, Amar Singh also brings in an additional variable 
importance of media in instituting change. Media has played a critical role in recent times in exposing 
cases of corruption and ensuring greater transparency. On one hand the above quotation highlights 
the role of external actors to ensure (meaningful) participation. On the other hand it also portrays a 
grim image that Amar Singh has of WUAs, which comes across as un-approachable and non-
transparent.  
Few farmers compared the present management system under WUAs with the time when the canal 
system was primarily run by department and posited: 
“Earlier the network of canal system did not run very well. Farmers did not have patience 
to wait for their turn. There was much more seepage/breakage in the canal system as 
farmers used to suddenly remove obstructions which led to overflow of water and 
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breakage. The officials were also at fault, they were also careless at time” (Mahendra 
Singh Jat, December 19, 2011). 
“Earlier, situation was different. Work was done through consensus. Nowadays, 
presidents don’t want to question the status quo so villagers also think why they should 
get burai (acrimony). Earlier, if few villagers used to get together then we used to talk 
about issues that could be beneficial for everyone. Now, that is not the case. It is difficult 
to tell who is telling the truth, there is so much animosity between villagers” (Abhay 
Singh Maina, December 9, 2011).  
It becomes evident from the above citation that burai (acrimony) is considered a more recent 
phenomenon, however, if you recall from chapter seven, many presidents and farmers did indicate 
not going against collective decision making, in order to avoid burai for selves. What seems to have 
changed in the last two decades is the intensity of emotions that farmers feel against each other or 
what Abhay Singh Maina refers to as animosity. Furthermore, there is trust deficit within the 
community, which is lucidly posited by Raman Singh (who is a low key functionary of one of the 
middle reach WUAs between Saraswati and Betwa WUA): 
“Earlier farmers were less advanced. Now all farmers are advanced, and want to go and 
deposit their contribution directly. They do not trust villagers easily. Earlier, farmers were 
straightforward; they were scared of stepping out of their comfort zones; so all 
collections used to happen here in the village. But now all farmers are active, and they 
don’t trust anyone. Now, everyone is corrupt, and people don’t trust each other” 
(Interview, December 6, 2011).  
Many a times during field discussion farmers made reference to how social fabric in villages has 
changed over time after elections are being held at local level (system of voting has started) be it for 
panchayats, WUAs, or for any other committee selection. Contestation for elections has made 
individuals more competitive and has also created groups of people/ identities that are categorized 
as supporters or opponents in an election, from same caste or village, etc. (Field notes, January 
2012). This has created greater anxiety and competitiveness at local level, which also results in 
farmers not taking much interest in various samitis (committees) that are constituted. Furthermore, 
Bhagwan Singh from Saronj of Betwa WUA elaborates:  
“Farmers are doing netagiri (politics) now; this did not happen earlier. Earlier, we used to 
spend time discussing all aspects of work to be done, prior to taking any decision. This 
does not happen anymore” (Interview, December 10, 2011).  
Thus, it becomes evident that there is lesser collective decision making in the villages now, which was 
not the case earlier. Box 9.2 elucidates how wealthy farmers try to manipulate perception of farmers 
for their own interest. 
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Box 9. 2: Profile of an elite strategic farmer 
Maharaj Singh Jat is a wealthy farmer from Betwa WUA. He owns 31.1 hectares and is interested in politics but 
has never contested any elections. Interestingly, however, he has supported candidature of many candidates 
whose affiliations are with BJP. Until five years ago he was an active karyakarta (party worker). In fact, he 
claims, in this region BJP has gained ground because of him. He takes pride in informing that he had a big role 
in facilitating the victory of one of the local MLAs four times in a row. He is strategic in his decision-making and 
points out, ‘I will never contest elections. I have observed that the moment an individual contests election 
there is a group of people against that individual. I am better off with the realization that I can pressurize 
villagers by being out of the race for any particular position. As not contesting makes me more 
accessible/approachable and villagers pay attention to what I have to say. Furthermore, I can influence 
decisions and have credibility in society’. 
Maharaj Singh Jat has interest in politics, but he likes pulling the strings from behind the scene. He understands 
the social cultural dynamics and the political landscape of the region and uses this knowledge to ensure his 
access to water and manipulate farmers. 
Source: Maharaj Singh Jat (Interview, December 10, 2011) 
Furthermore, an alternative perception of farmers about WUAs is provided by Samrat Singh 
(President of Saraswati WUA) who remarked that farmers interest in WUA work is limited and only 
lasts till the canals are running provides an alternate viewpoint of farmers’ mansikta. Once the canals 
stop running, farmer’s interest weans off (Samrat Singh, August 5, 2011). 
To sum up this section, caste, class and political affiliations divides farmers in SAS project area. A 
sizeable section of farmers in the command area (of the two selected WUAs) operate under the 
viewpoint that SAS Project irrigation network is owned by the state and it is the state’s responsibility 
to take care of the irrigation system. A recurrent subject during the interviews was the reluctance of 
farmers to question the president (in both the selected WUAs, presidents are large landholding 
farmers) depending on what kind of social relation they have with WUA president; their own 
standing in village (small/marginal/large landholding farmer); affiliation to opposing group and/or 
political party and preference to engage (or not) with them in a dialogue. There is no ownership for 
the canal system, farmers consider it something external and contend that it is not their 
responsibility to maintain them. In addition, they argue that mansikta (mind-set) of villagers has 
changed over time and at present farmers are not interested in doing anything to do with 
participation; thus, even if WUA president’s calls farmers for some collective work, they do not 
evince much interest. It becomes evident from the above discussion that farmers are not prepared to 
carry the burden of participation (and management) that has been put on them without any 
consultation with them. However, farmers believe that if the state uses (police) force to implement 
for instance, warabandi then the situation may change. This is an interesting point to ponder, as 
farmers (and to an extent WUA presidents’) believe that because they reside in same villages and 
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have familial and social ties with others farmers they cannot exert the kind of pressure needed to 
discipline water users, which overall highlights faith in state institutions. However, interpretation of 
this could be that farmers are not interested in following the rules of management that have been 
thrust on them from the top, and hence put the onus of implementing rules on the state, rather than 
themselves, as they ensure their access to irrigation water regardless: by stealing, by tapping social 
or political networks, etc. 
It also becomes evident that for (small) farmers the biasness that WUAs have in their functioning can 
only be turned around/ reversed if adequate support from WRD is received. Farmers consider the 
state as supreme, and there is clear reliance (and faith) on state structure to ensure that biases that 
WUAs have can somehow be straightened out by structure (state directives). This mansikta of 
farmers to rely on outside actor (in this case state officials) to ensure that all problems with WUAs at 
local level are solved relates to communities belief that the canals are not theirs. Rather state 
property and thus should be their responsibility. Whereas the large farmers use their social capital 
and political influence to ensure that their work gets done. What becomes evident from this section 
is that if farmers perceive the canals systems as their own then they would make more efforts to 
participate in WUAs day-to-day matters. However, this has not happened in this region, as the local 
community is divided on caste and class lines and have not made united, concerted and persistent 
effort to question the exiting state of affairs. Thus, they have accepted the present norm of irrigation 
practice, which is developed based on their past perception of how irrigation ought to be 
undertaken. Thus, it becomes evident that farmer’s current beliefs and associated action are 
influenced by their past experiences.  
9.3 Ideational realm of bureaucrats 
At the outset, clarification on categorization of bureaucracy made in this section is imperative. The 
senior bureaucracy in reference to this research is mostly engineers, and administrators that work in 
WRD, Bhopal in addition to executive engineer and sub division officer of SAS Project and the district 
collector, whilst competent authorities (i.e. sub engineers) of WUAs and other functionaries of the 
department are categorized as junior bureaucracy. This section discusses how the ideational realm 
(mansikta) of bureaucracy towards (farmer) participation in irrigation management is formed. One of 
the reasons for lack of intermediate level decentralization i.e. poor functioning of WUAs was 
discussed in chapter seven. To recall, chapter seven had illustrated strategic practices that the 
bureaucracy in SAS project has initiated to recentralize rather than decentralize micro level irrigation 
management. Building on that discussion further, this section articulates the narrative that has been 
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propounded by bureaucracy at the state and the SAS project level to justify lack of intermediate level 
decentralization.  
It is noteworthy that lack of intermediate level decentralization cannot be discussed in light of the 
quotidian realities of SAS project and the two WUAs (Saadhan and Rakshan) only. Rather it 
necessitates bringing in the narrative that has been propounded at the state level as well on this 
aspect, as the decision to not decentralize the intermediate level cannot be explicated in isolation 
and without taking into account the beliefs of senior bureaucrats, as this decision was not taken 
merely because of poor functioning of WUAs solely in SAS Project. Reason for selection of SAS 
Project as a case study is salient here. I had selected SAS Project as it was considered a typical case by 
bureaucrats in WRD, Bhopal, and hence is representative of other projects in the state. Furthermore, 
the senior bureaucracy considered it one of the better performing projects in reference to 
implementation of PIM. Therefore perception of senior bureaucracy in WRD, Bhopal is also critical to 
understand lack of intermediate level decentralization.  
9.3.1 PIM implemented in haste 
A predominate perception amongst junior WRD officials in SAS Project is that PIM was implemented 
in haste. For instance, two sub engineer of the Project (including of Betwa WUA) posit that in the 
haste to implement PIM Act most of the infrastructure was handed over to WUAs without any 
rehabilitation. SAS Project has mostly earthen structures, and given that in the year 2000 when the 
project was handed over to WUAs it was already two decades old, the condition of canals and minors 
were not in good condition but have worsened after the handover (Informal discussion, June 10, 
2011). Furthermore, competent authority of Saraswati WUA, explicating the state of affairs post-
WUAs posits: 
“We have no control over WUA presidents and if we don’t do as demanded by WUA 
presidents then WUA presidents’ complain to executive engineer. The quality of work 
done in canals was better prior to enactment of the PIM Act. Moreover, during that 
period the work was also being done within lesser budget than at present. Earlier the 
irrigation network maintenance work was considered department’s work and the onus of 
accountability was with the department, but now in the current period the accountability 
lays solely with (WUA) Presidents” (Interview, December 15, 2011).  
Another lower level functionary at the SAS project office remarks ‘earlier things worked as people 
were scared of officials, but they are not anymore’ (Informal discussion, February 10, 2012). Five 
other sub engineers of the SAS Project echoed similar viewpoint during Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
in the project office. They all collectively agreed that the state of affairs was better prior to PIM Act, 
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when they had more control and power, farmers used to listen to them and their words were of 
some importance (FGD, September 27, 2011). Two things that need to be noted here is that junior 
officials of SAS Project acknowledge that post enactment of the PIM Act the legislative mandate of 
implementing PIM was followed by WRD immediately without taking into consideration the existing 
state of infrastructure. Second, the condition of the network of irrigation system has worsened after 
handing over operation and maintenance to WUAs.  
Moreover, WRD officials are not discontent only because their powers have been restricted due to 
PIM Act, but also because they are now vulnerable to WUA presidents who threaten them by 
evincing their political ties. In fact, one of the sub engineers of SAS Project informally apprised that 
‘he is fed up of being pressurized by WUA presidents through netas (politicians)’ citing the instance 
of one of the local MLA (who is also a farmer in the project area) and pressurizes bureaucrats to 
ensure access to water for himself and his constituency first (Informal interview, December 15, 
2011). 
Furthermore, one of the senior officials of the SAS Project candidly admits that implementing PIM in 
totality is at the discretion of political office bearers - is a political issue and at local level cover up 
and positive reporting is routine. Further, he argued that PIM for big projects is a bad idea - it’s a bad 
model for irrigation management. There are not many instances where WUAs have worked in the 
state and elsewhere, but still the state and central government is pushing for this idea of governance 
(Interview, February 10, 2012).  
Overall, from the above discussion, the ideas and ideology that determine the ideational realm of 
bureaucracy becomes lucid. The bureaucracy predominantly seems to be functioning in a statist 
ideology, although the state now propagates neoliberal ideology. Moreover, the bureaucracy 
functions under narrow understanding of statist ideology wherein ‘state is an autonomous entity 
whose actions are not reducible to or determined by forces in society…an expression of authoritarian 
intentions’ (Mitchell, 1991, p. 82). This viewpoint has been salient in bureaucrat’s cognitive patterns 
due to the impetus given to the profession of engineer and bureaucrats in the Colonial and 
Nehruvian era (see chapter four). Here, it is noteworthy that the statist ideology that farmer perceive 
(discussed in previous section) is not based on such narrow definition of statism. Rather there 
worldview is more subjective wherein state is understood as a realm of plans, programs, or ideas 
(Mitchell, 1991, p. 82). Additionally, the limitations of pursuance of this top-down idea of decision-
making are also evident from the above discussion. Moreover, as discussed not all farmers are 
functioning under the statist paradigm. 
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9.3.2 WUAs are corrupt and political  
A very senior bureaucrat of WRD, Bhopal posits about status of WUAs in Madhya Pradesh, which also 
echoes the situation in SAS Project: 
“ (…) the current status of WUAs in Madhya Pradesh differs from region to region and is 
contingent on behavioural pattern of farmers and the manner in which they irrigate. 
Problem with WUAs is that they have money at their disposal. The current structure for 
project implementation is such that the more money you vest with anybody there is 
much more money generated and thus greater need for accountability and transparency. 
Thus, governance becomes an issue and in order to have some control over WUAs, the 
sub engineer was made secretary in WUA. Decentralization is a tool for better 
governance and not for abdication of governance. Creation of WUAs is decentralization 
and there is (perhaps) no need to take a step further at least not at this point i.e. to have 
distributory committees and project committees. Decentralization should be restricted to 
policy decisions, for instance we don’t have a totally decentralized judiciary in the 
country. With MPWSRP there is more money from new projects and elections are hotly 
contested. WUA elections are populist and farmers look at it as stepping-stone for other 
elections, for instance, panchayat elections. Farmers who do not succeed in panchayat 
elections contest for WUA elections. While making the PIM Act it was envisaged that 
WUAs would be self-help bodies and will share benefits but in Madhya Pradesh this has 
not happened. Candidates spend substantial money for campaigning for WUA elections 
and it obvious that they will (try) to get back the money they have spent (Interview, 
February 8, 2012).  
From the above citation, the viewpoint of this very senior bureaucrat in Bhopal it becomes evident 
WUAs (presidents) are perceived to be corrupt and thus in order to control/monitor their financial 
transactions soon after the first term of WUA elections an amendment to the PIM Act was made to 
redefine the role of sub engineers by making them joint signatories along with WUA president for 
any transaction. For few months sub engineers were nominated members in WUA, but after the 
amendment they played a monitoring role. Thus, participation of sub engineer in WUA was 
instrumentally activated to monitor WUA functioning. Moreover, by undertaking this amendment, 
structural constraints initiated to ensure control over WUAs. This amendment can thus be 
interpreted as department’s distrust for WUAs and farmers in general and also the efforts made to 
ensure its continued control over irrigation management at the micro level. This need for control 
arose because of a popular socio-cultural perception among bureaucrats that farmers if given too 
much power, they will misuse it and this would lead to abdication of governance. Moreover, this is a 
sign of re-centralizing power back into the hand of officials rather than decentralizing, as it is 
perceived by senior bureaucracy that if WUAs will be given too much power then they would misuse 
it. Here, another facet of participation also becomes clear, i.e. participation of engineers was 
instituted in WUAs as a check and balance mechanism. There is an inherent contradiction here, as 
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junior bureaucracy was involved in WUA for ensuring smooth functioning, and has failed to do so (as 
discussed in chapter eight). However, the senior bureaucracy puts the onus of poor implementation 
of PIM on farmer/farmer organizations behaviour by arguing that farmer organizations have not 
fulfilled their expected responsibilities, for instance, undertaking good quality operation and 
maintenance, raising additional resources for better management, involving general body members 
in irrigation management. From the above discussion it is evident that post PIM the success of 
decentralization initiative is on farmers foremost and thereafter on WRD officials who are considered 
facilitators for implementing the Act. Top down statist mind-set emerges from the above citation 
wherein farmer organizations are expected to take over responsibilities, which the state has 
bestowed on them, i.e. to perform the task of being an extended arm of the government.  
This particular senior bureaucrat, however, omitted mentioning role of junior officials in obstructing 
smooth implementation of participatory processes. For instance, the sub engineers were made 
signatories to curb corruption in WUAs, but they accentuated corruption by asking for commission 
from WUA presidents to approve any physical work that ought to be done. The commission for lower 
functionaries is 2 per cent while the executive engineer’s share varies form 5-7 per cent (Samrat 
Singh, August 5, 2011; Ramdhari, August 9, 2011). A dominant narrative that has been propounded is 
that WUAs are corrupt by bureaucracy, but officials fail to acknowledge that if not less they are 
equally hand in glove with WUAs as far as financial malpractices are concerned. Few instances of 
progressive WUA presidents’ trying to check this practice of taking commission for approving 
budgets was discussed in chapter eight. However, this is not to argue that WUAs are not corrupt, in 
fact, many farmers in the two select WUAs opined that WUAs are corrupt for instance, Nirman Singh 
of Jamunkheri (Interview, February 11, 2012). 
Sub engineers of SAS Project unanimously argue that WUA presidents get work done in areas where 
their vote bank resides irrespective of the fact whether the irrigation network requires work in these 
areas or not. Furthermore, given the sub engineers are aggrieved that WUA presidents do not have 
the technical knowhow but still get minor channels dug deeper every year while getting them 
cleaned through excavators (or JCB -is the name of the company that builds excavators- as they are 
popularly known as in this region). Photograph 9.2 illustrates two instances where work is being 
done sans farmer participation.  
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Photograph 9. 2: Maintenance work under way 
 
 
The top photograph shows work of clearing of grass on the distributory canal being done by daily 
wage labourers hired by the chowkidaar (watchman). The bottom photograph illustrates work done 
by JCB on a minor channel prior to opening of the irrigation season in 2011. In the two pictures 
operation and maintenance work is being done sans farmer participation at distributory canal and 
minor channel.  
Prior to implementation of the PIM Act, operation and maintenance of canals was done through 
labour, but now JCBs are used to dig minor channels. The sub engineers’ argue that usage of JCBs has 
affected the design discharge capacity of minor channels -as they are dug deeper- and this results in 
unequal distribution of water. Additionally, sub engineers contend that their powers have been 
curtailed, rather they have no powers now after the WUAs have been formed, which they perceive 
as a structural constraint (FGD, September 27, 2011). This is apparent as the Act envisages greater 
involvement of WUAs in management of irrigation water. The policy idea of participation and 
management that gained prominence in the national debate affected their way of functioning. Thus, 
state structure redefined their (ideational) role in management of irrigation water. However, junior 
bureaucracy have circumvented this structural constraint through strategic practices that they 
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initiated during the time of scarcity in SAS Project, when the canals were not running enough and 
there was lesser interest of WUAs and farmers in irrigation work. For instance, as mentioned 
previously, junior bureaucracy is currently signing forms for releasing salaries of timekeeper and 
watchmen (see chapter eight). From this instance, strategic realm of engineers becomes evident who 
have circumvented structural constraints by taking over some of the work that WUAs are supposed 
to do by not apprising them about relevant details for their own benefit and to maintain control over 
the irrigation system. In his seminal work, Wade (1982) posits that bureaucracy is reluctant to give 
away political and administrative control as they gain from irrigation corruption. This confirms in the 
SAS project areas as well; however, it is not only the financial incentive that leads to junior 
bureaucracy taking strategic action but also loss of social status and power, as indicate above. 
Discussion on actor’s ideational realm also necessitates understanding the materiality of their 
context, which drives their actions, as it is not being argued that actor’s professional realm guides 
their actions. Rather it is being argued that ideas and ideologies that are institutionalized, determine 
actors’ ideational realm. Box 9.3 elucidates the material context under which junior functionaries like 
chowkidaar (watchman) and timekeeper of WRD operate. 
Box 9. 3: Material context in which junior functionaries of WRD operate 
 
The chowkidaars (watchmen) in the two studied WUAs are local farmers and thus beneficiaries of water from 
this irrigation network. As mentioned earlier, there are not too many permanent chowkidaar currently in WRD 
as there has not been any new recruitment for more than a decade. Kirrori Lal is one of the chowkidaar 
responsible for patrolling one of the distributories and has been working with WRD since 1989 as daily wage 
labourer. After a long wait of more than two decades, he was included in the permanent rolls of WRD. He 
perceives like other WRD functionaries that state of canals was better prior to WUAs. He posits vehemently 
that ‘earlier it was his responsibility to keep the canals clean and he would work all through the year to ensure 
that canals were clean and there was no unwanted grass (forest clearance in PIM Act’s terminology) growing 
on its bunds. But the situation has changed now, and it is no longer his responsibility’. Further, reflecting on the 
current state of affairs he posits that they are being forced to do this cleaning by sub engineers though it is not 
their responsibility. Watchmen are not paid anything additionally to clean the unwanted grass, they either have 
to clear grass themselves or hire daily wage labourers for the same (see photograph 9.2). Ideally distributory 
committee ought to take care of cleaning of distributories. However, given that the distributory committee and 
project committee elections have not been held for the last two terms, and there are no distributory 
committees in this area. The department manages the work that needs to be done at the distributory level.  
To elucidate the social setting of Kirrori Lal, he is a Brahmin by caste who resides in village Amla (middle reach 
village) of Betwa WUA. He is also one of the beneficiaries of the SAS Project and uses water from canals to 
irrigate his fields. On being asked about the status of work in Betwa WUA in his area, he is reluctant to respond 
and states that ‘the sub engineer sahib (sir) ought to know what work happens; I am here to do chowkidaari 
(watchman ship)’. When the same question was asked to him indirectly, he responds that he has not seen any 
work being done during the second term of Betwa WUA president. From conversations with him over many 
months, it becomes apparent that he is wary of saying anything against sub engineer or the ex WUA president 
initially as one is his reporting officer (sahib) and the other an ex-president and a rich and influential famer of 
this area (to recall Kamraj Singh of Sadhai). Kirrori Lal is conscious of his status as a watchman and his job with 
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WRD but he is also conscious of the surroundings he resides in and does not want to do anything that alienates 
him from other farmers in his village. Thus, there are multiple ideas, beliefs that guide his realm. For instance, 
while discussing the work of Saadhan in Betwa WUA he responds to the question of farmer’s contribution by 
stating that ‘nobody paid so why should I pay’. It becomes evident from Kirrori Lal’s interview that though he is 
part of WRD and he knows the rules and regulations; he chose not to participate and benefit from the work 
being undertaken by Saadhan as many of the farmers from his village decided not to. From the above it 
becomes evident that for Kirrori Lal the cultural paradigm as well as his socio-economic situation determines 
his worldview. Thus, interaction of interest and social cultural context guided his worldview. From this instance, 
it is evident that actors work at interface of ideational realms and seem to be guided by collective 
understanding of key terms like corruption in this case, rather than typology of ideas that Campbell (2004) 
articulates.  
Source: Interview with Kirori Lal, January 16, 2011 
9.3.3 Temperament of officials  
Temperament of officials has been a major hurdle for implementing PIM in Madhya Pradesh was an 
often-stated remark by progressive officials of WRD, Bhopal. The following sub section elaborates on 
this aspect further.  
Command and control mind-set  
Discussions with officials (especially executive engineer) in SAS Project office in Vidisha evoked 
imagery of a typical bureaucrat. The executive engineer works in engineering and control paradigm 
and posits that the state has given too much importance to farmers and that is why things have not 
worked out. The executive engineer believes that PIM should not have been implemented, as WUAs 
are not capable enough to run the system on their own, they are corrupt and only interested in 
usurping money from the department rather than motivating farmers to pay their water dues on 
time (Interview, June 10, 2011). The executive engineer’s viewpoint is clearly formed by his 
experience of working with farmers from a position of control, which after constitution of WUAs was 
diluted as farmer organization were given responsibilities and were not merely assistants like the 
previous experimentation with participation in 1980s and 1990s (discussed in chapter seven). Clearly, 
the structural directive (PIM Act) has resulted in handing over of operation and maintenance of 
irrigation system to WUAs and brought them on equal footing as officials (as was elucidated through 
powers that WUAs now have over management of irrigation system in chapter five). But these 
directives have not been able to change the mind-set of senior officials like executive engineer of a 
major irrigation project like SAS who does not want to lose the power and control he commanded 
over the irrigation network in the past.  
Moreover, on several occasions the executive engineer expressed his displeasure with NGOs and 
argued that NGOS should not have been involved in capacity building by positing, ‘we have no 
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control over NGOs, and our expectations were not met’ (Interview, June 10, 2011). Conversations 
with executive engineer make it evident that he views participation as convenience issue rather than 
a value or norm to imbibe. Thus, he has not made any serious effort to work towards 
facilitating/implementing it in SAS project area. For instance, he advocates that WUAs should take up 
all responsibility of water management and solve water related conflicts but in meetings with WUA 
presidents his mannerism and tone and tenor indicates that he believes that they don’t have either 
technical or management knowledge and are not capable of undertaking work on their own. Rather 
than motivating presidents to take up more responsibility, in meetings he silences them -does not 
give them opportunity to voice their opinion- to which several WUA presidents expressed their 
displeasure (also see chapter eight). 
Participation of women in WUAs 
Mind-set of officials also becomes evident from their perception on some key issues like participation 
of women in WUAs. To elucidate, the executive engineer of SAS Project on the question of 
participation of women in WUAs notes: 
“Having women members in WUAs is a majboori (compulsion) for us, and to ensure that 
there is woman member in WUA, someone is nominated to the post (…) in order to 
ensure that paperwork is up-to-date” (Interview, June 10, 2011).  
It becomes evident from the above citation that there are no concerted and persistent efforts made 
by executive engineer’s office to involve women in irrigation management process. Moreover, this 
decision to have (nominated) women WUA members on one hand is influenced by the socio-cultural 
practices of this region. As indicated in chapter six, the predominant groups in this region follow 
patriarchal system and there are clear demarcations of gender specific role with respect to water in 
the two select WUAs. Irrigation water is more or less men’s domain in the SAS region, and women 
practice purdah (veil) system. Though, Saadhan tried to break this stereotype and had encouraged 
involvement of women in WUA activities. Given, state structural directive necessitates involvement 
of women in WUA - the officials have devised a facile way of doing it, by promoting them as 
nominated member in WUAs and thus depoliticizing their presence in WUAs, as they are not involved 
in WUA activities. Here, again the idea of participation of women in WUAs is not viewed by 
bureaucracy as an idea that will transform the water management practices of the region in their 
mind-set. Thus, they perpetuate institution of participation of women instrumentally and apolitically 
through nomination as the current discourse on development and management necessitates 
mainstreaming gender by involving women in every activity.  
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Lack of transparency and cooperation in functioning 
Additionally, unwillingness of officials to decentralize is also evident from their handling of work with 
NGOs. An initial review meeting of capacity building project of ICEF with WRD, Bhopal and Indore 
revealed lack of coordination between WRD field staff and NGOs as a problem in smooth 
implementation of PIM (ICEF, 2004). One of the responsibilities of Saadhan was to improve 
communication between select WUAs and WRD in SAS Project. However, a major hurdle in 
facilitating participation and transparency between 2003 and 2007 for Saadhan was lack of 
willingness from WRD office Vidisha to share information with Saadhan. For instance, there are 
several correspondences from the Directorate, PIM to local WRD office in Vidisha to share 
‘technically sanctioned/framed estimates of physical works of restoration of canal systems under 
ICEF projects to the WUAs and NGOs’ (Directorate PIM, 2004). Despite directives by PIM Directorate, 
Bhopal the communication between Saadhan and SAS Project office, Vidisha did not improve with 
time. There are many correspondences between WRD, Vidisha and Saadhan where request for 
speedy technical sanctions have been made. In fact, Saadhan had questioned malpractices that were 
widespread in project WUAs for undertaking operation and maintenance activity. Saadhan directed 
its efforts to increase transparency of WUA accounts and this had put them in tenterhooks with 
officials of the SAS Project. Saadhan was even banned by one of the executive engineer to enter the 
SAS Vidisha office apprises a Saadhan employee (Interview, August 30, 2011).  
To illustrate with an instance, an aqueduct close to Saronj village failed as it was made with poor 
quality of cement. Mahesh Singh, a former WUA president, elucidates that earlier, people did not 
have knowledge of how work ought to be done. The sub engineer and contractor had used poor 
quality cement and this resulted in seepage from the aqueduct. Saadhan employees questioned the 
quality of work of this particular aqueduct and similar other works and exposed cases of corruption, 
which created a lot of unrest and displeasure within SAS Project office for Saadhan employees 
(Mahesh Singh, December 10, 2011; ibid.). A Saadhan employee apprises that they had also reported 
these malpractices to the principal secretary WRD, which resulted in total break of communication 
between officials at SAS, Vidisha and Saadhan (Interview, August 23, 2011). 
Multiple responsibilities 
In addition, Saadhan’s correspondence with WRD also brings forth the issue of overworked sub 
engineers. Correspondences between Saadhan and WRD highlight the problem of sub engineers 
being asked to do multiple jobs at the same time by the district administration for instance, working 
for Bal Sanjivani, Jalabhishek, pulse polio, programmes (Team leader Saadhan, 2006). This situation 
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was same in the year 2011-2012 when I was doing fieldwork. It was difficult to arrange meeting with 
sub engineer or amin (accountant/person responsible for revenue collection) as they were barely in 
the field after the canals were opened or in the project office, as this was also the time when they 
were given additional responsibilities by district administration. In fact, the executive engineer of the 
project also expressed his displeasure with these additional responsibilities that the department 
functionaries were allocated, but he expressed his helplessness as the district administration had 
final voice/control in these issues (Interview, December 7, 2011). It is not surprising then that the sub 
engineers undertake basic minimum work in WUAs, as they are also overworked due to structural 
constraints, have to follow orders and do other additional work, for instance, elections of different 
institutions (mandi, panchayat, assembly, parliament, etc.), pulse polio campaign, literacy campaign. 
Thus, project level staff of WRD is also associated with other government programmes, which are not 
always in direct consonance to their SAS Project responsibilities. Multiple responsibilities of WRD 
officials affect their work in WUAs, for instance, organizing regular meetings or conflict resolution. As 
meetings cannot be organized regularly, conflict resolution is hard to achieve. Moreover, given that 
engineers are overworked they also undertake the basic minimum work for WUAs and don’t have 
any incentive to perform better. Additionally, many of these sub engineers are in their mid-fifties, 
they are not very keen on undertaking arduous field work (Interview, December 16, 2011). 
To sum up, from discussion in this section it is evident that ideational realm of bureaucracy is 
institutionalized by structural constraint and the bureaucracy has gradually slowed down the reform 
process, by what has been succinctly articulated as foot dragging by Scott (1985)cxxv. Furthermore, 
notwithstanding the structural directives, the bureaucracy (along with WUA presidents at times) 
gradually have developed their own strategic practice by keeping paper work up-to-date be it for 
minutes of the meeting or social audit, though there isn’t sufficient representation of farmers or 
WUA members in meetings. Furthermore, interviews with junior bureaucracy (sans the sub 
engineers) i.e. timekeeper, watchmen, amin (person responsible for collecting irrigation fee), 
indicate that for junior functionaries the ideational realm/mind-set is a mixed one and traverses the 
professional and material interests and merges with their socio-cultural perceptions. Thus, salience 
of ideas and ideology and its interaction with material interests in shaping ideational realm of actors’ 
is evident.  
9.4 Perpetuation of participation by capacity building organizations 
Two organizations that were responsible for capacity building in the two WUAs selected for this 
research are Saadhan as part of ICEF funding and an international consultancy as part of MPWSRP 
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funding.cxxvi Hereafter, in this section work of Saadhan who were responsible for brokering a 
paradigm for greater involvement of farmer in irrigation management is elaborated upon.cxxvii  
Team leader of Saadhan who spearheaded Saadhan’s intervention in this region (and the two select 
WUAs) recounts that when they started work in this region:  
 “… We found a strange situation in field: farmers had not paid water tax for almost two 
decades (…) moreover, collectively they were of the opinion that given that they pay 
water tax the onus of maintenance and rehabilitation lay with the government. It was 
the greatest irony of that time” (Interview, August 23, 2011).  
Given that Saadhan started work with such grim scenario in field they devised a three pronged 
strategy for initiating work: i) identify small structures that will benefit greater number of people at 
the outset; ii) identify a work community model (i.e. rather than having all WUA members paying 
beneficiary contribution for a structure, identify and motivate smaller group of farmers that will 
benefit directly from a structure and thus would be willing to pay); iii) It was decided that no outside 
contractors will be used for project work. The farmers could decide how work gets done through 
machines or labour and who ought to design structures (WRD engineers/Saadhan engineers, or by 
hiring engineers). The first experimentation with this strategy was done in Chapna (part of Betwa 
WUA from 2000-2006) village to build a structure, which was successful. Thereafter, Saadhan 
decided to scale up this model of implementation and worked towards creating awareness amongst 
farmers about PIM and their roles and responsibilities by doing street plays, wall paintings and sign 
boards, video shows, and distributed pamphlets and posters to create awareness about PIM. They 
also organized exposure visits of select WUA members and farmers within Madhya Pradesh and to 
other states like Maharashtra to educate farmers about water management, volumetric water 
distribution, promoting crop diversification at sites considered successful in implementing PIM. 
Saadhan also organized thematic training of WUA members on technical and financial aspects for 
better WUA management. Additionally, they focused on building capacities of women and involving 
them in irrigation activities through formation of self-help groups that could avail micro credit for 
irrigation related needs for instance to buy pump sets (Capacity Building Achievement Report, 
Saadhan, 2006). Although, the idea of participation that ICEF funding instilled through its funding was 
‘apolitical’ and it assumed that if farmers contributecxxviii then it would be a sign of consensus and 
participation in the project, however, Saadhan initiated capacity building of WUAs and engineers 
with a deeper focus so they could innovate and work towards facilitating participation in its true 
essence and not just in terms of amount of physical work done for canal restoration work. Saadhan 
worked towards sensitizing and mobilizing farmers so that they could inculcate a sense of ownership 
towards irrigation network, one parameter for which was beneficiary contribution that farmers had 
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to give for rehabilitation of infrastructure and/or to improve access to irrigation water. Another 
aspect that Saadhan focused was on involving women in PIM by initiating self-help groups in WUAs it 
was working in and lastly they worked towards changing viewpoint/perception and attitude of 
engineers and farmers.  
Farmers in the two select WUAs, recalled Saadhan’s work to be beneficial, in creating awareness 
about PIM, for instance: 
“Saadhan created awareness and gave information about rules and regulations related 
to irrigation management. Farmers were unaware of so many things; and once they had 
the information, few farmers tried to imbibe and follow up on this new information (…) in 
earlier times, because of fear of department, farmers could not ask for much information 
from the officials. Saadhan filled that gap, and gave us lot of information about how we 
could get work done by giving (beneficiary) contribution” (Raghav Raj, December 19, 
2011). 
Furthermore, the team leader of Saadhan, narrating his experience with irrigation bureaucracy states 
that engineers in Vidisha at that time were reluctant to adopt and/or adapt to the new 
regulation/Act that was enacted by the state government. Additionally, the junior officials did not 
accept presence of Saadhan with ease; they were aware that they were in this region for a short time 
period and thus were reluctant to share space with them or lose control that they had over the 
irrigation network in the project. Perception of junior officials was not altered by the fact that ICEF 
and the state government had brought Saadhan on board as a model of government-organization-
non-government-organization collaboration with aim to build capacities of WUAs and engineers 
(ibid.).  
As mentioned in chapter eight, Saadhan through its work questioned the existing power structure, 
and had exposed corruption that was deep seeded in undertaking irrigation work. Given that 
Saadhan focused on exposing corruption in day-to-day irrigation work in this area their work was not 
appreciated either by junior or senior bureaucracy in the project office or in Bhopal. One of the 
senior most bureaucrats of WRD posits that there was no clarity on what ought to be role of NGOs 
during ICEF funding and on many occasions the WRD office in Bhopal had communicated to Saadhan 
that their role was restricted to ensuring collection of beneficiary contribution and they should just 
focus on it (Interview, February 8, 2012). The raison d’être for bureaucrats in Bhopal not appreciating 
Saadhan could be due to the fact that of the two NGOs in the region, Saadhan was the one which had 
focused on changing the style and approach of functioning of sub engineers by building pressure on 
them through active farmers and leaders in the villages who were motivated by Saadhan, for 
instance, Samrat Singh. Although, in the bureaucratic circles in Bhopal the work of Rakshan (the 
Diverse Ideational Realms on Irrigation Management: Roadblock to Intermediate Level Decentralization 
 
 
 
 
258 
other NGO also involved with capacity building) has been appreciated more than Saadhan. Interview 
with former Rakshan employee elucidates the viewpoint and motivations under which Rakshan 
functioned. Rakshan focused on tangible benefits like increasing agricultural productivity, and did not 
give adequate attention to institution building. On the other hand, Saadhan actively engaged with 
farmers, WUAs, junior and senior bureaucracy to curtail corruption in accounting during the period 
when repair and maintenance work on the canal is carried out. The two NGOs in this region pursued 
different strategies, which resulted in different outcomes as well. Although, Saadhan’s work was not 
appreciated in bureaucratic circles they were able to motivate/ institute greater participation that is 
if beneficiary contribution is considered a criterion for participation. Furthermore, Saadhan worked 
to challenge the system and inherent rent seeking behaviour and they thus received criticism for 
their work and collective dominant perception in bureaucratic circles that emerged was that 
Rakshan’s work is better than Saadhan’s. Given, that ICEF funding was only for about four years, 
Saadhan’s work has not yielded any long-term effect, but it still created some awareness in this area 
about PIM activities and new leadership for WUAs also emerged.  
Additionally, interviews with farmers and women elucidate that Saadhan was actively involved in 
project activity, and they did broker a paradigm of development and participation, which was more 
inclusive. Saadhan was functioning in the ideational realm of brokers and worked towards changing 
perception of the local populace. They were successful in doing that at the field level during the time 
that they were working on PIM activities in SAS project area. However, they were not able to bring in 
any change in thinking (or perception) of functionaries at the intermediate or macro level with regard 
to PIM. This is also due to the fact that they were not at the same footing as the executive engineer’s 
office and did not have the same leverage and their rights were not clear.  
Overall, Saadhan’s work approached participation first, instrumentally by viewing participation as 
beneficiary contribution- a facet of participation promoted by donor organizations. Second, approach 
to participation was political - drawing on the ethos of communitarianism and aimed at empowering 
the local farmers to question the existing practice of water management that reeks of rent seeking 
practices. 
9.5 Implications for intermediate level decentralization 
Till now, this chapter raised several important issues that impede devolution at the intermediate 
level, viz. categorical inequalities and ideologies that drive mansikta/ideational realm of different 
actors and this turn impacts functioning of WUAs. To elaborate, findings of previous chapter and this 
chapter elucidate poor functioning of WUAs in terms of lack of participation of farmers in meetings; 
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instrumental manner in which meetings are conducted; acrimony among actors (elite farmers) at the 
micro level which impedes their working together; social and political networks of farmers determine 
access to water; command and control mind-set of bureaucrats to name a few.  
Moreover, this chapter elucidated recognition and internalization by farmers of the unequal 
relationship that they have with WUA functionaries (see section 9.2) and thus they perceive best to 
approach junior bureaucracy rather than WUA members for fulfilling their water needs. Intermediate 
level committees like distributory committee and project committee would have been relevant to 
resolve some of the issues that farmers face, and (perhaps) would have also ensured check and 
balance mechanism to ensure junior bureaucracy falls in line. However, as discussed in this chapter 
the decision to not conduct elections for distributory and project committee in the second and third 
term was taken at the state level, and this aspect cannot be addressed at WUA level, though impacts 
decision making at micro level. 
Additionally, findings illustrate that farmers have greater trust on state structures and functionaries 
to institute change (see section 9.1.2). In this context, chapter seven and eight had illustrated 
salience of District Water Utilization Committee (DWUC) chaired by district collector as intermediate 
level organization currently deciding how water is allocated at regional level. However, currently 
there is only one intermediate level forum that mostly has representation from departmental heads 
(see chapter six). This level needs to have greater representation from farmers in order to have 
deliberative discussion on how irrigation water is allocated. Again, this aspect needs to be tackled at 
the state level to ensure deliberative discussion for water resource management at the intermediate 
level. Although, findings from this chapter indicate that lack of bureaucratic and political will to 
decentralize the intermediate level i.e. activate governance structure at the intermediate level has 
been a major roadblock. 
Additionally, salience of intermediate level is evident from issues that emerge in this chapter. 
Empirical findings indicate that that some of the issues can only be addressed at the intermediate 
level rather than micro level, for instance, water allocation among upstream and downstream WUAs 
and efforts to change the existing social norm on water distribution. And at present failed devolution 
at the intermediate level has led to non-functioning WUAs at the micro level (see chapter eight).  
Additionally, this chapter brings forth salience of scales of decentralization at different levels, as it is 
not possible to address issues of devolution at micro level, without addressing devolution at other 
level (intermediate level). Some of the issues that can be tackled at the micro level are, for instance, 
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process of holding WUA meetings or the manner in which the records are maintained by junior 
bureaucracy.  
Although, in the above-mentioned context also it needs to be pondered why farmers have been 
burdened with attending meetings and given responsibilities. This relates to larger debate on 
instrumentality with which participation is being practiced and if it’s worth propagating. Findings of 
this work illustrate that it is not, and is an issue that needs to be recognized and deliberated at the 
state and national level. This would have implications on how the idea of decentralization ought to 
unfold or if it is even relevant given the current circumstances and ideational realm of actors. Overall, 
decentralization is a complex issue that cannot be undertaken solely at one level. Therefore 
recognizing scales/different levels of decentralization and thereby taking appropriate action is 
important, otherwise the current approach to irrigation management is redundant.  
9.6 Summing up 
Overall, the discussion in this chapter elucidates diverse ideational realms which have resulted in 
poor functioning of micro level farmer organization at the micro level. Additionally, this chapter also 
illustrates that farmers are not a homogenous entity although the paradigmatic and programmatic 
ideation realms i.e. of decision makers or theorists failed to acknowledge this aspect while 
propagating the idea of decentralizing irrigation management (See Campbell, 2004). Furthermore, 
this chapter illustrates that farmer and bureaucratic realm has been a roadblock for devolving the 
3Fs (funds, functions and functionaries) at the intermediate level. 
Additionally, this chapter elaborated the prevalent notion of participation amongst key actors, viz. 
farmer perceive that their voting for WUA election or their financial contribution is signifier of their 
participation in WUA functioning. WUA presidents’ consider working for their constituents (who 
voted for them) and caste groups as signifier of their participation in WUA functioning (also evident 
from discussion in chapter eight.). Whilst bureaucracy perceives that quotidian functioning of WUA is 
not their responsibility, though competent authority are secretaries in WUAs. Additionally, 
bureaucracy perceives that after handing over farmer responsibility to manage irrigation system - 
fostering participation in WUAs is the responsibility of WUA president. The idea of participation 
propounded by World Bank and ICEF has been instrumental in nature and focused on propagating 
financial participation through beneficiary contribution. Saadhan’s work in select WUAs of SAS 
Project attempted to move beyond this instrumentality, as discussed in this chapter their work was 
appreciated as they questioned the inherent rent seeking behaviour of the bureaucracy.  
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Furthermore, findings of this chapter demonstrates that alternative framing of socio political 
relations -that tenets of PIM necessitates- has not happened in SAS project as bureaucracy through 
its strategic practices is foreclosing these options by exercising their agency to advance their 
dominant ideational realm of controlling the irrigation system by using managerial and technocratic 
narrative of irrigation management. Thus, it becomes apparent that incentives are important for 
actors (in this case bureaucrats/engineers) to partake in any reform process, if these incentives are 
denied or actors feel threatened then reform process will be sluggish or not bear desired results.  
Furthermore, WUA elections were aimed to increase participation, as elections in essence provide 
equal opportunity for contestants to run for a post. However, the reality is different, as 
demonstrated in this and the previous chapter. Elite capture of WUA posts has left the poor and/or 
marginal sections out from these farmer organizations. Further, there is significant depoliticization of 
marginalized community by including them as token members in WUAs through nomination. The 
caste and patriarchal issues are quite evident in this bastion of Hindutva. Formation of farmer 
organization and inclusion of dalit (Scheduled Caste) and women members by elites in WUAs 
engineers through nomination is a signifier of that. Rather than farmer organization providing a 
platform for these groups to rise on own. Additionally, inclusion of (marginal) groups through 
nomination is an act of depoliticizing (their) participation in these farmer organizations on one hand. 
On the other hand, the dissensus amongst farmers about WUA activity is a signifier of their lack of 
interest. A former WUA president, reflecting on current status of WUA functioning puts the onus of 
change on farmers and argues:  
“[U]ntil farmers understand the usefulness/ utility of managing system, the situation will 
not change. There has to be collective learning and internalization of how the system 
functions by farmers at large. Till that happens, neither the administration nor Ram 
Prakash (or any other local MLA) can usher change” (Mahesh Singh, December 19, 2011).  
Thus, (small) farmers disinterest in WUA functioning can be interpreted as their organized dissensus 
for designed institutions, as has also been succinctly stated by Swyngedouw (2011) ‘identification of 
‘democracy’ with stakeholder participation and inclusive governance fundamentally disavows the 
constitutive principle of democratic, namely egalitarian dissensus’.  
Discussions in this chapter bring forth that farmers of this region categorically perceive that WRD 
should manage the irrigation system as the canals belong to the state and thus farmers are reluctant 
to take over operation and maintenance of the system, which refutes a dominant assumption that 
local communities are keen on taking over management of resources (cf. E. Shah, 2008, p. 140). 
Additionally, it is apparent from field findings that the problem with instituting participation (by 
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designing institutions) is that farmer viewpoint was not involved while taking the decision to 
decentralize/ implement PIM. So, majority of farmers still consider operation and maintenance as 
state’s responsibility. Furthermore, this chapter also elaborated that social and locational 
background of farmers also influences to what extent they participate in WUA activities. To wit, 
farmers downstream were keen on irrigation activities in the first tenure of WUAs but during years of 
scarcity, the upstream farmers ensured that they received little or no water, which forced most of 
the farmers to find alternatives like installing tube wells, or renting tube well of neighbour to irrigate 
their fields. This chapter demonstrate that large dabang (bold) farmers ensure their access to water 
first, and the farmers downstream have internalized this situation and thus consider their voting for 
WUA elections (and thus putting the onus on presidents to get work done), their participation in 
WUAs.  
Additionally, findings in this chapter also demonstrate that most of the large farmers have good 
affiliations with MLAs and given their political ties they are brazen about following rules. This 
understanding of large farmers emerges from their understanding of the socio-political reality that 
political office bearers command control over the irrigation system and can pressurize the 
bureaucracy on one hand to decentralize the intermediate level and on the other hand, at the local 
level pressurize the engineers to ensure that they get water first. The importance of socio-political 
reality forming own structural constraint is not lost on junior functionaries of WRD either, as they 
feel crushed between engineers and WUA presidents both. Given their material and socio-political 
reality they are intimidated by sahibs (sir) one-side and WUA presidents on the other. Overall, it 
becomes evident that categorical inequalities play out at the micro level and determine access to 
irrigation water, and results in different capacities for farmers and bureaucrats and thus impacts how 
WUA meetings are conducted or what social political networks actors tap. Moreover, these 
categorical inequalities drive relationships between farmers, and between farmers and bureaucracy 
making intermediate level decentralization a complex issue. This chapter also emphasizes salience of 
scales of decentralization for taking appropriate action. As in absence of recognizing the importance 
of scale - the idea of decentralization is redundant.  
Overall, this chapter demonstrates: first, the technocracy, and managerial mind-set of bureaucrats 
which is influenced not only by structural constraints but also by how they perceive their standing in 
the given socio-political situation. Second, through the description and working of perception of 
farmers and farmer organizations this chapter elucidates that farmer motivations are driven based 
on how their structural position interacts with political, economic and cultural spheres and this in 
turn has slowed down the WUA functioning.  
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cxxiv
 Farmers during field discussion often brought up their experiences from exposure visits where they saw 
how management of irrigation system is undertaken by farmers in other states like Gujarat. Farmers in these 
discussions always compared and posited that situation in SAS Project area is different from other regions. 
Farmers here do not like adhering to rules; and collective action and organization is not their forte. Moreover, 
they argue that if the state had implemented warabandi from the beginning in SAS Project, i.e. when the 
project was commissioned in 1978, it perhaps would have been possible. But given that they (farmers) are used 
to a certain system it is very difficult to institute any kind of institutional or ideational change now (Field notes, 
January 2012). 
cxxv
 I am aware that Scott uses this terms in context of powerless groups (poor peasants) in rural Malaysia. The 
usage here is in reference to junior officials of the bureaucracy who did not have enough leverage over 
policymaking and thus impeded implementation of reforms strategically by their non-action.  
cxxvi
 The details of selection of these organizations were discussed in chapter five. 
cxxvii
 The international consultancy that worked for capacity building under MPWSRP worked under project 
mode and was handling institution-building work for entire state of Madhya Pradesh. As already discussed 
farmer organizations, farmers or the bureaucrats did not perceive their work to have added any value or 
changed/challenged their perception of irrigation management. 
cxxviii
 Details of farmer contribution that ICEF envisaged were discussed in chapter five. 
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10 Conclusion: Complexity of Intermediate Level 
Decentralization  
This research set out to examine various structural and cultural ideational factors that have moulded 
actors’ perception on participation and their involvement in facilitating/impeding functioning of the 
intermediate level governance structure through the case of Samrat Ashok Sagar (SAS) Project in 
Madhya Pradesh, India. This research also aimed to elucidate the role of actors in instituting a certain 
idea of decentralization in context of irrigation management in the national and state policy 
narrative. Specifically this research sought to answer the question: what is the role of actors’ 
(farmers, farmer organizations’, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), and bureaucracy) in 
influencing (or obstructing) decentralization of the intermediate level in SAS Project in Madhya 
Pradesh using the lens of ideational realm. To recall briefly, Madhya Pradesh was selected as the case 
study site as it is considered one of the pioneering states’ to take up the idea of decentralization in 
India. Within Madhya Pradesh a typical case study site -SAS Project- was selected where 
intermediate level decentralization issues could be analyzed.  
This research uses ideational realm as a conceptual frame to analyze the reasons for absence of 
initiation of governance structure at the intermediate level viz. distributory and project committees. 
Ideational realm in this research is enunciated as ideas and ideologies that actors subscribe to which 
determines their ideational realm. Actors follow various ideational frames, viz. decision makers, 
theorists, constituents, brokers (Campbell, 2004). Ideational realm is actor’s interpretation of a 
situation i.e. their perception and their capabilities over time based on the ideational frame they 
follow vis-à-vis the world around them resulting in creation of dominant mind-set (mansikta). This 
dissertation demonstrates salience of the notion of ideational realm in providing an interface to 
study interdependence of structural and cultural ideation factors to better understand the process of 
institutional change, rather than accounts that provide merely structural or cultural explanations. 
Moreover, I demonstrate that actors’ work at interface of different realms that are shaped by 
different ideas, ideologies, interests and beliefs and understanding and influence of these ideational 
realms/mind-set on actors (in)action explicates poor decentralization. 
Using the conceptual frame of ideational realm this research (in a way) provides a counterfactual 
analysis of why intermediate level farmer organizations are not there in the SAS Project. To recall 
briefly, in the SAS Project, distributory and project committee were constituted only once after the 
first round of Water User Associations (WUA) elections in the year 2000. Subsequent to the WUA 
elections in the 2006 and 2011, the state government did not hold elections for either distributory or 
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project committee in the state. Fieldwork for this research was conducted between mid-2011 and 
mid-2012 and during this time there were no intermediate level farmer organizations in the SAS 
Project. The focus thus has been on studying the reasons for absence of these intermediate level 
committees by elaborating: first, the strategic practices and processes related to irrigation 
management that are at play at the micro level where first (between 1980 and 1999) and second 
(2000 onwards) generation farmer organizations were formed in the case study site. Moreover, 
research findings reveal that actors ideational realm are influenced by multiple ideas /ideologies -
interventionist developmental state, neoliberalism, communitarianism as a consequence of which 
there has been clash in their worldviews and this has resulted in tardy irrigation reforms.  
The focus of this chapter is on theoretical and analytical strengths of the concept of ideational realm 
for understanding intermediate level decentralization. Section 10.1 synthesizes the empirical findings 
of this research in order to respond to the primary concern of this dissertation. Section 10.2 
discusses the theoretical and field utility of the concept of ideational realm in context of 
understanding success of decentralization projects. Section 10.3 underscores emerging issues from 
this research that could be further investigated, followed by limitations of this research. Section 10.4 
provides few concluding remarks.  
10.1 Ideational analysis of intermediate level decentralization 
This dissertation presents an ideational analysis of intermediate level decentralization by positing 
salience of history, ideas, ideology and structural and cultural elements in guiding and shaping 
ideational realm of actors. As discussed in chapter one, there has been immense international and 
national impetus for decentralization (PIM). Given this impetus the main concern of this work was 
why intermediate level decentralization has not happened despite such a strong neoliberal narrative 
at the international and national level for initiating decentralization through call for devolution of 3Fs 
(funds, functions and functionaries). Chapter two discussed the keenness and willingness of 
international organizations like the World Bank, United States Aid for International Development 
(USAID), Asian Development Bank (ADB) -and its representatives- in brokering PIM as the most 
appropriate reform process for decentralizing irrigation management worldwide.cxxix Furthermore, 
the chapter elaborated the debate on crafting or designing of institutions for irrigation management 
and elaborated how the ‘paradigmatic idea’ (c.f. Campbell, 2004) of decentralizing irrigation 
management by designing institutions for irrigation management was brokered by international 
organizations through development cooperation, which reeks of structural domination. This review 
provided an important insight, that paying attention to conditions and context of reforms i.e. 
Conclusion: Complexity of Intermediate Level Decentralization  
 
 
 
 
266 
whether institutions are crafted or designed, willingness of bureaucrats, political office bearers is 
essential to understand why certain ideas stick in policy realm of actors’ (political officer bearers and 
bureaucracy) and result in policymaking and thus are crucial for policy analysis. Moreover, salience of 
external actors in propagating irrigation management informed by tenets of neoliberalism became 
evident from the discussion in chapter two. As a continuation of discussion, chapter four elaborated 
how the discussion on participatory turn at the international level unfolded at national level. The 
focus was on elaborating the origin (which necessitated taking a historical standpoint) of different 
ideas, ideologies that have shaped ideational realm for irrigation management in India.  
Chapter four argued that two-fold pressure for decentralization for Indian states has come from 
central government’s policy: Command Area Development Programme (CADP) and international 
donor pressures (c.f. Gulati et al., 2005). It is noteworthy that CADP was the first reformist 
programme to solve the maladies that irrigation sector was facing in India. CADP was initially 
designed and evinced the ideology of a developmental interventionist state or statism (see chapter 
four). However, after its restructuring to Command Area Development and Water Management 
Programme (CADWM) the programme in its current avatar has more neoliberal viewpoint and notes 
PIM as one of its core area (See GoI, 2010a). In fact a government order from Ministry of Water 
Resources on CADWM states that state governments can avail CADWM funding only after they enact 
PIM legislation (GoI, 2008).cxxx Thus it becomes evident that CADP was (initially) an outcome of an 
ideology of developmental interventionist state, while international donors have used good 
governance as a defining idea for justifying and initiating policy change favourable to initiate PIM. 
Thus, two different top-down ideas/ideologies and thereby approach to irrigation management were 
being discussed and pursued at the national level for irrigation management. Moreover, at national 
level, with pursuance of tenets of neoliberalism, reforms in the water sector in India have 
emphasized principle of cost recovery, emphasis on water rights, participation, decentralization, and 
privatization of some or all functions in water delivery and redefining the government 
(Sangameswaran, 2009, p. 230). It is recognized that these ideas stem partly from Dublin- Rio 
principles, however, institutions such as World Bank through assumed role of ideational broker have 
ensured that this message was carried to developing countries by advocacy, loans and 
conditionalities (Goldman, 2006, 2007; Sangameswaran, 2009). The idea behind the call for these 
reforms has been the perception of state failure and thus there has been greater call for 
decentralization in irrigation management by handing over management of irrigation systems to 
WUAs. The neoliberal doctrine in general the way it has been implemented by international 
institutions emphasizes and treats the state and market or public space as two diametrically opposite 
principles and fails to recognize the political character of (economic) relations that it aims to alter. 
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Moreover, there is emphasis on ‘one size fit all’ model of policy implementation to resolve the 
financial and thereby management problem of irrigation bureaucracies at the national level in India 
(Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 353). Another ideology that has influenced how resources ought to be 
managed is the literature on community based natural resource management that argued for 
crafting of institutions for greater participation and cooperation at the local level (Ostrom, 1990, 
1992; Tang, 1991). Consequently, development practitioners have worked towards mainstreaming 
participatory approach and have advocated that local community plays a greater role in conservation 
and management of natural resources and participation became a buzzword in development practice 
and management of natural resources (Chambers, 1994a, 1994b). Although, the community based 
natural resource management literature has been critiqued for basing their work on myth of 
homogenous community, devoid of power relations and power dynamics and overlooks how access 
to resource for communities is contingent on wider power relations and hierarchical systems (B. 
Agarwal, 2001; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; M. Leach et al., 1999; Sultana, 2009 inter alia). 
Thus, despite the criticisms, as a consequence of this two-fold pressure to decentralize irrigation 
management, several states in India have used good governance as a defining idea for justifying and 
initiating policy change favourable to initiate PIM. For instance, Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation has played role in formation for WUAs in Orissa (Narain, 2008, p. 164). Furthermore, 
impetus on PIM at the national level by funding organizations and the Indian bureaucracy led to 
initiating four different approaches to PIM viz. contract approach, joint management approach, 
WUAs as arm of the state and formally organized warabandi (fixed time for distribution of water) in 
India (Brewer, 1997). These four approaches were premised on two models of PIM: first, the large-
scale impact model of policy change of which Andhra Pradesh is an example. The Andhra Pradesh 
model is based on the Mexican big bang approach of designing institutions that was popularized by 
the World Bank, despite its known problems (See Rap, 2006, and chapter two). Second, model is of 
scaling up through NGO interventions a case of crafting institutions, of which Gujarat is an instance 
(Thomas & Ballabh, 2008, p. 116). Contract approach has been used by WUAs in Gujarat and 
Maharashtra wherein the irrigation department and WUAs entered into an agreement that 
guaranteed water supply to WUAs in lieu of payment of fees for the water used. Development 
Support Centre, an NGO in Gujarat has been actively involved in implementing PIM in the state. This 
model has performed better as Development Support Centre has been involved in mobilization of 
farmers consistently in its field areas (Narain, 2009, p. 128).cxxxi Joint management approach - of 
which Tamil Nadu and Kerala are instances - used a multi-tier WUA model with Joint Management 
Committee (JMC) at system level, WUA or JMCs at the middle level and WUAs at the outlet level. 
Bihar tried an alternative model of PIM wherein WUAs are envisaged to be an extended arm of the 
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state. WUAs in Bihar legislatively have a larger role to play, given direct sharing of irrigation fees 
between farmers and the state is envisioned. Lastly, Haryana is an instance of formally organized 
warabandi with WUAs created at outlet level without any change in irrigation management practices 
(Narain, 2009, p. 164).cxxxii However, there are not many empirical studies from the Central Indian 
state of Madhya Pradesh on PIM except work of Pandey (2006) whose work is a mainstream 
anthropological study and discusses the social cultural setting of one village in the project, Bassi and 
Kumar (2011) and Pangare, Hooja and Kaushal (2003) have looked at institutional aspects again from 
a mainstream perspective. Overall, these works have not taken a critical approach and delved into 
ideational aspects, which determine actor’s function and actions. Thus this research focused on this 
under researched region.  
From the above discussion different ideational realms viz. neoliberalism, developmental 
interventionist state (statism), and communitarianism that have been propagated at the national 
level for irrigation management during different time periods becomes salient. Furthermore, from 
the above discussion, it becomes evident that reproduction of policy narratives, ideas and structure 
do not happen on its own. Rather is performed by actors who in this research have been categorised 
under the typology ideational brokers, decision makers, and theorists. Furthermore, any ideology 
manifests itself in practice differently and is contingent on actors who are spearheading an 
approach/idea/value/belief system. A lot has already been written about merits and demerits of 
these ideologies -neoliberalism, communitarianism, and statism (Gadgil & Guha, 1995; Kamat, 2004; 
Kohli, 2001; M. Leach et al., 1999; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Mitchell, 1991; Moore, 1989; Ostrom, 
1990; Sangameswaran, 2009, p.; inter alia). Here the focus is through discussing the empirical case of 
Madhya Pradesh how idea/ideology behind irrigation management has changed in state narrative, 
but this has not led to change in practices for irrigation management. Consequently there are 
multiple rationalities on how irrigation system ought to be governed. These different rationalities or 
ideational realms have resulted in adoption and perpetuation of different understanding on 
participation, corruption, role of state in irrigation management, as all actors have embraced the 
propagated beliefs selectively. The rest of this section substantiates through empirical findings why 
different ideational realms clash with each other.  
PIM in Madhya Pradesh was not donor driven, though was supported by donors through ICEF 
funding, and later through World Bank’s funding. The state level ideational processes -structural 
factors and role of political office bearer- that led to enactment and implementation of this 
programmatic idea (PIM) was discussed in chapter five. This chapter illuminated that PIM process in 
Madhya Pradesh was top-down, with focus of state government on shifting responsibility for 
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irrigation management from Water Resources Department (WRD) to farmer organizations. There was 
pressure to decentralize irrigation management in the Congress Party led state government (see 
chapter five). Other scholars have also identified top-down implementation of PIM as a problem in 
India for instance in Andhra Pradesh and Haryana (see Gulati et al., 2005; Narain, 2003; Nikku, 2006). 
This work departs from the above literature by carefully teasing out why top-down implementation 
still prevails by focusing on structural and cultural ideational factors that guide ideational realm of 
actors in Madhya Pradesh. Furthermore, focus has been on the guiding elements of ideational realms 
and how they can be differentiated. Moreover, in this work I have emphasized how multiple 
rationalities clash with each other and consequently has made the current approach to irrigation 
policy redundant. 
To elaborate, as an offshoot of the predominant neoliberal ideational realm and confidence that 
decentralization will deliver result led to enactment of the PIM Act in Madhya Pradesh in 1999. 
Consequently, in year 2000 locally democratically elected farmer organizations (WUAs) were granted 
greater authority over management decisions legislatively and farmer organization made a subject of 
new form of governance in the state narrative. It is noteworthy, however, that first generation 
farmer organizations (sinchai panchayats, Krishak Samitis) constituted at the micro level through 
USAID and World Bank funding were not successful in the state (see chapter seven). However, 
overlooking this learning, policy makers initiated PIM in the state. Importantly, it is only with 
constitution of these second-generation farmer organizations that efforts to activate participatory 
governance structure at intermediate level were made in the state which was the main concern of 
this research. Notably, elections for intermediate level -distributory and project- committees have 
been held only once in the state and thus this research focused on understanding roadblocks to 
decentralization.  
Through empirical findings I illustrate that the senior bureaucracy in the state have used the 
narrative of poor functioning of farmer organization at the micro level i.e. of WUAs as a reason for 
non-implementation of intermediate level farmer organizations i.e. distributory committee and 
project committee (see chapter eight and nine). Furthermore, senior bureaucrats substantiating their 
experience of SAS with similar major irrigation project in the state argue that the Act was drafted and 
implemented in haste; and suddenly after the first WUA and distributory and project committee 
elections it was felt in the capital that the entire system was becoming unstable (Interview, June 6, 
2011). The above citation highlight that with change in idea of irrigation management in state 
narrative, there was change in worldview of bureaucracy, who perceived that greater political 
participation of distributory and project committee would make the system unstable. Thus, not 
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surprisingly, a very senior bureaucrat in WRD, Bhopal posits that in the first term (i.e. post 2000) the 
project committee presidents commanded considerable authority and power, and they were not 
using this power judiciously rather for self-interest - the post became politicized (Interview, February 
8, 2011). So, one dominant bureaucratic worldview that emerges is that farmer organizations were 
corrupt and perceived to be gate keeping. As a consequence of internalization of this worldview by 
senior bureaucracy, election for distributory and project committee were not held in the second and 
third term. Interestingly, as noted in chapter seven, earlier junior bureaucracy was also a stronger 
gatekeeper. At the field level, there was clash in viewpoint on resource management between junior 
bureaucracy and WUAs (mostly WUA presidents). Thus, there were divergent rationalities on the 
subject. It is also worth noting that in absence of distributory and project committee in SAS Project, a 
considerable amount of decision making (about water and financial allocation) that should have been 
delegated to distributory and project committee members, now remain with engineers of the WRD 
who work in the SAS Project (see chapter nine). The reluctance of the executive engineer towards 
PIM and WUAs is in consonance with Irrigation Commission of 1972 findings. As after the commission 
recommended greater focus on OFD work, many engineers and bureaucrats were against this 
decision of decentralizing the micro level for water management (see chapter four). The above 
discussion highlights two fold problems with current approach to irrigation in India. First, there has 
been change in irrigation policy, but not much change in approach to implementing policy. Second, 
multiple ideational realms on irrigation management has led to led to emergence of multiple 
worldviews of actors on how resource can be governed and these worldviews are in conflict with 
each other. To substantiate further, several progressive senior officials in Bhopal argue that one of 
the reasons for lack of intermediate level decentralization has been the haste with which PIM was 
implemented.  
“Till we have person oriented business approach, we will always have multiple way of 
working. Every individual has their own line of thought; and person-to-person thinking 
changes and accordingly how policy is implemented changes. But this is not right, change 
in policy should happen if the system demands so and not because an individual thinks so 
(…) The basic aspect is that before implementing PIM, there should have been a pre-
preparation stage on PIM, wherein lot of capacity building on PIM should have been 
done and serious efforts for system rehabilitation were required. Control of the irrigation 
network ought to be given to farmers slowly i.e. handing over of the system immediately 
after elections was too fast and WUAs were not prepared to take over this responsibility 
(…) Earlier to maintain the earthen system, with the aid of farmers we use to use layer 
the soybean waste and mud on the bunds of canals, to control seepage. Through this 
system there was a joint system of responsibility created, however, gradually this 
withered. We are expecting farmers to take up too much work on one hand. On the other 
hand most of the engineers are now past fifties, therefore age is catching up and they 
are not interested in going out in the field. If new people join then things will change (…) 
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PIM in Madhya Pradesh has been implemented hastily that is my opinion. But I am not 
an authority on this subject; I am not a social scientist but then one needs to start 
thinking on this line to change things (…) Moreover, once implemented in haste; the 
focus has been on positive reporting. My personal opinion is that all reporting (including 
donor reporting) on PIM are on positive side. I have not seen a single report discussing 
problems from the department’s side” (Senior bureaucrat, WRD, Bhopal, December 16, 
2011, emphasis added). 
To recall, WUAs were constituted in Madhya Pradesh within six months of enactment of the PIM Act 
(see chapter nine). Another senior bureaucrat in Bhopal who is well respected for his work on 
initiating PIM in the state, echoed similar viewpoint: ‘it was sudden and top down; it did not give 
enough time to farmers to understand the situation and farmers were not prepared to take up this 
new responsibility’ (Interview, WRD, Bhopal, June 7, 2011). The above citations elucidate that at the 
state level there is a realization that implementing PIM without deliberative discussion -i.e. have 
consenting worldview- with all concerned actors, viz. farmers and junior officials has slowed down 
the reform process as the irrigation bureaucracy has not been comfortable with this directive that 
took the power away from them to control these irrigation networks. Interestingly, another meeting 
with this senior bureaucrat eight months later evoked similar sentiments about PIM but with a more 
positive perspective of WRD. The senior bureaucrat in the second meeting observed that the 
problem has been poor capacity building of WUAs. Furthermore, in the later interview, he put the 
onus of poor progress of PIM in the state on slow learning curve of WUAs and thus, the need for 
WRD to work on this aspect (Interview, WRD Bhopal, June 7, 2011; February 9, 2012). From above 
discussion, the influence of structure in influencing worldview of the second bureaucrat is evident as 
there is a felt need to have positive reporting for the work being done. Also, the focus has been on 
portraying WRD officials in positive light and to put the onus of poor implementation of PIM on poor 
learning curve of farmers. To recall, many of irrigation reports in the eighties had also blamed 
farmers for poor management (see chapter four). This is reflective of circular thinking within 
irrigation bureaucracy who initiates reforms but is not prepared to take it to its logical end (and tries 
to ensure that power remains in hands of WRD) an outcome of their worldview that is still influenced 
by statist thinking. Additionally, positive reporting on this subject is indicative of a dominant 
narrative that is being created by state and international donors to continue work without taking any 
drastic measures that may change the status quo. I had also demonstrated this through farmer 
testimonies in chapter eight. 
Moreover, empirical findings elucidate that policy makers ideational realm i.e. understanding of 
farmers as a homogenous category, who could be organized by top-down designing of institutions of 
political participation, has not been accurate (see chapter seven and eight, and nine). Boelens, 
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Getches and Gil (2010a) also make similar observation about top-down implementation of 
institutions which aim to apply externally imposed cultural and political values on rural communities 
in South America. Findings of this research establish that that the particularities of the local cannot 
be clubbed within one predominant worldview of farmers, which is driven only by their rational 
interest and thus they are expected to collectivize in order to avail irrigation services. Rather farmers 
operate under different worldviews, which has been informed by different ideologies governance 
that they have experienced (see chapter seven and eight). Furthermore, the empirical findings also 
illustrate that though the neoliberal idea of PIM propounded by international organizations gained 
salience in policy narrative at the national and state level, diffusion of the values, norms, beliefs that 
embody the idea has been slow at the project and farmer organization level. There is a clear 
mismatch in understanding between policy that the state is perpetuating, and actual perception of 
junior bureaucracy and farmer/ farmer organization on the ground, on how irrigation management 
ought to be undertaken (c.f. Saravanan, 2010). The lens of ideational realm facilitated in 
underscoring that though international institutions like the World Bank have influenced policy 
making, but so has the irrigation bureaucracy, in equal measure, by evading the question of 
decentralizing the intermediate level, primarily based on the argument that WUAs are corrupt and 
not ready to take up this role (see chapter nine). This is indicative of the strength of the worldview of 
state (irrigation) bureaucrats who have used their interpretation of legislation on PIM for 
implementation both at the state level, as discussed in chapter five, and at the project level as 
discussed in chapter eight and nine. Clearly, at least a section of bureaucracy is still functioning under 
statist belief of having command and control over the irrigation systems and has thus evaded the 
question of devolving 3Fs (Funds, functions, and functionaries) at intermediate level. 
Moreover, weak political will (or rather strategic political will) has further hampered intermediate 
level decentralization. Given, weak/strategic political will to change the status quo - this minimalist 
interpretation has not been questioned either by the political office bearers or senior bureaucracy. 
Not questioning the status quo has also been favourable for the political office bearer, as farmers 
approach local Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) to ensure their access to irrigation water 
and likewise it is in the interest of MLAs to appease their constituents. Chapter seven to nine had 
highlighted the norms and values of patron client relationship that embody the worldview and 
relationship between MLAs, farmers and farmer organization members. Hence, not surprisingly, the 
MLAs do not want to disturb the status quo. Likewise, many senior bureaucrats posit that 
intermediate level decentralization is not in interest of MLAs, as a project committee president in a 
project like SAS would command greater authority (given the expanse of the project) than the 
constituency of a legislative assembly (see chapter nine).cxxxiii  
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The conceptual frame of ideational realm in this research also facilitated in demonstrating how a 
dominant narrative (neoliberal, statist) for irrigation management has been reproduced in the policy 
arena, and how this has resulted in a mismatch between field realities - what impersonal state 
structure envisages and what junior bureaucracy perceives. Saravanan (2010) and Swain & Das 
(2008) have also made similar observation by undertaking an institutional and economic analysis 
however their work focuses on salience of institutional constraints on actors actions. The above 
findings are in consonance with experiences on participatory irrigation management from other 
countries like Indonesia where irrigation bureaucracy has been reluctant to share responsibilities, 
specially senior bureaucracy (c.f. Suhardiman, 2008; Suhardiman & Mollinga, 2012). Moreover, the 
idea behind modifying the institutional structure was to create a sustainable structure for resource 
governance. However, reworking of institutional structure has not reduced the financial crisis of 
bureaucracies as I had indicated through discussion in chapter eight that the collection of irrigation 
revenue has not improved since involvement of farmer organizations. 
Furthermore, based on empirical findings discussed in chapter five to nine it can be succinctly argued 
that tardy reform process has been deliberate as there has been minimalistic implementation of the 
PIM Act by the competent authorities/ engineers. For instance, according to the Act at least two 
general body meetings in a year need to be held for a WUA. The competent authority/sub engineers 
have through their day-to-day functioning interpreted number of general body meetings as 
maximum rather than a basic minimum and there is almost no awareness about the general body 
meetings amongst farmers. Thus, there are multiple understanding and implementation of the idea 
of participation that is framed by different worldview (discussed in chapter seven to nine). Similarly, 
Table 10.1 elaborates different interpretation of corruption and elections that different actors have.  
Table 10. 1: Diverse understanding on key issues in actors’ ideational realm  
Actors 
Diverse meanings/understanding on key issues in actors’ ideational realm 
Participation Corruption Elections  
Farmers  - Participation as voting  
- Value that can change 
reality 
- Delegation of irrigation 
work to farmer organization  
- Is a given, structural 
issue; normalized 
- Is gandagi  
- Negative value 
 
- Muse of people with money & 
time, interest in politics 
- Provides resources & 
opportunities 
- Casting vote as directed 
(womenfolk) 
Farmer 
organizations 
(mostly 
viewpoint of 
WUA 
president 
members)  
- Substantial participation: 
ability to exercise greater 
authority & decision making 
in functioning of WUA 
- Gatekeepers  
- (Petty) corruption are 
‘adjustments’  
- Embedded in quotidian 
living  
- Corruption as 
commission  
- Opportunity to improve local 
condition. Facilitates substantial 
participation  
- Opportunity to initiate into 
politics  
- Greater power and authority  
Senior - Procedural matter: through - Farmer organization - Handing over responsibility of 
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Actors 
Diverse meanings/understanding on key issues in actors’ ideational realm 
Participation Corruption Elections  
bureaucracy  quorum’s 
- Convenience and efficiency, 
apolitical participation 
- Check & balance 
mechanism  
are corrupt 
- Hesitant to talk about 
their own corruption or 
of corruption at macro 
level  
management to farmers 
- Voting for material gains by 
constituents (farmers) 
- Contestation and populism 
Junior 
bureaucracy 
- Instrumental participation: 
Implementing rules 
regulation strategically  
-  Procedural participation: 
nominating women 
members 
- Local corruption as 
minor malpractices 
 
- Increase in burden of work 
- Dual reporting 
- Lesser control over farmers  
International 
organizations 
like the 
World Bank, 
ICEF 
- Co-participation model 
relying on beneficiary 
contribution  
- Apolitical participation 
- Mainstreaming gender 
- Systemic issue that 
needs to be corrected 
- Elections & greater 
representation can 
reduce corruption 
- Elections deepens democracy, 
provides voice to the unheard 
- Creates greater transparency 
and accountability  
NGO 
Saadhan 
- Co-participation model 
- Encourage & enable 
political participation of 
constituents  
- Need to be corrected & 
exposed  
- Reporting to 
authorities can reduce 
corruption  
- Strong leaders, 
collective voice can 
reduce corruption 
- Tool for empowerment 
- Opportunity to create 
appropriate check & balances 
that can facilitate greater 
transparency  
International 
consultancy  
- Minimalist procedural issue - Normalized & essential 
part of being 
- Procedural issue 
 
From Table 10.1 it is evident that there are multiple meanings associated with participation, 
corruption and elections and this has led to perpetuation of multiple rationalities on how water 
ought to be governed. Notably, different understanding of participation can be clubbed under 
Arnstein (1969) ladder of participation which categorizes participation as citizen power, tokenism and 
non-participation and differentiates different levels - politicized and depoliticize- of participation. For 
instance, in Table 10.1, the understanding of bureaucracy on participation is non-participation, while 
international organisations enunciate depoliticized participation, which when implemented becomes 
for tokenism. Corruption and elections can also be viewed from similar lens of politicization or 
depoliticization. From the above table, different understanding of corruption, for instance, illuminate 
that in quotidian living, corruption has been depoliticized and become ‘part of being’ in actors 
ideational realm. Furthermore, as elaborated in empirical chapters, actors contend that corruption is 
a structural issue to be corrected, however, none of the actors attached negative value to their own 
corrupt practices. In context of corruption, a common ideational realm is that the individual 
corruption is acceptable and has been normalized in quotidian living. It is the structural corruption, 
which is viewed originating at macro level that is a problem. Furthermore, it can be concluded from 
Table 10.1 that actor’s ideational realm is crisscrossing social identities, especially at the local level, 
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as far as understanding of key terms like participation, corruption, elections are concerned. 
Additionally, a common viewpoint at the local level of junior functionaries of the department, 
farmers and even some of the project officials of SAS is that that PIM is not working. The next section 
discusses different worldviews that have been a hindrance for carrying out irrigation reforms. 
Command and control mind-set 
Command and control mind-set here is referred to the worldview of bureaucracy who still are guided 
by the beliefs and values of developmental interventionist state and have not adopted the ‘new’ 
beliefs of leaner state that neoliberalism envisages. To substantiate, few senior officials of WRD in 
Bhopal posit that one of the major roadblocks to smooth implementation of PIM in the state is 
temperament of officials i.e. there command and control mind-set.  
“There is conflict between what WUAs want to do and what engineers want them to do. 
The WUAs are interested in overseeing more work related to irrigation management, but 
the engineers have not let go of the idea of control over the irrigation system and thus 
don’t want WUAs to take over” (Interview, June 6, 2011). 
“Bureaucrats are powerful and misuse their power. After the enactment of the PIM Act 
they were supposed to function as support team but it has not happened and this has 
slowed down the process of reforms” (Interview, December 16, 2011). 
The above citations evince that WRD officials are wary of giving up power and control they had over 
irrigation networks (c.f. Sengupta, 2006), as before reforms, they were sole managers of irrigation 
systems. It also becomes evident from the above citation that the progressive officials in the state 
capital acknowledge the gap between what the legislative change demanded from officials and the 
actual reality, that is the mansikta (mind-set) of a predominant section within WRD which was not 
ready to give up this idea of control - a predominant structural worldview that was also evident at 
the national level (see chapter four, five and nine). Additionally, empirical evidence demonstrates 
anxiety and unwillingness of department officials to share work with first generation farmer 
organizations like sinchai panchayat that were constituted in 1980s and 1990s at the micro level; 
despite knowing that during the earlier period, legislatively the role of farmer organizations was 
limited to being assistants to department officials (see chapter seven). Furthermore, the command 
and control mind-set of the state bureaucracy stems from non-discursive politics of command, which 
the bureaucracy practiced, by knowing that they enjoyed surrogate rationality to maintain social 
order (Kaviraj, 2010, p. 149), discussed earlier in chapter four.  
Additionally, senior bureaucracy during interviews were more open to discussion on participation 
and few officials who are pragmatic/progressive posited that the problem with reform process has 
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been the departmental focus till now i.e. its mode of functioning as a civil works and construction 
department which is an outcome of developmental interventionist state ideology of Nehruvian era 
which focused on construction of large dams. There is a need to refocus department’s (work) 
orientation and have two-streamlined divisions, i.e. construction and service oriented. The 
bureaucrat posits that ‘if we combine service and construction section, then the system will get 
damaged. System efficiency can only be achieved if the focus is on improving service delivery’ 
(Interview, December 16, 2011). Furthermore, progressive officials in Bhopal argue that junior 
bureaucracy or irrigation staff in projects sites have not adopted management and participation 
terminology and this has been a hindrance for smooth implementation of PIM (c.f. Lipsky, 2010). To 
simply put it, the (junior) bureaucracy has not showed any willingness to decentralize. The 
philosophy that officials in SAS project function under are - if work happens fine, if does not then it is 
fine as well.cxxxiv However, as I had demonstrated through findings of chapter eight it is not only the 
junior bureaucracy that has showed unwillingness to decentralize. Even senior bureaucracy in Bhopal 
and SAS Project, Vidisha were sceptical to decentralize the intermediate level. Farrington et al (1999) 
have made similar observation through their work in context of watershed management in India.  
Further, evidence indicates that participation has been constrained by (strategic) practices of 
recentralization not only at the WUA level, but also at the intermediate level: WRD at the state level 
has not conducted distributory and project committee elections in the second and third term (see 
chapter eight). The position of project committee president in major irrigation projects, commands 
control over the distribution and management of entire irrigation system, and for instance in projects 
like SAS, can have decision making power over the irrigation water of a constituency which in some 
cases is greater than the constituency that a MLA commands. Therefore it is not surprising that the 
political office bearers are threatened by this new appointment. Whilst for bureaucracy the decision 
to decentralize has been top-down as well, to an extent, as the Madhya Pradesh has tried to follow 
the national trajectory of decentralization, as elucidated in chapter five. Thus, at the state level, this 
decision of not holding elections is partly influenced by worldview of political office bearers and 
partly by the irrigation bureaucracy. As both these actors’ are averse to the idea of losing power and 
control they had over irrigation systems (and farmers thereof). Clearly the worldview political office 
bearers and (at least) sections of bureaucracy is still influenced by the ideology of developmental 
interventionist state. 
Moreover, politicians enjoy power that farmers bestow on them by approaching them to improve 
their access to irrigation water in case of conflict. Overall, given the subtle and not so subtle efforts 
made to recentralize, it is evident that two influential actors (bureaucrats and politicians) do not 
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want to let this project of participation lead to a deeper social or political change, as it is not in their 
interest. Furthermore, the national level discussion on genesis of PIM and role of international 
organizations in influencing policy making at national level makes it evident that at the national level, 
PIM policy was devised without taking into account the complexity at local level (discussed in chapter 
four). In other words, it can be safely posited that the PIM policy-making process is blind to these 
multiple worldviews/rationalities that exist in the society, and these worldviews determine the 
relationship between bureaucracy and farmers. Additionally, the empirical chapters demonstrate 
that even farmers/farmer organizations are also not interested in decentralizing irrigation 
management. Thus, a collective worldview on decentralization is the unwillingness to decentralize, as 
actors believe that it will not work given power differentials and lack of legitimacy of the idea in 
actor’s ideational realm (see chapters, seven to nine). Given, this status quo I argue through this 
research that one needs to rethink the idea of decentralization, as it is redundant/a failure in current 
socio-political context of Madhya Pradesh (also see chapter nine). Moreover, the essence of 
democratic decentralization through participatory practices, the way it has been implemented, 
cannot be viewed as a project that could lead to deeper social or political change in the SAS Project 
region. Rather participatory practices that have emerged in this region needs to be viewed in light of 
constraining bureaucratic worldview, evident from their perceptions. Thus, a larger question to 
ponder is why promote participation, when actors who have to take forward this idea are not 
interested in it? 
Checklist mind-set for conducting capacity building  
The above-discussed empirical findings establish that current approach to irrigation management is 
not in sync with worldview of farmers, farmer organization and bureaucracy. Perceptions and 
existing mind-sets do not change easily. It requires regulations that can support change and are not 
ambiguous or are tailored to take forward a certain idea of change. In this context, capacity building 
efforts undertaken under SAS Project and the two select WUAs need a mention. A senior progressive 
bureaucrat in WRD reflecting on the training programme carried out by Madhya Pradesh WALMI 
posits that the training programmes leaves a lot to be desired. ‘The trainers are not innovative and 
undertake training programmes with a checklist mind-set’ i.e. programmes only done with objective 
of completing on record that training programme has been conducted. The components and method 
of training is uninspiring and repetitive, and does not spark much interest/enthusiasm among WUA 
presidents. To elaborate: 
“If we think that by doing workshop or publishing literature, the ethos of PIM will be 
imbibed, we are mistaken. In actuality, we need to go back to basics and start from the 
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first few letters rather than the end. The manner in which work is being done (i.e. the 
way participation is being implemented) in field needs to be re-evaluated. Awareness has 
increased, but we still need to work towards ensuring some basic minimum 
understanding about the ethos of participation and how work ought to be done” 
(Interview, December 16, 2011). 
Furthermore, a WALMI faculty reflecting on the capacity building programme for WUAs posits: 
“We have created dependency by creating government committees for the last sixty 
years. Frankly speaking, all the capacity building that we are doing currently is 
generating only awareness amongst WUAs about their role and functions. There is no 
effort being made through our capacity building programmes to make them technically 
capable to handle management aspects. These issues need to be addressed. WALMI is 
going to do it, given that it is the core agency for capacity building. Earlier WALMI was 
the nodal agency for WRD, but was transferred to rural development department in 
1997-98. So, our priorities changed and we now work on a broader domain including 
non-irrigated area for water management. Thus our focus was diverted to watershed 
management and rainfed agriculture i.e. there has been a gradual shift from command 
area to non-command areas. This shift in focus has affected work in command area. As 
there are limited specialities and services available, so there has been lesser focus on 
irrigation in the last decade or so” (Interview, August 30, 2011).  
From the above citations, two things become evident: structural constraints (i.e. who they report to) 
have influenced the functioning of WALMI, as with transfer to rural development department WALMI 
officials did not give adequate attention to training programmes of WRD. Secondly, worldview of 
WRD officials who implement PIM on ground needs to be broadened if this neoliberal project has to 
succeed. What also becomes evident from the above discussion is that too many (structural) changes 
can divert the focus of concerned actors’ to perform consistently given multiple ideologies for 
governance. Additionally, capacity building measures till now have been only for tokenism and only 
for WUA presidents and competent authorities. These training programmes are carried out in 
WALMI, Bhopal and the Territorial Constituency (TC) members and farmers are not part of this 
process (see chapter eight). Thus, lack of awareness, interest and consequently participation of TC 
members or the general body of the WUA towards WUA functioning is not surprising (see chapter 
five and eight). The above discussed was the approach of WALMI to capacity building which conducts 
programmes in an instrumental manner.  
The approach of the international consultancy hired under World Bank was even worse (discussed in 
chapter five and nine). Interestingly, the senior bureaucrats of WRD in Bhopal were hesitant to talk 
about the performance of this consultancy firm with respect to SAS Project (or any other project) as 
WRD terminated their contract because of poor performance and there was an on going enquiry of 
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the same in 2011-2012 (Interview, December 16, 2011).cxxxv While the ICEF funded Saadhan’s work 
was appreciated by the farmers but not by bureaucracy (see chapter nine). 
Interestingly, these organizations for capacity building were operating under three different 
ideologies viz. statism (WALMI), neoliberalism (International consultancy), and communitarianism 
(Saadhan).cxxxvi However, none of them were able to change the narrative for irrigation management 
in the project area or the worldview of farmers/farmer organizations/junior bureaucracy as discussed 
in this work. Overall, hegemonic participatory turn at the international level has resulted in creating 
rhetoric of participation at the national and state level, however with little results on ground.cxxxvii 
Moreover, it is essential to recognize that actors’ worldview are not going to change from token 
capacity building programmes, deeper thought into standpoint of actors, multiple rationalities and 
why or when they initiate action ought to be taken.cxxxviii This requires broadening the 
perspective/approach to understanding institutional change. A broader focus on deliberative 
discussion with receiver’s (farmers) and implementers of change (junior bureaucracy) could be one 
approach. However, this deliberative discussion cannot be necessarily achieved through crafting of 
institutions as suggested by Ostrom (1992) which is an offshoot of mainstream institutional approach 
and envisages efficient resource management through institutional crafting.  
Moreover, uncritical approach to capacity building has led to: first, introduction of this term in the 
policy lexicon without taking into account marginal differences between the proclaimed goals and 
methods of community development and community capacity building; second, application of the 
term community is done uncritically and universally to rationalize top-down interventions by 
national/state government and organizations like the World Bank; third, motive of this approach 
need to be clarified as changing organizational structure does not by itself alter the power 
differences at the local level; fourth, an underlying assumption in the term capacity building is that 
there people who have deficient capacities, skill sets, knowledge (Craig, 2007). Thus, 
conceptualization of capacity building programmes ought to be rethought as it currently is premised 
on the idea that local community is power deficient and thus needs to be empowered by building 
capabilities by the state and international institutions. The current approach to participatory 
irrigation management policy is from the standpoint of what farmers lack (i.e. be able to do 
operation and maintenance and other activities on the canal) and thus aims to embody a productive 
form of power, which can put them into action. This approach is not working as demonstrated in this 
work, as political projects of the governed do not match with the desires and plans of the governors 
(c.f. McKee, 2009, p. 472). The above discussion also evinces that policy makers would have to go 
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beyond traditional binaries for instance, citizen/subjects, and private/public while conceptualizing 
irrigation policy. 
Statist mind-set? 
A section of farmers in the two select WUAs of the SAS Project have a statist mind-set and expect the 
state to provision irrigation water as irrigation infrastructure is state property and its operation and 
maintenance ought to be undertaken by state representatives (see chapter seven to nine). Although, 
as elaborated in chapter eight and nine, statism – a notion based on the logic of political order- is not 
the only mind-set that farmers have. Rather as Kaviraj (2010) elucidates logic of social order which is 
premised on pre-capitalist social and bargaining relations also gain primacy in actors ideational 
realm. In chapter nine, this rationale was teased out while discussing farmer’s viewpoint on irrigation 
management in SAS project, wherein farmers apprised that the system is being managed, as there 
are established/acceptable practices for managing water. 
 Furthermore, handing over the operation and maintenance of irrigation network of SAS to WUAs 
was like handing over a system to the populace, which is mired with problems and required major 
responsibilities. It was assumed by the state/donor organizations that farmers would collectivize and 
spontaneously organize themselves if they perceive it in their interest; however, this has not 
happened in context of functioning of the two WUAs -Betwa and Saraswati (see chapter seven and 
eight). There is a need to re-evaluate how irrigation between upstream and downstream farmers 
ought to be organized. To substantiate, discussion with farmers, junior bureaucracy in SAS Project 
and in the state capital are indicative of the fact that practice of warabandi without proper 
infrastructure is not practical in all regions and without proper infrastructure, though it is still being 
voiced in policy circles and workshops as viable management approach. To elaborate, in January 
2012, I had participated in an all India seminar on ‘sustainable management of irrigations system 
through participatory irrigation management: techno-legal issues of farmer organizations’ in Kota, 
Rajasthan to observe the proceedings. Mostly senior bureaucrats from WRD/irrigation department of 
most of the states’ participated and the discussion in the seminar delved into how PIM can work, and 
not much discussion was paid to structural and cultural issues, which are hampering implementation. 
In fact not much recognition was given to problems in implementing PIM, which reflected the 
rhetorical approach that officials have without any interest in recognizing problems or initiating 
change. To elaborate, a senior official of Ministry of Water Resources, New Delhi posited, ‘we don’t 
accept that PIM has failed or is failing. There is scope for PIM in major and medium projects. There 
are teething problems but there has been work going on’ (Presentation, January 6, 2012).  
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Recent scholarship has also questioned, for instance, the relevance of following warabandi in large-
scale irrigation systems. Chambers (2013, p. 158) in fact connotes metal warabandi boards as 
‘monuments of top-down ignorance and folly’. Although, to give credit to the executive engineer of 
SAS Project, he did recognize the futility of following warabandi without proper infrastructure 
(Interview, February 10, 2012); but is trapped in the state structural directives that are top-down and 
at times far from the field reality. Here, again the futility of top-down policymaking as evinced by 
national and international donors becomes salient. Empirical findings illuminate that bureaucracy has 
developed their own strategic practices to evade some of these follies. However, given the power 
that irrigation bureaucracy commands, they have also used these strategic practices to restrict 
implementation of decentralization to suit their own purpose.  
PIM has failed in SAS project, and status of other projects in Madhya Pradesh is similar. Experience 
from Andhra Pradesh and Haryana also indicates that there have been problems with its 
implementation. Interestingly, Bassi and Kumar (2011) in context of Madhya Pradesh have argued 
that PIM will be more effective ‘if few institutional changes are made which are suitable for the end 
users’. However, as this research has demonstrated that these are not teething problems and issues 
will not resolve by instituting change at the micro level. Decentralization needs to be scaled at 
different level (see chapter nine) or given the current mansikta/ ideational landscape of actors the 
idea is redundant in its current form. 
Overall, based on empirical findings I argue that it is not only organizational affiliations that 
determine how actors’ perceive and act on a particular policy i.e. fulfil their ideational role for 
instance as decision makers or constituents organizations. Rather actors’ work at interface of 
different realms. Thus, despite efforts made to instil greater participation and commitment of 
farmers towards irrigation management in the state narrative (Madhya Pradesh), there has not been 
much change in the field reality, as institutions created i.e. WUAs as an outcome of decentralization 
at the micro level have not resulted in desired change, and this narrative of failure has been used by 
the bureaucracy to further stall the reform process at the intermediate level. Given that senior 
bureaucracy has not showed willingness to decentralize, it would be foolhardy to expect the junior 
bureaucracy to initiate a participatory paradigm, as they expect the leadership at the senior level 
need to set the norm. Senior bureaucracy’s unwillingness to decentralize in Madhya Pradesh was 
also evinced by an expert on irrigation management at the national level, who is also chairperson of 
the working group of major and medium irrigation and command area development for the Twelfth 
Five Year Plan.  
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“Madhya Pradesh has a long way to go, as senior officials don’t want to work (…) if 
farmers perceived any benefit/economic good was created by the system they would 
work, but they know they have no powers (...) PIM could work if it was part of much 
larger initiative to bring greater performance orientation in bureaucracy. If there were 
clear benchmarks for performance and there was view of verifying it. It is critical to 
holding irrigation bureaucracy accountable (…) if the bureaucracy wanted PIM to work, 
then it would work (…) Irrigation department of all the states are hoodwinking the 
political leadership. Minsters have no way of finding out what is the truth for instance 
about actual canal irrigated area in the country” (Interview, April 13, 2012). 
The above citation again highlights the critical role that irrigation bureaucracy plays in restricting 
implementation of PIM not only in Madhya Pradesh but also in other states. In this context, salience 
of history is critical, as actors’ worldview are not developed ahistorically as demonstrated in this 
work. 
10.2 Theoretical and analytical strength of ideational realm  
 This research demonstrates the utility of using the conceptual frame of ideational realm to 
understand the complexities that irrigation management sector in India is mired with. Using the lens 
of ideational realm I highlight not only the divergent worldview that are at play but also illustrate 
how ideas that gain salience through policy directives at national level may not be able to have 
envisaged impact (stickiness) at state or local level due to actors’ ideational realm that are guided by 
multiple worldview, norms, and values.  
Ideational explanation facilitate in understanding not only how reform process shape but also shed 
light on how idea of farmer participation is legitimized by actors, in different contexts - an aspect that 
is overlooked while designing institutions. Ideational variables -relevant for this paper- that defines 
actor’s ideational realm are norms, beliefs, values, culture, ideology, and structure. It is noteworthy 
that some of these variables are also identified as institutional variables. The difference is that in 
mainstream approach to institutional change these variables are looked at objectively to see how 
they relate to actions, whilst an ideational approach undertakes this endeavour in an interpretative 
way (Parsons, 2007, p. 100). Using this approach I have gleaned the underlying dynamics that shapes 
ideational realm of actors. Ideational approach is useful to discern different rationalities and goes 
beyond institutionalist explanations that articulate salience of a singular rationality, which are tied to 
values, rules and regulations that an institution inscribes to. Moreover, non-institutional variables 
and exogenous and endogenous factors are left out of institutionalist account (Gorges, 2001). I do 
recognize conceptual advances made by new institutionalists like Denzau and North (1994) by 
referring to conceptual models and cognitive maps to explicate institutional change. However, 
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Denzau and North’s (1994) claims are from rational institutionalism perspective wherein salience of 
(material) structural logic as determinant of action is elaborated. Furthermore, difference between 
institutionalist claim and ideational claim is that institutionalist claim that institutions shape action 
and thus do not give space for multiple interpretations and perceptions. Whereas ideational claims 
explains action as a result of people interpreting their world through certain ideational elements 
(Parsons, 2007, pp. 71, 96). Moreover, origin of ideas i.e. social, economic and historical factors that 
shape them are by themselves crucial as an explanatory variables (Gorges, 2001). Thus, Ideational 
approach facilitates in overcoming the over deterministic role of institutions which give primacy to 
singular rationality and posit that institutions sort out ambiguities that arise and these ambiguities in 
environmental conditions are just unintended consequence of institution building at the outset. 
Another difference between ideational and institutional approach is that institutionalists see 
ambiguity in environmental conditions only at the beginning while ideational scholars view ambiguity 
throughout (Parsons, 2007, p. 98). Having said that it needs to be noted that sociological 
institutionalism has strands of ideation elements in its approach wherein it is argued that 
conventions that take on a rule like status in social thought and action (Parsons, 2007, p. 100; Powell 
& DiMaggio, 1991, p. 9). Although, the problem is that in conceptualization of sociological 
institutionalism these rules and conventions take on an overly deterministic focus on all-defining 
cultural norms (Schmidt, 2008, p. 304). Ideational approach is also better informed than institutional 
approaches like rational choice theorists who give primacy to rational preferences of actors, or the 
historical institutionalists who argue for self-reinforcing path dependent outcome of institutions 
(Schmidt, 2008, p. 304). Overall, ideational analysis is useful to fill gaps in institutional theory –
rational choice, historical, organizational or sociological institutionalism wherein scholars have 
posited difficulty in explaining institutional change (Campbell, 2004; Schmidt, 2008). Ideational 
approach also connoted by few as discursive institutionalism or ideational institutionalism (Schmidt, 
2008) facilitates in better understanding of political action compared to other institutionalist 
approaches. Ideational analysis is also different from structural analysis as its defining feature is 
starting from the ambiguity that arises due to environmental conditions. Readers will notice that I 
have outlined structure as one of the ideational variable in this work. The reason for putting 
structure with other ideational variables like norms, beliefs, values is to distinguish it from taken for 
granted explanation of structure for instance, material or legislative structures. As demonstrated 
through the empirical findings, structure can be something more intersubjective which structures 
and is structured by human interactions. For instance, PIM Act necessitates that management 
committee meeting of WUAs ought to be held every month. However, sub engineers and WUA 
presidents have an intersubjective understanding of how monthly meetings ought to be done, and 
thus paperwork is kept up-to-date, but actual meeting are done on as-required basis. Moreover, 
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given multiple sites of governing (farmers, farmer organizations, junior bureaucracy) after creation of 
WUAs, there are multiple power nodes that are generated given diverse meaning attached to 
participation  (see table 10.1), which is indicative of how structuring of structure happens. Thus, 
structure cannot be taken for granted as an explanation. Rather it is the interaction between 
structure and social cultural context that needs to be emphasized.  
Conceptually the focus in this work has been on providing clearer definition of ideational variables 
and the utility of operationalizing it. Focus has been on detailed elaboration of ideational variables to 
elucidate how they influence both the policy implementation and outcome and thereby result in 
tardy reform process at micro level, which has been used as benchmark to not decentralize the 
intermediate level by the legislative and executive arm of the state. Furthermore, ideational 
literature deals with these variables from the perspective of actors position (and thereof their realm- 
mansikta/mind-set), which is in contrast to discursive institutionalist who employ ensemble of ideas, 
concepts and categorizations of beliefs, norms, etc. to make sense of underlying institutional 
patterns (Weiner, 2007, p. 20 emphasis added). Additionally, the concept of ideational realm as 
demonstrated through this research overcomes the fuzziness of ideas that comes with ideational 
analysis by providing clearer definition of ideational variables, which is one of the critiques of 
ideational approach (Schmidt, 2008). Process tracing in ideational analysis also facilitates in 
elucidating how ideas are tied to action. In this dissertation I elucidate how multiple interpretation of 
key terms -participation, corruption, state control, elections- has been generated, deliberated and 
legitimized by actors who are carriers/implementers or recipients of ideas.  
Furthermore, ideational approach in this dissertation illuminated that ideational factors 
‘programmes, frames, paradigms and public sentiments’ are shaped by context which is determined 
by structural and cultural elements and thus shape polices and its implementation. The conceptual 
frame facilitated in highlighting the objective as well the subjective ideational realms as key drivers 
for understanding how actors perceive their interest, role, and devolution of 3Fs of decentralization. 
This conceptual frame is useful to demonstrate not only relationship of idea with action of actors, but 
also facilitates in demonstrating how actors reproduce apolitical notion of participation (c.f. B. 
Agarwal, 2001; Arnstein, 1969; Gaventa, 2004). This interpretation is divergent from other literature 
wherein it is argued that institutions reproduce a certain idea for instance, social exclusion (c.f. De 
Koning & Cleaver, 2012). Rather I argue that it is actor’s ideational realm or mansikta that reproduces 
and propagates certain idea -be it of participation or of management or corruption or elections- in 
light of structural and cultural elements.   
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The concept of ideational realm is comparable to scholars who undertake actor oriented approach 
like Cleaver (2002, 2012) who argue through the notion of bricolage that actors work within ‘bounds 
of circumstantial constraints’ and thus institutions could be crafted at the micro level to achieve 
desired change. However as findings of this research indicate decentralization cannot be achieved by 
focusing only on micro level, as it is difficult to craft institutions at intermediate level, given multiple 
rationalities that are at play. It is noteworthy that both the concept of ideational realm and bricolage 
as explicated by Cleaver emphasize relationality with other actors i.e. people’s consciousness and 
actions are shaped in web of human connection (c.f. Cleaver, 2002; Cleaver, 2012, p. 40). However, 
the notion of ideational realm also sheds lights on structural elements (along with cultural elements) 
and thus facilitate in understanding how ideas are legitimated. 
Moreover, this work evinces causal explanation for lack of intermediate decentralization, rather than 
just provide an explanation. To recall, chapter three had listed one of the criticism that ideational 
researchers face is of providing weak causal explanations. This drawback is overcome by 
demonstrating policy making as a two-step process. As a first step the focus was on elaborating how 
certain idea for irrigation management was established during the colonial period, which resulted in 
establishment of a dominant ideational realm for irrigation management. I also demonstrate how 
post-independence, the focus was on doing away with the colonial idea of governance and greater 
focus on democratic and welfare-oriented approach. This led to initiation of multiple narratives on 
irrigation policy in India which was operationalized by ideational brokers. Consequently, in the late 
1960s there were varieties of idea championed for irrigation management by experts, bureaucracy 
and international organizations; however, during this period there was limited decentralization (see 
chapter four). It’s only in the 1990s at the national level with a weak Indian state and pursuance of 
neoliberal policies that idea of participatory irrigation management was championed with great 
rigour by organizations like the World Bank and adopted by the bureaucracy, which led to adoption 
of the idea of participatory irrigation management (see chapter four). Similarly, for Madhya Pradesh 
an exposition of how policy is promoted as an outcome of the endogenous and exogenous factors is 
provided to demonstrate causality (see chapter five). Empirical findings in chapter six to nine further 
elaborate the causal effects of top-down designing of institutions. To elaborate, it is acknowledged 
that change does not happen overnight. Causality of ideas in this work has been established by 
elucidating different learning curves for actors’. For instance, change in ideational realms of farmers 
over the years, or bureaucracy’s internalization of the idea of participation and then its 
operationalization. Furthermore, change in ideas has not lead to change in practices of water 
management, but as demonstrated through this work change in ideas has led to change in approach 
to irrigation management. This has changed actors’ viewpoint on the interface between state and 
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society i.e. the intermediate level. Moreover, change in ideas, in fact, has led to change in functioning 
of actors, for instance, junior bureaucracy now have to indulge WUA members, which was not the 
case earlier.  
Overall, this dissertation further advances understanding of ideational literature by arguing the need 
to pay attention to structural and cultural ideation factors i.e. to understand the interdependence of 
categorical inequalities as this facilitates in understanding how ideas are generated, deliberated and 
legitimized and thus provides response to the central research question on reasons for poor reform 
process are the multiple ideational realms that are being pursued by actors (see chapter five to 
nine).cxxxix Thus, on one hand functioning of junior bureaucracy elucidates how they establish 
minimalist interpretation and implementation of the PIM Act as a status quo. On the other hand 
farmers also exercise their agency and restrict their participation as they view this top-down 
designing of institutions is not for their benefit. This viewpoint of farmers of giving greater salience to 
quotidian realities is also formed by their assessment of process of irrigation management, which 
they perceive ought to be with the state. Thus, it becomes evident that actors’ have interpreted idea 
of democratic decentralization propagated by the state for irrigation management differently and 
have taken it forward to fulfil their vested interests. This approach of studying roadblock to 
institutional change overcomes the limitations of other institutional approaches that give salience to 
one factor over other like rational interest, social explanations or institutional path dependency. 
Ideational approach followed in this dissertation can also be compared and contrasted with legal 
pluralists who bring forth centrality of water rights in analysis of institutions of water management to 
posit how WUAs lack incentives and rights for management of irrigation system or reluctance of 
irrigation agencies to cede authority (Meinzen-Dick & Bruns, 2000, p. 37). The legal pluralists don’t 
make dualistic interpretations of legal or customary rights, for instance, as an explanation for poor 
functioning of WUAs. Moreover, their argumentation does not illuminate why certain ideas gain 
primacy over other as they focus on how laws and institutions relate to social practices. But they miss 
to give salience to structural and impersonal forces like ideology, which influences implementation of 
decentralization.  
Having discussed the salience of the notion of ideational realm, it is prudent to acknowledge its limits 
as well. To wit, ideational realm, worldview, mind-set have been defined and interpreted by scholars 
differently that is to say, fuzziness of this concept can be its strength as well as weakness, as lack of 
common intersubjective understanding of the concept among scholars leads to problem in 
implementing this as a methodological approach. Moreover, causality is difficult to establish through 
this approach as one is taking about variables like ideas, norms, and culture. Given the discussion is 
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about something intangible, it is difficult to measure compared to institutions or structures and thus 
at times scholars have critiqued this approach to be tautological, static and monolithic (Parsons, 
2007, p. 94). Although, as demonstrated through this work causality can be hard to establish but can 
be done and similarly, variance has also been demonstrated through this work, establishing multiple 
understanding of participation, corruption, elections, for instance, among actors. 
10.3 Future research areas and limitations of this research 
This dissertation has argued for moving away from a policy prescription model of designing of 
institutions as propagated by international institutions like the World Bank and the Indian state alike, 
as it is argued that this prescriptive model has not worked on the ground. Although, as is evident 
from empirical findings this model has been pursued by the Indian state at the behest of 
international organizations with great fervour. The relation between World Bank and the Indian 
state, specifically the irrigation department will be intriguing to research, as they have continued 
funding of certain programmes despite known problems.cxl It is obvious that there has been certain 
degree of accommodating action from both actors’ to ensure a way forward. I am aware of the tied 
funding argument for pursuance of a certain policy; however, the answer is not that simple and 
needs to be delved further. I had sought appointment with World Bank official to understand this 
conundrum but unfortunately, I was not given an appointment. The other donor agency, ICEF has 
already wound up its operation in India, and some of the relevant people who spearheaded the ICEF 
funding in Madhya Pradesh have since moved to other organization outside India, hence were not 
approachable. The research findings could have been richer from these discussions and that is a 
limitation of this research.  
Additionally, role of political office bearers in stalling the reform process need to be studied in depth 
(also sugegsted by Mollinga, 2003; Nikku, 2006). This research had aimed to do this, but lack of 
access to MLAs despite several attempts made in this direction is a shortcoming of this research. 
However, I was able to interview one former MLA of this region who provided some insights into the 
issue from the time when he was an MLA in the 1980s – when the project was commissioned.   
Another empirical research issue is to study how did Soybean cultivation start in this region and its 
impact on changing irrigation practices in this region. If it was not for Soybean being practiced 
rainfed in this region, then the irrigation management system (perhaps) would have been different 
and farmer would have also availed water during kharif season, which could have made the water 
management practice more efficient and sustainable.   
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10.4 Concluding remarks 
Overall, this research posits that having a blanket (one size fits all) approach to institutional change 
based on expert advice without taking into account field realities can go awry. It is critical to bear in 
mind the processes by which institutions are created -to wit if they are an outcome of a deliberative 
discussion process or rather were created at the behest of an organizational mandate or ruling- as 
that has an effect on institutional life later on. Further, if institutions are created without bearing in 
mind the deliberative discussion process then diverse worldview of actors can be a major roadblock 
for successful implementation of any policy, as is evident from the case of intermediate level 
decentralization in SAS project. Thus, approach/viewpoint to devising irrigation policy needs to be 
rethought. 
This dissertation underscores that political/democratic decentralization that the state sought to 
undertake, ought to be viewed through the lens of ideational realm to understand why reforms are 
tardy. This research also discusses how top-down regulation can initiate processes for a certain 
institutional change, but with little problem resolution on the ground as ideational realm of actors 
curtailed full implementation of the policy. There has been minimalistic implementation of PIM by 
the bureaucracy and weak political will to decentralize has further hampered the decentralization 
process. Thus, this research contends that mere policy formulation is not going to ensure effective 
management. Rather there needs to be cohesion between actors’ worldview to ensure smooth 
implementation of policy. Furthermore, initiating a governance structure at the intermediate level is 
a problem not affecting irrigation sector. Rather other sectors like health, education, forests are 
facing similar institutional design problems as well. Thus, this study merits paying attention to actors’ 
ideational realm to find an interface for building institutions for democratic decentralization.   
Democratic decentralization is potentially a good notion, however, the manner in which 
decentralization and participation has been pursed currently is apolitical. Further, at present there 
are too many committees (panchayats, village forest committee, seed committee, etc.) at the micro 
level. Most often these committees are headed by elites of the village who have become new 
gatekeepers of information and/or resources. This has resulted in disenchantment and burai 
(acrimony) at the village level about farmer organizations, and farmers are wary of outcome of 
participatory approaches, which are depoliticizing participation (as demonstrated through this work) 
but politicizing the local community. As discussed in this work, categorical inequalities determine 
who gets elected for a committee post (like WUA president) or who has access to information. The 
depoliticizing effect of participation has also created lesser accountability and transparency for 
functioning of these committees. Decentralization in its current form is not a panacea as it is 
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envisaged to be. This failure needs to be recognized rather than connoting emerging issues as mere 
teething problems. Working from this standpoint, salience of decentralization at different levels 
needs to be recognized, as an important aspect to address issues of devolution at different levels and 
this cannot be done without taking into cognizance divergent worldviews of actors as otherwise 
institutional change that is envisaged will not gain legitimacy in actors ideational realm.  
Overall, this work demonstrates that enactment of PIM legislation has been viewed as an end in itself 
to solve the maladies that irrigation sector in India is facing and consequently, hegemonic pursuance 
of this approach has foreclosed exploration of alternatives ideas, which could enable better irrigation 
management. An alternative perspective could be having a ‘problem shed approach’ as articulated by 
Mollinga, Meinzen-Dick, & Merrey (2007) rather than watershed or hydraulic approach to irrigation 
management. To elaborate, focus could be on improving decision-making power, and deliberation at 
local level/project level to resolve quotidian problems. For instance, farmers of SAS Project do not 
want warabandi as they are aware that it is not practical to implement in the region. Therefore, 
instead of focusing on enforcing it as was done by one of the district collectors in early 2000, it is 
pragmatic to work with the existing system of water distribution to ensure equity and efficiency. 
Additionally, a problem-shed approach can ensure quicker and faster resolution of conflicts. In the 
empirical chapters, I had discussed how Saraswati WUA has been delineated on hydraulic basis and 
the distance between upstream village of the WUA and downstream village of WUA through all-
weather road is about forty kilometres. Given, the distance, it is practically not viable for farmers to 
approach WUA president for day-to-day matters. Here again, the futility of having large WUA 
delineated on hydraulic principle becomes salient. Overall, it becomes evident that by making PIM an 
end in itself has resulted in diversion of focus from exploring other alternatives that could facilitate in 
achieving the goal of better irrigation management. Findings also reveal that farmers are not 
interested in participation and neither is bureaucracy and thus both these actors have overridden the 
legislative mandate of implementing PIM ruling by initiating strategic practices that just accentuate 
symbolic and procedural mode of participation. However, does not resolve the quotidian irrigation 
problems of an area. 
 
                                                          
cxxix
 Literature review of select cases Mexico, Philippines, Turkey and Colombo indicates salience of structural 
elements; organizations (international donor agencies, national or provincial bureaucracies); actors (experts 
and individuals working with donor organizations, bureaucrats, political office bearers, user groups) in shaping 
policy on decentralizing irrigation management (see chapter two). 
cxxx
 Additionally, prevalence of top-down idea of participation in Madhya Pradesh is also evident from the 
funding that state governments need for large-scale irrigation promoted. Most of the state government are 
dependent on CADP funding and as discussed in chapter four and five and earlier in this chapter, CADP is 
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promoted and funded by central government and provides funds and ideas for the state to adopt participatory 
approach to irrigation. Given lack of adequate funding with state departments, a senior official of WRD, Bhopal 
elaborated the plan of using CADP fund for building capacity and enhancing farmer participation (Interview, 
December 20, 2011). Apart from that the capacity building was also funded by World Bank’s MPWSRP in select 
projects that has a strong PIM component in its project design.  
cxxxi
 In Karnataka, Sahayog - another NGO - has facilitated/ served as an intermediary between farmers and 
irrigation bureaucracy. Sahayog had sensitized and mobilized the farming community to imperatives of reform 
process. Their work was later taken up by Pragathi (an offshoot of Sahayog) that was made by farmers who 
were disenchanted with the rift among the professional leadership of Sahayog (Narain, 2009, p. 128). 
cxxxii
 In Haryana, Water Resource Consolidation Project (WRCP) was initiated after an agreement between 
government of Haryana and the World Bank. Under this project in 1994, it was mandated that farmers 
contribute in operation and maintenance activities in large irrigation systems by collecting irrigation fees. PIM, 
however, has been ineffective in Haryana; there has been no change in equation between farmers and the 
irrigation department, or reorientation of bureaucracy (Narain, 2003, p. 217). Moreover, no effort has been 
made to change this status quo. 
cxxxiii
 This finding can be contrasted with finding of Narain (2003, p. 217) in Haryana, who posits that water 
management problems in Haryana were not only below the outlet, where the focus of reform had been. Rather 
one needs to also look at reforms at the middle and system level, which is in control of the irrigation 
department. 
cxxxiv
 This finding is in accord with a recent Central Water Commission evaluation of the SAS Project that 
observes:  
 ‘It is also felt that the sub-engineers who were the main instrument in maintenance of the irrigation system 
have withdrawn themselves from this work after the transfer of maintenance of the system to farmer 
organizations. Without any powers under the act, sub engineers feel let down by the department and feel 
humiliated in working in the changed scenario. Presidents of the farmers’ organizations have also started 
thinking that sub engineers will have to work under them as per their will and wishes. These wrong notions of 
the farmers have to be removed and they should be made to work in close association with the sub engineers 
and seek technical guidance from them in running and maintenance of the system’ (GoI, 2006b, pp. EC-9).  
cxxxv
 Chapter five had discussed how this particular consultancy was selected over NGOs who initially were 
hopeful of being awarded the institutional development contract for another term under MPSWRP programme 
of the World Bank. 
cxxxvi
 As already discussed in chapter five, Saadhan did try to broker that paradigm but they were not given 
funding to continue their work of capacity building post 2007. 
cxxxvii
 Scholars in the edited volume by Cooke and Kothari (2001) have also questioned hegemonic participatory 
development discourse. 
cxxxviii
 To elaborate, WALMI officials train farmer organization members and it assumed that they would embody 
the ideas of the ideational realm of neoliberalism while undertaking their duty. 
cxxxix
 Till now, scholars have attributed institutional change to either structural changes, local political/social 
context, or actors rationality however, scholars by using this either/or criterion have missed delving into the 
interdependence and interaction of structural and cultural factors (c.f. Berman, 2013, p. 227). 
cxl
 Other authors have also suggested greater understanding of this relationship (See Chambers, 2013; Levine, 
2013; E. Shah, 2012). 
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11 Appendices 
11.1 Appendix I: Method of data collection and analysis 
This research draws together evidence collected ethnographically and from archival sources to 
elucidate salience of history to understand current irrigation management practices. Additionally, by 
focusing on cognitive factors like perception, beliefs, values of farmers/farmer organizations on 
irrigation management, I on one hand deconstruct the narrative around irrigation management to 
illustrate salience of farmer ideational realm as situated in the local socio-cultural context in the SAS 
Project as a roadblock to intermediate level decentralization. On the other hand, interviews with 
junior and senior bureaucracy highlight the situatedness of their ideational perspective in history, 
state functioning and local context. Key informants for this research were identified purposefully to 
ensure representative from all actors considered crucial for the research design, namely, senior and 
junior bureaucracy, farmers/farmer organization, NGO personnel, and experts on the subject.  
In this note, I focus on three broad points that were not tackled in the research design discussed in 
chapter one, viz. how the fieldwork was conducted, i.e. how the respondents were identified and 
interviews conducted, and my own ideational perspective on the same. Secondly, I elaborate how 
the data was analyzed. Third, I briefly discuss issues that constrained data collection during fieldwork. 
I arrived in the state capital, Bhopal and initiated my field research with setting up a meeting with 
the project director of Water Resources Department (WRD) with help of a former colleague from 
work. The project director was helpful and encouraged me to talk to some other senior officials of 
WRD who could provide me more information on the subject. Given, that focus of my work was on 
intermediate level decentralization, at the outset, I initiated contact with all relevant offices of WRD 
like Chief Engineer E&M, PIM Directorate, in Bhopal who could have played some role/provided 
information on intermediate level decentralization issue. This initial contact was crucial, as the Indian 
bureaucracy is not known to share information easily, and from my own experience with the Madhya 
Pradesh bureaucracy, as part of my previous work, I knew that I would have to be constantly in touch 
with them and make my presence felt in order to access information/have discussions. To elaborate 
further on the process, I always used to set appointment with officials in advance, however, despite 
setting up appointment, many a times the concerned officials would not be in their office, and it was 
normal to wait for an hour or more in such circumstances. Getting any information from the Indian 
bureaucracy is not easy, especially for an independent researcher. Given my conceptual framework, I 
started reflecting on how they perceived me, as a female, foreign university student from Delhi and 
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thus, an outsider, and therefore were unwilling to share too much information with me, although, I 
had put in a formal requisition with the project director to access basic secondary information from 
WRD. This is also a signifier of the ideational realm of bureaucrats who know that they have a 
position of power and authority and thus were in general unapologetic about not sticking to 
appointments or providing information.  
Apart from WRD, I also contacted Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI), faculty at Indian 
Institute of Forest Management (IIFM), key Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) working on the 
subject and discussion with these officials/experts facilitated in narrowing down the case study site 
i.e. the Samrat Ashok Sagar (SAS) Project which is close to the state capital.  
While in the field I was critical of my own worldview and did not allow my subjectivities influence the 
trajectory of my data interpretation or how my field research was conducted. Rather it was the inter-
subjectivity that I paid attention to while undertaking field research. To elaborate, I conducted my 
fieldwork in the heartland of BJP. Politically my views are contrasting to that of right wing 
fundamentalist party. However, as a researcher, I chose SAS area, as that was the ideal case study 
site for my research. However, that did not constrain me for being objective as a researcher about 
my work in the field area. Furthermore, having selected the case area, I was critical of my actions, or 
how I presented myself in the field and not to be biased by my precepts. I initiated myself in the SAS 
Project by setting up meeting with executive engineer of the SAS Project, who gave me an overview 
of the project and also introduced me to two sub engineers who accompanied me to two WUAs in 
which they were secretaries. I am aware that going to villages with government officials can give an 
impression to farmers that you are somehow associated with state/not independent. I was aware of 
this association, and had immediately made note in my diary to avoid similar situation in future and 
also to clarify my position with farmers and womenfolk later, which happened over long discussions 
over a period of time. Nevertheless, the introduction to the SAS Project area through the two sub 
engineers was useful for me to understand the area and later I selected two WUAs (Betwa and 
Saraswati) for in depth research. In my initial days I also got in touch with NGO Saadhan, which had 
undertaken capacity building programme in this project (see chapter eight). During these initial days I 
also selected my first field assistant who was a local farmer from Sadhai village of Betwa WUA. He 
was educated, had a Masters degree, was well travelled, and knew the project area well and thus 
was a perfect candidate for field assistant. Moreover, my field assistant had also worked as a 
community organizer for the international consultancy firm that the World Bank had recruited under 
Madhya Pradesh Water Sector Restructuring Project (MPWSRP). As mentioned in empirical chapters 
(six, seven and eight) the SAS Project area farmers are wealthy and many farmers live in close by 
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towns and visit villages from time to time. Here, the experience of my field assistant with the 
international consultancy firm came handy to set up appointments with Water User Association 
(WUA) presidents and other Territorial Constituency (TC) members. My field assistant facilitated and 
introduced me to WUA members of the two selected WUAs and also to members of the intermediary 
level farmer organization i.e. the distributory and project committee members of the SAS Project. 
However, after few months my first field assistant expressed his unwillingness to work, as he wanted 
to prepare for a state exam and was busy with agricultural activity. I was in the middle of fieldwork at 
this point and though I already knew all the major actors in the region who were part of farmer 
organization. I thought it would work best, if I could find another field assistant to facilitate my work. 
This time, one of the fieldworker of NGO Saadhan helped me in finding a field assistant. My 
experience with my two field assistants was interesting and made me cautious and critical of how I 
interacted with local community and also made me reflect about their perception about me. My first 
assistant was a Brahmin and the second one a dalit (lowest caste group). There was perceptible 
difference between how the two field assistants approached big landholding upper caste farmers 
(mostly rajputs). Taking cue from this experience and not a believer/practitioner of caste system 
personally, I chose not to tell my last name (as it is indicative of one’s caste) and I was critical of the 
caste discussion - an important factor in those parts.   
Overall, in the initial few months of my field work I focused on making myself aware of the area, 
farming practices, farmers, farmer organization members both pre and post constitution of the PIM 
Act. Given, that the area in the two WUAs is quite large with many villages, I did not find it fruitful to 
live in one village. As somehow farmers could have perceived that I was biased against one 
community/village. This was a good decision in retrospect as over many months of field interviews 
and informal discussion with farmers I realized that there were many categorical inequalities (as 
discussed in empirical chapter) that divided the farmers and living in one area could have restricted 
my access to information. Additionally, given that the research focus was on intermediate level 
decentralization, I found it useful to live in a close by town, which also made my access to officials 
facile. Moreover, many a times meeting with WUA members was set in nearby towns as they used to 
either live there, or preferred meeting in town.  
During the initial few months into data collection, it became evident that awareness of farmers about 
farmer organizations was poor. Additionally, a generic question that farmers asked was how was my 
work going to be beneficial to them. Given, that this question was asked frequently I always clarified 
my position as a researcher. Moreover, I also took this opportunity to apprise farmers and 
womenfolk about role of farmer organization, rights of farmers as envisaged in the Act. Additionally, I 
Appendices 
 
 
 
 
294 
used to meet WRD officials regularly for follow up interviews/discussion, and I took that as an 
opportunity to bring to their notice some of the quotidian problem in the two select WUAs, for 
instance, inaction by WUA after flooding of farmer fields. Moreover, compared to the officials in 
WRD, Bhopal the junior officials in SAS Project were much more forthcoming with sharing data, after 
approval of their reporting authority.  
I maintained field diaries for the entire duration of my research, in which I noted not only my field 
interviews, but also made notes from my observation in the field, WUA president meetings at 
executive engineer’s office, etc. I also prepared regular monthly progress reports to share with my 
supervisor and tutor. These reports facilitated me to structure my thought and work while in the field 
and were also useful to initiate myself into data analysis later. Additionally, I used a voice recorder to 
record (almost all) my interviews, by taking consent of my interviewees. The interviews were 
conducted in English or Hindi depending on the preference of the interviewee. Select interviews 
were transcribed by a transcription agency.  
Post completion of my fieldwork phase, I immersed myself in the data I had collected i.e. listening to 
audio files, perusing transcripts, field notes and the other secondary data I had collected.  Given that 
I conducted mostly semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. The responses of 
interviewee to a question were woven through out an interview, and thus I analyzed interview 
transcripts, field notes, for common recurring themes or outliers, categories and patterns that 
evinced causal relationships and facilitated responding to the primary research question. 
Additionally, I have used the secondary data collected from the project office, to corroborate field 
findings. Although, it is recognized that whilst undertaking interpretative research, farmers or 
officials perception/construction of social reality with respect to irrigation management is a 
determinant of their ideational realms. To elaborate, farmers and junior officials alike perceive late 
2007 to 2010 as scarcity years. Although, data on opening and closing of the canals presented in 
Appendix VII illustrates that intensity of scarcity was not same in all these years, however, it is the 
perceived scarcity that determines ideational realm, was an important insight that corroboration 
with secondary data provided in this context.  
There were several impediments to fieldwork. Here I will elaborate few that I perceive affected my 
work. First, about two months into my fieldwork, while in the field, I got sick and was diagnosed with 
Typhoid, and this slowed down my work considerably. Secondly, accessing secondary information 
from government organizations was a major hurdle, especially old information. To elaborate, after 
the first round of WUA elections in 2000, WRD had organized training programme through RCVP 
Noronha Academy of Administration. However, the officials of the Academy were not able to provide 
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any documentation of the training programme of that time. They apprised that any document, which 
is more than five years old, is purged to maintain space and organize information. Therefore, details 
on various components of this training programme are not available. Ideally, the library ought to 
have had one copy of the training programme for their records.  
Getting any information from the Indian bureaucracy is not easy, especially for an independent 
researcher. Given my conceptual framework, I started reflecting on how they perceived me, as a 
female, foreign university student from Delhi and thus, an outsider, and evinced unwillingness to 
share too much information with me, although, I had put in a formal requisition with the project 
director to access basic secondary information from WRD. Additionally, from past experiences, I was 
critical of how I conducted myself in the field and being aware that they were being guarded about 
giving data was due to their inter-subjective realm. I through constant interactions, meetings, and 
waiting in their offices, spoke to them and alleviated their concerns. Moreover, by doing so I did not 
give in to the norms of the social (bureaucratic) order. Rather by persevere and pursuance I managed 
to elicit information. In fact, one of the respondents even suggested that I should use RTI to get 
information (Personal interview, December 16, 2011), which is indicative that not all in the 
bureaucracy are corrupt and few officials were warming up to the idea of greater transparency and 
accessibility. On the other, this remark by a senior bureaucrat elucidates his acknowledgement of 
problem that WRD faces today- the resistance to open and share information. The officials are aware 
that the state structure provides them a (iron) veil that they can use to restrict access to information. 
If an independent researcher faces this problem, it is not too hard to imagine how access to 
information is restricted for farmers and WUAs (discussed in chapter six, seven and eight). 
Interestingly though this particular official of WRD with whom I had been following up with for many 
months for data with little success in a conference that I was attending on PIM where he was also 
present remarked that I should stop collecting information now as I have already collected 
information to do five PhDs (Field notes, January 2012). From the above encounter, it is clear that 
some of the WRD officials were not comfortable to share information and were wary of the subject I 
was researching.  
Furthermore, two excerpts from my field diary with two different officials in Bhopal one a WRD 
official and another expert on the subject highlight the dilemmas of a researcher studying ideational 
realm of actors: 
“(…) Interestingly, Mr. X categorized SAS Project as an instance of very active project that 
has good coordination between WUAs and engineers. During the interview I pointed out 
that my field impression is slightly different and there is not much awareness amongst 
farmers about the project or even among WUA members about what their roles and 
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responsibilities are. Mr. X’s response to this question was that if I want to see really good 
active participation of farmers and WUA then one ought to go to Harsi project close to 
Gwalior district (…) Although, interestingly Harsi project was recently evaluated by Mr. Y 
and he noted that everything is not right there either. Another professor from IIFM made 
similar remarks. He was part of the team that was constituted for internal review of 
Harsi Project by World Bank, Washington D.C (Field diary, February 9. 2012).   
From the above notes it is clear, that the WRD official, initially praised the SAS Project, but when I 
questioned him further about the project, based on my knowledge/field experience, he instantly 
encouraged me to see another project and discounted the success of SAS Project. Although, my 
meeting with another expert on the same day had brought forth that all was not well in the Harsi 
project either. There are many instances like the one narrated above and I was always in a dilemma 
whether to question the officials and present alternative facts as that might constrain my access to 
them in future. To resolve this dilemma, early on in my fieldwork I decided to be as transparent and 
maintain sanctity of an independent researchers, which entailed that I would share any information I 
had, if this facilitated in questioning what the interviewee was putting forth.  
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11.2 Appendix II: Irrigation potential created and utilized in India since the 
pre-plan period 
 
 
Source: Data compiled from GoI (1992a, 2001a, 2009b) 
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11.3 Appendix III: Accelerating investment and decelerating irrigation 
benefits 
 
 
 
 
Source: Shah (2011, p. 74) 
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11.4 Appendix IV: Box on Irrigation Act 1931 and Irrigation Rules 1974 
 
The Madhya Pradesh irrigation Act 1931 defined the irrigation management regulations in Madhya Pradesh 
along with the Irrigation Rules of 1974. Under the Irrigation Act 1931, ‘rights in the water of any river, natural 
stream or natural drainage channel, natural lake or other natural collection of water vests with the 
government’ (GoMP, 1931, Section 26). The water supply under the Act was under the discretion of the 
executive engineer, and payment of water was done according to the area irrigated based on the prevalent 
demand rates (GoMP, 1931, Section 38). The Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Act is supplemented with Irrigation 
Rules 1974 to give operational guidelines for users. The 1974 Irrigation Rules, however, are unclear about 
distribution of water below outlet. Although, they indicate that in ordinary circumstances distribution of water 
for irrigation beyond the outlet will rest with the beneficiaries, who can divide and allocate it among 
themselves. In case of disagreement between farmers, the irrigation panchayats were responsible for ensuring 
proper distribution (GoMP, 1975, Rule 219). Further, in case of disagreement, the irrigation panchayats with 
the aid of amin and in discussion with beneficiaries’ (i.e. the farmers) were to resolve the dispute by coming to 
a mutual agreement that the beneficiaries were bound to abide by (GoMP, 1975, Rule 220). 
Moreover, another issue that becomes evident on perusing through legal writings is the willingness to initiate 
warabandi for distribution of water at least in letter for several decades now. The Irrigation rules of 1974 that 
were formed for Irrigation Act of 1931 were corrected in 1982 through a departmental notification, wherein 
any reference to osrabandi was deleted from the irrigation rules, and corrected with the term warabandi. For 
instance, in section 75(C), (D)(4), (E) & (G), paragraph number 220, 221, 222 the words osrabandi were 
corrected to warabandi vide notification number F-27-8-81.MM-39 dated November 6, 1982. Similar deletion 
was done in rule 213(a), vide, Irrigation department’s notification number F-27-8-81-MM-39 dated November 
6, 19x82 (GoMP, 1975). This deletion seems to be in consonance with the thinking at the national level.   
Overall, the irrigation Act has been powerless and was not able to provide enough directions to the irrigation 
panchayats that were initiated in the state. The same is elaborated through the status of irrigation panchayats 
in Chapter six.  
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11.5 Appendix V: Opening and closing dates of canal system 
 
Year Opening of canal Water level (Ft) Closing of canal 
1978 October 27, 1978 1502.15 March 31, 1979 
1979 November 1, 1979 1493.00 April 2, 1980 
1980 October 28, 1980 1502.65 April 1, 1981 
1981 October 30, 1981 1499.40 March 30, 1982 
1982 November 1, 1982 1501.41 March 30, 1983 
1983 November 1, 1983 1504.85 April 25, 1984 
1984 November 1, 1984 1501.90 March 31, 1985 
1985 November 1, 1985 1506.40 March 31, 1986 
1986 November 1, 1986 1502.20 March 1, 1987 
1987 November 1, 1987 1499.65 March 14, 1988 
1988 October 27, 1988 1502.30 April 10, 1989 
1989 November 1, 1989 1498.30 March 31, 1990 
1990 October 29, 1990 1505.30 April 4, 1991 
1991 October 25, 1991 1504.60 March 29, 1992 
1992 November 3, 1992 1497.40 March 30, 1993 
1993 November 11, 1993 1503.10 March 29, 1994 
1994 October 29, 1994 1506.50 March 29, 1995 
1995 October 29, 1995 1501.10 April 8, 1996 
1996 November 12, 1996 1505.20 March 22, 1997 
1997 November 30, 1997 1503.70 April 6, 1998 
1998 November 1, 1998 1506.20 March 31, 1999 
1999 November 1, 1999 1504.40 March 31, 2000 
2000 November 1, 2000 1501.40 March 31, 2001 
2001 October 28, 2001 1501.60 March 13, 2002 
2002 October 29, 2002 1497.00 April 1, 2003 
2003 November 6, 2003 1504.40 March 29, 2004 
2004 November 1, 2004 1505.10 March 7, 2005 
2005 October 27, 2005 1506.40 March 1, 2006 
2006 November 1, 2006 1506.60 March 31, 2007 
2007 October 10, 2007 1488.80 December 14, 2007 
2008 Not opened - NA 
Source: SAS Project Office, Division No. 2, WRD, Vidisha 
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11.6 Appendix VI: Year wise actual irrigation done against culturable 
command area in SAS Project 
 
 
Source: Design by author based on data from SAS Project Office, Division No. 2, WRD, Vidisha  
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11.7 Appendix VII: Distribution of landholders by the size of their 
landholdings in 1980-81 in India 
 
Category of Landholders Size of landholders 
Average size of 
landholding in the 
category 
Marginal Up to 1 ha 0.39 
Small holders 1 to 2 ha 1.43 
Medium holders 2 to 4 ha 2.76 
Upper medium holders 4 to 10 ha 5.97 
Large (rich) holders more than 10 
hectares 
more than 10 ha 17.24 
 
Source: Data from Agriculture Census of India 1980-81 cited in Dhanagare (1995, p. 75) 
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11.8 Appendix VIII: Pre (1976-77) and post (2003-04) PIM cropping pattern 
in SAS Project 
 
Pre project cropping pattern 
Cropping season Crops Area (in hectare) 
Percentage area 
cropped 
Kharif 
Soybean 0 0 
Jowar (Sorghum) 151.668 5.7 
Maize 286.07 1.02 
Paddy 40.146 0.14 
Groundnut 89.356 0.32 
Arhar/toor (pulses) 376.974 1.35 
Others 181.398 0.65 
Total 2565.612 9.19 
Rabi 
Gram 4984.434 17.85 
Masoor 913.114 3.27 
Wheat 11990.565 42.94 
Peas 57.935 0.21 
Others 2086.627 7.47 
Rabi 20032.675 71.74 
Other crops 
Vegetable, fodder, 
fruits, etc. 5325.113 19.07 
Grand total 27923.4 100 
    
Post PIM cropping pattern 
Cropping season Crops Area (in hectare) 
Percentage area 
cropped  
Kharif 
Soybean 12155 43.53 
Jowar (Sorghum) 112 0.4 
Maize 163 0.58 
Paddy 26 0.09 
Groundnut 12 0.04 
Arhar/toor (pulses) 35 0.13 
Others 73 0.26 
Total 12576 45.04 
Rabi 
Gram 9672 34.64 
Masoor 2626 9.4 
Wheat 10520 42.94 
Peas 212 0.76 
Others 1064 3.81 
Total 24094 86.28 
Other crops 
Vegetable, fodder, 
fruits, etc. 2690 9.63 
Grand total 39360 140.95 
*Culturable Command Area of the project (in hectares) = 27924.4 
 
Source: CWC (2006, pp. 273-274) 
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11.9 Appendix IX: German Summary (Deutsche Zusammenfassung) 
Die vorliegende Dissertation befasst sich mit den Prozessen, die 1999 zur Einführung des 
partizipatorischen Bewässerungsmanagements im indischen Bundesstaat Madhya Pradesh führten. 
Die Arbeit zeigt auf, warum die Entscheidung, Farmerverbände zu gründen kein Ergebnis eines 
deliberativen Prozesses war, sondern den Landwirten eher von oben verordnet wurde, was zu sich 
zäh hinziehenden Reformen führte. Diese Forschungsarbeit legt dar, wie Verordnungen von oben 
nach unten zwar zu bestimmten institutionellen Veränderungen führen können, jedoch an der 
Ursache des Problems wenig ändern. Außerdem soll erläutert werden, warum und inwieweit die 
ideelle Vorstellungswelt der Akteure ein entscheidender Faktor für das Verständnis (und die 
Gestaltung) institutioneller Reformen ist, da die Dezentralisierung in Madhya Pradesh die 
hierarchischen Grenzen eher verstärkt als abgebaut und somit ein schwieriges Feld für  politische 
Umsetzungen geschaffen hat.  
I. Fragestellung, konzeptioneller Rahmen und Herangehensweise an die 
Forschungsarbeit 
Dezentralisierung wird weltweit als ein Allheilmittel für eine verantwortungsbewusste 
Regierungsführung angesehen und von internationalen Organisation und Staatsregierungen 
gleichermaßen angestrebt, obwohl weltweite Erfahrungen bewiesen haben, dass dem nicht so ist. 
Trotzdem wurden demokratische Dezentralisierungsprozesse als Wundermittel für das 
Bewässerungsmanagement vom indischen Staat und indischen Institutionen in gleichem Maße 
vorangetrieben. Demokratische Dezentralisierungsprozesse sind nicht nur in Bezug auf 
Bewässerungsmanagement ein wichtiges Forschungsthema, sondern auch wenn es darum geht, 
Probleme einer gerechten Ressourcenverteilung zu erfassen, welche heutzutage immer noch für alle 
Staaten eine Herausforderung darstellt. Demokratische Dezentralisierung betrifft jeden Bereich, wie 
zum Beispiel das Gesundheits- und Bildungswesen oder auch natürliche Ressourcen wie Wasser, mit 
deren demokratischer Dezentralisierung sich diese Dissertation befasst. In dieser Arbeit soll es 
demnach um Prozesse gehen, welche die Umsetzung von Richtlinien für ein dezentralisiertes 
Bewässerungsmanagement auf mittlerer Verwaltungsebene in Madhya Pradesh beeinflussen. 
Im Hinblick auf dezentralisiertes Bewässerungsmanagement wurde das ‚partizipatorische 
Bewässerungsmanagement’ (PIM) von internationalen Institutionen und Organisationen wie der 
Weltbank, der US-amerikanischen Organisation für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (USAID) und der 
Ford-Stiftung als großartiges Mittel gepriesen, die weltweit benötigten 
Bewässerungsdienstleistungen zu gewährleisten. Andere Akteure wenden jedoch ein, dass 
partizipatorisches Bewässerungsmanagement in der Realität nicht funktioniert, woraus sich folgende 
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Frage ergibt: Wenn das partizipatorische Bewässerungsmanagement nicht funktioniert, warum wird 
es dann von internationalen Organisationen und Institutionen sowie den verschiedenen Staaten 
dennoch zur Verbesserung des Bewässerungsmanagements eingesetzt? Zusätzlich zeigen 
Forschungsarbeiten zu weltweiter Dezentralisierung, dass deren Ergebnisse auf Mikroebene durch 
strukturelle und kulturelle Gegebenheiten beeinflusst und geformt werden. Basierend auf diesen 
Erkenntnissen stellt die vorliegende Dissertation die Behauptung auf, dass die ideelle 
Vorstellungswelt (die Wahrnehmung einer Person, welche über einen Zeitraum hinweg entsteht und 
durch strukturelle und kulturelle Realitäten geformt und beeinflusst wird) der Akteure die 
erfolgreiche Einführung jeglicher Dezentralisierungsprojekte beeinflusst. Es soll weiterhin näher 
ausgeführt werden, inwieweit soziokulturelle, ökonomische und staatliche Strukturen wichtige 
Determinanten zur Gestaltung der Lebenswelt eines Akteurs sind. Hinausgehend über die 
Betrachtung von Vorschriften und Richtlinien einer bestimmten Politik beleuchtet die Dissertation 
näher, wie sich die Akteure aufgrund dieser Politik und innerhalb der durch diese Politik etablierten 
Institutionen verhalten. Das Konzept der ideellen Lebenswelt wurde dabei als passend befunden, die 
wahrgenommenen Realitäten der Akteure und deren Einfluss auf Ergebnisse herauszustellen.1 
Bisher wurden verschiedenste Aspekte der Dezentralisation in Indien erforscht, wobei jedoch 
Betrachtungen dieses Themas für die mittlere Verwaltungsebene fehlen.2 Daher hat es sich die 
Verfasserin zum Ziel gesetzt zu ermitteln, warum die Dezentralisierung auf mittlerer Ebene des 
Bewässerungsmanagements trotz unzähliger Versuche von Seiten der indischen Regierung und 
internationaler Institutionen bisher nicht zufriedenstellend war. Die übergeordnete Forschungsfrage 
befasst sich deshalb mit den ideellen Lebenswelten von Farmern, Farmerverbänden, gemeinnützigen 
Organisationen sowie über- und untergeordneter Bürokratie, welche die Dezentralisierung auf 
mittlerer Verwaltungsebene im Samrat Ashok Sagar Projekt (SAS) in Madhya Pradesh, Indien, am 
meisten beeinflussen (bzw. blockieren). Dies steht im Kontrast zu bisherigen Forschungsarbeiten, 
welche sich größtenteils auf institutionelle Hürden für die Dezentralisierung auf Mikroebene 
konzentriert haben. Die Arbeit zielt darauf ab, die drei folgenden Dimensionen des 
Forschungsproblems zu bearbeiten: 
1. Welche Rolle spielen die verschiedenen Akteure, wie Bürokratie, internationale und  
gemeinnützige Organisationen sowie Experten, bei der Institutionalisierung einer bestimmten 
Vorstellung über dezentralisiertes Bewässerungsmanagements innerhalb der staatlichen 
Politikgestaltung? Und wie verbreitet sich diese spezifische Vorstellung im SAS-Projektgebiet? 
                                                          
1
 (Chhatre, 2008) 
2
 (Mollinga, 2010) 
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2. Wie wird  Partizipation von ausgewählten Akteuren, d. h. Farmern, Farmerverbänden, über- und 
untergeordneter Bürokratie sowie zwei ausgewählten Farmerverbänden innerhalb des SAS-Projekts 
(Betwa und Saraswati) wahrgenommen? Welche Hürden bestehen auf mittlerer 
Dezentralisierungsebene? 
3. Welche kulturellen und strukturelle Faktoren formen die ideelle Lebenswelt der Akteure und 
beeinflussen so die Einführung eines dezentralisierten Bewässerungsmanagements auf mittlerer 
Staatsebene? 
Das SAS-Projekt wurde von der Landesregierung Madhya Pradeshs in den späten 1980ern ins Leben 
gerufen. Seitdem wurden mehrere Versuche durchgeführt, das Bewässerungsmanagement  durch 
die Einbindung von Farmern in verschiedenen Farmerorganisationen zu dezentralisieren. Dies 
geschah vorwiegend unter der Schirmherrschaft der Landesregierung sowie mit gelegentlicher 
(finanzieller) Förderung durch USAID, der Weltbank und der indisch-kanadischen Umwelteinrichtung 
ICEF. In der langen Laufzeit des SAS-Projektes von den 1980er bis in die 2000er Jahre wurden etliche 
Farmerverbände und etliche Ebenen (mittlere, kommunale und Mikroebene) zum Zwecke der 
Dezentralisation gegründet, was das Projekt nun zu einer idealen Fallstudie für die Erforschung von 
Hindernissen für die Dezentralisation auf mittlerer Verwaltungsebene macht. In dieser Dissertation 
soll daher der Zusammenhang zwischen Dezentralisierungsrichtlinien und Farmereinbindung im 
Kontext der Kommunalpolitik sowie unter Einbeziehung der ideellen Lebenswelt der Akteure 
untersucht werden (gemäß Campbell, 2004 und Berman, 2013), anstatt nur davon auszugehen, dass 
eine größere Farmerbeteiligung für die Dezentralisierung des Bewässerungsmanagements förderlich 
ist. Die vorliegende Dissertation argumentiert, dass interdependente strukturelle und kulturelle 
ideelle Faktoren die ideelle Lebenswelt des Akteurs beeinflussen und sich so auch auf die 
Durchführung von Dezentralisationsprozessen auswirken. Die ideelle Lebenswelt wird in dieser 
Arbeit konzeptualisiert als Interpretation einer Situation durch einen Akteur. D.h. die Interpretation, 
und nicht die Situation selbst, ist die Basis für weiterführende Handlungen eines Akteurs. Ideelle 
Lebenswelten werden von Weltanschauungen, die der Akteur vertritt und welche seine ideelle Rolle 
bestimmen, geformt.3 Ideelle Variablen sind Normen, Glaubensvorstellungen, Kultur, Ideologie und 
Strukturen. Sie werden in dieser Arbeit verwendet, um herauszufinden, wie Lebenswelten von 
Akteuren durch deren Beweggründe sowie Lebensumstände geformt werden.4 Zusätzlich wurde das 
Konzept der ideellen Lebenswelt von der Autorin weiterentwickelt, um aufzuzeigen, dass das 
                                                          
3
 (Campbell, 2004) 
4
 (Berman, 2013) 
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Konzept als analytischer Rahmen geeignet ist, um die langatmigen Reformen im 
Bewässerungsmanagement zu erklären. 
II. Erkenntnisse und Struktur der Dissertation 
Die Erkenntnisse dieser Dissertation dienen nicht nur dem Verständnis, weshalb Reformprozesse im 
Bewässerungsmanagement der Fallstudie nicht richtig greifen, sondern können auch dazu verwendet 
werden, Dezentralisierungsprozesse im Allgemeinen zu verstehen. Die Forschungsergebnisse sind 
bedeutend, da weltweit viel Energie und Ressourcen zur Verbesserung dieser Reformprozesse 
aufgewendet werden, um Staatsführung und nachhaltiges Ressourcenmanagement effektiver zu 
gestalten. Diese Forschungsarbeit soll auch die Relevanz umfassender sozio-politischer Beziehungen 
als Bestimmungsfaktoren der ideellen Lebenswelt der Akteure hervorheben. Die Arbeit argumentiert 
außerdem, dass sich nicht nur die Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten Organisation darauf auswirkt, 
wie Akteure bestimmte politische Vorgaben wahrnehmen, sondern dass die Akteure an den 
Schnittstellen verschiedener Lebenswelten agieren. Diese Schnittstellen werden zu einem 
bestimmten Ausmaß durch die von einer spezifischen Organisation vorgeschriebene ideelle Rolle 
sowie durch umfassendere sozio-politische und kulturelle Beziehungen gesteuert und geformt, 
welche wiederum die ideelle Lebenswelt der Akteure prägt. 
Kapitel eins gibt einen Überblick über das Forschungsproblem und stellt die Forschungsmethodik 
dar. In diesem Kapitel wird erläutert, dass das SAS-Projekt als Fallstudie gewählt wurde, da es für 
großangelegte Bewässerungsprojekte in Madhya Pradesh repräsentativ ist. Außerdem bietet es 
verschiedene Analyseaspekte, da es das einzige große Bewässerungsprojekt ist, welches finanzielle 
Unterstützung vom ICEF erfuhr und weil viele verschiedene Akteure (z. B. über- und untergeordnete 
Bürokratie, Farmer, Farmerverbände, gemeinnützige Organisationen/ Beratungsunternehmen sowie 
politische Amtsträger) an diesem Dezentralisierungsprojekt beteiligt waren. 
Das Projekt wurde hinsichtlich des Lands und der Lage gezielt als Fallstudie ausgewählt. Um 
verschiedene Sichtweisen innerhalb der Fallstudie hervorzuheben, wurden zwei 
Farmerorganisationen innerhalb des Projekts ausgewählt: zum einen Saraswati am flussaufwärts 
gelegenen Abschnitt, zum anderen Betwa am flussabwärts gelegenen Abschnitt desselben Kanals. 
Daten für diese Dissertation wurden in Interviews mit Schlüsselpersonen, in 
Fokusgruppendiskussionen, in Beobachtungen und durch die Auswertung sekundärer Quellen 
erhoben. Schlüsselinformationen wurden in Interviews mit leitenden Beamten, jüngeren Beamten, 
Nachwuchsingenieuren, rangniedrigen Funktionären des Wasser Ressourcen Abteilung WRD, 
Personal gemeinnütziger Organisationen, Mitliedern der Wassernutzervereinigung (WUA), 
ehemaligen Mitgliedern der gesetzgebenden Versammlung sowie weiteren Fachexperten ermittelt. 
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Die Dezentralisation wurde sowohl aus hierarchischer (auf nationaler und staatlicher sowie Projekt-
/WUA-Ebene) als auch diachroner Sichtweise analysiert. Die historische Betrachtungsweise ist 
besonders hervorzuheben, da die Ergebnisse auf im Laufe der Zeit entstandenen 
Interpretationsprozessen, Mechanismen und diskursiver Wirklichkeit basieren. Die Analyse durch 
den gewählten ideellen Ansatz hat sich als dabei nützlich erwiesen, herauszufinden, wie die 
Einbindung von Farmern in das Bewässerungsmanagement institutionalisiert wurde. 
Kapitel zwei bildet die Grundlage für die folgenden sieben Kapitel dieser Dissertation. Es legt die auf 
internationaler Ebene vertretene Sichtweise auf Bewässerungsreformprozesse sowie die weltweite 
Relevanz internationaler Organisationen  bei der Förderung der Farmerbeteiligung am 
Bewässerungsmanagement dar. Das Kapitel unterstreicht, dass Politikgestaltung und  Reformprozess 
nur nachvollzogen werden können, wenn man Historie, Strukturen, Organisationen sowie Personen 
und ihre lokalen Bedingungen anhand ausgesuchter Fälle untersucht. Im Falle des partizipatorischen 
Bewässerungsmanagements werden weltweit zwei Ansätze zur Entwicklung von 
Managementinstitutionen vertreten. Im Kapitel wird dargelegt,  dass passende Voraussetzungen für 
den langfristigen Erfolg von Reformprozessen unabdingbar sind. Außerdem wird die Bedeutung 
weltweiter Diskurse erörtert, die für ein partizipatorisches Bewässerungsmanagement als geeigneten 
Ansatz zur Dezentralisierung des Bewässerungsmanagements plädieren. Weiterhin werden die 
strukturellen und kulturellen Elemente betrachtet, welche die weltweit vorherrschenden Meinungen 
über Bewässerungsmanagement beeinflussen. 
Kapitel drei erläutert Schlüsselbegriffe und den analytischen Rahmens, der angewendet wurde, um 
Hindernisse bei der Dezentralisierung des Bewässerungsmanagements zu ermitteln. In der Literatur 
zu ideeller Lebenswelt finden sich nicht genügend Fallbeispiele, welche die Prozesse, die zur 
Institutionalisierung von Ideen führen und somit politische Ergebnisse im Laufe der Zeit 
beeinflussten, darlegen. Noch weniger jedoch finden sich empirisch belegte Fälle darüber, wie 
Konzepte die Motivation und die Lebenswelten der Akteure formen.5 Hier knüpft diese 
Forschungsarbeit konzeptionell an die Diskussionen an: Sie stellt einen Fallstudie vor, in der 
Konzepte, die in der Vergangenheit relevant waren, den Lernprozess für neue Konzepte (bezüglich 
des partizipatorischen Bewässerungsmanagements) verlangsamt haben, da die vorherigen 
Bewässerungsmanagementkonzepte die Beweggründe und Lebenswelten der Akteure auf bestimmte 
Weise institutionalisiert haben. Zusätzlich wird die in der ideellen Forschung laut gewordene Kritik, 
dass „Motivationen und Kausalität undeutlich und unklar bleiben“6 durch Anwendung des 
                                                          
5
 (Berman, 2013, p. 217). 
6
 (ibid.). 
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konzeptuellen Rahmens der ideellen Lebenswelt aufgegriffen und die Kritikpunkte (Motivation und 
Kausalität) anhand dessen und am Fallbeispiel des partizipatorischen Bewässerungsmanagements 
verdeutlicht. 
Kapitel vier nimmt Bezug auf Kapitel zwei und drei und stellt die Wichtigkeit von Historie, Strukturen, 
Organisationen und Personen für das Verständnis eines dezentralisierten 
Bewässerungsmanagements in Indien heraus und unterstreicht die Rolle von Konzepten für die 
Politikgestaltung. Es wird außerdem diskutiert, dass der Verlauf von Bewässerungsreformen in Indien 
hinsichtlich der Idee der Farmerpartizipation am Bewässerungsmanagement einer umfassenderen 
Untersuchung bestimmter Schlüsselaspekte bedarf. Dazu muss das Konzept der Farmerbeteiligung 
am Bewässerungsmanagement in Indien im historischen Verlauf verstanden, die Befürworter und 
Träger dieser Idee identifiziert und die Bedingungen, welche zur Übernahme dieses Konzepts zu 
einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt im politischen Paradigma führten, verstanden werden. Des Weiteren 
wird die nationale Ebene analysiert, da vorausgesetzt wird, dass Politik der nationalen und 
Länderebene die Wahrnehmung von Akteuren (Bürokraten) kommunaler Ebenen beeinflussen. 
Anhand einer Prozessanalye wird untersucht, wie sich die Konzepte für das 
Bewässerungsmanagement im Verlaufe der Zeit entwickelt haben, um hervorzuheben, wie 
unterschiedlich die Entwicklung von Mechanismen und Prozessen für das Bewässerungsmanagement 
verlief. Die Analyse in diesem Kapitel wird mit Hilfe ideeller Variablen durchgeführt und legt ideelle 
Paradigmen dar, welche das Bewässerungsmanagement in Indien prägten. Zum Beispiel wird 
aufgezeigt, wie verschiedene politische Fragestellungen in einem bestimmten Zeitraum – wie z. B. in 
der Kolonialzeit, nach Erreichen der Unabhängigkeit und nach 1990 im liberalen Zeitalter – darüber 
entschieden, welche Richtlinien für das Bewässerungsmanagement zu diesem Zeitpunkt wichtig 
waren.  
Kapitel fünf führt näher aus, wie das ideelle Paradigma für die Farmerbeteiligung am 
Bewässerungsmanagement in Madhya Pradesh durch Diskussionen über den Aufbau von 
Farmerverbänden erster und zweiter Generation geprägt wurden. Es wird ausgeführt, welche Rolle 
die verschiedenen Akteure, die das ideelle Paradigma beeinflussten und/oder innerhalb ihres 
Geltungsbereichs sehr einflussreich waren und so die Dezentralisierung behindern/fördern konnten, 
spielten. Des Weiteren wird betrachtet, wie die Farmerbeteiligung innerhalb der ideellen 
Vorstellungswelt der Akteure auf Landesebene beeinflusst wurde, d.h. wie sich die Direktiven der 
Zentralregierung und Geberorganisationen, welche das Konzept der Farmerbeteiligung am 
Bewässerungsmanagement einführten, auf das ideelle Paradigma auswirken. Daneben wird 
aufgezeigt, dass auch weitere endogene Faktoren das ideelle Paradigma prägen, wie die 
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Bereitwilligkeit der politischen Amtsträger und Bürokraten, die Idee zu tragen und zu verbreiten. 
Dieses Kapitel verdeutlicht darüber hinaus, wie die vorgenommenen Reformmaßnahmen zur 
Einführung des Gesetzes über das partizipatorische Bewässerungsmanagement bestimmte 
Verwaltungsfunktionen gleichzeitig dezentralisiert und wieder zentralisiert haben. Die 
bürokratischen Strukturen sicherten so, dass die Entscheidungsgewalt im eigenen Geltungsbereich 
erhalten blieb.  
Kapitel sechs stellt den Ort der Fallstudie vor und beleuchtet den sozio-kulturellen und  politischen 
Kontext des SAS-Projekts. Die lokalen Akteure sind in dessen Kontext eingebettet und werden in ihrer 
ideelle Lebenswelt durch diesen geprägt. Kapitel sieben beschreibt diese ideelle Lebenswelt der 
Akteure, die durch ihre ideelle Rolle (z. B. als Farmer, als Mitglied eines Farmerverbandes, in der 
Bürokratie) im SAS-Projekt zwischen 1978 – 2000, als Farmerverbände der ersten Generation im 
Bundesland gegründet wurden, geformt ist. Das Kapitel stellst außerdem heraus, wie das Netzwerk 
rund um das Bewässerungssystem, welches in den 1970ern vom Staat errichtet wurde, die 
landwirtschaftliche und soziale Landschaft des SAS-Projekts bis in die 1990er Jahre veränderte und 
betrachtet den Gründungsprozess von Farmerverbänden der ersten Generation (Sinchai Panchayats 
und Krishak Samiti) in den Dörfern sowie die ideellen Variablen, die für das Verstehen dieser 
Farmerverbände wichtig sind. , Das Kapitel beweist,, dass diese Farmerverbände der ersten 
Generation nicht erfolgreich waren: auf legislativer Ebene waren sie nur mit einer begrenzten Rolle 
und begrenzten Funktionen ausgestattet; die für die Bewässerung zuständige Bürokratie führte kaum 
oder keine Maßnahmen durch, um die Gemeinschaft auf diese Organisationen aufmerksam zu 
machen; die Leiter der Farmerverbände gaben keine Informationen und/oder kein Wissen über die 
Funktionsweise der Verbände an die lokale Gemeinschaft oder an Mitglieder des Ausschusses weiter; 
und die Haltung und Wahrnehmung der Bürokratie war ein Hindernis bei der Etablierung einer guten 
Zusammenarbeit und/oder beim Teilen von Informationen zwischen Bewässerungsbürokratie und 
Führern von Farmerverbänden der ersten Generation. Des Weiteren wird in diesem Kapitel die 
Wahrnehmung der Farmer hinsichtlich der Normen zur Nutzbarmachung von Bewässerungswasser 
sowie ihre Wahrnehmung der Bürokratie und der Funktionsweise von Farmerverbänden betrachtet. 
Es wird außerdem erörtert, wie diese Standards und Überzeugungen durch den sozio-kulturellen 
Kontext beeinflusst wurden,  dass bis zum Ende der 1990er Jahre alle Vorhaben zur Dezentralisierung 
des Bewässerungsmanagements ausschließlich auf Mikroebene durchgeführt wurden und dass es 
keine Versuche gab, das Bewässerungsmanagement auf mittlerer Landesebene zu dezentralisieren. 
In Kapitel acht wird die ideelle Lebenswelt der Akteure nach dem Jahr 2000 weiter ausgeführt, als 
Farmerverbände der zweiten Generation (WUAs) in Madhya Pradesh sowohl auf Projektebene als 
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auch auf Mikroebene und mittlerer Ebene gegründet wurden. Ziel ist es, näher auf die Gründe 
einzugehen, die der Staat vorgeschoben hat, um die mittlere Verwaltungsebene nicht zu 
dezentralisieren, wie zum Beispiel das schlechte Funktionieren der Farmerverbände (WUAs) auf 
Mikroebene. Die Feldstudien zeigen jedoch, dass die Gründe in Wahrheit vielfältiger sind. In diesem 
Kapitel wird gezeigt, dass einige der an die WUAs übertragenen Verantwortlichkeiten ihnen Schritt 
für Schritt durch diskursive Praktiken der untergeordneten Bürokratie auf Projektebene wieder 
entzogen wurden, wie z. B. Dokumentenverwaltung oder das Zahlen von Gehältern an das 
Wachpersonal oder Zeitnehmer. In den zwei erhobenen WUA-Fallstudien zeigte sich auch, dass 
Beamte der untergeordneten bürokratischen Ebene zum Einen versuchten, ihre Vorrechte auf 
grundlegende strukturelle Bevollmächtigungen zu erhalten und zum Anderen ihre Behörde zur 
Verwirklichung privater Interessen nutzten, um sich den Zugang zu Kommissionszahlungen, welche 
sie bereits vor der Etablierung der WUAs genossen, zu sichern. Das Kapitel beleuchtet außerdem die 
strukturellen und kulturellen ideellen Faktoren, welche wichtig sind, um zu verstehen, warum die 
Farmerverbände auf Mikroebene (also die WUAs) schlecht funktionieren. 
Kapitel neun knüpft an die Diskussionen in Kapitel acht an und wendet sich den verschiedenen 
ideellen Lebenswelten zu, wie z. B. denen von Farmern oder leitenden und untergeordneten 
Beamten, welche auf Mikroebene zu schlecht funktionierenden Farmerverbänden geführt haben. Es 
wird des Weiteren hervorgehoben, dass Farmer keine homogene Gruppe sind, auch wenn dies in den 
paradigmatischen und programmatischen ideellen Lebenswelten von z. B. Entscheidungsträgern oder 
Theoretikern noch keine Rolle spielt und daher auch nicht in das Konzept des dezentralisierten 
Bewässerungsmanagements aufgenommen wurde. Das Kapitel illustriert, dass die Lebenswelten von 
Farmern und Bürokraten ein Hindernis für die Dezentralisierung auf mittlerer Staatsebene darstellen. 
Die Erkenntnisse in Kapitel sieben, acht und neun verdeutlichen die Relevanz kolonialer und post-
kolonialer ideeller Lebenswelten für das Bewässerungsmanagement und derzeit angewandte 
Verfahren im Bewässerungsmanagement verdeutlichen. Deshalb fließen auch historische Realitäten, 
welche die ideellen Lebenswelten prägten, in die Betrachtungen in Kapitel neun mit ein.  
In Kapital zehn werden Schlussfolgerungen dazu gezogen, inwieweit das in dieser Forschungsarbeit 
dargestellte Konzept der ideellen Lebenswelten für das Verständnis von Hindernissen für die 
Dezentralisation auf mittlerer Ebene von Nutzen sein kann. Es werden weiterhin diskursive Praktiken, 
welche Indikatoren für die komplexe Beziehung zwischen Bürokratie und Farmern/Farmerverbänden 
in Bezug auf die Dezentralisierung des Bewässerungsmanagements in Madhya Pradesh sind, 
hervorgehoben. Die Verfasserin hebt ebenfalls hervor, wie formale Strukturen der Dezentralisation 
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und Farmerpartizipation Methoden des Bewässerungsmanagements im dynamischen sozial-
politischen Ambiente des SAS-Projekts beeinflusst haben oder von ihnen beeinflusst wurden. 
Die Forschungsarbeit unterstreicht, wie bestimmte ideelle Ansichten, die vom Staat und staatlichen 
Akteuren vertreten und unterstützt werden, zum derzeitigen Konzept des 
Bewässerungsmanagements führten. Die vorliegende Dissertation betont deshalb, wichtig der 
Kontext für die Ausführung des partizipatorischen Bewässerungsmanagements in einem bestimmten 
Land oder auf lokaler und regionaler Ebene ist. Gleichzeitig sollte der „Kontrolllistenmentalität“ auf 
untergeordneter bürokratischer Ebene und der staatlich-orientierten Mentalität der Farmer als ein 
Hindernis der Dezentralisierung größere Aufmerksamkeit zukommen. Außerdem darf das Verhältnis 
zwischen den Akteuren (Bürokratie und staatliche Amtsträger), die in einem komplexen institutionell-
ideologischen Kontext arbeiten, nicht vergessen werden, um institutionellen Wandel zu verstehen.  
Die Akteure verfügen über spezifische Identitäten und Subjektivitäten. So führte zum Beispiel das 
Verständnis von Ingenieuren als Garanten für Wachstum und Fortschritt zu einer Verfestigung einer 
Mentalität, die auf Befehl und Kontrolle basiert. 
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